establishment clause in Hawaii

2020See Silva, 75 Haw. at 438–39, 864 P.2d at 592 (refusing to adopt the prosecution’s suggested general rule that a defendant may 21 The dissent’s insistence that an HRPP Rule 40 proceeding is the “only legally permissible procedure,” dissent at 9, does not sufficiently consider the importance of preserving a defendant’s constitutional rights and the analogous caselaw applicable to the untimely filing of a notice of appeal.

2006See Hawkins v. Hawkins, 101 N.C.App. 529 , 400 S.E.2d 472, 474 (1991) (“Once a cause of action is established, plaintiff is entitled to recover, as a matter of law, nominal damages, which in turn support an award of punitive damages....

2006See Hawkins v. Hawkins, 101 N.C.App. 529 , 400 S.E.2d 472, 474 (1991) (“Once a cause of action is established, plaintiff is entitled to recover, as a matter of law, nominal damages, which in turn support an award of punitive damages....

2005Brannan’s testimony is entirely in keeping with the conclusions of the post -Daubert courts that uniform standards have been established “through professional training, peer review, presentation of conflicting evidence and double checking.” Rogers, 26 Fed.Appx. 171 [, 2001 WL 1635494 , *1] (4th Cir.2001); see also, e.g., Llera Plaza, 188 F.Supp.2d at 566-71 (detailing development of identification criteria and holding that “standards which control the opining of a competent fingerprint examiner are sufficiently widely agreed upon to satisfy Daubert requirements”); cf. Harvard, 260 F.3d at 599

2005Furthermore, in Havvard, the Seventh Circuit determined that Daubert’s “known error rate” factor was satisfied because the expert had testified that the error rate for fingerprint comparison was “essentially zero.” 260 F.3d at 599.

1987The State's inaction, in the court's opinion, "constitute[d] affirmative misconduct" which "estopped [it] from [recouping] any portion of [the] food stamps overpayments." True, we have "explicitly maintained the validity of the notion that [the] government can be estopped." Filipo v. Chang, 62 Haw. 626, 635 , 618 P.2d 295, 300 (1980).

1987The State's inaction, in the court's opinion, "constitute[d] affirmative misconduct" which "estopped [it] from [recouping] any portion of [the] food stamps overpayments." True, we have "explicitly maintained the validity of the notion that [the] government can be estopped." Filipo v. Chang, 62 Haw. 626, 635 , 618 P.2d 295, 300 (1980).