establishment clause in California

2018(East Bay Asian Local Development Corp. v. State of California (2000) 24 Cal.4th 693, 719 (East Bay); Sedlock v. Baird (2015) 235 Cal.App.4th 874, 885 .) In Lemon v. Kurtzman (1971) 403 U.S. 602 (Lemon), the United States Supreme Court set forth a three-part test for determining whether a statute or governmental practice violates the establishment clause.

2015The Lemon test In Lemon v. Kurtzman (1971) 403 U.S. 602 [ 29 L.Ed.2d 745 , 91 S.Ct. 2105 ] (Lemon), the United States Supreme Court adopted a three-part test to determine whether a government practice violates the establishment clause of the First Amendment.

2000Adherence to the policy of neutrality that derives from an accommodation of the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses had prevented the kind of involvement that would tip the balance toward government control of churches or governmental restraint on religious practice." ( Walz, supra, 397 U. S. at pp. 669-670, 90 S.Ct. 1409 .) Building on Walz and earlier cases, in Lemon v. Kurtzman, supra, 403 U.S. 602 , 91 S.Ct. 2105 ( Lemon ), the court developed an analytical framework under which a statute challenged under the establishment clause should be examined to assess whether the conduct is cons

2000First, the statute must have a secular legislative purpose; second, its principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion, Board of Education v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 243 , 88 S.Ct. 1923 , 20 L.Ed.2d 1060 (1968); finally, the statute must not foster `an excessive government entanglement with religion.' Walz, supra, at 674 , 90 S.Ct. 1409 ." ( Lemon, supra, 403 U. S. at pp. 612-613, 91 S.Ct. 2105 .) Collectively, these are the three prongs of the " Lemon test." Although, as the Court of Appeal noted here, the Lemon test, which derives in part from Walz , is ill-

2000Besides Walz and Texas Monthly , one may look to such cases as Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of Univ. of Va. (1995) 515 U.S. 819, 839-840 , 115 S.Ct. 2510 , 132 L.Ed.2d 700 (holding that use of a student activity fund to pay costs of a Christian student publication would not violate the establishment clause, because the fund was used to create an open forum for speech and publication, evenhandedly supporting a wide variety of student publications); Estate of Thornton *320 v. Caldor, Inc. (1985) 472 U.S. 703, 710 , footnote 9, 105 S.Ct. 2914 , 86 L.Ed.2d 557 (law requiring employers to giv

2000Besides Walz and Texas Monthly , one may look to such cases as Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of Univ. of Va. (1995) 515 U.S. 819, 839-840 , 115 S.Ct. 2510 , 132 L.Ed.2d 700 (holding that use of a student activity fund to pay costs of a Christian student publication would not violate the establishment clause, because the fund was used to create an open forum for speech and publication, evenhandedly supporting a wide variety of student publications); Estate of Thornton *320 v. Caldor, Inc. (1985) 472 U.S. 703, 710 , footnote 9, 105 S.Ct. 2914 , 86 L.Ed.2d 557 (law requiring employers to giv

2004The United States Supreme Court has long recognized that the alleviation of significant governmentally created burdens on religious exercise is a permissible legislative purpose that does not offend the establishment clause. ( Corporation of Presiding Bishop v. Amos (1978) 483 U.S. 327, 334-335 , 107 S.Ct. 2862 , 97 L.Ed.2d 273 ; Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n of Fla. (1987) 480 U.S. 136, 144-145 , 107 S.Ct. 1046 , 94 L.Ed.2d 190 ; cf. Employment Div., Ore.

2004The United States Supreme Court has long recognized that the alleviation of significant governmentally created burdens on religious exercise is a permissible legislative purpose that does not offend the establishment clause. ( Corporation of Presiding Bishop v. Amos (1978) 483 U.S. 327, 334-335 , 107 S.Ct. 2862 , 97 L.Ed.2d 273 ; Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n of Fla. (1987) 480 U.S. 136, 144-145 , 107 S.Ct. 1046 , 94 L.Ed.2d 190 ; cf. Employment Div., Ore.

2015(See, e.g., East Bay, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 719 [“Our construction of the establishment clause of article I, section 4 is . .. guided by decisions of the Supreme Court.”]; Sands v. Morongo Unified School Dist. (1991) 53 Cal.3d 863, 883 [ 281 Cal.Rptr. 34 , 809 P.2d 809 ] (lead opn. of Kennard, J.) (Sands) [“federal cases . . . supply guidance for interpreting [the establishment clause of state Constitution]”].) 2.

2015(See, e.g., East Bay, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 719 [“Our construction of the establishment clause of article I, section 4 is . .. guided by decisions of the Supreme Court.”]; Sands v. Morongo Unified School Dist. (1991) 53 Cal.3d 863, 883 [ 281 Cal.Rptr. 34 , 809 P.2d 809 ] (lead opn. of Kennard, J.) (Sands) [“federal cases . . . supply guidance for interpreting [the establishment clause of state Constitution]”].) 2.

1993(Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock (1989) 489 U.S. 1, 15 [ 103 L.Ed. 2d 1, 15 , 109 S.Ct. 890 ]; Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc. (1985) 472 U.S. 703, 710 [ 86 L.Ed.2d 557, 563 , 105 S.Ct. 2914 ].) The establishment clause, which is made applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment (Everson v. Board of Education (1947) 330 U.S. 1, 15 [ 91 L.Ed. 711, 723 , 67 S.Ct. 504 ]), was intended to protect against three main evils: (1) sponsorship, (2) financial support of religion by the civil government, and (3) active involvement of the sovereign in religious activity.

1993(Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock (1989) 489 U.S. 1, 15 [ 103 L.Ed. 2d 1, 15 , 109 S.Ct. 890 ]; Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc. (1985) 472 U.S. 703, 710 [ 86 L.Ed.2d 557, 563 , 105 S.Ct. 2914 ].) The establishment clause, which is made applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment (Everson v. Board of Education (1947) 330 U.S. 1, 15 [ 91 L.Ed. 711, 723 , 67 S.Ct. 504 ]), was intended to protect against three main evils: (1) sponsorship, (2) financial support of religion by the civil government, and (3) active involvement of the sovereign in religious activity.

1991(See, e.g., Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, supra, 374 U.S. at p. 223 [ 10 L.Ed.2d at p. 858 ] [“The distinction between the two clauses is apparent—a violation of the Free Exercise Clause is predicated on coercion while the Establishment Clause violation need not be so attended.”]; Committee for Public Education v. Nyquist (1973) 413 U.S. 756, 786 [ 37 L.Ed.2d 948, 970 , 93 S.Ct. 2955 ] [“proof of coercion . . . [is] not a necessary element of any claim under the Establishment Clause”]; County of Allegheny, supra, 492 U.S. at p._ [ 106 L.Ed.2d at p. 517 , 109 S.Ct. at p. 3119] (conc. opn. o

1991(See, e.g., Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, supra, 374 U.S. at p. 223 [ 10 L.Ed.2d at p. 858 ] [“The distinction between the two clauses is apparent—a violation of the Free Exercise Clause is predicated on coercion while the Establishment Clause violation need not be so attended.”]; Committee for Public Education v. Nyquist (1973) 413 U.S. 756, 786 [ 37 L.Ed.2d 948, 970 , 93 S.Ct. 2955 ] [“proof of coercion . . . [is] not a necessary element of any claim under the Establishment Clause”]; County of Allegheny, supra, 492 U.S. at p._ [ 106 L.Ed.2d at p. 517 , 109 S.Ct. at p. 3119] (conc. opn. o

2004Because a legislative accommodation benefits religion, it is tested not under the free exercise clause but under the establishment clause. ( Amos, supra, *303 483 U.S. 327, 334-336 , 107 S.Ct. 2862 .) To comply with the establishment clause, a law must among other things serve a "`secular legislative purpose.'" ( Id., at p. 335, 107 S.Ct. 2862 , quoting Lemon v. Kurtzman, supra, 403 U.S. 602, 612 , 91 S.Ct. 2105 .) In this context, the requirement of a secular legislative purpose "does not mean that the law's purpose must be unrelated to religion — that would amount to a requirement `that the

2004Because a legislative accommodation benefits religion, it is tested not under the free exercise clause but under the establishment clause. ( Amos, supra, *303 483 U.S. 327, 334-336 , 107 S.Ct. 2862 .) To comply with the establishment clause, a law must among other things serve a "`secular legislative purpose.'" ( Id., at p. 335, 107 S.Ct. 2862 , quoting Lemon v. Kurtzman, supra, 403 U.S. 602, 612 , 91 S.Ct. 2105 .) In this context, the requirement of a secular legislative purpose "does not mean that the law's purpose must be unrelated to religion — that would amount to a requirement `that the

2018The First Amendment to the United States Constitution, which applies to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, provides: "Congress shall make no law respecting the establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof." (Cantwell v. Connecticut (1940) 310 U.S. 296, 303 .) Similarly, article I, section 4 of the California Constitution provides: "The Legislature shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion." In interpreting the California Constitution's establishment clause, we are 17 guided by decisions of the United States Supreme Court regarding the federal es

1991(Cantwell v. Connecticut (1940) 310 U.S. 296, 303 [ 84 L.Ed. 1213, 1217-1218 , 60 S.Ct. 900 , 128 A.L.R. 1352 ] [applying the free exercise clause to the states]; Everson v. Board of Education (1946) 330 U.S. 1 [ 91 L.Ed. 711 , 67 S.Ct. 504 ] [applying the establishment clause to the states].) Prior to 1974, article I, section 4 of the California Constitution provided in pertinent part: “The free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without discrimination or preference, shall forever be guaranteed in this State . . . .” As readopted by vote of the people on November 5, 1

2000First, the statute must have a secular legislative purpose; second, its principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion, Board of Education v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 243 , 88 S.Ct. 1923 , 20 L.Ed.2d 1060 (1968); finally, the statute must not foster `an excessive government entanglement with religion.' Walz, supra, at 674 , 90 S.Ct. 1409 ." ( Lemon, supra, 403 U. S. at pp. 612-613, 91 S.Ct. 2105 .) Collectively, these are the three prongs of the " Lemon test." Although, as the Court of Appeal noted here, the Lemon test, which derives in part from Walz , is ill-

2000First, the statute must have a secular legislative purpose; second, its principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion, Board of Education v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 243 , 88 S.Ct. 1923 , 20 L.Ed.2d 1060 (1968); finally, the statute must not foster `an excessive government entanglement with religion.' Walz, supra, at 674 , 90 S.Ct. 1409 ." ( Lemon, supra, 403 U. S. at pp. 612-613, 91 S.Ct. 2105 .) Collectively, these are the three prongs of the " Lemon test." Although, as the Court of Appeal noted here, the Lemon test, which derives in part from Walz , is ill-

2023(See Jamestown Builders, supra, 77 Cal.App.4th at p. 346 [the import of an NVP provision is that “insureds cannot unilaterally settle a claim before the establishment of the claim against them and the insurer’s refusal to defend in a lawsuit to establish liability”].) The Consent Decree to which the District agreed, without Century’s consent, was therefore “coverage by fait accompli” (ibid.), precluded by the NVP provisions here.

2023The District’s negotiation and execution of an agreement (the Consent Decree) in which it obligated itself to incur substantial funds to settle the NRD Claim deprived Century of its contractual role as a third-party liability insurer of making the “ ‘judgment call’ ” concerning the “ ‘decision to pay any remediation costs outside the civil action context.’ ” (Pitzer College, supra, 8 Cal.5th at p. 108 .) The District thereby violated the basic tenet of an NVP provision that 46 “insureds cannot unilaterally settle a claim before the establishment of the claim against them and the insurer’s refu

2000They argue that the nopreference provision of the California Constitution is a broader guarantee of separation of church and state than the establishment clause, that it is more protective of that principle than the federal Constitution ( Sands v. Morongo Unified School Dist. (1991) 53 Cal.3d 863, 883 , 281 Cal.Rptr. 34 , 809 P.2d 809 ), and that under it, "[p]reference . . . is forbidden even when there is no discrimination." ( Fox v. City of Los Angeles (1978) 22 Cal.3d 792, 796 , 150 Cal. Rptr. 867 , 587 P.2d 663 .) This court has never had occasion to definitively construe the no-preferenc

2000They argue that the nopreference provision of the California Constitution is a broader guarantee of separation of church and state than the establishment clause, that it is more protective of that principle than the federal Constitution ( Sands v. Morongo Unified School Dist. (1991) 53 Cal.3d 863, 883 , 281 Cal.Rptr. 34 , 809 P.2d 809 ), and that under it, "[p]reference . . . is forbidden even when there is no discrimination." ( Fox v. City of Los Angeles (1978) 22 Cal.3d 792, 796 , 150 Cal. Rptr. 867 , 587 P.2d 663 .) This court has never had occasion to definitively construe the no-preferenc

2000"Where . . . government acts with the proper purpose of lifting a regulation that burdens the exercise of religion, we see no reason to require that the exemption come packaged with benefits to secular entities." ( Corporation of Presiding Bishop v. Amos, supra, 483 U.S. at p. 338 , 107 S.Ct. 2862 .) The court subsequently struck down a state religious exemption from a generally applicable sales tax on periodicals in Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock (1989) 489 U.S. 1, 18 , 109 S.Ct. 890 , 103 L.Ed.2d 1 , holding that the tax exemption violated the establishment clause of the First Amendment beca

2000"Where . . . government acts with the proper purpose of lifting a regulation that burdens the exercise of religion, we see no reason to require that the exemption come packaged with benefits to secular entities." ( Corporation of Presiding Bishop v. Amos, supra, 483 U.S. at p. 338 , 107 S.Ct. 2862 .) The court subsequently struck down a state religious exemption from a generally applicable sales tax on periodicals in Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock (1989) 489 U.S. 1, 18 , 109 S.Ct. 890 , 103 L.Ed.2d 1 , holding that the tax exemption violated the establishment clause of the First Amendment beca

2018(East Bay Asian Local Development Corp. v. State of California (2000) 24 Cal.4th 693, 719 (East Bay); Sedlock v. Baird (2015) 235 Cal.App.4th 874, 885 .) In Lemon v. Kurtzman (1971) 403 U.S. 602 (Lemon), the United States Supreme Court set forth a three-part test for determining whether a statute or governmental practice violates the establishment clause.

2015The establishment clause of the state Constitution Article I, section 4 of the California Constitution provides in relevant part: “The Legislature shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion.” *885 In East Bay Asian Local Development Corp. v. State of California (2000) 24 Cal.4th 693 [ 102 Cal.Rptr.2d 280 , 13 P.3d 1122 ] (East Bay), the California Supreme Court explained that “the protection against the establishment of religion embedded in the California Constitution” does not “create[] broader protections than those of the First Amendment [of the United States Constitution].”

2004Under the high court's analysis in Larson v. Valente, supra, 456 U.S. 228 , 102 S.Ct. 1673 , a law that selectively discriminates among religious organizations might still not violate the establishment clause if it is "closely fitted to the furtherance" of a "compelling governmental interest." ( Id. at p. 255, 102 S.Ct. 1673 .) As the majority explains, and I agree, the WCEA serves the compelling state interest of eliminating gender discrimination.

2004Under the high court's analysis in Larson v. Valente, supra, 456 U.S. 228 , 102 S.Ct. 1673 , a law that selectively discriminates among religious organizations might still not violate the establishment clause if it is "closely fitted to the furtherance" of a "compelling governmental interest." ( Id. at p. 255, 102 S.Ct. 1673 .) As the majority explains, and I agree, the WCEA serves the compelling state interest of eliminating gender discrimination.

1993(Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, supra, 489 U.S. at p. 18, fn. 8 , 103 L.Ed.2d at p. 15 .) 17 In so holding, the Supreme Court acknowledged that an express purpose of benefiting religious organizations is not, strictly speaking, “secular,” even where the benefit can legitimately be characterized as an “accommodation." (Corporation of Presiding Bishop v. Amos, supra, at p. 335 [ 97 L.Ed.2d at p. 282 ].) Lemon's requirement of a secular purpose “does not mean that the law’s purpose must be unrelated to religion.” (Ibid.) In effect, the court appears to have adopted the views expressed by Justice

1991(Wallace v. Jaffree (1985) 472 U.S. 38, 56, fn. 42 [ 86 L.Ed.2d 29, 43 , 105 S.Ct. 2479 ]; accord, County of Allegheny, supra, 492 U.S. at p. 593 [ 106 L.Ed.2d at p. 494 , 109 S.Ct. at p. 3101 ].) Recently, the United States Supreme Court reaffirmed that the establishment clause “ "preclude[s] government from conveying or attempting to convey a message that religion or a particular religious belief is favored or preferred.’ ” (County of Allegheny, supra, 492 U.S. at p. 593 [ 106 L.Ed.2d at p. 494 , 109 S.Ct. at p. 3101 ], italics in original.) The religious invocations and benedictions challen

1979Without violating the establishment clause, governments may lighten the burden consequent on religious practices through laws that are “secular in purpose, evenhanded in operation, and neutral in primary impact.” (Gillette v. United States (1971) 401 U.S. 437, 450 [ 28 L.Ed.2d 168, 181 , 91 S.Ct. 828 ] (exemption of religious conscientious objectors from compulsory military service); see Walz v. Tax Commission (1970) 397 U.S. 664 [ 25 L.Ed.2d 697 , 90 S.Ct. 1409 ] (property tax exemption for churches).) Unlike the paid three-hours-off for state employees on Good Friday, found violative of the

1979Without violating the establishment clause, governments may lighten the burden consequent on religious practices through laws that are “secular in purpose, evenhanded in operation, and neutral in primary impact.” (Gillette v. United States (1971) 401 U.S. 437, 450 [ 28 L.Ed.2d 168, 181 , 91 S.Ct. 828 ] (exemption of religious conscientious objectors from compulsory military service); see Walz v. Tax Commission (1970) 397 U.S. 664 [ 25 L.Ed.2d 697 , 90 S.Ct. 1409 ] (property tax exemption for churches).) Unlike the paid three-hours-off for state employees on Good Friday, found violative of the

2007(See Agostini supra, 521 U.S. at p. 233 , 117 S.Ct. 1997 ; see also Bowen v. Kendrick (1988) 487 U.S. 589, 615-617 , 108 S.Ct. 2562 , 101 L.Ed.2d 520 [government monitoring of educational materials used by grantee is not excessive entanglement with religion]; Roemer v. Maryland Public Works Bd. (1976) 426 U.S. 736, 764-765 , 96 S.Ct. 2337 , 49 L.Ed.2d 179 [no excessive entanglement with religion where state conducts annual audits of religious colleges to ensure state aid is not used for "sectarian purposes"].) For all of these reasons we conclude that the Authority's issuance of government bon

2007(See Agostini supra, 521 U.S. at p. 233 , 117 S.Ct. 1997 ; see also Bowen v. Kendrick (1988) 487 U.S. 589, 615-617 , 108 S.Ct. 2562 , 101 L.Ed.2d 520 [government monitoring of educational materials used by grantee is not excessive entanglement with religion]; Roemer v. Maryland Public Works Bd. (1976) 426 U.S. 736, 764-765 , 96 S.Ct. 2337 , 49 L.Ed.2d 179 [no excessive entanglement with religion where state conducts annual audits of religious colleges to ensure state aid is not used for "sectarian purposes"].) For all of these reasons we conclude that the Authority's issuance of government bon

2000Besides Walz and Texas Monthly , one may look to such cases as Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of Univ. of Va. (1995) 515 U.S. 819, 839-840 , 115 S.Ct. 2510 , 132 L.Ed.2d 700 (holding that use of a student activity fund to pay costs of a Christian student publication would not violate the establishment clause, because the fund was used to create an open forum for speech and publication, evenhandedly supporting a wide variety of student publications); Estate of Thornton *320 v. Caldor, Inc. (1985) 472 U.S. 703, 710 , footnote 9, 105 S.Ct. 2914 , 86 L.Ed.2d 557 (law requiring employers to giv

2000Besides Walz and Texas Monthly , one may look to such cases as Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of Univ. of Va. (1995) 515 U.S. 819, 839-840 , 115 S.Ct. 2510 , 132 L.Ed.2d 700 (holding that use of a student activity fund to pay costs of a Christian student publication would not violate the establishment clause, because the fund was used to create an open forum for speech and publication, evenhandedly supporting a wide variety of student publications); Estate of Thornton *320 v. Caldor, Inc. (1985) 472 U.S. 703, 710 , footnote 9, 105 S.Ct. 2914 , 86 L.Ed.2d 557 (law requiring employers to giv

2005(See Catholic Charities of Sacramento, Inc. v. Superior Court, supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 559 , 10 Cal.Rptr.3d 283 , 85 P.3d 67, fn. 15 ["Catholic Charities perfunctorily asserts that its claims under the establishment clause [citation] also justify treating this case as involving hybrid rights.

2005(See Catholic Charities of Sacramento, Inc. v. Superior Court, supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 559 , 10 Cal.Rptr.3d 283 , 85 P.3d 67, fn. 15 ["Catholic Charities perfunctorily asserts that its claims under the establishment clause [citation] also justify treating this case as involving hybrid rights.

1991Through this accommodation, as Justice Douglas observed, governmental action has ‘follow[ed] the best of our traditions’ and ‘respect[ed] the religious nature of our people.’ ” ( Lynch, supra, 465 U.S. at pp. 677-678 [ 79 L.Ed.2d at p. 613 ], quoting Zorach, supra, 343 U.S. at p. 314 [ 96 L.Ed. at p. 962 ].) This reasoning directly supported the court’s holding that the establishment clause did not prohibit the public display of a creche.

1991(Ibid. [ 79 L.Ed.2d at p. 613 ], italics added.) The lead opinion’s explanation for applying the Lemon test in this case does not fully address the unbroken line of authority recognizing that the establishment clause permits the government to accommodate religion in public life.

2000Besides Walz and Texas Monthly , one may look to such cases as Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of Univ. of Va. (1995) 515 U.S. 819, 839-840 , 115 S.Ct. 2510 , 132 L.Ed.2d 700 (holding that use of a student activity fund to pay costs of a Christian student publication would not violate the establishment clause, because the fund was used to create an open forum for speech and publication, evenhandedly supporting a wide variety of student publications); Estate of Thornton *320 v. Caldor, Inc. (1985) 472 U.S. 703, 710 , footnote 9, 105 S.Ct. 2914 , 86 L.Ed.2d 557 (law requiring employers to giv

2000Besides Walz and Texas Monthly , one may look to such cases as Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of Univ. of Va. (1995) 515 U.S. 819, 839-840 , 115 S.Ct. 2510 , 132 L.Ed.2d 700 (holding that use of a student activity fund to pay costs of a Christian student publication would not violate the establishment clause, because the fund was used to create an open forum for speech and publication, evenhandedly supporting a wide variety of student publications); Estate of Thornton *320 v. Caldor, Inc. (1985) 472 U.S. 703, 710 , footnote 9, 105 S.Ct. 2914 , 86 L.Ed.2d 557 (law requiring employers to giv

1999(Id. at p. 41 [101 S.Ct. at pp. 193-194].) The court reiterated the three-part test of Lemon v. Kurtzman (1971) 403 U.S. 602, 612-613 [ 91 S.Ct. 2105, 2111 , 29 L.Ed.2d 745 ] (Lemon) used for determining whether a statute passes muster under the establishment clause: “ ‘First, the statute must have a secular legislative purpose; second, its principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion . . . ; finally the statute must not foster “an excessive government entanglement with religion.” ’ ” (Stone v. Graham, supra, at p. 40 [ 101 S.Ct. at p. 193 ].) In concludi

1999(Id. at p. 42 [ 101 S.Ct. at p. 194 ].) Applying the three-part test of Lemon , we conclude that the posting of appellant’s sign would have violated the establishment clause.

2002Allegheny County v. Greater Pittsburgh ACLU (1989) 492 U.S. 573 [ 109 S.Ct. 3086 , 106 L.Ed.2d 472 ], the court considered whether a December holiday display of a creche in a county courthouse and a menorah outside a city and county building violated the establishment clause.

2002Allegheny County v. Greater Pittsburgh ACLU (1989) 492 U.S. 573 [ 109 S.Ct. 3086 , 106 L.Ed.2d 472 ], the court considered whether a December holiday display of a creche in a county courthouse and a menorah outside a city and county building violated the establishment clause.

1991The United States Supreme Court has made clear that the establishment clause prohibits not only explicit denominational preferences, but also government favoritism of religion in general (e.g., County of Allegheny, supra, 492 U.S. at p. 593 [106 L.Ed.2d at pp. 494-495, 109 S.Ct. at p. 3101]), as well as government sponsorship of “neutral” prayers and religious exercises (Engel v. Vitale, supra, 370 U.S. at p. 430 [ 8 L.Ed.2d at p. 60 ]).

1991The United States Supreme Court has made clear that the establishment clause prohibits not only explicit denominational preferences, but also government favoritism of religion in general (e.g., County of Allegheny, supra, 492 U.S. at p. 593 [106 L.Ed.2d at pp. 494-495, 109 S.Ct. at p. 3101]), as well as government sponsorship of “neutral” prayers and religious exercises (Engel v. Vitale, supra, 370 U.S. at p. 430 [ 8 L.Ed.2d at p. 60 ]).

1988The idea is not without cogent critics, however: “Paradoxically, the neutrality principle not only requires hostility to religion at odds with the values of the Free Exercise Clause, but also permits aid to religion in conflict with values of the Establishment Clause.” (Choper, The Religion Clauses of the First Amendment: Reconciling the Conflict (1980) 41 U.Pitt.L.Rev. 673, 689.) 12 Dean Choper describes the Supreme Court’s establishment clause cases as a “conceptual disaster area.” (Choper, The Establishment Clause and Aid to Parochial Schools—An Update (1987) 75 Cal.L.Rev. 5, 6.) In another

1988The idea is not without cogent critics, however: “Paradoxically, the neutrality principle not only requires hostility to religion at odds with the values of the Free Exercise Clause, but also permits aid to religion in conflict with values of the Establishment Clause.” (Choper, The Religion Clauses of the First Amendment: Reconciling the Conflict (1980) 41 U.Pitt.L.Rev. 673, 689.) 12 Dean Choper describes the Supreme Court’s establishment clause cases as a “conceptual disaster area.” (Choper, The Establishment Clause and Aid to Parochial Schools—An Update (1987) 75 Cal.L.Rev. 5, 6.) In another

1988The idea is not without cogent critics, however: “Paradoxically, the neutrality principle not only requires hostility to religion at odds with the values of the Free Exercise Clause, but also permits aid to religion in conflict with values of the Establishment Clause.” (Choper, The Religion Clauses of the First Amendment: Reconciling the Conflict (1980) 41 U.Pitt.L.Rev. 673, 689.) 12 Dean Choper describes the Supreme Court’s establishment clause cases as a “conceptual disaster area.” (Choper, The Establishment Clause and Aid to Parochial Schools—An Update (1987) 75 Cal.L.Rev. 5, 6.) In another

1988The idea is not without cogent critics, however: “Paradoxically, the neutrality principle not only requires hostility to religion at odds with the values of the Free Exercise Clause, but also permits aid to religion in conflict with values of the Establishment Clause.” (Choper, The Religion Clauses of the First Amendment: Reconciling the Conflict (1980) 41 U.Pitt.L.Rev. 673, 689.) 12 Dean Choper describes the Supreme Court’s establishment clause cases as a “conceptual disaster area.” (Choper, The Establishment Clause and Aid to Parochial Schools—An Update (1987) 75 Cal.L.Rev. 5, 6.) In another

1977In the course of the opinion, Justice Mosk states “[t]he benefits of the Act are available to,all nonpublic institutions of higher education in the state, whether sectarian or nonsectarian.” (Id, at p. 601.) Invoking Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734 [ 37 L.Ed.2d 923 , 93 S.Ct. 2868 ] Justice Mosk continues, “. . . in evaluating the ‘primary effect’ of the legislation in [the cited case], the court reiterated its prior rejection of the argument, also advanced by respondent here, that all governmental assistance to a sectarian organization is forbidden under the establishment clause ‘because aid to

1977In the course of the opinion, Justice Mosk states “[t]he benefits of the Act are available to,all nonpublic institutions of higher education in the state, whether sectarian or nonsectarian.” (Id, at p. 601.) Invoking Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734 [ 37 L.Ed.2d 923 , 93 S.Ct. 2868 ] Justice Mosk continues, “. . . in evaluating the ‘primary effect’ of the legislation in [the cited case], the court reiterated its prior rejection of the argument, also advanced by respondent here, that all governmental assistance to a sectarian organization is forbidden under the establishment clause ‘because aid to

1991Accordingly, we do not address this issue. [5] In Tilton v. Richardson, supra, 403 U.S. 672 , five members of the court agreed that the religion clauses were not violated by grants to church-related colleges and universities for construction of buildings and facilities to be used exclusively for secular purposes, and eight members of the court agreed that the establishment clause was violated by provisions of the grants limiting the government's interest in covered facilities to a twenty-year period and thereby allowing use of the facilities for sectarian purposes after such period, since such

1991In Tilton v. Richardson, supra, 403 U.S. 672 , five members of the court agreed that the religion clauses were not violated by grants to church-related colleges and universities for construction of buildings and facilities to be used exclusively for secular purposes, and eight members of the court agreed that the establishment clause was violated by provisions of the grants limiting the government’s interest in covered facilities to a twenty-year period and thereby allowing use of the facilities for sectarian purposes after such period, since such provisions operated to effect a contribution o