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37 New Jersey opinions name it 3 courts 1897–2019 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New Jersey courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Lemon v. Kurtzmanred2 sentences1997That Amendment requires the state to be a neutral in its relations with groups of religious believers and non-believers. [Id. at 15, 18, 67 S.Ct at 511, 513 , 91 L.Ed at 723, 724-25.] The standard for conducting an Establishment Clause analysis is a three-pronged test that was articulated in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 , 91 S.Ct. 2105, 2111 , 29 L.Ed.2d 745, 755 (1971). 1997That Amendment requires the state to be a neutral in its relations with groups of religious believers and non-believers. [Id. at 15, 18, 67 S.Ct at 511, 513 , 91 L.Ed at 723, 724-25.] The standard for conducting an Establishment Clause analysis is a three-pronged test that was articulated in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 , 91 S.Ct. 2105, 2111 , 29 L.Ed.2d 745, 755 (1971). | 6 | 8 |
Walz v. Tax Comm'n of City of New Yorkgreen2 sentences1979In its more recent opinions, the Court has characterized this latter requirement of the establishment clause as a prohibition of "excessive government entanglement with religion." Walz, supra, 397 U.S. at 674 , 90 S.Ct. at 1414 , 25 L.Ed. 2d at 704 ; see, e.g., National Labor Relations Board v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 99 S.Ct. 1313, 1319 , 59 L.Ed. 2d 533, 542 (1979); Lemon, supra, 403 U.S. at 613 , 91 S.Ct. at 2111 , 29 L.Ed. 2d at 755 ; Resnick v. East Brunswick Tp. 1979In its more recent opinions, the Court has characterized this latter requirement of the establishment clause as a prohibition of "excessive government entanglement with religion." Walz, supra, 397 U.S. at 674 , 90 S.Ct. at 1414 , 25 L.Ed. 2d at 704 ; see, e.g., National Labor Relations Board v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 99 S.Ct. 1313, 1319 , 59 L.Ed. 2d 533, 542 (1979); Lemon, supra, 403 U.S. at 613 , 91 S.Ct. at 2111 , 29 L.Ed. 2d at 755 ; Resnick v. East Brunswick Tp. | 5 | 6 |
Everson v. Board of Ed. of Ewinggreen2 sentences1997That Amendment requires the state to be a neutral in its relations with groups of religious believers and non-believers. [Id. at 15, 18, 67 S.Ct at 511, 513 , 91 L.Ed at 723, 724-25.] The standard for conducting an Establishment Clause analysis is a three-pronged test that was articulated in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 , 91 S.Ct. 2105, 2111 , 29 L.Ed.2d 745, 755 (1971). 1997That Amendment requires the state to be a neutral in its relations with groups of religious believers and non-believers. [Id. at 15, 18, 67 S.Ct at 511, 513 , 91 L.Ed at 723, 724-25.] The standard for conducting an Establishment Clause analysis is a three-pronged test that was articulated in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 , 91 S.Ct. 2105, 2111 , 29 L.Ed.2d 745, 755 (1971). | 5 | 5 |
Abington School Dist. v. Schemppgreen2 sentences1978The distinction between the two clauses is apparent — a violation of the Free Exercise Clause is predicated on coercion while the Establishment Clause violation need not be so attended. [Abington School District v. Schempp, 374 U. S. 203, 223 , 83 S. Ct. 1560, 1572, 10 L. 1978The distinction between the two clauses is apparent — a violation of the Free Exercise Clause is predicated on coercion while the Establishment Clause violation need not be so attended. [Abington School District v. Schempp, 374 U. S. 203, 223 , 83 S. Ct. 1560, 1572, 10 L. | 4 | 6 |
cluster 347695green2 sentences1996To minimize Motion between the Church and the Board, prudence will ultimately dictate that the bishop tailor his conduct and decisions to “steer far wider of the unlawful zone” of impermissible conduct. [559 F. 2d at 1123-24 (citations omitted).] The court held that the case presented “not only ... sovereign involvement in the religious activity under the establishment clause but ... also curtailment of the free exercise of religion ...” Id. at 1131. 1996To minimize Motion between the Church and the Board, prudence will ultimately dictate that the bishop tailor his conduct and decisions to “steer far wider of the unlawful zone” of impermissible conduct. [559 F. 2d at 1123-24 (citations omitted).] The court held that the case presented “not only ... sovereign involvement in the religious activity under the establishment clause but ... also curtailment of the free exercise of religion ...” Id. at 1131. | 2 | 2 |
Investigation & Determination of an Appropriate Unit & Exclusive Representative Hill-Murray Federation of Teachers, St. Paul v. Hill-Murray High School, Maplewoodgreen2 sentences1996Faced with an issue similar to the issue raised by this appeal, one court concluded that "the church-labor relations issues presented here are most appropriately analyzed under the free exercise clause" and that "the establishment clause challenge ... is actually a free exercise question." Hill-Murray Federation of Teachers v. Hill-Murray H.S., 487 N.W. 2d 857, 863 (Minn. 1992). 1996Faced with an issue similar to the issue raised by this appeal, one court concluded that “the church-labor relations issues presented here are most appropriately analyzed under the free exercise clause” and that “the establishment clause challenge ... is actually a free exercise question.” Hill-Murray Federation of Teachers v. Hill-Murray H.S., 487 N.W.2d 857, 863 (Minn.1992). | 2 | 2 |
National Labor Relations Board v. Catholic Bishopgreen2 sentences1979In its more recent opinions, the Court has characterized this latter requirement of the establishment clause as a prohibition of "excessive government entanglement with religion." Walz, supra, 397 U.S. at 674 , 90 S.Ct. at 1414 , 25 L.Ed. 2d at 704 ; see, e.g., National Labor Relations Board v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 99 S.Ct. 1313, 1319 , 59 L.Ed. 2d 533, 542 (1979); Lemon, supra, 403 U.S. at 613 , 91 S.Ct. at 2111 , 29 L.Ed. 2d at 755 ; Resnick v. East Brunswick Tp. 1979In its more recent opinions, the Court has characterized this latter requirement of the establishment clause as a prohibition of "excessive government entanglement with religion." Walz, supra, 397 U.S. at 674 , 90 S.Ct. at 1414 , 25 L.Ed. 2d at 704 ; see, e.g., National Labor Relations Board v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 99 S.Ct. 1313, 1319 , 59 L.Ed. 2d 533, 542 (1979); Lemon, supra, 403 U.S. at 613 , 91 S.Ct. at 2111 , 29 L.Ed. 2d at 755 ; Resnick v. East Brunswick Tp. | 2 | 2 |
Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese for United States and Canada v. Milivojevichgreen2 sentences1992Cf. id. at 732-33 , 96 S.Ct. at 2385 , 49 L.Ed.2d at 176 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (emphasizing that the inquiry in addressing an Establishment Clause challenge is “whether the [affiliates of the same religion] had bound themselves to abide by the decisions of the [hierarchical *302 authority] in the matter[] at issue”). 1992Cf. id. at 732-33 , 96 S.Ct. at 2385 , 49 L.Ed.2d at 176 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (emphasizing that the inquiry in addressing an Establishment Clause challenge is “whether the [affiliates of the same religion] had bound themselves to abide by the decisions of the [hierarchical *302 authority] in the matter[] at issue”). | 1 | 2 |
Engel v. Vitalegreen2 sentences1967Among the significant trends in judicial development cited by plaintiffs which point to a current rejection of the Everson holding are the Supreme Court opinions in Abington School District v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 , 83 S.Ct. 1560 , 10 L.Ed. 2 d 844 (1963), and Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 , 82 S.Ct. 1261 , 8 L.Ed. 2 d 601 (1962), where the recital of prayers in public schools was struck down as violative of the establishment clause of the First Amendment. 1967Among the significant trends in judicial development cited by plaintiffs which point to a current rejection of the Everson holding are the Supreme Court opinions in Abington School District v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 , 83 S.Ct. 1560 , 10 L.Ed. 2 d 844 (1963), and Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 , 82 S.Ct. 1261 , 8 L.Ed. 2 d 601 (1962), where the recital of prayers in public schools was struck down as violative of the establishment clause of the First Amendment. | 1 | 2 |
New Jersey State Board of Higher Education v. Board of Directors of Shelton Collegegreen2 sentences1997Those elements are: “First, the statute must have a secular legislative purpose; second, its principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion; finally, the statute must not foster ‘an excessive government entanglement with religion.’ ” Ibid, (citations omitted); see also New Jersey State Bd. of Higher Educ. v. Board of Dirs. of Shelton College, 90 N.J. 470, 487 , 448 A.2d 988 (1982). 1997Those elements are: “First, the statute must have a secular legislative purpose; second, its principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion; finally, the statute must not foster ‘an excessive government entanglement with religion.’ ” Ibid, (citations omitted); see also New Jersey State Bd. of Higher Educ. v. Board of Dirs. of Shelton College, 90 N.J. 470, 487 , 448 A.2d 988 (1982). | 1 | 1 |
| Thomas v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
Raines v. Stategreen2 sentences1990See Raines v. State, 191 Ga. App. 743 , 382 S.E. 2d 738 (1989); State v. Jacques, 558 A. 2d 706 (Me. 1989); Thomas v. State, 301 Md. 294 , 483 A. 2d 6, 18 (1983) ("Of course, rape shield laws may not be used to exclude probative evidence in violation of a defendant's constitutional rights of confrontation and due process."); Commonwealth v. Ruffen, 399 Mass. 811 , 507 N.E. 2d 684, 688 (1987) ("Yet, despite the general statutory policy prohibiting inquiry into a victim's prior sexual experiences, the Constitution requires that a defendant be permitted to introduce evidence which may materially 1990See Raines v. State, 191 Ga. App. 743 , 382 S.E. 2d 738 (1989); State v. Jacques, 558 A. 2d 706 (Me. 1989); Thomas v. State, 301 Md. 294 , 483 A. 2d 6, 18 (1983) ("Of course, rape shield laws may not be used to exclude probative evidence in violation of a defendant's constitutional rights of confrontation and due process."); Commonwealth v. Ruffen, 399 Mass. 811 , 507 N.E. 2d 684, 688 (1987) ("Yet, despite the general statutory policy prohibiting inquiry into a victim's prior sexual experiences, the Constitution requires that a defendant be permitted to introduce evidence which may materially | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Hackettgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Commonwealth v. Ruffengreen | 1 | 1 |
| Hunt v. McNairgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Schaad v. Ocean Grove Camp Meeting Ass'n of United Methodist Churchgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Wolman v. Walterred | 1 | 1 |
| Johnson v. Huntington Beach Union High School Districtgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Johnson v. Huntington Beach Union High School Districtgreen | 1 | 1 |
| National Labor Relations Board v. Alpers' Jobbing Co.green | 1 | 1 |
| Torcaso v. Watkinsgreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Haightgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New Jersey. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Dugan v. Camden Cty. Clerk's Office
green
1 sentence2019Standard per document filing and recording fees shall be set so that the per document fee is no less than the average fee for the filing or recording of the document as set forth in the final report required to be issued pursuant to subsection c. of this section. [ Ibid. ] Moreover, the Legislature has provided a mechanism by which technological upgrades are to be funded. | 1 | 2019–2019 |
NJ COLALITION OF HEALTH CARE v. Dobi
green
1 sentence2002The policy may provide that certain benefits provided by the policy which are in excess of the basic benefits required by the commissioner to be included in the policy may be subject to reasonable copayments in addition to the copayments provided for herein, provided that the copayments shall not be unreasonable and shall be established in such manner [as not] to serve to encourage underutilization of benefits subject to the copayments, nor encourage overutilization of benefits. [ Ibid. ] [2] To facilitate implementation of these reforms the Legislature granted the Commissioner broad powers to | 1 | 2002–2002 |
Porta v. Klagholz
green
2 sentences1999In Porta v. Klagholz, 19 F.Supp. 2d 290 (D.N.J.1998), the Federal District Court upheld the Act against an Establishment Clause challenge, an issue not presented by these three appeals. 1999In Porta v. Klagholz, 19 F.Supp. 2d 290 (D.N.J.1998), the Federal District Court upheld the Act against an Establishment Clause challenge, an issue not presented by these three appeals. | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Sanzari v. Rosenfeld
green
2 sentences1998Ordinarily, the common knowledge doctrine is applied in a malpractice case after the plaintiff proves his injury and a causally related act or omission by the defendant. [ Id. at 141 , 167 A. 2d 625 (emphasis added).] Thus, res ipsa cases only require plaintiff's showing of an injury; the establishment of a standard of care is not part of the plaintiff's case. 1998Ordinarily, the common knowledge doctrine is applied in a malpractice case after the plaintiff proves his injury and a causally related act or omission by the defendant. [ Id. at 141 , 167 A. 2d 625 (emphasis added).] Thus, res ipsa cases only require plaintiff's showing of an injury; the establishment of a standard of care is not part of the plaintiff's case. | 1 | 1998–1998 |
Buckley v. Pirolo Estate
green
2 sentences1997The Appellate Division, assuming that the passengers were not intoxicated, had held that the establishment could claim the benefit of the Comparative Negligence Act to reduce recovery by the passengers’ survivors. 190 N.J.Super. 491, 500 , 464 A.2d 1136 (App.Div.1983). 1997The Appellate Division, assuming that the passengers were not intoxicated, had held that the establishment could claim the benefit of the Comparative Negligence Act to reduce recovery by the passengers’ survivors. 190 N.J.Super. 491, 500 , 464 A.2d 1136 (App.Div.1983). | 1 | 1997–1997 |
State v. Straka
green
2 sentences1996The court reasoned that the toxicologist’s establishment of test procedures did not constitute “rules” that “establishe[d], alter[ed], or revoke[d]” a citizen’s enjoyment of driving “benefits or privileges conferred by law.” Id. at 892 , 810 P.2d 888 . 1996The court reasoned that the toxicologist’s establishment of test procedures did not constitute “rules” that “establishe[d], alter[ed], or revoke[d]” a citizen’s enjoyment of driving “benefits or privileges conferred by law.” Id. at 892 , 810 P.2d 888 . | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Matter of Kimber Petroleum Corp.
green
1 sentence1995Such relief may include, singly or in combination: (1) [I]njunction[s]; (2) Assessment of the violator for the reasonable costs of any investigation, inspection, or monitoring survey which led to the establishment of the violation, and for the reasonable costs of preparing and litigating the case under this subsection; (3) Assessment of the violator for any reasonable cost incurred by the State in removing, correcting or terminating the adverse effects upon water quality resulting from any unauthorized discharge of pollutants for which the action under this subsection may have been brought; (4 | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Matter of Thomas
green
1 sentence1995"Deeply imbedded in New Jersey jurisprudence is the principle that `legal expenses ... are not recoverable absent express authorization by statute, court rule, or contract.'" In re Thomas, 278 N.J. | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Sterling v. Sterling
neutral
2 sentences1993In a similar situation, the Chancery Division found that when the settlement agreement provides for the supported party to make an application for continued or increased support at the end of a specified period, the agreement “establish[ed] a right in plaintiff [ex-wife] to make [an] application for a modification — not the type of modification contemplated and dealt with in Lepis, supra, but one which is related to the establishment of the standard of living of the parties during the marriage.” Sterling v. Sterling, 180 N.J.Super. 569, 572 , 435 A.2d 1192 (Ch.Div.1981), rev’d on other grounds 1993In a similar situation, the Chancery Division found that when the settlement agreement provides for the supported party to make an application for continued or increased support at the end of a specified period, the agreement “establish[ed] a right in plaintiff [ex-wife] to make [an] application for a modification — not the type of modification contemplated and dealt with in Lepis, supra, but one which is related to the establishment of the standard of living of the parties during the marriage.” Sterling v. Sterling, 180 N.J.Super. 569, 572 , 435 A.2d 1192 (Ch.Div.1981), rev’d on other grounds | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Sterling v. Sterling
neutral
2 sentences1993In a similar situation, the Chancery Division found that when the settlement agreement provides for the supported party to make an application for continued or increased support at the end of a specified period, the agreement “establish[ed] a right in plaintiff [ex-wife] to make [an] application for a modification — not the type of modification contemplated and dealt with in Lepis, supra, but one which is related to the establishment of the standard of living of the parties during the marriage.” Sterling v. Sterling, 180 N.J.Super. 569, 572 , 435 A.2d 1192 (Ch.Div.1981), rev’d on other grounds 1993In a similar situation, the Chancery Division found that when the settlement agreement provides for the supported party to make an application for continued or increased support at the end of a specified period, the agreement “establish[ed] a right in plaintiff [ex-wife] to make [an] application for a modification — not the type of modification contemplated and dealt with in Lepis, supra, but one which is related to the establishment of the standard of living of the parties during the marriage.” Sterling v. Sterling, 180 N.J.Super. 569, 572 , 435 A.2d 1192 (Ch.Div.1981), rev’d on other grounds | 1 | 1993–1993 |
County of Allegheny v. American Civil Liberties Union
red
2 sentences1992As the Supreme Court noted in County of Allegheny v. Greater Pittsburgh ACLU, 492 U.S. 573 , 614-15 n. 60, 109 S.Ct. 3086 , 3112 n. 60, 106 L.Ed.2d 472 , 507-08 n. 60 (1989), courts should not hesitate to refer “to secondary sources in aid of their Establishment Clause analysis.” To ignore secondary sources, said the Court, is to write a judicial “prescription for ignorance.” Ibid. 1992As the Supreme Court noted in County of Allegheny v. Greater Pittsburgh ACLU, 492 U.S. 573 , 614-15 n. 60, 109 S.Ct. 3086 , 3112 n. 60, 106 L.Ed.2d 472 , 507-08 n. 60 (1989), courts should not hesitate to refer “to secondary sources in aid of their Establishment Clause analysis.” To ignore secondary sources, said the Court, is to write a judicial “prescription for ignorance.” Ibid. | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Jones v. Butz
green
2 sentences1992For example, the Humane Slaughter Act, 7 U.S. C. §§ 1901-1906, withstood an establishment clause challenge although it includes within its definition of humane, “slaughtering in accordance with the ritual requirements of the Jewish faith.” See Jones v. Butz, 374 F.Supp. 1284 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 419 U.S. 806 , 95 S.Ct. 22 , 42 L.Ed.2d 36 (1974). 1992For example, the Humane Slaughter Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1906 , withstood an establishment clause challenge although it includes within its definition of humane, "slaughtering in accordance with the ritual requirements of the Jewish faith." See Jones v. Butz, 374 F. Supp. 1284 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 419 U.S. 806 , 95 S.Ct. 22 , 42 L.Ed. 2d 36 (1974). | 1 | 1992–1992 |
National Foods, Inc. v. Rubin
green
2 sentences1992Hebrew National’s amended complaint alleges no facts showing that the 1987 sanction or the 1989 investigation is based on a theological disagreement. * * * Thus, the facts alleged in the amended complaint do not state a claim of violation of the establishment clause. [National Foods, supra, 727 F.Supp. at 109 .] See also Korn v. Rabbinical Council, 148 Cal.App.3d 491 , 195 Cal.Rptr. 910 , 914 (1983) (determining that court has jurisdiction “if, after the application of traditional Judaic law to the facts surrounding the preparation of the specific food in question, Jewish religious authorities 1992Hebrew National's amended complaint alleges no facts showing that the 1987 sanction or the 1989 investigation is based on a theological disagreement. * * * Thus, the facts alleged in the amended complaint do not state a claim of violation of the establishment clause. [ National Foods, supra, 727 F. Supp. at 109 .] See also Korn v. Rabbinical Council, 148 Cal. App. 3d 491 , 195 Cal. Rptr. 910 , 914 (1983) (determining that court has jurisdiction "if, after the application of traditional Judaic law to the facts surrounding the preparation of the specific food in question, Jewish religious author | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Cahill v. Cedar County
green
2 sentences1992For example, the Humane Slaughter Act, 7 U.S. C. §§ 1901-1906, withstood an establishment clause challenge although it includes within its definition of humane, “slaughtering in accordance with the ritual requirements of the Jewish faith.” See Jones v. Butz, 374 F.Supp. 1284 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 419 U.S. 806 , 95 S.Ct. 22 , 42 L.Ed.2d 36 (1974). 1992For example, the Humane Slaughter Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1906 , withstood an establishment clause challenge although it includes within its definition of humane, "slaughtering in accordance with the ritual requirements of the Jewish faith." See Jones v. Butz, 374 F. Supp. 1284 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 419 U.S. 806 , 95 S.Ct. 22 , 42 L.Ed. 2d 36 (1974). | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Owens v. I. F. P. Corp.
green
2 sentences1992For example, the Humane Slaughter Act, 7 U.S. C. §§ 1901-1906, withstood an establishment clause challenge although it includes within its definition of humane, “slaughtering in accordance with the ritual requirements of the Jewish faith.” See Jones v. Butz, 374 F.Supp. 1284 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 419 U.S. 806 , 95 S.Ct. 22 , 42 L.Ed.2d 36 (1974). 1992For example, the Humane Slaughter Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1906 , withstood an establishment clause challenge although it includes within its definition of humane, "slaughtering in accordance with the ritual requirements of the Jewish faith." See Jones v. Butz, 374 F. Supp. 1284 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 419 U.S. 806 , 95 S.Ct. 22 , 42 L.Ed. 2d 36 (1974). | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Logan v. Stanley
green
2 sentences1992For example, the Humane Slaughter Act, 7 U.S. C. §§ 1901-1906, withstood an establishment clause challenge although it includes within its definition of humane, “slaughtering in accordance with the ritual requirements of the Jewish faith.” See Jones v. Butz, 374 F.Supp. 1284 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 419 U.S. 806 , 95 S.Ct. 22 , 42 L.Ed.2d 36 (1974). 1992For example, the Humane Slaughter Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1906 , withstood an establishment clause challenge although it includes within its definition of humane, "slaughtering in accordance with the ritual requirements of the Jewish faith." See Jones v. Butz, 374 F. Supp. 1284 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 419 U.S. 806 , 95 S.Ct. 22 , 42 L.Ed. 2d 36 (1974). | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Ilderton v. Ilderton
green
2 sentences1992State action is invalid under that prong only when there is “no question that the statute or activity was motivated wholly by religious considerations.” Lynch v. Donnelly, supra, 465 U.S. at 680, 104 S. Ct. at 1362 , 79 L.Ed.2d at 614. 1992State action is invalid under that prong only when there is “no question that the statute or activity was motivated wholly by religious considerations.” Lynch v. Donnelly, supra, 465 U.S. at 680, 104 S. Ct. at 1362 , 79 L.Ed.2d at 614. | 1 | 1992–1992 |
| Commonwealth v. Black green | 1 | 1990–1990 |
State v. Jacques
green
1 sentence1990See Raines v. State, 191 Ga. App. 743 , 382 S.E. 2d 738 (1989); State v. Jacques, 558 A. 2d 706 (Me. 1989); Thomas v. State, 301 Md. 294 , 483 A. 2d 6, 18 (1983) ("Of course, rape shield laws may not be used to exclude probative evidence in violation of a defendant's constitutional rights of confrontation and due process."); Commonwealth v. Ruffen, 399 Mass. 811 , 507 N.E. 2d 684, 688 (1987) ("Yet, despite the general statutory policy prohibiting inquiry into a victim's prior sexual experiences, the Constitution requires that a defendant be permitted to introduce evidence which may materially | 1 | 1990–1990 |
| State v. Finley green | 1 | 1990–1990 |
| Soronen v. Olde Milford Inn, Inc. green | 1 | 1990–1990 |
State v. Kroshus
green
1 sentence1990See Raines v. State, 191 Ga. App. 743 , 382 S.E. 2d 738 (1989); State v. Jacques, 558 A. 2d 706 (Me. 1989); Thomas v. State, 301 Md. 294 , 483 A. 2d 6, 18 (1983) ("Of course, rape shield laws may not be used to exclude probative evidence in violation of a defendant's constitutional rights of confrontation and due process."); Commonwealth v. Ruffen, 399 Mass. 811 , 507 N.E. 2d 684, 688 (1987) ("Yet, despite the general statutory policy prohibiting inquiry into a victim's prior sexual experiences, the Constitution requires that a defendant be permitted to introduce evidence which may materially | 1 | 1990–1990 |
| State v. Williams green | 1 | 1990–1990 |
| State v. Howard green | 1 | 1990–1990 |
| State v. Green green | 1 | 1990–1990 |
| Anti-Defamation League Of B'nai B'rith v. Fcc green | 1 | 1989–1989 |
| Young v. Mader green | 1 | 1989–1989 |
| Bernard v. Beneficial Finance Co. green | 1 | 1989–1989 |
| Capitol Movies, Inc. v. City of Passaic green | 1 | 1989–1989 |
| State v. Miller green | 1 | 1989–1989 |
| Norwood v. Harrison green | 1 | 1983–1983 |
| United States v. Giordano green | 1 | 1982–1982 |
| Harris v. McRae green | 1 | 1982–1982 |
| Lepis v. Lepis green | 1 | 1981–1981 |
| Illinois Ex Rel. McCollum v. Board of Ed. of School Dist. No. 71, Champaign Cty. green | 1 | 1979–1979 |
| Resnick v. East Brunswick Township Board of Education green | 1 | 1979–1979 |
| Southside Estates Bapt. Church v. Board of Trustees green | 1 | 1978–1978 |
| Committee for Public Education & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist green | 1 | 1978–1978 |
| Cantwell v. Connecticut green | 1 | 1977–1977 |
| Zorach v. Clauson green | 1 | 1977–1977 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.