hard and fast rule in Washington

2007This system is flexible because "`[w]hat is just and proper must be determined by the facts of each case, not by a hard and fast rule applicable to all situations regardless of the outcome.'" Griggs, 92 Wash.2d at 582 , 599 P.2d 1289 (quoting Widicus, 26 Ill.App.2d at 109 , 167 N.E.2d 799 ). ¶ 17 A party moving to vacate a default judgment must be prepared to show (1) that there is substantial evidence supporting a prima facia defense; (2) that the failure to timely appear and answer was due to mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (3) that the defendant acted with due diligen

2007This system is flexible because “ ‘[w]hat is just and proper must be determined by the facts of each case, not by a hard and fast rule applicable to all situations regardless of the outcome.’ ” Griggs, 92 Wn.2d at 582 (quoting Widicus, 26 Ill.

2026Accordingly, DeCaro is not dispositive. 6 Instead, “what is just and proper must be determined by the facts of each case, not by a hard and fast rule applicable to all situations regardless of the outcome.” TMT, 140 Wn.

2024As this court stated in TMT, what is just and proper must be determined by the facts of each case, not by a hard and fast rule applicable to all situations regardless of the outcome. 140 Wn.

2024With respect to default judgments, “ ‘[w]hat is just and proper must be determined by the facts of each case, not by a hard and fast rule applicable to all situations regardless of the outcome.’ ” Id. (quoting Akhavuz, 178 Wn.

2014None of those cases involved a default judgment. 4 Rather, with respect to default judgments, “[w]hat is just and proper must be determined by the facts of each case, not by a hard and fast rule applicable to all situations regardless of the outcome.” 5 Akhavuz v. Moody, 178 Wn.

2007This four-part test was first articulated by our Supreme Court in White v. Holm, 73 Wn.2d 348, 352 , 438 P.2d 581 (1968): The discretion which the trial court is called upon to exercise in passing upon an appropriate application to set aside a default judgment concerns itself with and revolves about two primary and two secondary factors which must be shown by the moving party.

2007This four-part test was first articulated by our Supreme Court in White v. Holm, 73 Wn.2d 348, 352 , 438 P.2d 581 (1968): The discretion which the trial court is called upon to exercise in passing upon an appropriate application to set aside a default judgment concerns itself with and revolves about two primary and two secondary factors which must be shown by the moving party.

2024“This system is flexible because ‘[w]hat is just and proper must be determined by the facts of each case, not by a hard and fast rule applicable to all situations regardless of the outcome.’” Id. (citing Little v. King, 160 Wn.2d 696, 703 , 161 P.3d 345 (2007)).

2007"This system is flexible because `[w]hat is just and proper must be determined by the facts of each case, not by a hard and fast rule applicable to all situations regardless of the outcome.'" Little, 160 Wash.2d 696, ¶ 16 , 161 P.3d 345 (quoting Griggs, 92 Wash.2d at 582 , 599 P.2d 1289 ). ¶ 20 A party against whom a default judgment has been entered may move for vacation of the default judgment pursuant to CR 60. [5] Courts have traditionally taken four *1278 factors into consideration in determining whether a defendant is entitled to vacation of a default judgment pursuant to that rule.

2016App. 191 , 200, 165 P.3d 1271 (2007). '"What is justand proper must be determined by the facts of each case, not by a hard and fast rule applicable to all situations regardless of the outcome.'" Griggs v. Averbeck Realty, Inc., 92 Wn.2d 576, 582 , 599 P.2d 1289 (1979) (quoting Widucus v. Sw.

2015App. 191 , 200, 165 P.3d 1271 (2007). “ ‘What is just and proper must be determined by the facts of each case, not by a hard and fast rule applicable to all situations regardless of the outcome.’” Griggs v. Averbeck Realty, Inc., 92 Wn.2d 576, 582 , 599 P.2d 1289 (1979) (quoting Widucus v. Sw.

2007Therefore, we disapprove of the decisions in Hupe, Bland, State v. Rivas, 97 Wash.App. 349, 352 , 984 P.2d 432 (1999), and State v. Nicholson, 119 Wash. App. 855 , 84 P.3d 877 (2003), to the extent those cases can be read as endorsing a hard and fast rule that the common law definitions of assault constitute alternative means of committing assault, thereby requiring substantial evidence to support each of the alternative means charged or instructed. ¶ 15 Our second reason for holding that the common law definitions of assault, when submitted in a jury instruction as they were in this case, do

2007App. 855 , 84 P.3d 877 (2003), to the extent those cases can be read as endorsing a hard and fast rule that the common law definitions of assault constitute alternative means of committing assault, thereby requiring substantial evidence to support each of the alternative means charged or instructed. ¶15 Our second reason for holding that the common law definitions of assault, when submitted in a jury instruction as they were in this case, do not constitute alternative means of committing assault is that, properly understood, these definitions merely define an element of the crime charged and,

1996Spalding, 29 Wn.2d at 128-29 , quoted in Judd v. Department of Labor & Indus., 63 Wn.

1996Spalding, 29 Wash.2d at 128-29 , 186 P.2d 76 , quoted in Judd v. Department of Labor & Indus., 63 Wash.App. 471, 474-75 , 820 P.2d 62 (1991).

1996Spalding, 29 Wn.2d at 128-29 , quoted in Judd v. Department of Labor & Indus., 63 Wn.

1996Spalding, 29 Wash.2d at 128-29 , 186 P.2d 76 , quoted in Judd v. Department of Labor & Indus., 63 Wash.App. 471, 474-75 , 820 P.2d 62 (1991).

2024“This system is flexible because ‘[w]hat is just and proper must be determined by the facts of each case, not by a hard and fast rule applicable to all situations regardless of the outcome.’” Id. (citing Little v. King, 160 Wn.2d 696, 703 , 161 P.3d 345 (2007)).

2024With respect to default judgments, “ ‘[w]hat is just and proper must be determined by the facts of each case, not by a hard and fast rule applicable to all situations regardless of the outcome.’ ” Id. (quoting Akhavuz, 178 Wn.

2013Little, 160 Wn.2d at 703 ; Griggs, 92 Wn.2d at 582 . ¶27 For the proposition that an “innocent insured” must be excused for delays attributable to the insurer or defense counsel, Studio Seven relies primarily on White and Berger, 50 Wn.

2007What is just and proper must be determined by the facts of each case, not by a hard and fast rule applicable to all situations regardless of the outcome.” Id. at 582 (quoting Widicus v. Sw.

2007Therefore, we disapprove of the decisions in Hupe, Bland, State v. Rivas, 97 Wash.App. 349, 352 , 984 P.2d 432 (1999), and State v. Nicholson, 119 Wash. App. 855 , 84 P.3d 877 (2003), to the extent those cases can be read as endorsing a hard and fast rule that the common law definitions of assault constitute alternative means of committing assault, thereby requiring substantial evidence to support each of the alternative means charged or instructed. ¶ 15 Our second reason for holding that the common law definitions of assault, when submitted in a jury instruction as they were in this case, do

2007Therefore, we disapprove of the decisions in Hupe, Bland, State v. Rivas, 97 Wash.App. 349, 352 , 984 P.2d 432 (1999), and State v. Nicholson, 119 Wash. App. 855 , 84 P.3d 877 (2003), to the extent those cases can be read as endorsing a hard and fast rule that the common law definitions of assault constitute alternative means of committing assault, thereby requiring substantial evidence to support each of the alternative means charged or instructed. ¶ 15 Our second reason for holding that the common law definitions of assault, when submitted in a jury instruction as they were in this case, do

2007White v. Holm, 73 Wash.2d 348, 352 , 438 P.2d 581 (1968) (citing Hull v. Vining, 17 Wash. 352 , 49 P. 537 (1897)).

2007White v. Holm, 73 Wash.2d 348, 352 , 438 P.2d 581 (1968) (citing Hull v. Vining, 17 Wash. 352 , 49 P. 537 (1897)).

2007Therefore, we disapprove of the decisions in Hupe, Bland, State v. Rivas, 97 Wash.App. 349, 352 , 984 P.2d 432 (1999), and State v. Nicholson, 119 Wash. App. 855 , 84 P.3d 877 (2003), to the extent those cases can be read as endorsing a hard and fast rule that the common law definitions of assault constitute alternative means of committing assault, thereby requiring substantial evidence to support each of the alternative means charged or instructed. ¶ 15 Our second reason for holding that the common law definitions of assault, when submitted in a jury instruction as they were in this case, do

1996We will not say that in no possible case can interest be allowed [on an unliquidated claim].” Mowry v. Whitney, 81 U.S. (14 Wall.) 620, 653 , 20 L.

1996We will not say that in no possible case can interest be allowed [on an unliquidated claim].” Mowry v. Whitney, 81 U.S. (14 Wall.) 620, 653 , 20 L.

1996App. 604, 607 , 722 P.2d 815 (1986). " 'What is just and proper must be determined by the facts of each case, not by a hard and fast rule applicable to all situations regardless of the outcome.’ ” 44 Wn.

1996App. 604, 607 , 722 P.2d 815 (1986). " 'What is just and proper must be determined by the facts of each case, not by a hard and fast rule applicable to all situations regardless of the outcome.’ ” 44 Wn.

1987See United States v. Inadi, 475 U.S. 387, 397 , 89 L.Ed.2d 390 , 106 S.Ct. 1121 (1986); Bourjaily, 107 S.Ct. at 2782 .

1983Miller v. Cain, 40 Wn.2d 216 , 242 P.2d 505 (1952), although we warned in that case against laying down a hard and fast rule that all spot zoning is illegal.

1983Miller v. Cain, 40 Wn.2d 216 , 242 P.2d 505 (1952), although we warned in that case against laying down a hard and fast rule that all spot zoning is illegal.

1935It was not held in the Pearson case, as pointed out in the later case of State v. Jones, 53 Wash. 142 , 101 Pac. 708 , that the instruction set out in the opinion in that case contained a hard and fast rule of law, and the form of it was not approved.

1935It was not held in the Pearson case, as pointed out in the later case of State v. Jones, 53 Wash. 142 , 101 Pac. 708 , that the instruction set out in the opinion in that case contained a hard and fast rule of law, and the form of it was not approved.

1933J. 447; Donaldson v. Kenegy, 197 Ia. 893 , 196 N. W. 587 ; Security Co. v. Graybeal, 85 Ia. 543 , 52 N. W. 497 , 39 Am.

1933J. 447; Donaldson v. Kenegy, 197 Ia. 893 , 196 N. W. 587 ; Security Co. v. Graybeal, 85 Ia. 543 , 52 N. W. 497 , 39 Am.

1933J. 447; Donaldson v. Kenegy, 197 Ia. 893 , 196 N. W. 587 ; Security Co. v. Graybeal, 85 Ia. 543 , 52 N. W. 497 , 39 Am.

1923The case of Carlsen v. Cooney, 123 Wash. 441 , 212 Pac. 575 , is relied on by the respondent as justifying his conduct.

1923The case of Carlsen v. Cooney, 123 Wash. 441 , 212 Pac. 575 , is relied on by the respondent as justifying his conduct.

1909It is said: “The instruction asked for was approved by our court in State v. Pearson, 37 Wash. 405 , 79 Pac. 985 , and the case was reversed and sent back for a new trial because the requested instruction was not given.” It is true that the words stricken from the requested instruction were contained in the instruction quoted in the Pearson case, but we did not there hold that the instruction requested contained a statement of a hard and fast rule of law, nor did we approve the form of it.

1909It is said: “The instruction asked for was approved by our court in State v. Pearson, 37 Wash. 405 , 79 Pac. 985 , and the case was reversed and sent back for a new trial because the requested instruction was not given.” It is true that the words stricken from the requested instruction were contained in the instruction quoted in the Pearson case, but we did not there hold that the instruction requested contained a statement of a hard and fast rule of law, nor did we approve the form of it.