27 Michigan opinions name it 2 courts 1906–2024 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Michigan courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. Talleygreen2 sentences2004See People v Talley, 410 Mich 378, 398 ; 301 NW2d 809 (1981) (Levin, J., concurring), quoting Langes v Green, 282 US 531, 541 ; 51 S Ct 243 ; 75 L Ed 520 (1931) (“ ‘The term “discretion” denotes the absence of a hard and fast rule.’ ”). 2004See People v Talley, 410 Mich 378, 398 ; 301 NW2d 809 (1981) (Levin, J., concurring), quoting Langes v Green, 282 US 531, 541 ; 51 S Ct 243 ; 75 L Ed 520 (1931) (“ ‘The term “discretion” denotes the absence of a hard and fast rule.’ ”). | 3 | 4 |
Langnes v. Greengreen2 sentences2019See Sparks v Sparks, 440 Mich 141 , -6- 149 n 7; 485 NW2d 893 (1992), quoting Langnes v Green, 282 US 531, 541 ; 51 S Ct 243 ; 75 L Ed 520 (1931) (“ ‘The term “discretion” denotes the absence of a hard and fast rule. 2019See Sparks v Sparks, 440 Mich 141 , -6- 149 n 7; 485 NW2d 893 (1992), quoting Langnes v Green, 282 US 531, 541 ; 51 S Ct 243 ; 75 L Ed 520 (1931) (“ ‘The term “discretion” denotes the absence of a hard and fast rule. | 2 | 6 |
People v. Knoxgreen1 sentence2024Compare, in the context of due-process challenges, Doe, 488 Mass at 24 (“[T]he inclusion of child kidnapping among the offenses requiring registration is still reasonably related to such an objective, given the correlation between child abductions and sexual assault undergirding the Federal law”); Knox, 12 NY3d at 69 (“It could rationally have found that the administrative burden, and the risk that some dangerous sex offenders would escape registration, justified a hard and fast rule, with no exceptions.”); State v Smith, 323 Wis 2d 377, 406-407 ; 2010 WI 16 ; 780 NW2d 90 (2010) (“Because of a | 1 | 1 |
Flemming v. Nestorgreen1 sentence2024It is reasonable that the public not be at risk that some dangerous sex offenders would escape registration, particularly those who falsely imprison a 41 This Court’s policy preferences are not any more “reasonable” than those of the democratically elected legislatures of almost every American jurisdiction, and there is nowhere near the “clearest proof” of irrationality so as to make them a “sham” or “disguised punishment,” as is required under well-accepted law to declare a statute punitive notwithstanding the Legislature’s intent. 133 The reasoning in the majority opinion is dismissive of th | 1 | 1 |
Kansas v. Hendricksgreen1 sentence2024It is reasonable that the public not be at risk that some dangerous sex offenders would escape registration, particularly those who falsely imprison a 41 This Court’s policy preferences are not any more “reasonable” than those of the democratically elected legislatures of almost every American jurisdiction, and there is nowhere near the “clearest proof” of irrationality so as to make them a “sham” or “disguised punishment,” as is required under well-accepted law to declare a statute punitive notwithstanding the Legislature’s intent. 133 The reasoning in the majority opinion is dismissive of th | 1 | 1 |
Moffitt v. Commonwealthgreen1 sentence2024It is reasonable that the public not be at risk that some dangerous sex offenders would escape registration, particularly those who falsely imprison a 41 This Court’s policy preferences are not any more “reasonable” than those of the democratically elected legislatures of almost every American jurisdiction, and there is nowhere near the “clearest proof” of irrationality so as to make them a “sham” or “disguised punishment,” as is required under well-accepted law to declare a statute punitive notwithstanding the Legislature’s intent. 133 The reasoning in the majority opinion is dismissive of th | 1 | 1 |
Sidney Lamour Tyson v. State of Indianagreen1 sentence2024It is reasonable that the public not be at risk that some dangerous sex offenders would escape registration, particularly those who falsely imprison a 41 This Court’s policy preferences are not any more “reasonable” than those of the democratically elected legislatures of almost every American jurisdiction, and there is nowhere near the “clearest proof” of irrationality so as to make them a “sham” or “disguised punishment,” as is required under well-accepted law to declare a statute punitive notwithstanding the Legislature’s intent. 133 The reasoning in the majority opinion is dismissive of th | 1 | 1 |
State of Arizona v. Craig Victor Colemangreen1 sentence2024It is reasonable that the public not be at risk that some dangerous sex offenders would escape registration, particularly those who falsely imprison a 41 This Court’s policy preferences are not any more “reasonable” than those of the democratically elected legislatures of almost every American jurisdiction, and there is nowhere near the “clearest proof” of irrationality so as to make them a “sham” or “disguised punishment,” as is required under well-accepted law to declare a statute punitive notwithstanding the Legislature’s intent. 133 The reasoning in the majority opinion is dismissive of th | 1 | 1 |
Allen v. Illinoisgreen1 sentence2024It is reasonable that the public not be at risk that some dangerous sex offenders would escape registration, particularly those who falsely imprison a 41 This Court’s policy preferences are not any more “reasonable” than those of the democratically elected legislatures of almost every American jurisdiction, and there is nowhere near the “clearest proof” of irrationality so as to make them a “sham” or “disguised punishment,” as is required under well-accepted law to declare a statute punitive notwithstanding the Legislature’s intent. 133 The reasoning in the majority opinion is dismissive of th | 1 | 1 |
Sparks v. Sparksgreen2 sentences2019See Sparks v Sparks, 440 Mich 141 , -6- 149 n 7; 485 NW2d 893 (1992), quoting Langnes v Green, 282 US 531, 541 ; 51 S Ct 243 ; 75 L Ed 520 (1931) (“ ‘The term “discretion” denotes the absence of a hard and fast rule. 2019See Sparks v Sparks, 440 Mich 141 , -6- 149 n 7; 485 NW2d 893 (1992), quoting Langnes v Green, 282 US 531, 541 ; 51 S Ct 243 ; 75 L Ed 520 (1931) (“ ‘The term “discretion” denotes the absence of a hard and fast rule. | 1 | 1 |
Teague v. Lanegreen2 sentences2000See Teague v Lane, 489 US 288, 300 ; 109 S Ct 1060 ; 103 L Ed 2d 334 (1989) (addressing the question of retroactivity of a habeas corpus petitioner’s claim despite the fact that it was raised only in an amicus curiae brief), and Allen Park Village Council v Allen Park Village Clerk, 309 Mich 361, 363 ; 15 NW2d 670 (1944). 2000See Teague v Lane, 489 US 288, 300 ; 109 S Ct 1060 ; 103 L Ed 2d 334 (1989) (addressing the question of retroactivity of a habeas corpus petitioner’s claim despite the fact that it was raised only in an amicus curiae brief), and Allen Park Village Council v Allen Park Village Clerk, 309 Mich 361, 363 ; 15 NW2d 670 (1944). | 1 | 1 |
Council of Allen Park v. Allen Park Village Clerkgreen2 sentences2000See Teague v Lane, 489 US 288, 300 ; 109 S Ct 1060 ; 103 L Ed 2d 334 (1989) (addressing the question of retroactivity of a habeas corpus petitioner’s claim despite the fact that it was raised only in an amicus curiae brief), and Allen Park Village Council v Allen Park Village Clerk, 309 Mich 361, 363 ; 15 NW2d 670 (1944). 2000See Teague v Lane, 489 US 288, 300 ; 109 S Ct 1060 ; 103 L Ed 2d 334 (1989) (addressing the question of retroactivity of a habeas corpus petitioner’s claim despite the fact that it was raised only in an amicus curiae brief), and Allen Park Village Council v Allen Park Village Clerk, 309 Mich 361, 363 ; 15 NW2d 670 (1944). | 1 | 1 |
Martinez v. Redford Community Hospitalgreen1 sentence1989Martinez , 230.] Where the factual basis of the alleged malpractice is within the knowledge of the ordinary layperson, the cause may be pled with less specificity than a more complicated, technical malpractice claim. | 1 | 1 |
O'Rourke v. Deffenbaughgreen2 sentences1986See O’Rourke v Deffenbaugh, 280 Mich 407 ; 273 NW 749 (1937), and Fortner v Koch, 277 Mich 429 ; 269 NW 222 (1936), where the Court relied upon the traditional theories of pleading negligence in deciding whether a complaint sufficiently stated a cause of action for medical malpractice. 1986See O’Rourke v Deffenbaugh, 280 Mich 407 ; 273 NW 749 (1937), and Fortner v Koch, 277 Mich 429 ; 269 NW 222 (1936), where the Court relied upon the traditional theories of pleading negligence in deciding whether a complaint sufficiently stated a cause of action for medical malpractice. | 1 | 1 |
Muntean v. City of Detroitgreen1 sentence1986See Muntean, supra, p 503, n 1 . 2 Obviously this cannot be a hard and fast rule since there will be circumstances where the original judge will be unavailable to consider the motion. | 1 | 1 |
Wilson v. Michigan State Board of Registration in Medicinegreen1 sentence1970See particularly Justice Fellows’ one-century-later definitional discussion in Wilson v. State Board of Registration in Medicine (1924), 228 Mich 25, 27, 28 , citing and quoting the Osborn case and adopting from various authorities (including Webster’s then-current edition) explicits such as: “The term discretion implies the absence of a hard-and-fast rule. | 1 | 1 |
| Canadian Bank of Commerce v. Binghamgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Michigan. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
People v. Johnson
green
1 sentence2024It is reasonable that the public not be at risk that some dangerous sex offenders would escape registration, particularly those who falsely imprison a 41 This Court’s policy preferences are not any more “reasonable” than those of the democratically elected legislatures of almost every American jurisdiction, and there is nowhere near the “clearest proof” of irrationality so as to make them a “sham” or “disguised punishment,” as is required under well-accepted law to declare a statute punitive notwithstanding the Legislature’s intent. 133 The reasoning in the majority opinion is dismissive of th | 1 | 2024–2024 |
State v. Smith
green
2 sentences2024Compare, in the context of due-process challenges, Doe, 488 Mass at 24 (“[T]he inclusion of child kidnapping among the offenses requiring registration is still reasonably related to such an objective, given the correlation between child abductions and sexual assault undergirding the Federal law”); Knox, 12 NY3d at 69 (“It could rationally have found that the administrative burden, and the risk that some dangerous sex offenders would escape registration, justified a hard and fast rule, with no exceptions.”); State v Smith, 323 Wis 2d 377, 406-407 ; 2010 WI 16 ; 780 NW2d 90 (2010) (“Because of a 2024Compare, in the context of due-process challenges, Doe, 488 Mass at 24 (“[T]he inclusion of child kidnapping among the offenses requiring registration is still reasonably related to such an objective, given the correlation between child abductions and sexual assault undergirding the Federal law”); Knox, 12 NY3d at 69 (“It could rationally have found that the administrative burden, and the risk that some dangerous sex offenders would escape registration, justified a hard and fast rule, with no exceptions.”); State v Smith, 323 Wis 2d 377, 406-407 ; 2010 WI 16 ; 780 NW2d 90 (2010) (“Because of a | 1 | 2024–2024 |
In Re Brown
green
1 sentence2023We question such a hard-and-fast rule that fails to take into account the specific facts of a case because “[t]he most fundamental premise of the rule of law is that equivalent misconduct should be treated equivalently.” In re Brown, 461 Mich at 1292 . | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Fortner v. Koch
green
2 sentences1986See O’Rourke v Deffenbaugh, 280 Mich 407 ; 273 NW 749 (1937), and Fortner v Koch, 277 Mich 429 ; 269 NW 222 (1936), where the Court relied upon the traditional theories of pleading negligence in deciding whether a complaint sufficiently stated a cause of action for medical malpractice. 1986See O’Rourke v Deffenbaugh, 280 Mich 407 ; 273 NW 749 (1937), and Fortner v Koch, 277 Mich 429 ; 269 NW 222 (1936), where the Court relied upon the traditional theories of pleading negligence in deciding whether a complaint sufficiently stated a cause of action for medical malpractice. | 1 | 1986–1986 |
People v. McKaig
neutral
2 sentences1980However, we agree with the Court in People v McKaig, 89 Mich App 746, 750 ; 282 NW2d 209 (1979), that there should not be a hard and fast rule in every case. 1980However, we agree with the Court in People v McKaig, 89 Mich App 746, 750 ; 282 NW2d 209 (1979), that there should not be a hard and fast rule in every case. | 1 | 1980–1980 |
Terry v. Ohio
green
1 sentence1979Indeed, Justice White’s concurring opinion in Dunaway recognizes the wider application of Terry and its progeny as follows: "The opinion of the Court might be read to indicate that Terry v Ohio, 392 US 1 (1968), is an almost unique exception to a hard-and-fast standard of probable cause. | 1 | 1979–1979 |
People v. Rimmer
green
2 sentences1979There being no open court acknowledgment of the waiver of jury trial, this Court's prior ruling in Rimmer, supra, requires a retrial." Since concurring in the Word opinion, supra, I have come to the conclusion that there cannot be a hard and fast rule for every case. 1979There being no open court acknowledgment of the waiver of jury trial, this Court’s prior ruling in Rimmer, supra, requires a retrial.” Since concurring in the Word opinion, supra, I have come to the conclusion that there cannot be a hard and fast rule for every case. | 1 | 1979–1979 |
Citizens Mut. Ins. Co. v. COMMUNITY SERVS. INS.
green
1 sentence1978Accordingly, we refuse to follow the hard and fast rule set forth in Citizens Mutual, supra, which would deny plaintiff relief in this case. | 1 | 1978–1978 |
Filaseta v. Pennsylvania Threshermen & Farmers' Mutual Insurance
green
1 sentence1976We agree with the Pennsylvania court in Filaseta that the result must depend on the facts of each individual case; "a hard and fast rule that the car must be junked or sold * * * would work in many cases a substantial injustice”. 209 Pa Super 322, 329; 228 A2d 18, 22 . | 1 | 1976–1976 |
Crawford v. Cicotte
neutral
1 sentence1971In Crawford v. Cicotte (1915), 186 Mich 269 , the Court dealt with a problem similar to the one before us. | 1 | 1971–1971 |
Spalding v. Spalding
green
1 sentence1970The establishment of a clearly defined rule of action would be the end of discretion, and yet discretion should not be a word for arbitrary will or inconsiderate action. ‘Discretion means a decision of what is just and proper in the circumstances.’ Bouvier’s Law Diet. ‘Discretion means the liberty or power of acting without other control than one’s own judgment.’ Webster’s Diet.” 8 This Court said' unanimously, in Spalding v. Spalding (1959), 355 Mich 382 , 384: “In view of the frequency with which cases are reaching this Court assailing the exercise of a trial court’s discretion as an abuse t | 1 | 1970–1970 |
Gilson v. Bronkhorst
green
1 sentence1968What testimonial "facts establish apprehended future consequences is a question for the jury according to Justice Black in Gilson v. Bronkhorst (1958), 353 Mich 148, 156 , 157: “Brininstool, incidentally, did not on its facts hint that it was improper to submit the question of apprehended future consequences to the jury. | 1 | 1968–1968 |
People v. Lowenstein
green
1 sentence1960Actually, in this jurisdiction, the grant or denial of a new trial rests in the sound discretion of the trial court, People v. Lowenstein, 309 Mich 94 , and we do not disturb without a clear showing of abuse of such discretion. | 1 | 1960–1960 |
Brydges v. Emmendorfer
green
2 sentences1956The court of equity frequently overlooks delays.” Brydges v. Emmendorfer, 311 Mich 274 , 279: “We are not in accord with defendants’ claim that the trustee is barred by laches or statute of limitations from maintaining the suit. 1956The court of equity frequently overlooks delays." Brydges v. Emmendorfer, 311 Mich 274 , 279: "We are not in accord with defendants' claim that the trustee is barred by laches or statute of limitations from maintaining the suit. | 1 | 1956–1956 |
| Mott v. Mott neutral | 1 | 1946–1946 |
| Riede v. Riede green | 1 | 1946–1946 |
| Brown v. Harrison neutral | 1 | 1942–1942 |
| Young v. Young green | 1 | 1942–1942 |
| City of Indianapolis v. Gaston green | 1 | 1936–1936 |
| Town of Elkhart v. Ritter neutral | 1 | 1936–1936 |
| Noblesville Gas & Improvement Co. v. Loehr neutral | 1 | 1936–1936 |
| Selchow v. . Baker green | 1 | 1906–1906 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.