hard and fast rule in Kansas

1972In the case of Domann v. Pence, 183 Kan. 135 , 325 P. 2nd 321, we recognized that, in the nature of things, it is impossible to formulate a hard and fast rule on the question of the amount of damages to be allowed in a personal injury action for the simple reason that determination of the matter necessarily depends upon the facts and circumstances of each particular case.

1972In the case of Domann v. Pence, 183 Kan. 135 , 325 P. 2nd 321, we recognized that, in the nature of things, it is impossible to formulate a hard and fast rule on the question of the amount of damages to be allowed in a personal injury action for the simple reason that determination of the matter necessarily depends upon the facts and circumstances of each particular case.

1971Circumstances may be such that he would not be at fault if he took a nap.’ ” (p. 773.) A case bearing factual similarity to the instant case is Link v. Miller, 133 Kan. 469 , 300 Pac. 1105 .

1971Circumstances may be such that he would not be at fault if he took a nap.’ ” (p. 773.) A case bearing factual similarity to the instant case is Link v. Miller, 133 Kan. 469 , 300 Pac. 1105 .

1938All the authorities to which we have referred sustain the doctrine that a contract of this nature will be enforced when it is not inequitable.....We do not regard Renz v. Drury, 57 Kan. 84 , 45 Pac. 71 , as laying down the hard and fast rule that a court of equity should never compel the specific performance of a parol contract of this character, but rather as an illustration of the doctrine, recognized almost universally, that each case depends upon its own particular facts and circumstances, and the granting or denying of'the remedy rests in judicial discretion.” (pp. 128, 129.) And in Bray

1938All the authorities to which we have referred sustain the doctrine that a contract of this nature will be enforced when it is not inequitable.....We do not regard Renz v. Drury, 57 Kan. 84 , 45 Pac. 71 , as laying down the hard and fast rule that a court of equity should never compel the specific performance of a parol contract of this character, but rather as an illustration of the doctrine, recognized almost universally, that each case depends upon its own particular facts and circumstances, and the granting or denying of'the remedy rests in judicial discretion.” (pp. 128, 129.) And in Bray

2026Relevant here, the Kansas Supreme Court has clarified that the skip rule would only suggest harmlessness "where the elements of the crime of conviction, as compared to a rejected lesser included offense, necessarily show that the jury would have rejected or eliminated a still lesser included offense." Simmons, 295 Kan. at 179 .

2019Instead, it is " 'simply a logical deduction that may be drawn from jury verdicts in certain cases.' " (Emphasis added.) State v. Plummer , 295 Kan. 156 , 169, 283 P.3d 202 (2012).

2019Instead, it is " 'simply a logical deduction that may be drawn from jury verdicts in certain cases.' " (Emphasis added.) State v. Plummer , 295 Kan. 156 , 169, 283 P.3d 202 (2012).

1997Fuqua v. Hanson, 222 Kan. 653, 657 , 567 P.2d 862 (1977).

1997Fuqua v. Hanson, 222 Kan. 653, 657 , 567 P.2d 862 (1977).

1974While defendant’s brief cites several authorities from sister states in support of such a rule, the law of Kansas is expressed in Colvin v. Wilson, 100 Kan. 247 , 164 Pac. 284 , where the court stated: “However, we do not wish to be understood as favoring the adoption of the hard and fast rule that wherever proof has been admitted showing contradictory statements of a witness who is a party concerning matters foreign to the issues the party whose veracity as a witness in the particular instance has been assailed has dren the absolute right to offer rebuttal testimony to show his general reputa

1974While defendant’s brief cites several authorities from sister states in support of such a rule, the law of Kansas is expressed in Colvin v. Wilson, 100 Kan. 247 , 164 Pac. 284 , where the court stated: “However, we do not wish to be understood as favoring the adoption of the hard and fast rule that wherever proof has been admitted showing contradictory statements of a witness who is a party concerning matters foreign to the issues the party whose veracity as a witness in the particular instance has been assailed has dren the absolute right to offer rebuttal testimony to show his general reputa

1965State courts followed the “rule of thumb” propounded in the case of Betts v. Brady, 316 U. S. 455 , 86 L.

1965State courts followed the “rule of thumb” propounded in the case of Betts v. Brady, 316 U. S. 455 , 86 L.

1965State courts followed the "rule of thumb" propounded in the case of Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 , 86 L.Ed. 1595 , 62 S.Ct. 1252 (1942), which essentially held that indigent defendants were entitled to court-appointed counsel under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment only under those circumstances where failure to appoint counsel would amount to a "denial of fundamental fairness shocking to the universal sense of justice." The landmark case of Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 , 9 L.Ed.2d 799 , 83 S.Ct. 792 , 93 A.L.R.2d 733 (1963), overruled Betts v. Brady, supra, and held tha

1965State courts followed the "rule of thumb" propounded in the case of Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 , 86 L.Ed. 1595 , 62 S.Ct. 1252 (1942), which essentially held that indigent defendants were entitled to court-appointed counsel under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment only under those circumstances where failure to appoint counsel would amount to a "denial of fundamental fairness shocking to the universal sense of justice." The landmark case of Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 , 9 L.Ed.2d 799 , 83 S.Ct. 792 , 93 A.L.R.2d 733 (1963), overruled Betts v. Brady, supra, and held tha

1938All the authorities to which we have referred sustain the doctrine that a contract of this nature will be enforced when it is not inequitable.....We do not regard Renz v. Drury, 57 Kan. 84 , 45 Pac. 71 , as laying down the hard and fast rule that a court of equity should never compel the specific performance of a parol contract of this character, but rather as an illustration of the doctrine, recognized almost universally, that each case depends upon its own particular facts and circumstances, and the granting or denying of'the remedy rests in judicial discretion.” (pp. 128, 129.) And in Bray

1938All the authorities to which we have referred sustain the doctrine that a contract of this nature will be enforced when it is not inequitable.....We do not regard Renz v. Drury, 57 Kan. 84 , 45 Pac. 71 , as laying down the hard and fast rule that a court of equity should never compel the specific performance of a parol contract of this character, but rather as an illustration of the doctrine, recognized almost universally, that each case depends upon its own particular facts and circumstances, and the granting or denying of'the remedy rests in judicial discretion.” (pp. 128, 129.) And in Bray

1931Circumstances may be such that he “would not be at fault if he took a nap.” (Howse v. Weinrich, ante, pp. 132, 135, 298 Pac. 766 .) As bearing on the question, see, also, Link v. Miller, ante, pp. 469, 472, 300 Pac. 1105 , and Houser v. Nelson, ante, pp. 142, 147, 298 Pac. 777 .

1931Circumstances may be such that he “would not be at fault if he took a nap.” (Howse v. Weinrich, ante, pp. 132, 135, 298 Pac. 766 .) As bearing on the question, see, also, Link v. Miller, ante, pp. 469, 472, 300 Pac. 1105 , and Houser v. Nelson, ante, pp. 142, 147, 298 Pac. 777 .

1928“A promise to do an act which one is not otherwise legally bound to perform is a sufficient consideration for a contract to forbear action, notwithstanding the act is one apparently more to the interest of the promisor than of the promisee, and notwithstanding it may be difficult to ascribe a motive to the latter for wishing it done.” (Dendy v. Russell, 67 Kan. 721 , syl., 74 Pac. 248 .) In the case of Grunder v. Yeager, 106 Kan. 818 , 189 Pac. 922 , which was a suit for breach of an oral contract to sell and deliver a Delco lighting plant, the court, in the opinion said: “It is argued that th

1928“A promise to do an act which one is not otherwise legally bound to perform is a sufficient consideration for a contract to forbear action, notwithstanding the act is one apparently more to the interest of the promisor than of the promisee, and notwithstanding it may be difficult to ascribe a motive to the latter for wishing it done.” (Dendy v. Russell, 67 Kan. 721 , syl., 74 Pac. 248 .) In the case of Grunder v. Yeager, 106 Kan. 818 , 189 Pac. 922 , which was a suit for breach of an oral contract to sell and deliver a Delco lighting plant, the court, in the opinion said: “It is argued that th

1928“A promise to do an act which one is not otherwise legally bound to perform is a sufficient consideration for a contract to forbear action, notwithstanding the act is one apparently more to the interest of the promisor than of the promisee, and notwithstanding it may be difficult to ascribe a motive to the latter for wishing it done.” (Dendy v. Russell, 67 Kan. 721 , syl., 74 Pac. 248 .) In the case of Grunder v. Yeager, 106 Kan. 818 , 189 Pac. 922 , which was a suit for breach of an oral contract to sell and deliver a Delco lighting plant, the court, in the opinion said: “It is argued that th

1928“A promise to do an act which one is not otherwise legally bound to perform is a sufficient consideration for a contract to forbear action, notwithstanding the act is one apparently more to the interest of the promisor than of the promisee, and notwithstanding it may be difficult to ascribe a motive to the latter for wishing it done.” (Dendy v. Russell, 67 Kan. 721 , syl., 74 Pac. 248 .) In the case of Grunder v. Yeager, 106 Kan. 818 , 189 Pac. 922 , which was a suit for breach of an oral contract to sell and deliver a Delco lighting plant, the court, in the opinion said: “It is argued that th

1905(Snodgrass v. Snodgrass, 40 Kan. 494 , 20 Pac. 203 ; Leach v. Leach, 46 Kan. 724 , 27 Pac. 131 ; Neddo v. Neddo, 56 Kan. 507 , 44 Pac. 1 ; Johnson v. Johnson, 66 Kan. 546 , 72 Pac. 267 .) Counsel argue that from the language of these cases “it can be pretty well determined what the boundary-line is between excessive and reasonable alimony in any case,” and think the rule should be laid down that the wife in no case should be awarded more than one-half of the husband’s property, “unless the conduct of the husband had been so outrageous as would justify the award of a larger amount in the nature

1905(Snodgrass v. Snodgrass, 40 Kan. 494 , 20 Pac. 203 ; Leach v. Leach, 46 Kan. 724 , 27 Pac. 131 ; Neddo v. Neddo, 56 Kan. 507 , 44 Pac. 1 ; Johnson v. Johnson, 66 Kan. 546 , 72 Pac. 267 .) Counsel argue that from the language of these cases “it can be pretty well determined what the boundary-line is between excessive and reasonable alimony in any case,” and think the rule should be laid down that the wife in no case should be awarded more than one-half of the husband’s property, “unless the conduct of the husband had been so outrageous as would justify the award of a larger amount in the nature

1905(Snodgrass v. Snodgrass, 40 Kan. 494 , 20 Pac. 203 ; Leach v. Leach, 46 Kan. 724 , 27 Pac. 131 ; Neddo v. Neddo, 56 Kan. 507 , 44 Pac. 1 ; Johnson v. Johnson, 66 Kan. 546 , 72 Pac. 267 .) Counsel argue that from the language of these cases “it can be pretty well determined what the boundary-line is between excessive and reasonable alimony in any case,” and think the rule should be laid down that the wife in no case should be awarded more than one-half of the husband’s property, “unless the conduct of the husband had been so outrageous as would justify the award of a larger amount in the nature

1905(Snodgrass v. Snodgrass, 40 Kan. 494 , 20 Pac. 203 ; Leach v. Leach, 46 Kan. 724 , 27 Pac. 131 ; Neddo v. Neddo, 56 Kan. 507 , 44 Pac. 1 ; Johnson v. Johnson, 66 Kan. 546 , 72 Pac. 267 .) Counsel argue that from the language of these cases “it can be pretty well determined what the boundary-line is between excessive and reasonable alimony in any case,” and think the rule should be laid down that the wife in no case should be awarded more than one-half of the husband’s property, “unless the conduct of the husband had been so outrageous as would justify the award of a larger amount in the nature

1905(Snodgrass v. Snodgrass, 40 Kan. 494 , 20 Pac. 203 ; Leach v. Leach, 46 Kan. 724 , 27 Pac. 131 ; Neddo v. Neddo, 56 Kan. 507 , 44 Pac. 1 ; Johnson v. Johnson, 66 Kan. 546 , 72 Pac. 267 .) Counsel argue that from the language of these cases “it can be pretty well determined what the boundary-line is between excessive and reasonable alimony in any case,” and think the rule should be laid down that the wife in no case should be awarded more than one-half of the husband’s property, “unless the conduct of the husband had been so outrageous as would justify the award of a larger amount in the nature

1905(Snodgrass v. Snodgrass, 40 Kan. 494 , 20 Pac. 203 ; Leach v. Leach, 46 Kan. 724 , 27 Pac. 131 ; Neddo v. Neddo, 56 Kan. 507 , 44 Pac. 1 ; Johnson v. Johnson, 66 Kan. 546 , 72 Pac. 267 .) Counsel argue that from the language of these cases “it can be pretty well determined what the boundary-line is between excessive and reasonable alimony in any case,” and think the rule should be laid down that the wife in no case should be awarded more than one-half of the husband’s property, “unless the conduct of the husband had been so outrageous as would justify the award of a larger amount in the nature