11 Vermont opinions name it 1 courts 1933–2019 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Vermont courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Couturegreen2 sentences2008We have expressly declined to “fashion a hard and fast rule regarding the sufficiency of evidence” but instead have concluded that “each case must be based on its own facts and circumstances.” State v. Couture, 169 Vt. 222, 226 , 734 A.2d 524, 527 (1999). ¶ 22. 2008We have expressly declined to “fashion a hard and fast rule regarding the sufficiency of evidence” but instead have concluded that “each case must be based on its own facts and circumstances.” State v. Couture, 169 Vt. 222, 226 , 734 A.2d 524, 527 (1999). ¶ 22. | 2 | 3 |
State v. Gregagreen2 sentences2019See Albernaz v. U.S., 450 U.S. 333, 340 (1981) (“[B]ecause it serves as a means of discerning congressional purpose the rule should not be controlling where, for example, there is a clear indication of contrary legislative intent.”); see also Grega, 168 Vt. at 385 , 721 A.2d at 460 (noting that the Blockburger presumption may be overcome by a clear indication of contrary legislative intent). 2019See Albernaz v. U.S., 450 U.S. 333, 340 (1981) (“[B]ecause it serves as a means of discerning congressional purpose the rule should not be controlling where, for example, there is a clear indication of contrary legislative intent.”); see also Grega, 168 Vt. at 385 , 721 A.2d at 460 (noting that the Blockburger presumption may be overcome by a clear indication of contrary legislative intent). | 1 | 1 |
Albernaz v. United Statesgreen1 sentence2019See Albernaz v. U.S., 450 U.S. 333, 340 (1981) (“[B]ecause it serves as a means of discerning congressional purpose the rule should not be controlling where, for example, there is a clear indication of contrary legislative intent.”); see also Grega, 168 Vt. at 385 , 721 A.2d at 460 (noting that the Blockburger presumption may be overcome by a clear indication of contrary legislative intent). | 1 | 1 |
Hayden v. Haydengreen2 sentences2017See Hayden , 2003 VT 97 , ¶ 13, 176 Vt. 52 , 838 A.2d 59 (stating that " Russell does not establish a hard and fast rule regarding the date on which a coverture fraction should be based," but rather sets forth "the principles that should guide a court's decision," most particularly that court consider period during which both parties contributed to growth of funds in question); see also Golden , 2007 VT 15 , ¶ 12, 181 Vt. 359 , 924 A.2d 19 (citing Hayden for same principle); cf. Camisa v. Camisa , 168 Vt. 563 , 564, 714 A.2d 641 , 642 (1998) (mem.) (concluding that family court did not err by 2017See Hayden , 2003 VT 97 , ¶ 13, 176 Vt. 52 , 838 A.2d 59 (stating that " Russell does not establish a hard and fast rule regarding the date on which a coverture fraction should be based," but rather sets forth "the principles that should guide a court's decision," most particularly that court consider period during which both parties contributed to growth of funds in question); see also Golden , 2007 VT 15 , ¶ 12, 181 Vt. 359 , 924 A.2d 19 (citing Hayden for same principle); cf. Camisa v. Camisa , 168 Vt. 563 , 564, 714 A.2d 641 , 642 (1998) (mem.) (concluding that family court did not err by | 1 | 1 |
Golden v. Cooper-Ellisgreen2 sentences2017See Hayden , 2003 VT 97 , ¶ 13, 176 Vt. 52 , 838 A.2d 59 (stating that " Russell does not establish a hard and fast rule regarding the date on which a coverture fraction should be based," but rather sets forth "the principles that should guide a court's decision," most particularly that court consider period during which both parties contributed to growth of funds in question); see also Golden , 2007 VT 15 , ¶ 12, 181 Vt. 359 , 924 A.2d 19 (citing Hayden for same principle); cf. Camisa v. Camisa , 168 Vt. 563 , 564, 714 A.2d 641 , 642 (1998) (mem.) (concluding that family court did not err by 2017See Hayden , 2003 VT 97 , ¶ 13, 176 Vt. 52 , 838 A.2d 59 (stating that " Russell does not establish a hard and fast rule regarding the date on which a coverture fraction should be based," but rather sets forth "the principles that should guide a court's decision," most particularly that court consider period during which both parties contributed to growth of funds in question); see also Golden , 2007 VT 15 , ¶ 12, 181 Vt. 359 , 924 A.2d 19 (citing Hayden for same principle); cf. Camisa v. Camisa , 168 Vt. 563 , 564, 714 A.2d 641 , 642 (1998) (mem.) (concluding that family court did not err by | 1 | 1 |
Golden v. Cooper-Ellisgreen1 sentence2017See Hayden , 2003 VT 97 , ¶ 13, 176 Vt. 52 , 838 A.2d 59 (stating that " Russell does not establish a hard and fast rule regarding the date on which a coverture fraction should be based," but rather sets forth "the principles that should guide a court's decision," most particularly that court consider period during which both parties contributed to growth of funds in question); see also Golden , 2007 VT 15 , ¶ 12, 181 Vt. 359 , 924 A.2d 19 (citing Hayden for same principle); cf. Camisa v. Camisa , 168 Vt. 563 , 564, 714 A.2d 641 , 642 (1998) (mem.) (concluding that family court did not err by | 1 | 1 |
Russell v. Russellgreen2 sentences2003See Russell, 157 Vt. at 305 , 597 A.2d at 804 . 2003See Russell, 157 Vt. at 305 , 597 A.2d at 804 . | 1 | 1 |
Merrilees v. TREASURER, State of Vermontgreen2 sentences2003This Court has generally taken a flexible approach to Rule 8(c) in light of our determination that the rule is primarily “a notice provision, intended to prevent unfair surprise at trial.” Merrilees v. State, 159 Vt. 623, 623 , 618 A.2d 1314, 1315 (1992) (mem.). 2003This Court has generally taken a flexible approach to Rule 8(c) in light of our determination that the rule is primarily “a notice provision, intended to prevent unfair surprise at trial.” Merrilees v. State, 159 Vt. 623, 623 , 618 A.2d 1314, 1315 (1992) (mem.). | 1 | 1 |
Lynch v. Lynchgreen2 sentences1992See Lynch v. Lynch, 147 Vt. 574, 576 , 522 A.2d 234, 235 (1987); Roberts v. Roberts, 146 Vt. 498, 499 , 505 A.2d 676, 677 (1986). 1992See Lynch v. Lynch, 147 Vt. 574, 576 , 522 A.2d 234, 235 (1987); Roberts v. Roberts, 146 Vt. 498, 499 , 505 A.2d 676, 677 (1986). | 1 | 1 |
Roberts v. Robertsgreen2 sentences1992See Lynch v. Lynch, 147 Vt. 574, 576 , 522 A.2d 234, 235 (1987); Roberts v. Roberts, 146 Vt. 498, 499 , 505 A.2d 676, 677 (1986). 1992See Lynch v. Lynch, 147 Vt. 574, 576 , 522 A.2d 234, 235 (1987); Roberts v. Roberts, 146 Vt. 498, 499 , 505 A.2d 676, 677 (1986). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Martingreen2 sentences1988While we declined in Martin to establish a hard and fast rule, we did recognize that “Xa]s a general rule, a DUI roadblock will pass constitutional muster if: (1) the initial stop and the contact between the officers in the field and the motorist involves an explanation of the nature of the roadblock and minimal detention of a nonimpaired driver; (2) the discretion of the officers in the field, as to the method to be utilized in selecting vehicles to be stopped, is carefully circumscribed by clear objective guidelines established by a high level administrative official; (3) the guidelines are 1988While we declined in Martin to establish a hard and fast rule, we did recognize that “Xa]s a general rule, a DUI roadblock will pass constitutional muster if: (1) the initial stop and the contact between the officers in the field and the motorist involves an explanation of the nature of the roadblock and minimal detention of a nonimpaired driver; (2) the discretion of the officers in the field, as to the method to be utilized in selecting vehicles to be stopped, is carefully circumscribed by clear objective guidelines established by a high level administrative official; (3) the guidelines are | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Vermont. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Camisa v. Camisa
green
2 sentences2017See Hayden , 2003 VT 97 , ¶ 13, 176 Vt. 52 , 838 A.2d 59 (stating that " Russell does not establish a hard and fast rule regarding the date on which a coverture fraction should be based," but rather sets forth "the principles that should guide a court's decision," most particularly that court consider period during which both parties contributed to growth of funds in question); see also Golden , 2007 VT 15 , ¶ 12, 181 Vt. 359 , 924 A.2d 19 (citing Hayden for same principle); cf. Camisa v. Camisa , 168 Vt. 563 , 564, 714 A.2d 641 , 642 (1998) (mem.) (concluding that family court did not err by 2017See Hayden , 2003 VT 97 , ¶ 13, 176 Vt. 52 , 838 A.2d 59 (stating that " Russell does not establish a hard and fast rule regarding the date on which a coverture fraction should be based," but rather sets forth "the principles that should guide a court's decision," most particularly that court consider period during which both parties contributed to growth of funds in question); see also Golden , 2007 VT 15 , ¶ 12, 181 Vt. 359 , 924 A.2d 19 (citing Hayden for same principle); cf. Camisa v. Camisa , 168 Vt. 563 , 564, 714 A.2d 641 , 642 (1998) (mem.) (concluding that family court did not err by | 1 | 2017–2017 |
State v. Baird
green
2 sentences2010First, the application of this type of bright-line rule contradicts our statement in numerous cases that “we have expressly declined to fashion a hard and fast rule regarding the sufficiency of evidence in a circumstantial case.” State v. Baird, 2006 VT 86, ¶ 13 , 180 Vt. 243 , 908 A.2d 475 (quotation omitted). 2010First, the application of this type of bright-line rule contradicts our statement in numerous cases that “we have expressly declined to fashion a hard and fast rule regarding the sufficiency of evidence in a circumstantial case.” State v. Baird, 2006 VT 86, ¶ 13 , 180 Vt. 243 , 908 A.2d 475 (quotation omitted). | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Kaufman v. Hegeman Transfer & Lighterage Terminal, Inc.
neutral
2 sentences1933Such application, it is said *387 in Kaufman v. Hegeman Transfer & Literage Terminal, 100 Conn. 114, 118 , 123 Atl. 16, 17 , “would force the traveler to assume that the highway was liable to be obstructed, and, in view of this, to so travel that he should not collide with any obstruction in the highway however negligently it may have been maintained upon it. 1933Such application, it is said *387 in Kaufman v. Hegeman Transfer & Literage Terminal, 100 Conn. 114, 118 , 123 Atl. 16, 17 , “would force the traveler to assume that the highway was liable to be obstructed, and, in view of this, to so travel that he should not collide with any obstruction in the highway however negligently it may have been maintained upon it. | 1 | 1933–1933 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.