14 Georgia opinions name it 2 courts 1915–2020 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Georgia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Phelps Dodge Corp. v. National Labor Relations Boardgreen2 sentences2020Thus, a term whose statutory definition declares what it ‘includes’ is more susceptible to extension of meaning than where . . . the definition declares what a term ‘means’”) (citation and punctuation omitted); Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177, 189 ( 61 SCt 845 , 85 LE 1271) (1941) (construing “including” expansively in a statute allowing an agency “to take such affirmative action, including reinstatement of employees with or without back pay, as will effectuate the policies of this Act”) (punctuation omitted). 11 We do not decide whether there is a hard-and-fast rule that the number o 2020Thus, a term whose statutory definition declares what it ‘includes’ is more susceptible to extension of meaning than where . . . the definition declares what a term ‘means’”) (citation and punctuation omitted); Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177, 189 ( 61 SCt 845 , 85 LE 1271) (1941) (construing “including” expansively in a statute allowing an agency “to take such affirmative action, including reinstatement of employees with or without back pay, as will effectuate the policies of this Act”) (punctuation omitted). 11 We do not decide whether there is a hard-and-fast rule that the number o | 1 | 1 |
Gordon v. Stategreen2 sentences2006Gordon v. State, 250 Ga. App. 80, 82 ( 550 SE2d 131 ) (2001). 2006Gordon v. State, 250 Ga. App. 80, 82 ( 550 SE2d 131 ) (2001). | 1 | 1 |
Fletcher v. Weirgreen1 sentence2001See, e.g., Fletcher v. Weir, 455 U. S. 603 (102 SC 1309, 71 LE2d 490) (1982); Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U. S. 231 (100 SC 2124, 65 LE2d 86) (1980). | 1 | 1 |
Smith v. Stategreen2 sentences1973As the Court of Appeals of Georgia said in Smith v. State, 123 Ga. App. 269, 272 ( 180 SE2d 556 ), "every case relying on the Act (Code Ann. § 27-1403) so far has been found to come under an exception thereto." I think it is time to stop allowing exceptions to the statute and make it an instrument for insuring a fair trial for an accused. 1973As the Court of Appeals of Georgia said in Smith v. State, 123 Ga. App. 269, 272 ( 180 SE2d 556 ), "every case relying on the Act (Code Ann. § 27-1403) so far has been found to come under an exception thereto." I think it is time to stop allowing exceptions to the statute and make it an instrument for insuring a fair trial for an accused. | 1 | 1 |
Edmondson v. Hancockgreen1 sentence1966Compare, for example, Edmondson v. Hancock, 40 Ga. App. 587 , supra, and Piedmont Hospital v. Truitt, 48 Ga. App. 232 ( 172 SE 237 ), to see some of the obvious problems that might have arisen if there had been a payment by one of the tortfeasors, or a release to one of them. | 1 | 1 |
Piedmont Hospital v. Truittgreen2 sentences1966Compare, for example, Edmondson v. Hancock, 40 Ga. App. 587 , supra, and Piedmont Hospital v. Truitt, 48 Ga. App. 232 ( 172 SE 237 ), to see some of the obvious problems that might have arisen if there had been a payment by one of the tortfeasors, or a release to one of them. 1966Compare, for example, Edmondson v. Hancock, 40 Ga. App. 587 , supra, and Piedmont Hospital v. Truitt, 48 Ga. App. 232 ( 172 SE 237 ), to see some of the obvious problems that might have arisen if there had been a payment by one of the tortfeasors, or a release to one of them. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Georgia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Simmons v. Pennsylvania Railroad
green
2 sentences1936Co., 199 Pa. 232 ( 48 Atl. 1070 ), it was said: “Since the scope of the servant’s employment is necessarily dependent on circumstances, a hard and fast rule can not be laid down as to the scope of any particular employment; and it is ordinarily a question for the jury whether or not a particular act comes within the scope of the servant’s employment.” In Guignon v. Campbell, 80 Wash. 543 ( 141 Pac. 1031 ), involving a car which the mother permitted different members of the family to drive in the usual manner of family conveyances, the mother was held liable for its misuse by her minor son.- Ju 1936Co., 199 Pa. 232 ( 48 Atl. 1070 ), it was said: “Since the scope of the servant’s employment is necessarily dependent on circumstances, a hard and fast rule can not be laid down as to the scope of any particular employment; and it is ordinarily a question for the jury whether or not a particular act comes within the scope of the servant’s employment.” In Guignon v. Campbell, 80 Wash. 543 ( 141 Pac. 1031 ), involving a car which the mother permitted different members of the family to drive in the usual manner of family conveyances, the mother was held liable for its misuse by her minor son.- Ju | 2 | 1915–1936 |
Yelverton v. State
green
1 sentence2019Further, it is clear from Yelverton, 300 Ga. at 319-320 , in which the Court remanded the case for the lower court to find whether evidence admitted at trial as a similar transaction constituted a relevant similar transaction for purposes of OCGA § 17-10-6.2 (c) (1) (C), that generally it is for the sentencing court to make this determination in the first instance. | 1 | 2019–2019 |
State v. Adamczyk
green
2 sentences2002The Adamczyk court declined to require any particular form, deeming a pleading sufficient if it "[could] reasonably be construed as a demand for trial under the [statutory] provisions...." 162 Ga.App. at 290 , 290 S.E.2d 149 . 2002The Adamczyk court declined to require any particular form, deeming a pleading sufficient if it "[could] reasonably be construed as a demand for trial under the [statutory] provisions...." 162 Ga.App. at 290 , 290 S.E.2d 149 . | 1 | 2002–2002 |
Patten v. State
yellow
2 sentences2002While "substantial compliance" with either of the statutes authorizing the filing of a demand for speedy trial is insufficient to trigger discharge and acquittal *480 ( Patten v. State, supra, 250 Ga.App. at 499 , 552 S.E.2d 110 ), and appellate case law requires that the caption of the pleading in which the demand for speedy trial is made contain "the exact nature of the pleading" before discharge and acquittal occur ( Kramer v. State, supra, 185 Ga.App. 254 , 363 S.E.2d 800 ), the appellate courts have been reluctant to adopt a hard and fast rule as to what constitutes a demand for speedy tr 2002While "substantial compliance" with either of the statutes authorizing the filing of a demand for speedy trial is insufficient to trigger discharge and acquittal *480 ( Patten v. State, supra, 250 Ga.App. at 499 , 552 S.E.2d 110 ), and appellate case law requires that the caption of the pleading in which the demand for speedy trial is made contain "the exact nature of the pleading" before discharge and acquittal occur ( Kramer v. State, supra, 185 Ga.App. 254 , 363 S.E.2d 800 ), the appellate courts have been reluctant to adopt a hard and fast rule as to what constitutes a demand for speedy tr | 1 | 2002–2002 |
Kramer v. State
green
2 sentences2002While "substantial compliance" with either of the statutes authorizing the filing of a demand for speedy trial is insufficient to trigger discharge and acquittal *480 ( Patten v. State, supra, 250 Ga.App. at 499 , 552 S.E.2d 110 ), and appellate case law requires that the caption of the pleading in which the demand for speedy trial is made contain "the exact nature of the pleading" before discharge and acquittal occur ( Kramer v. State, supra, 185 Ga.App. 254 , 363 S.E.2d 800 ), the appellate courts have been reluctant to adopt a hard and fast rule as to what constitutes a demand for speedy tr 2002While "substantial compliance" with either of the statutes authorizing the filing of a demand for speedy trial is insufficient to trigger discharge and acquittal *480 ( Patten v. State, supra, 250 Ga.App. at 499 , 552 S.E.2d 110 ), and appellate case law requires that the caption of the pleading in which the demand for speedy trial is made contain "the exact nature of the pleading" before discharge and acquittal occur ( Kramer v. State, supra, 185 Ga.App. 254 , 363 S.E.2d 800 ), the appellate courts have been reluctant to adopt a hard and fast rule as to what constitutes a demand for speedy tr | 1 | 2002–2002 |
Jenkins v. Anderson
green
1 sentence2001See, e.g., Fletcher v. Weir, 455 U. S. 603 (102 SC 1309, 71 LE2d 490) (1982); Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U. S. 231 (100 SC 2124, 65 LE2d 86) (1980). | 1 | 2001–2001 |
Pollard v. State
green
1 sentence1994Id. | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Monroe v. Sigler
green
2 sentences1988Monroe v. Sigler, 256 Ga. 759 ( 353 SE2d 23 ) (1987), states a hard and fast rule, i.e, denial of a motion for a directed verdict of acquittal constitutes a binding determination of the existence of probable cause. 1988Monroe v. Sigler, 256 Ga. 759 ( 353 SE2d 23 ) (1987), states a hard and fast rule, i.e, denial of a motion for a directed verdict of acquittal constitutes a binding determination of the existence of probable cause. | 1 | 1988–1988 |
Evans v. State
green
2 sentences1973Also, I think that the ruling in Evans v. State, 227 Ga. 571, 576 , supra, is not a basis for a hard and fast rule as to what is imputed to the district attorney, because in that case the district attorney had disclosed to counsel for *417 the accused the names of the newly discovered witnesses more than two weeks before the trial. 1973Also, I think that the ruling in Evans v. State, 227 Ga. 571, 576 , supra, is not a basis for a hard and fast rule as to what is imputed to the district attorney, because in that case the district attorney had disclosed to counsel for the accused the names of the newly discovered witnesses more than two weeks before the trial. | 1 | 1973–1973 |
In Re State in Int. of Johnson
neutral
2 sentences1961Jur. 316 , § 37, citing In re State in Interest of Johnson, 110 Utah 500 ( 175 P2d 486 ), holding “that a petition alleging that a mother is financially unable to provide for her child and will not provide a proper home and necessities for him does not allege sufficient grounds for depriving her of the custody of her child and adjudicating him as dependent.” It is difficult to lay down a hard and fast rule as to what constitutes “dependency” or who is a “dependent child” within the meaning of the Juvenile Court Act. 1961Jur. 316 , § 37, citing In re State in Interest of Johnson, 110 Utah 500 ( 175 P2d 486 ), holding “that a petition alleging that a mother is financially unable to provide for her child and will not provide a proper home and necessities for him does not allege sufficient grounds for depriving her of the custody of her child and adjudicating him as dependent.” It is difficult to lay down a hard and fast rule as to what constitutes “dependency” or who is a “dependent child” within the meaning of the Juvenile Court Act. | 1 | 1961–1961 |
Moore v. Central of Georgia Railway Co.
neutral
2 sentences1949Co., 1 Ga. App. 514 ( 58 S. E. 63 ), are so different from those of the instant case that we do not consider it binding, and for the further reason that the decision in that case does not set up a hard and fast rule, but rather leaves the nonsuit matter to be based on the facts of the individual cases, depending upon whether or not the plaintiff might have anything which it would be to his advantage to submit to a jury. 1949Co., 1 Ga. App. 514 ( 58 S. E. 63 ), are so different from those of the instant case that we do not consider it binding, and for the further reason that the decision in that case does not set up a hard and fast rule, but rather leaves the nonsuit matter to be based on the facts of the individual cases, depending upon whether or not the plaintiff might have anything which it would be to his advantage to submit to a jury. | 1 | 1949–1949 |
Lamb v. Fedderwitz
green
2 sentences1949In the instant case, we think that a nonsuit was legal justice; and, taking the view most favorable to the plaintiff (Lamb v. Fedderwitz, 71 Ga. App. 249, 255 , 30 S. E. 2d, 436 ), was effectual and just legal mechanics. 1949In the instant case, we think that a nonsuit was legal justice; and, taking the view most favorable to the plaintiff (Lamb v. Fedderwitz, 71 Ga. App. 249, 255 , 30 S. E. 2d, 436 ), was effectual and just legal mechanics. | 1 | 1949–1949 |
Curtis v. Ashworth
green
2 sentences1936Lacey v. Forehand, 27 Ga. App. 344 ( 108 S. E. 247 ); Kennedy v. Manis, 46 Ga. App. 808 ( 169 S. E. 319 ); Petway v. McLeod, 47 Ga. App. 647 ( 171 S. E. 225 ); Espy v. Ash, 42 Ga. App. 487 ( 156 S. E. 474 ); Samples v. Shaw, 47 Ga. App. 337 ( 170 S. E. 389 ); Ficklen v. Heichelheim, 49 Ga. App. 777 ( 176 S. E. 540 ); Mitchell v. Mullen, 45 Ga. App. 285 ( 164 S. E. 278 ); Curtis v. Ashworth, 165 Ga. 782 ( 142 S. E. 111 , 54 A. L. 1936Lacey v. Forehand, 27 Ga. App. 344 ( 108 S. E. 247 ); Kennedy v. Manis, 46 Ga. App. 808 ( 169 S. E. 319 ); Petway v. McLeod, 47 Ga. App. 647 ( 171 S. E. 225 ); Espy v. Ash, 42 Ga. App. 487 ( 156 S. E. 474 ); Samples v. Shaw, 47 Ga. App. 337 ( 170 S. E. 389 ); Ficklen v. Heichelheim, 49 Ga. App. 777 ( 176 S. E. 540 ); Mitchell v. Mullen, 45 Ga. App. 285 ( 164 S. E. 278 ); Curtis v. Ashworth, 165 Ga. 782 ( 142 S. E. 111 , 54 A. L. | 1 | 1936–1936 |
Davis v. Mesler
green
1 sentence1936Lacey v. Forehand, 27 Ga. App. 344 ( 108 S. E. 247 ); Kennedy v. Manis, 46 Ga. App. 808 ( 169 S. E. 319 ); Petway v. McLeod, 47 Ga. App. 647 ( 171 S. E. 225 ); Espy v. Ash, 42 Ga. App. 487 ( 156 S. E. 474 ); Samples v. Shaw, 47 Ga. App. 337 ( 170 S. E. 389 ); Ficklen v. Heichelheim, 49 Ga. App. 777 ( 176 S. E. 540 ); Mitchell v. Mullen, 45 Ga. App. 285 ( 164 S. E. 278 ); Curtis v. Ashworth, 165 Ga. 782 ( 142 S. E. 111 , 54 A. L. | 1 | 1936–1936 |
Lacey v. Forehand
green
1 sentence1936Lacey v. Forehand, 27 Ga. App. 344 ( 108 S. E. 247 ); Kennedy v. Manis, 46 Ga. App. 808 ( 169 S. E. 319 ); Petway v. McLeod, 47 Ga. App. 647 ( 171 S. E. 225 ); Espy v. Ash, 42 Ga. App. 487 ( 156 S. E. 474 ); Samples v. Shaw, 47 Ga. App. 337 ( 170 S. E. 389 ); Ficklen v. Heichelheim, 49 Ga. App. 777 ( 176 S. E. 540 ); Mitchell v. Mullen, 45 Ga. App. 285 ( 164 S. E. 278 ); Curtis v. Ashworth, 165 Ga. 782 ( 142 S. E. 111 , 54 A. L. | 1 | 1936–1936 |
Espy v. Ash
green
2 sentences1936Lacey v. Forehand, 27 Ga. App. 344 ( 108 S. E. 247 ); Kennedy v. Manis, 46 Ga. App. 808 ( 169 S. E. 319 ); Petway v. McLeod, 47 Ga. App. 647 ( 171 S. E. 225 ); Espy v. Ash, 42 Ga. App. 487 ( 156 S. E. 474 ); Samples v. Shaw, 47 Ga. App. 337 ( 170 S. E. 389 ); Ficklen v. Heichelheim, 49 Ga. App. 777 ( 176 S. E. 540 ); Mitchell v. Mullen, 45 Ga. App. 285 ( 164 S. E. 278 ); Curtis v. Ashworth, 165 Ga. 782 ( 142 S. E. 111 , 54 A. L. 1936Lacey v. Forehand, 27 Ga. App. 344 ( 108 S. E. 247 ); Kennedy v. Manis, 46 Ga. App. 808 ( 169 S. E. 319 ); Petway v. McLeod, 47 Ga. App. 647 ( 171 S. E. 225 ); Espy v. Ash, 42 Ga. App. 487 ( 156 S. E. 474 ); Samples v. Shaw, 47 Ga. App. 337 ( 170 S. E. 389 ); Ficklen v. Heichelheim, 49 Ga. App. 777 ( 176 S. E. 540 ); Mitchell v. Mullen, 45 Ga. App. 285 ( 164 S. E. 278 ); Curtis v. Ashworth, 165 Ga. 782 ( 142 S. E. 111 , 54 A. L. | 1 | 1936–1936 |
Mitchell v. Mullen
green
2 sentences1936Lacey v. Forehand, 27 Ga. App. 344 ( 108 S. E. 247 ); Kennedy v. Manis, 46 Ga. App. 808 ( 169 S. E. 319 ); Petway v. McLeod, 47 Ga. App. 647 ( 171 S. E. 225 ); Espy v. Ash, 42 Ga. App. 487 ( 156 S. E. 474 ); Samples v. Shaw, 47 Ga. App. 337 ( 170 S. E. 389 ); Ficklen v. Heichelheim, 49 Ga. App. 777 ( 176 S. E. 540 ); Mitchell v. Mullen, 45 Ga. App. 285 ( 164 S. E. 278 ); Curtis v. Ashworth, 165 Ga. 782 ( 142 S. E. 111 , 54 A. L. 1936Lacey v. Forehand, 27 Ga. App. 344 ( 108 S. E. 247 ); Kennedy v. Manis, 46 Ga. App. 808 ( 169 S. E. 319 ); Petway v. McLeod, 47 Ga. App. 647 ( 171 S. E. 225 ); Espy v. Ash, 42 Ga. App. 487 ( 156 S. E. 474 ); Samples v. Shaw, 47 Ga. App. 337 ( 170 S. E. 389 ); Ficklen v. Heichelheim, 49 Ga. App. 777 ( 176 S. E. 540 ); Mitchell v. Mullen, 45 Ga. App. 285 ( 164 S. E. 278 ); Curtis v. Ashworth, 165 Ga. 782 ( 142 S. E. 111 , 54 A. L. | 1 | 1936–1936 |
Hickson v. Maloof
green
1 sentence1936Lacey v. Forehand, 27 Ga. App. 344 ( 108 S. E. 247 ); Kennedy v. Manis, 46 Ga. App. 808 ( 169 S. E. 319 ); Petway v. McLeod, 47 Ga. App. 647 ( 171 S. E. 225 ); Espy v. Ash, 42 Ga. App. 487 ( 156 S. E. 474 ); Samples v. Shaw, 47 Ga. App. 337 ( 170 S. E. 389 ); Ficklen v. Heichelheim, 49 Ga. App. 777 ( 176 S. E. 540 ); Mitchell v. Mullen, 45 Ga. App. 285 ( 164 S. E. 278 ); Curtis v. Ashworth, 165 Ga. 782 ( 142 S. E. 111 , 54 A. L. | 1 | 1936–1936 |
Petway v. McLeod
green
2 sentences1936Lacey v. Forehand, 27 Ga. App. 344 ( 108 S. E. 247 ); Kennedy v. Manis, 46 Ga. App. 808 ( 169 S. E. 319 ); Petway v. McLeod, 47 Ga. App. 647 ( 171 S. E. 225 ); Espy v. Ash, 42 Ga. App. 487 ( 156 S. E. 474 ); Samples v. Shaw, 47 Ga. App. 337 ( 170 S. E. 389 ); Ficklen v. Heichelheim, 49 Ga. App. 777 ( 176 S. E. 540 ); Mitchell v. Mullen, 45 Ga. App. 285 ( 164 S. E. 278 ); Curtis v. Ashworth, 165 Ga. 782 ( 142 S. E. 111 , 54 A. L. 1936Lacey v. Forehand, 27 Ga. App. 344 ( 108 S. E. 247 ); Kennedy v. Manis, 46 Ga. App. 808 ( 169 S. E. 319 ); Petway v. McLeod, 47 Ga. App. 647 ( 171 S. E. 225 ); Espy v. Ash, 42 Ga. App. 487 ( 156 S. E. 474 ); Samples v. Shaw, 47 Ga. App. 337 ( 170 S. E. 389 ); Ficklen v. Heichelheim, 49 Ga. App. 777 ( 176 S. E. 540 ); Mitchell v. Mullen, 45 Ga. App. 285 ( 164 S. E. 278 ); Curtis v. Ashworth, 165 Ga. 782 ( 142 S. E. 111 , 54 A. L. | 1 | 1936–1936 |
Ficklen v. Heichelheim
neutral
2 sentences1936Lacey v. Forehand, 27 Ga. App. 344 ( 108 S. E. 247 ); Kennedy v. Manis, 46 Ga. App. 808 ( 169 S. E. 319 ); Petway v. McLeod, 47 Ga. App. 647 ( 171 S. E. 225 ); Espy v. Ash, 42 Ga. App. 487 ( 156 S. E. 474 ); Samples v. Shaw, 47 Ga. App. 337 ( 170 S. E. 389 ); Ficklen v. Heichelheim, 49 Ga. App. 777 ( 176 S. E. 540 ); Mitchell v. Mullen, 45 Ga. App. 285 ( 164 S. E. 278 ); Curtis v. Ashworth, 165 Ga. 782 ( 142 S. E. 111 , 54 A. L. 1936Lacey v. Forehand, 27 Ga. App. 344 ( 108 S. E. 247 ); Kennedy v. Manis, 46 Ga. App. 808 ( 169 S. E. 319 ); Petway v. McLeod, 47 Ga. App. 647 ( 171 S. E. 225 ); Espy v. Ash, 42 Ga. App. 487 ( 156 S. E. 474 ); Samples v. Shaw, 47 Ga. App. 337 ( 170 S. E. 389 ); Ficklen v. Heichelheim, 49 Ga. App. 777 ( 176 S. E. 540 ); Mitchell v. Mullen, 45 Ga. App. 285 ( 164 S. E. 278 ); Curtis v. Ashworth, 165 Ga. 782 ( 142 S. E. 111 , 54 A. L. | 1 | 1936–1936 |
Kennedy v. Manis
green
2 sentences1936Lacey v. Forehand, 27 Ga. App. 344 ( 108 S. E. 247 ); Kennedy v. Manis, 46 Ga. App. 808 ( 169 S. E. 319 ); Petway v. McLeod, 47 Ga. App. 647 ( 171 S. E. 225 ); Espy v. Ash, 42 Ga. App. 487 ( 156 S. E. 474 ); Samples v. Shaw, 47 Ga. App. 337 ( 170 S. E. 389 ); Ficklen v. Heichelheim, 49 Ga. App. 777 ( 176 S. E. 540 ); Mitchell v. Mullen, 45 Ga. App. 285 ( 164 S. E. 278 ); Curtis v. Ashworth, 165 Ga. 782 ( 142 S. E. 111 , 54 A. L. 1936Lacey v. Forehand, 27 Ga. App. 344 ( 108 S. E. 247 ); Kennedy v. Manis, 46 Ga. App. 808 ( 169 S. E. 319 ); Petway v. McLeod, 47 Ga. App. 647 ( 171 S. E. 225 ); Espy v. Ash, 42 Ga. App. 487 ( 156 S. E. 474 ); Samples v. Shaw, 47 Ga. App. 337 ( 170 S. E. 389 ); Ficklen v. Heichelheim, 49 Ga. App. 777 ( 176 S. E. 540 ); Mitchell v. Mullen, 45 Ga. App. 285 ( 164 S. E. 278 ); Curtis v. Ashworth, 165 Ga. 782 ( 142 S. E. 111 , 54 A. L. | 1 | 1936–1936 |
Samples v. Shaw
green
1 sentence1936Lacey v. Forehand, 27 Ga. App. 344 ( 108 S. E. 247 ); Kennedy v. Manis, 46 Ga. App. 808 ( 169 S. E. 319 ); Petway v. McLeod, 47 Ga. App. 647 ( 171 S. E. 225 ); Espy v. Ash, 42 Ga. App. 487 ( 156 S. E. 474 ); Samples v. Shaw, 47 Ga. App. 337 ( 170 S. E. 389 ); Ficklen v. Heichelheim, 49 Ga. App. 777 ( 176 S. E. 540 ); Mitchell v. Mullen, 45 Ga. App. 285 ( 164 S. E. 278 ); Curtis v. Ashworth, 165 Ga. 782 ( 142 S. E. 111 , 54 A. L. | 1 | 1936–1936 |
Guignon v. Campbell
neutral
2 sentences1936Co., 199 Pa. 232 ( 48 Atl. 1070 ), it was said: “Since the scope of the servant’s employment is necessarily dependent on circumstances, a hard and fast rule can not be laid down as to the scope of any particular employment; and it is ordinarily a question for the jury whether or not a particular act comes within the scope of the servant’s employment.” In Guignon v. Campbell, 80 Wash. 543 ( 141 Pac. 1031 ), involving a car which the mother permitted different members of the family to drive in the usual manner of family conveyances, the mother was held liable for its misuse by her minor son.- Ju 1936Co., 199 Pa. 232 ( 48 Atl. 1070 ), it was said: “Since the scope of the servant’s employment is necessarily dependent on circumstances, a hard and fast rule can not be laid down as to the scope of any particular employment; and it is ordinarily a question for the jury whether or not a particular act comes within the scope of the servant’s employment.” In Guignon v. Campbell, 80 Wash. 543 ( 141 Pac. 1031 ), involving a car which the mother permitted different members of the family to drive in the usual manner of family conveyances, the mother was held liable for its misuse by her minor son.- Ju | 1 | 1936–1936 |
Fielder v. Davison
green
1 sentence1924Since the scope of the servant’s employment is necessarily dependent on circumstances, a hard and fast rule cannot be laid down as to the scope of any particular employment; and it is ordinarily a question for the jury whether or not a particular act comes within the scope of a servant’s employment.” Fielder v. Davison, 139 Ga. 509 (6), 515 ( 77 S. E. 618 ). | 1 | 1924–1924 |
| Chattooga County v. Megginson green | 1 | 1924–1924 |
| Moon v. Matthews green | 1 | 1915–1915 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.