hard and fast rule (Georgia) · Go Syfert
← Georgia issues

hard and fast rule in Georgia

14 Georgia opinions name it 2 courts 1915–2020 0 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by Georgia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (6)

CaseFollowedCited
Phelps Dodge Corp. v. National Labor Relations Boardgreen
scotus · 1941 · cited in 1 Georgia opinions naming this issue, 2020–2020
2 sentences

2020Thus, a term whose statutory definition declares what it ‘includes’ is more susceptible to extension of meaning than where . . . the definition declares what a term ‘means’”) (citation and punctuation omitted); Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177, 189 ( 61 SCt 845 , 85 LE 1271) (1941) (construing “including” expansively in a statute allowing an agency “to take such affirmative action, including reinstatement of employees with or without back pay, as will effectuate the policies of this Act”) (punctuation omitted). 11 We do not decide whether there is a hard-and-fast rule that the number o

2020Thus, a term whose statutory definition declares what it ‘includes’ is more susceptible to extension of meaning than where . . . the definition declares what a term ‘means’”) (citation and punctuation omitted); Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177, 189 ( 61 SCt 845 , 85 LE 1271) (1941) (construing “including” expansively in a statute allowing an agency “to take such affirmative action, including reinstatement of employees with or without back pay, as will effectuate the policies of this Act”) (punctuation omitted). 11 We do not decide whether there is a hard-and-fast rule that the number o

11
Gordon v. Stategreen
gactapp · 2001 · cited in 1 Georgia opinions naming this issue, 2006–2006
2 sentences

2006Gordon v. State, 250 Ga. App. 80, 82 ( 550 SE2d 131 ) (2001).

2006Gordon v. State, 250 Ga. App. 80, 82 ( 550 SE2d 131 ) (2001).

11
Fletcher v. Weirgreen
scotus · 1982 · cited in 1 Georgia opinions naming this issue, 2001–2001
1 sentence

2001See, e.g., Fletcher v. Weir, 455 U. S. 603 (102 SC 1309, 71 LE2d 490) (1982); Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U. S. 231 (100 SC 2124, 65 LE2d 86) (1980).

11
Smith v. Stategreen
gactapp · 1971 · cited in 1 Georgia opinions naming this issue, 1973–1973
2 sentences

1973As the Court of Appeals of Georgia said in Smith v. State, 123 Ga. App. 269, 272 ( 180 SE2d 556 ), "every case relying on the Act (Code Ann. § 27-1403) so far has been found to come under an exception thereto." I think it is time to stop allowing exceptions to the statute and make it an instrument for insuring a fair trial for an accused.

1973As the Court of Appeals of Georgia said in Smith v. State, 123 Ga. App. 269, 272 ( 180 SE2d 556 ), "every case relying on the Act (Code Ann. § 27-1403) so far has been found to come under an exception thereto." I think it is time to stop allowing exceptions to the statute and make it an instrument for insuring a fair trial for an accused.

11
Edmondson v. Hancockgreen
gactapp · 1929 · cited in 1 Georgia opinions naming this issue, 1966–1966
1 sentence

1966Compare, for example, Edmondson v. Hancock, 40 Ga. App. 587 , supra, and Piedmont Hospital v. Truitt, 48 Ga. App. 232 ( 172 SE 237 ), to see some of the obvious problems that might have arisen if there had been a payment by one of the tortfeasors, or a release to one of them.

11
Piedmont Hospital v. Truittgreen
gactapp · 1933 · cited in 1 Georgia opinions naming this issue, 1966–1966
2 sentences

1966Compare, for example, Edmondson v. Hancock, 40 Ga. App. 587 , supra, and Piedmont Hospital v. Truitt, 48 Ga. App. 232 ( 172 SE 237 ), to see some of the obvious problems that might have arisen if there had been a payment by one of the tortfeasors, or a release to one of them.

1966Compare, for example, Edmondson v. Hancock, 40 Ga. App. 587 , supra, and Piedmont Hospital v. Truitt, 48 Ga. App. 232 ( 172 SE 237 ), to see some of the obvious problems that might have arisen if there had been a payment by one of the tortfeasors, or a release to one of them.

11

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

CaseNegativeCited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Georgia. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (26)

CaseCitedYears
Simmons v. Pennsylvania Railroad green
· 1901
2 sentences

1936Co., 199 Pa. 232 ( 48 Atl. 1070 ), it was said: “Since the scope of the servant’s employment is necessarily dependent on circumstances, a hard and fast rule can not be laid down as to the scope of any particular employment; and it is ordinarily a question for the jury whether or not a particular act comes within the scope of the servant’s employment.” In Guignon v. Campbell, 80 Wash. 543 ( 141 Pac. 1031 ), involving a car which the mother permitted different members of the family to drive in the usual manner of family conveyances, the mother was held liable for its misuse by her minor son.- Ju

1936Co., 199 Pa. 232 ( 48 Atl. 1070 ), it was said: “Since the scope of the servant’s employment is necessarily dependent on circumstances, a hard and fast rule can not be laid down as to the scope of any particular employment; and it is ordinarily a question for the jury whether or not a particular act comes within the scope of the servant’s employment.” In Guignon v. Campbell, 80 Wash. 543 ( 141 Pac. 1031 ), involving a car which the mother permitted different members of the family to drive in the usual manner of family conveyances, the mother was held liable for its misuse by her minor son.- Ju

21915–1936
Yelverton v. State green
ga · 2016
1 sentence

2019Further, it is clear from Yelverton, 300 Ga. at 319-320 , in which the Court remanded the case for the lower court to find whether evidence admitted at trial as a similar transaction constituted a relevant similar transaction for purposes of OCGA § 17-10-6.2 (c) (1) (C), that generally it is for the sentencing court to make this determination in the first instance.

12019–2019
State v. Adamczyk green
gactapp · 1982
2 sentences

2002The Adamczyk court declined to require any particular form, deeming a pleading sufficient if it "[could] reasonably be construed as a demand for trial under the [statutory] provisions...." 162 Ga.App. at 290 , 290 S.E.2d 149 .

2002The Adamczyk court declined to require any particular form, deeming a pleading sufficient if it "[could] reasonably be construed as a demand for trial under the [statutory] provisions...." 162 Ga.App. at 290 , 290 S.E.2d 149 .

12002–2002
Patten v. State yellow
gactapp · 2001
2 sentences

2002While "substantial compliance" with either of the statutes authorizing the filing of a demand for speedy trial is insufficient to trigger discharge and acquittal *480 ( Patten v. State, supra, 250 Ga.App. at 499 , 552 S.E.2d 110 ), and appellate case law requires that the caption of the pleading in which the demand for speedy trial is made contain "the exact nature of the pleading" before discharge and acquittal occur ( Kramer v. State, supra, 185 Ga.App. 254 , 363 S.E.2d 800 ), the appellate courts have been reluctant to adopt a hard and fast rule as to what constitutes a demand for speedy tr

2002While "substantial compliance" with either of the statutes authorizing the filing of a demand for speedy trial is insufficient to trigger discharge and acquittal *480 ( Patten v. State, supra, 250 Ga.App. at 499 , 552 S.E.2d 110 ), and appellate case law requires that the caption of the pleading in which the demand for speedy trial is made contain "the exact nature of the pleading" before discharge and acquittal occur ( Kramer v. State, supra, 185 Ga.App. 254 , 363 S.E.2d 800 ), the appellate courts have been reluctant to adopt a hard and fast rule as to what constitutes a demand for speedy tr

12002–2002
Kramer v. State green
gactapp · 1987
2 sentences

2002While "substantial compliance" with either of the statutes authorizing the filing of a demand for speedy trial is insufficient to trigger discharge and acquittal *480 ( Patten v. State, supra, 250 Ga.App. at 499 , 552 S.E.2d 110 ), and appellate case law requires that the caption of the pleading in which the demand for speedy trial is made contain "the exact nature of the pleading" before discharge and acquittal occur ( Kramer v. State, supra, 185 Ga.App. 254 , 363 S.E.2d 800 ), the appellate courts have been reluctant to adopt a hard and fast rule as to what constitutes a demand for speedy tr

2002While "substantial compliance" with either of the statutes authorizing the filing of a demand for speedy trial is insufficient to trigger discharge and acquittal *480 ( Patten v. State, supra, 250 Ga.App. at 499 , 552 S.E.2d 110 ), and appellate case law requires that the caption of the pleading in which the demand for speedy trial is made contain "the exact nature of the pleading" before discharge and acquittal occur ( Kramer v. State, supra, 185 Ga.App. 254 , 363 S.E.2d 800 ), the appellate courts have been reluctant to adopt a hard and fast rule as to what constitutes a demand for speedy tr

12002–2002
Jenkins v. Anderson green
scotus · 1980
1 sentence

2001See, e.g., Fletcher v. Weir, 455 U. S. 603 (102 SC 1309, 71 LE2d 490) (1982); Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U. S. 231 (100 SC 2124, 65 LE2d 86) (1980).

12001–2001
Pollard v. State green
gactapp · 1985
1 sentence

1994Id.

11994–1994
Monroe v. Sigler green
ga · 1987
2 sentences

1988Monroe v. Sigler, 256 Ga. 759 ( 353 SE2d 23 ) (1987), states a hard and fast rule, i.e, denial of a motion for a directed verdict of acquittal constitutes a binding determination of the existence of probable cause.

1988Monroe v. Sigler, 256 Ga. 759 ( 353 SE2d 23 ) (1987), states a hard and fast rule, i.e, denial of a motion for a directed verdict of acquittal constitutes a binding determination of the existence of probable cause.

11988–1988
Evans v. State green
ga · 1971
2 sentences

1973Also, I think that the ruling in Evans v. State, 227 Ga. 571, 576 , supra, is not a basis for a hard and fast rule as to what is imputed to the district attorney, because in that case the district attorney had disclosed to counsel for *417 the accused the names of the newly discovered witnesses more than two weeks before the trial.

1973Also, I think that the ruling in Evans v. State, 227 Ga. 571, 576 , supra, is not a basis for a hard and fast rule as to what is imputed to the district attorney, because in that case the district attorney had disclosed to counsel for the accused the names of the newly discovered witnesses more than two weeks before the trial.

11973–1973
In Re State in Int. of Johnson neutral
utah · 1946
2 sentences

1961Jur. 316 , § 37, citing In re State in Interest of Johnson, 110 Utah 500 ( 175 P2d 486 ), holding “that a petition alleging that a mother is financially unable to provide for her child and will not provide a proper home and necessities for him does not allege sufficient grounds for depriving her of the custody of her child and adjudicating him as dependent.” It is difficult to lay down a hard and fast rule as to what constitutes “dependency” or who is a “dependent child” within the meaning of the Juvenile Court Act.

1961Jur. 316 , § 37, citing In re State in Interest of Johnson, 110 Utah 500 ( 175 P2d 486 ), holding “that a petition alleging that a mother is financially unable to provide for her child and will not provide a proper home and necessities for him does not allege sufficient grounds for depriving her of the custody of her child and adjudicating him as dependent.” It is difficult to lay down a hard and fast rule as to what constitutes “dependency” or who is a “dependent child” within the meaning of the Juvenile Court Act.

11961–1961
Moore v. Central of Georgia Railway Co. neutral
gactapp · 1907
2 sentences

1949Co., 1 Ga. App. 514 ( 58 S. E. 63 ), are so different from those of the instant case that we do not consider it binding, and for the further reason that the decision in that case does not set up a hard and fast rule, but rather leaves the nonsuit matter to be based on the facts of the individual cases, depending upon whether or not the plaintiff might have anything which it would be to his advantage to submit to a jury.

1949Co., 1 Ga. App. 514 ( 58 S. E. 63 ), are so different from those of the instant case that we do not consider it binding, and for the further reason that the decision in that case does not set up a hard and fast rule, but rather leaves the nonsuit matter to be based on the facts of the individual cases, depending upon whether or not the plaintiff might have anything which it would be to his advantage to submit to a jury.

11949–1949
Lamb v. Fedderwitz green
gactapp · 1944
2 sentences

1949In the instant case, we think that a nonsuit was legal justice; and, taking the view most favorable to the plaintiff (Lamb v. Fedderwitz, 71 Ga. App. 249, 255 , 30 S. E. 2d, 436 ), was effectual and just legal mechanics.

1949In the instant case, we think that a nonsuit was legal justice; and, taking the view most favorable to the plaintiff (Lamb v. Fedderwitz, 71 Ga. App. 249, 255 , 30 S. E. 2d, 436 ), was effectual and just legal mechanics.

11949–1949
Curtis v. Ashworth green
ga · 1928
2 sentences

1936Lacey v. Forehand, 27 Ga. App. 344 ( 108 S. E. 247 ); Kennedy v. Manis, 46 Ga. App. 808 ( 169 S. E. 319 ); Petway v. McLeod, 47 Ga. App. 647 ( 171 S. E. 225 ); Espy v. Ash, 42 Ga. App. 487 ( 156 S. E. 474 ); Samples v. Shaw, 47 Ga. App. 337 ( 170 S. E. 389 ); Ficklen v. Heichelheim, 49 Ga. App. 777 ( 176 S. E. 540 ); Mitchell v. Mullen, 45 Ga. App. 285 ( 164 S. E. 278 ); Curtis v. Ashworth, 165 Ga. 782 ( 142 S. E. 111 , 54 A. L.

1936Lacey v. Forehand, 27 Ga. App. 344 ( 108 S. E. 247 ); Kennedy v. Manis, 46 Ga. App. 808 ( 169 S. E. 319 ); Petway v. McLeod, 47 Ga. App. 647 ( 171 S. E. 225 ); Espy v. Ash, 42 Ga. App. 487 ( 156 S. E. 474 ); Samples v. Shaw, 47 Ga. App. 337 ( 170 S. E. 389 ); Ficklen v. Heichelheim, 49 Ga. App. 777 ( 176 S. E. 540 ); Mitchell v. Mullen, 45 Ga. App. 285 ( 164 S. E. 278 ); Curtis v. Ashworth, 165 Ga. 782 ( 142 S. E. 111 , 54 A. L.

11936–1936
Davis v. Mesler green
gactapp · 1921
1 sentence

1936Lacey v. Forehand, 27 Ga. App. 344 ( 108 S. E. 247 ); Kennedy v. Manis, 46 Ga. App. 808 ( 169 S. E. 319 ); Petway v. McLeod, 47 Ga. App. 647 ( 171 S. E. 225 ); Espy v. Ash, 42 Ga. App. 487 ( 156 S. E. 474 ); Samples v. Shaw, 47 Ga. App. 337 ( 170 S. E. 389 ); Ficklen v. Heichelheim, 49 Ga. App. 777 ( 176 S. E. 540 ); Mitchell v. Mullen, 45 Ga. App. 285 ( 164 S. E. 278 ); Curtis v. Ashworth, 165 Ga. 782 ( 142 S. E. 111 , 54 A. L.

11936–1936
Lacey v. Forehand green
gactapp · 1921
1 sentence

1936Lacey v. Forehand, 27 Ga. App. 344 ( 108 S. E. 247 ); Kennedy v. Manis, 46 Ga. App. 808 ( 169 S. E. 319 ); Petway v. McLeod, 47 Ga. App. 647 ( 171 S. E. 225 ); Espy v. Ash, 42 Ga. App. 487 ( 156 S. E. 474 ); Samples v. Shaw, 47 Ga. App. 337 ( 170 S. E. 389 ); Ficklen v. Heichelheim, 49 Ga. App. 777 ( 176 S. E. 540 ); Mitchell v. Mullen, 45 Ga. App. 285 ( 164 S. E. 278 ); Curtis v. Ashworth, 165 Ga. 782 ( 142 S. E. 111 , 54 A. L.

11936–1936
Espy v. Ash green
gactapp · 1931
2 sentences

1936Lacey v. Forehand, 27 Ga. App. 344 ( 108 S. E. 247 ); Kennedy v. Manis, 46 Ga. App. 808 ( 169 S. E. 319 ); Petway v. McLeod, 47 Ga. App. 647 ( 171 S. E. 225 ); Espy v. Ash, 42 Ga. App. 487 ( 156 S. E. 474 ); Samples v. Shaw, 47 Ga. App. 337 ( 170 S. E. 389 ); Ficklen v. Heichelheim, 49 Ga. App. 777 ( 176 S. E. 540 ); Mitchell v. Mullen, 45 Ga. App. 285 ( 164 S. E. 278 ); Curtis v. Ashworth, 165 Ga. 782 ( 142 S. E. 111 , 54 A. L.

1936Lacey v. Forehand, 27 Ga. App. 344 ( 108 S. E. 247 ); Kennedy v. Manis, 46 Ga. App. 808 ( 169 S. E. 319 ); Petway v. McLeod, 47 Ga. App. 647 ( 171 S. E. 225 ); Espy v. Ash, 42 Ga. App. 487 ( 156 S. E. 474 ); Samples v. Shaw, 47 Ga. App. 337 ( 170 S. E. 389 ); Ficklen v. Heichelheim, 49 Ga. App. 777 ( 176 S. E. 540 ); Mitchell v. Mullen, 45 Ga. App. 285 ( 164 S. E. 278 ); Curtis v. Ashworth, 165 Ga. 782 ( 142 S. E. 111 , 54 A. L.

11936–1936
Mitchell v. Mullen green
gactapp · 1932
2 sentences

1936Lacey v. Forehand, 27 Ga. App. 344 ( 108 S. E. 247 ); Kennedy v. Manis, 46 Ga. App. 808 ( 169 S. E. 319 ); Petway v. McLeod, 47 Ga. App. 647 ( 171 S. E. 225 ); Espy v. Ash, 42 Ga. App. 487 ( 156 S. E. 474 ); Samples v. Shaw, 47 Ga. App. 337 ( 170 S. E. 389 ); Ficklen v. Heichelheim, 49 Ga. App. 777 ( 176 S. E. 540 ); Mitchell v. Mullen, 45 Ga. App. 285 ( 164 S. E. 278 ); Curtis v. Ashworth, 165 Ga. 782 ( 142 S. E. 111 , 54 A. L.

1936Lacey v. Forehand, 27 Ga. App. 344 ( 108 S. E. 247 ); Kennedy v. Manis, 46 Ga. App. 808 ( 169 S. E. 319 ); Petway v. McLeod, 47 Ga. App. 647 ( 171 S. E. 225 ); Espy v. Ash, 42 Ga. App. 487 ( 156 S. E. 474 ); Samples v. Shaw, 47 Ga. App. 337 ( 170 S. E. 389 ); Ficklen v. Heichelheim, 49 Ga. App. 777 ( 176 S. E. 540 ); Mitchell v. Mullen, 45 Ga. App. 285 ( 164 S. E. 278 ); Curtis v. Ashworth, 165 Ga. 782 ( 142 S. E. 111 , 54 A. L.

11936–1936
Hickson v. Maloof green
gactapp · 1933
1 sentence

1936Lacey v. Forehand, 27 Ga. App. 344 ( 108 S. E. 247 ); Kennedy v. Manis, 46 Ga. App. 808 ( 169 S. E. 319 ); Petway v. McLeod, 47 Ga. App. 647 ( 171 S. E. 225 ); Espy v. Ash, 42 Ga. App. 487 ( 156 S. E. 474 ); Samples v. Shaw, 47 Ga. App. 337 ( 170 S. E. 389 ); Ficklen v. Heichelheim, 49 Ga. App. 777 ( 176 S. E. 540 ); Mitchell v. Mullen, 45 Ga. App. 285 ( 164 S. E. 278 ); Curtis v. Ashworth, 165 Ga. 782 ( 142 S. E. 111 , 54 A. L.

11936–1936
Petway v. McLeod green
gactapp · 1933
2 sentences

1936Lacey v. Forehand, 27 Ga. App. 344 ( 108 S. E. 247 ); Kennedy v. Manis, 46 Ga. App. 808 ( 169 S. E. 319 ); Petway v. McLeod, 47 Ga. App. 647 ( 171 S. E. 225 ); Espy v. Ash, 42 Ga. App. 487 ( 156 S. E. 474 ); Samples v. Shaw, 47 Ga. App. 337 ( 170 S. E. 389 ); Ficklen v. Heichelheim, 49 Ga. App. 777 ( 176 S. E. 540 ); Mitchell v. Mullen, 45 Ga. App. 285 ( 164 S. E. 278 ); Curtis v. Ashworth, 165 Ga. 782 ( 142 S. E. 111 , 54 A. L.

1936Lacey v. Forehand, 27 Ga. App. 344 ( 108 S. E. 247 ); Kennedy v. Manis, 46 Ga. App. 808 ( 169 S. E. 319 ); Petway v. McLeod, 47 Ga. App. 647 ( 171 S. E. 225 ); Espy v. Ash, 42 Ga. App. 487 ( 156 S. E. 474 ); Samples v. Shaw, 47 Ga. App. 337 ( 170 S. E. 389 ); Ficklen v. Heichelheim, 49 Ga. App. 777 ( 176 S. E. 540 ); Mitchell v. Mullen, 45 Ga. App. 285 ( 164 S. E. 278 ); Curtis v. Ashworth, 165 Ga. 782 ( 142 S. E. 111 , 54 A. L.

11936–1936
Ficklen v. Heichelheim neutral
gactapp · 1934
2 sentences

1936Lacey v. Forehand, 27 Ga. App. 344 ( 108 S. E. 247 ); Kennedy v. Manis, 46 Ga. App. 808 ( 169 S. E. 319 ); Petway v. McLeod, 47 Ga. App. 647 ( 171 S. E. 225 ); Espy v. Ash, 42 Ga. App. 487 ( 156 S. E. 474 ); Samples v. Shaw, 47 Ga. App. 337 ( 170 S. E. 389 ); Ficklen v. Heichelheim, 49 Ga. App. 777 ( 176 S. E. 540 ); Mitchell v. Mullen, 45 Ga. App. 285 ( 164 S. E. 278 ); Curtis v. Ashworth, 165 Ga. 782 ( 142 S. E. 111 , 54 A. L.

1936Lacey v. Forehand, 27 Ga. App. 344 ( 108 S. E. 247 ); Kennedy v. Manis, 46 Ga. App. 808 ( 169 S. E. 319 ); Petway v. McLeod, 47 Ga. App. 647 ( 171 S. E. 225 ); Espy v. Ash, 42 Ga. App. 487 ( 156 S. E. 474 ); Samples v. Shaw, 47 Ga. App. 337 ( 170 S. E. 389 ); Ficklen v. Heichelheim, 49 Ga. App. 777 ( 176 S. E. 540 ); Mitchell v. Mullen, 45 Ga. App. 285 ( 164 S. E. 278 ); Curtis v. Ashworth, 165 Ga. 782 ( 142 S. E. 111 , 54 A. L.

11936–1936
Kennedy v. Manis green
gactapp · 1933
2 sentences

1936Lacey v. Forehand, 27 Ga. App. 344 ( 108 S. E. 247 ); Kennedy v. Manis, 46 Ga. App. 808 ( 169 S. E. 319 ); Petway v. McLeod, 47 Ga. App. 647 ( 171 S. E. 225 ); Espy v. Ash, 42 Ga. App. 487 ( 156 S. E. 474 ); Samples v. Shaw, 47 Ga. App. 337 ( 170 S. E. 389 ); Ficklen v. Heichelheim, 49 Ga. App. 777 ( 176 S. E. 540 ); Mitchell v. Mullen, 45 Ga. App. 285 ( 164 S. E. 278 ); Curtis v. Ashworth, 165 Ga. 782 ( 142 S. E. 111 , 54 A. L.

1936Lacey v. Forehand, 27 Ga. App. 344 ( 108 S. E. 247 ); Kennedy v. Manis, 46 Ga. App. 808 ( 169 S. E. 319 ); Petway v. McLeod, 47 Ga. App. 647 ( 171 S. E. 225 ); Espy v. Ash, 42 Ga. App. 487 ( 156 S. E. 474 ); Samples v. Shaw, 47 Ga. App. 337 ( 170 S. E. 389 ); Ficklen v. Heichelheim, 49 Ga. App. 777 ( 176 S. E. 540 ); Mitchell v. Mullen, 45 Ga. App. 285 ( 164 S. E. 278 ); Curtis v. Ashworth, 165 Ga. 782 ( 142 S. E. 111 , 54 A. L.

11936–1936
Samples v. Shaw green
gactapp · 1933
1 sentence

1936Lacey v. Forehand, 27 Ga. App. 344 ( 108 S. E. 247 ); Kennedy v. Manis, 46 Ga. App. 808 ( 169 S. E. 319 ); Petway v. McLeod, 47 Ga. App. 647 ( 171 S. E. 225 ); Espy v. Ash, 42 Ga. App. 487 ( 156 S. E. 474 ); Samples v. Shaw, 47 Ga. App. 337 ( 170 S. E. 389 ); Ficklen v. Heichelheim, 49 Ga. App. 777 ( 176 S. E. 540 ); Mitchell v. Mullen, 45 Ga. App. 285 ( 164 S. E. 278 ); Curtis v. Ashworth, 165 Ga. 782 ( 142 S. E. 111 , 54 A. L.

11936–1936
Guignon v. Campbell neutral
wash · 1914
2 sentences

1936Co., 199 Pa. 232 ( 48 Atl. 1070 ), it was said: “Since the scope of the servant’s employment is necessarily dependent on circumstances, a hard and fast rule can not be laid down as to the scope of any particular employment; and it is ordinarily a question for the jury whether or not a particular act comes within the scope of the servant’s employment.” In Guignon v. Campbell, 80 Wash. 543 ( 141 Pac. 1031 ), involving a car which the mother permitted different members of the family to drive in the usual manner of family conveyances, the mother was held liable for its misuse by her minor son.- Ju

1936Co., 199 Pa. 232 ( 48 Atl. 1070 ), it was said: “Since the scope of the servant’s employment is necessarily dependent on circumstances, a hard and fast rule can not be laid down as to the scope of any particular employment; and it is ordinarily a question for the jury whether or not a particular act comes within the scope of the servant’s employment.” In Guignon v. Campbell, 80 Wash. 543 ( 141 Pac. 1031 ), involving a car which the mother permitted different members of the family to drive in the usual manner of family conveyances, the mother was held liable for its misuse by her minor son.- Ju

11936–1936
Fielder v. Davison green
ga · 1913
1 sentence

1924Since the scope of the servant’s employment is necessarily dependent on circumstances, a hard and fast rule cannot be laid down as to the scope of any particular employment; and it is ordinarily a question for the jury whether or not a particular act comes within the scope of a servant’s employment.” Fielder v. Davison, 139 Ga. 509 (6), 515 ( 77 S. E. 618 ).

11924–1924
Chattooga County v. Megginson green
ga · 1913
11924–1924
Moon v. Matthews green
pa · 1910
11915–1915

Where else courts name it

IL 63 (1903–2026) PA 56 (1899–2023) MD 54 (1939–2022) TX 50 (1949–2023) CA 41 (1907–2026) MO 40 (1909–2019) WA 39 (1909–2026) LA 37 (1931–2010) NY 34 (1896–2018) IN 32 (1909–2024) FL 27 (1958–2020) MI 27 (1906–2024) OH 27 (1902–2024) OR 25 (1896–2025) TN 24 (1960–2025) NJ 19 (1924–2018) OK 18 (1924–2021) MA 17 (1915–2014) NE 17 (1904–2026) AL 16 (1927–2025) HI 15 (1959–2025) DC 15 (1963–2025) KS 15 (1905–2019) IA 15 (1926–2025) GA 14 (1915–2020) CT 13 (1964–2017) KY 11 (1909–2023) SC 11 (1930–2009) VT 11 (1933–2019) WV 10 (1953–2025) MS 10 (1984–2017) MT 10 (1922–2016) MN 8 (1949–2024) NM 8 (1966–2024) CO 8 (1947–2025) RI 7 (2004–2022) WI 7 (1929–1996) DE 6 (1933–2024) UT 6 (1902–2024) AZ 5 (1975–2016) ME 5 (1963–2002) VA 5 (1915–2007) NC 4 (1929–2012) ID 3 (1939–2020) AR 3 (1992–2000) NV 3 (1951–2012) ND 2 (1992–2009) NH 2 (1973–1975) WY 2 (1975–1981) AK 2 (1990–1995)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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