hard and fast rule in Illinois

1974That principal should be “a guide and not a hard and fast rule.” People v. Scott, 117 Ill.App.2d 344 .

1972Such a sentence may not be consistent with the principles announced in People v. Jones, 92 Ill.App.2d 124 , 235 N.E.2d 379 , where the court recommended imposition of a minimum sentence of not in excess of one-third of the maximum sentence, but as indicated in People v. Scott, 117 Ill.App.2d 344 , that standard is quoted only as a guide and not as a hard and fast rule.

1972Such a sentence may not be consistent with the principles announced in People v. Jones, 92 Ill.App.2d 124 , 235 N.E.2d 379 , where the court recommended imposition of a minimum sentence of not in excess of one-third of the maximum sentence, but as indicated in People v. Scott, 117 Ill.App.2d 344 , that standard is quoted only as a guide and not as a hard and fast rule.

1972Such a sentence may not be consistent with the principles announced in People v. Jones, 92 Ill.App.2d 124 , 235 N.E.2d 379 , where the court recommended imposition of a minimum sentence of not in excess of one-third of the maximum sentence, but as indicated in People v. Scott, 117 Ill.App.2d 344 , that standard is quoted only as a guide and not as a hard and fast rule.

2024McNulty, 2022 IL App (1st) 201239, ¶ 43 ; Draper, 2014 IL App (1st) 132073, ¶ 23 .

2022App. 3d 367, 377 (2001). ¶ 44 Respondent argues that his motion should have been “routinely granted” and cites in support Draper, 2014 IL App (1st) 132073, ¶ 25 .

2003As a result, the Illinois Supreme Court has discouraged an application of a hard-and-fast rule and stated, “Under the facts of one case, willful and wanton misconduct may be only degrees more than ordinary negligence, while under the facts of another case, willful and wanton acts may be only degrees less than intentional wrongdoing.” Ziarko, 161 Ill. 2d at 275-76 , 641 N.E.2d at 406 .

2003As a result, the Illinois Supreme Court has discouraged an application of a hard-and-fast rule and stated, “Under the facts of one case, willful and wanton misconduct may be only degrees more than ordinary negligence, while under the facts of another case, willful and wanton acts may be only degrees less than intentional wrongdoing.” Ziarko, 161 Ill. 2d at 275-76 , 641 N.E.2d at 406 .

2001App. 3d at 943 . " 'What is just and proper must be determined by the facts of each case, not by a hard and fast rule applicable to all situations regardless of the outcome.' " Merchants Bank v. Roberts , 292 Ill.

2001App. 3d at 943 . “ ‘ “What is just and proper must be determined by the facts of each case, not by a hard and fast rule applicable to all situations regardless of the outcome.” ’ ” Merchants Bank v. Roberts, 292 Ill.

1973Bank (1967), 88 Ill.App.2d 428, 438 .) ‘What is just and proper must be determined by the facts of each case, not by a hard and fast rule applicable to all situations regardless of the outcome.” Widicus v. Southwestern Electric Cooperative, Inc., supra. Under the facts of this case we are of the opinion that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to vacate the decree of divorce and that defendant is clearly guilty of unexcusable delay in retaining counsel and entering the case.

1973Bank (1967), 88 Ill.App.2d 428, 438 . ‘What is just and proper must be determined by the facts of each case, not by a hard and fast rule applicable to all situations regardless of the outcome.’ ( Widicus, supra, 109 .) From the facts in this case, we are of the opinion that justice will be accomplished by allowing the defendant his day in court.” Applying these principles to the facts of this case as outlined above, we are of the considered opinion that substantial justice will best be accomplished by aHowing the defendants to have their day in court.

1972In People v. Donahoe, 279 Ill. 411, 414 , 117 N.E.2d 105 , 107, the Illinois Supreme Court stated: “* * * The rule is that alleged errors in the ruling of a trial court not argued or brought to the attention of the Appellate Court will be held to have been waived and abandoned and cannot be raised for the first time in this court. [Dunn v. Crichfield, 214 Ill. 292 , 73 N.E. 386 , and cases there cited.] This is not a hard and fast rule, and, where this court can see that the application of it would result in great injustice, it will not be blindly adhered to.” The basic principle of justice in

1972In People v. Donahoe, 279 Ill. 411, 414 , 117 N.E.2d 105 , 107, the Illinois Supreme Court stated: “* * * The rule is that alleged errors in the ruling of a trial court not argued or brought to the attention of the Appellate Court will be held to have been waived and abandoned and cannot be raised for the first time in this court. [Dunn v. Crichfield, 214 Ill. 292 , 73 N.E. 386 , and cases there cited.] This is not a hard and fast rule, and, where this court can see that the application of it would result in great injustice, it will not be blindly adhered to.” The basic principle of justice in

1968Succeeding cases have reiterated the same principles as expressed in the Widicus case (Kehrer v. Kehrer, 28 Ill App2d 296, 171 NE2d 239 ; Lynch v. Illinois Hospital Services, Inc., 38 Ill App2d 470, 187 NE2d 330 ).

1966What is just and proper must be determined by the facts of each case, not by a hard and fast rule applicable to all situations regardless of the outcome.” Similarly, in Lynch v. Illinois Hospital Services, Inc., 38 Ill App2d 470, 187 NE2d 330 , the court reaffirms the conclusions set forth in the case of Widucus v. Southwestern Electric Cooperative, Inc., supra, and goes on to say (at pages 475, 476): “Reviewing the record and exhibits in this cause, and after having heard the oral arguments of the parties, this court is not unmindful of the fact that the defendant’s attorney, failed not once

1954As it was said in the case of Judge v. Bergman, 258 Ill. 246 : “It would not be possible to lay down, in advance, a hard and fast rule by which to determine what is and what is not an ‘adjunct’ or ‘addition,’ within the meaning of Section 7 of the Sanitary District Act.” Each case must be decided upon its own peculiar facts.

1932Since June 29, 1923, section 19 reads in part as follows: “The board of trustees shall have the power to build and construct and to defray the costs and expenses of the construction of drains, sewers, or laterals, or drains and sewers and laterals and other necessary adjuncts thereto, including pumps and pumping stations, made' by it in the execution or in furtherance of the powers heretofore granted to such sanitary district by special assessment or by general taxation, as they shall by ordinance prescribe.” In the case of City of Chicago v. Green, 238 Ill. 258 , and Judge v. Bergman, 258 Ill

1932Co. v. Sandusky, 198 Ill. 400 , ‘ ‘ a hard and fast rule that instructions shall be limited to a given number” was regarded as unreasonable, and further, “any rule which would authorize the refusal of an instruction otherwise proper to be given, on the ground, alone, that as many instructions as the rule allowed had been given, could not be defended.” In Osgood v. Skinner, 211 Ill. 229 , the court said, “Parties have the privilege of tendering such instructions concerning the law as they may deem necessary, and the Practice act requires the court to mark them as given or refused, but only auth

1903The Supreme Court has recently, in the case of Chicago City Railway Company v. Sandusky, 198 Ill. 400 , said that they are inclined to regard as unreasonable a hard and fast rule that instructions shall be limited to a given number.

2026Relevant considerations include the diligence or lack thereof by the movant and the relevant hardships on the parties from granting or denying the motion.” Id. ¶ 22 The decision of whether to grant or deny a motion to vacate is within the discretion of the circuit court and will not be reversed absent an abuse of that discretion.

2025We said “should” and not “must.” Curtner, 2012 IL App (4th) 110820, ¶ 21 .

2024McNulty, 2022 IL App (1st) 201239, ¶ 43 ; Draper, 2014 IL App (1st) 132073, ¶ 23 .

2011We have no hesitation, therefore, in concluding that it is reasonably related to that legitimate purpose for the legislature to permit the trial court, in its sound discretion, to compel divorced parents to educate their children to the same extent as might reasonably be expected of nondivorced parents.” Kujawinski v. Kujawinski, 71 Ill. 2d 563, 579-80 , 376 N.E.2d 1382, 1390 (1978). ¶ 11 Nonetheless, “ ‘As to the amount of education that should be considered necessary, courts have never laid down a hard and fast rule.’ ” Truhlar, 404 Ill.

2011App. 3d at 180 , 935 N.E.2d at 1202 (quoting Esteb, 244 P. at 265).

2010The Esteb court noted, "As to the amount of education that should be considered necessary, courts have never laid down a hard and fast rule." Esteb, 138 Wash. at 178 , 244 P. at 265.

2010Indeed the supreme court has explained that decisions under Rule 103(b) should be based on the “facts and circumstances of each case individually.” Case, 227 Ill. 2d at 213 .