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54 Maryland opinions name it 2 courts 1939–2022 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Maryland courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Schneider v. Hawkinsgreen2 sentences2014Cooper also was empowered with the discretionary “ ‘freedom to act according to one’s judgment in the absence of a hard and fast rule.’ ” (Quoting Schneider v. Hawkins, 179 Md. 21, 25 , 16 A.2d 861 (1940)). 2014Cooper also was empowered with the discretionary “ ‘freedom to act according to one’s judgment in the absence of a hard and fast rule.’ ” (Quoting Schneider v. Hawkins, 179 Md. 21, 25 , 16 A.2d 861 (1940)). | 11 | 15 |
Fagnani v. Fishergreen2 sentences2015That discretion will naturally be affected by the character and location of the property and other circumstances peculiar to the case, so that it is impossible to lay down a hard and fast rule.... 418 Md. at 385 , 15 A.3d 282 (citation omitted). 2015That discretion will naturally be affected by the character and location of the property and other circumstances peculiar to the case, so that it is impossible to lay down a hard and fast rule.... 418 Md. at 385 , 15 A.3d 282 (citation omitted). | 2 | 2 |
Hart v. Millergreen2 sentences2007Gunning v. State, 347 Md. 332, 351 , 701 A.2d 374 (1997) (A “judge’s unyielding adherence to [a] predetermined position amounts to a ... failure to properly exercise discretion.”); Maus v. State, 311 Md. 85, 108 , 532 A.2d 1066 (1987) (“When a court must *503 exercise discretion, failure to do so is error, and ordinarily requires reversal.”); Colter v. State, 297 Md. 423, 428 , 466 A.2d 1286 (1983) (trial judge committed reversible error when he “applied a hard and fast rule[ ] of not granting a continuance”); Taliaferro, supra, 295 Md. at 390 , 456 A.2d 29 (“The exercise of discretion contemp 2007Gunning v. State, 347 Md. 332, 351 , 701 A.2d 374 (1997) (A “judge’s unyielding adherence to [a] predetermined position amounts to a ... failure to properly exercise discretion.”); Maus v. State, 311 Md. 85, 108 , 532 A.2d 1066 (1987) (“When a court must *503 exercise discretion, failure to do so is error, and ordinarily requires reversal.”); Colter v. State, 297 Md. 423, 428 , 466 A.2d 1286 (1983) (trial judge committed reversible error when he “applied a hard and fast rule[ ] of not granting a continuance”); Taliaferro, supra, 295 Md. at 390 , 456 A.2d 29 (“The exercise of discretion contemp | 2 | 2 |
Langnes v. Greengreen2 sentences2001See also Langnes v. Green, 282 U.S. 531, 544 , 51 S.Ct. 243, 248 , 75 L.Ed. 520, 526 (1931) (“discretion” means the absence of a hard and fast rule). 2001See also Langnes v. Green, 282 U.S. 531, 544 , 51 S.Ct. 243, 248 , 75 L.Ed. 520, 526 (1931) (“discretion” means the absence of a hard and fast rule). | 1 | 2 |
Securities And Exchange Commission v. Graystone Nash, Inc.green1 sentence2022It is “not the province of appellate courts to try to set down a hard and fast rule when, typically, the trial court is in a better position to know what means will accomplish the end of accommodating all interests.” Id. (cleaned up); see also Graystone Nash, 25 F.3d at 192-94 (emphasizing “the circumstances of the particular litigation,” and, therefore, that an “appropriate remedy is within the discretion of the trial court”); Robert Heidt, The Conjurer’s Circle-The Fifth Amendment Privilege in Civil Cases, 91 Yale L.J. 1062 , 1131-32 (1982) (“When previously invoking defendants … indicate be | 1 | 1 |
Holland v. Stategreen1 sentence2020Pietruszewski further argues: “Alternatively, the trial court’s refusal to allow [him] to ‘strike from the box’ is an abuse of the trial court’s discretion because the trial court failed to exercise any discretion” when it applied “a hard and fast rule” “for no reason other than that is what it always does[.]” The State responds that “[t]he practice of ‘striking from the box’ is a permitted, but not a required, method of exercising peremptory strikes under Maryland common law[,]” because Rule 4-313(b) does not expressly “require trial courts to permit ‘striking from the box.’” The State assert | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Corey Grantgreen2 sentences2018And, critically, the Third Circuit emphasized that "lower courts must consider the age of retirement as a sentencing factor, in addition to life expectancy [.]" Id. at 151 (emphasis added) (emphasis omitted). 2018The Third Circuit cautioned that it was "adopt[ing] only a rebuttable presumption that a non-incorrigible juvenile offender should be afforded an opportunity for release before the national age of retirement, not a hard and fast rule." Id. at 152 . | 1 | 1 |
Livesay v. Baltimore Countygreen2 sentences2015When applied to public officials, discretion is the power conferred upon them by law to act officially under certain circumstances according to the dictates of their own judgment and conscience and uncontrolled by the judgment or conscience of others.” Livesay, 384 Md. at 16 , 862 A.2d at 41 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 14 *714 Here, there can be no reasonable dispute that, at the time of the incident, Cooper was a public official, acting within the scope of his employment, and that he was authorized to use his discretion in the furtherance of his employment. 2015When applied to public officials, discretion is the power conferred upon them by law to act officially under certain circumstances according to the dictates of their own judgment and conscience and uncontrolled by the judgment or conscience of others.” Livesay, 384 Md. at 16 , 862 A.2d at 41 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 14 *714 Here, there can be no reasonable dispute that, at the time of the incident, Cooper was a public official, acting within the scope of his employment, and that he was authorized to use his discretion in the furtherance of his employment. | 1 | 1 |
Waters v. Prettymangreen2 sentences2012That discretion will naturally be affected by the character and location of the property and other circumstances peculiar to the case, so that it is impossible to lay down a hard and fast rule[.] Jackson, 249 Md. at 16-17 , 238 A.2d at 87 (quoting Webster, 176 Md. at 254-55 , 4 A.2d at 438 ); see Waters, 165 Md. at 75 , 166 A. at 432-33 . 2012That discretion will naturally be affected by the character and location of the property and other circumstances peculiar to the case, so that it is impossible to lay down a hard and fast rule[.] Jackson, 249 Md. at 16-17 , 238 A.2d at 87 (quoting Webster, 176 Md. at 254-55 , 4 A.2d at 438 ); see Waters, 165 Md. at 75 , 166 A. at 432-33 . | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Marcavagegreen2 sentences2012See Marcavage, supra, which analyzed the facial challenge first because of the "significantly heavier” burden required for facial challenges and anticipating a speedy resolution of this prong of the constitutional challenge. 609 F.3d at 273 . . 2012See Marcavage, supra, which analyzed the facial challenge first because of the "significantly heavier” burden required for facial challenges and anticipating a speedy resolution of this prong of the constitutional challenge. 609 F.3d at 273 . . | 1 | 1 |
Harris v. Stategreen2 sentences2010Although as a general rule, Brady issues crystalize after the conclusion of trial, and indeed, often in the context of collateral attacks on criminal verdicts, see, e.g., Harris v. State, 407 Md. 503, 506 , 966 A.2d 925, 926-27 (2009) (post conviction proceeding); Williams, 392 Md. at 202 , 896 A.2d at 977 (same); Grandison, 390 Md. 412 , 889 A.2d 366 (fifth appeal from conviction); State v. Thomas, 325 Md. 160 , 599 A.2d 1171 (1992) (post conviction proceeding); Bowers v. State, 320 Md. 416 , 578 A.2d 734 (1990) (same), we hasten to add that this is not a hard- and-fast requirement. 2010Although as a general rule, Brady issues crystalize after the conclusion of trial, and indeed, often in the context of collateral attacks on criminal verdicts, see, e.g., Harris v. State, 407 Md. 503, 506 , 966 A.2d 925, 926-27 (2009) (post conviction proceeding); Williams, 392 Md. at 202 , 896 A.2d at 977 (same); Grandison, 390 Md. 412 , 889 A.2d 366 (fifth appeal from conviction); State v. Thomas, 325 Md. 160 , 599 A.2d 1171 (1992) (post conviction proceeding); Bowers v. State, 320 Md. 416 , 578 A.2d 734 (1990) (same), we hasten to add that this is not a hard- and-fast requirement. | 1 | 1 |
Diallo v. Stategreen2 sentences2010See, e.g., Diallo v. State, 413 Md. 678 , 994 A.2d 820 (2010) (issue raised by pre-trial motion, and addressed in direct appeal); Ware v. State, 348 Md. 19 , 702 A.2d 699 (1997) (direct appeal in capital case). 2010See, e.g., Diallo v. State, 413 Md. 678 , 994 A.2d 820 (2010) (issue raised by pre-trial motion, and addressed in direct appeal); Ware v. State, 348 Md. 19 , 702 A.2d 699 (1997) (direct appeal in capital case). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Williamsgreen2 sentences2010Although as a general rule, Brady issues crystalize after the conclusion of trial, and indeed, often in the context of collateral attacks on criminal verdicts, see, e.g., Harris v. State, 407 Md. 503, 506 , 966 A.2d 925, 926-27 (2009) (post conviction proceeding); Williams, 392 Md. at 202 , 896 A.2d at 977 (same); Grandison, 390 Md. 412 , 889 A.2d 366 (fifth appeal from conviction); State v. Thomas, 325 Md. 160 , 599 A.2d 1171 (1992) (post conviction proceeding); Bowers v. State, 320 Md. 416 , 578 A.2d 734 (1990) (same), we hasten to add that this is not a hard- and-fast requirement. 2010Although as a general rule, Brady issues crystalize after the conclusion of trial, and indeed, often in the context of collateral attacks on criminal verdicts, see, e.g., Harris v. State, 407 Md. 503, 506 , 966 A.2d 925, 926-27 (2009) (post conviction proceeding); Williams, 392 Md. at 202 , 896 A.2d at 977 (same); Grandison, 390 Md. 412 , 889 A.2d 366 (fifth appeal from conviction); State v. Thomas, 325 Md. 160 , 599 A.2d 1171 (1992) (post conviction proceeding); Bowers v. State, 320 Md. 416 , 578 A.2d 734 (1990) (same), we hasten to add that this is not a hard- and-fast requirement. | 1 | 1 |
Maus v. Stategreen2 sentences2007Gunning v. State, 347 Md. 332, 351 , 701 A.2d 374 (1997) (A “judge’s unyielding adherence to [a] predetermined position amounts to a ... failure to properly exercise discretion.”); Maus v. State, 311 Md. 85, 108 , 532 A.2d 1066 (1987) (“When a court must *503 exercise discretion, failure to do so is error, and ordinarily requires reversal.”); Colter v. State, 297 Md. 423, 428 , 466 A.2d 1286 (1983) (trial judge committed reversible error when he “applied a hard and fast rule[ ] of not granting a continuance”); Taliaferro, supra, 295 Md. at 390 , 456 A.2d 29 (“The exercise of discretion contemp 2007Gunning v. State, 347 Md. 332, 351 , 701 A.2d 374 (1997) (A “judge’s unyielding adherence to [a] predetermined position amounts to a ... failure to properly exercise discretion.”); Maus v. State, 311 Md. 85, 108 , 532 A.2d 1066 (1987) (“When a court must *503 exercise discretion, failure to do so is error, and ordinarily requires reversal.”); Colter v. State, 297 Md. 423, 428 , 466 A.2d 1286 (1983) (trial judge committed reversible error when he “applied a hard and fast rule[ ] of not granting a continuance”); Taliaferro, supra, 295 Md. at 390 , 456 A.2d 29 (“The exercise of discretion contemp | 1 | 1 |
| Schultze v. Montgomery County Planning Boardgreen | 1 | 1 |
| In Re Don Mc.green | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Craiggreen | 1 | 1 |
| Anglo-American Grain Co. v. the S/T Mina D'Amicogreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Maryland. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
James v. Prince George's County
yellow
2 sentences2015As the name of the doctrine suggests, public official immunity protects public officials from liability under certain circumstances in order to ensure that they are free to make decisions in the exercise of judgment “in the absence of a hard and fast rule.” James v. Prince George’s Cnty., 288 Md. 315, 326 , 418 A.2d 1173 (1980) (citation omitted). 2015As the name of the doctrine suggests, public official immunity protects public officials from liability under certain circumstances in order to ensure that they are free to make decisions in the exercise of judgment “in the absence of a hard and fast rule.” James v. Prince George’s Cnty., 288 Md. 315, 326 , 418 A.2d 1173 (1980) (citation omitted). | 5 | 1989–2015 |
Colter v. State
green
2 sentences2007Gunning v. State, 347 Md. 332, 351 , 701 A.2d 374 (1997) (A “judge’s unyielding adherence to [a] predetermined position amounts to a ... failure to properly exercise discretion.”); Maus v. State, 311 Md. 85, 108 , 532 A.2d 1066 (1987) (“When a court must *503 exercise discretion, failure to do so is error, and ordinarily requires reversal.”); Colter v. State, 297 Md. 423, 428 , 466 A.2d 1286 (1983) (trial judge committed reversible error when he “applied a hard and fast rule[ ] of not granting a continuance”); Taliaferro, supra, 295 Md. at 390 , 456 A.2d 29 (“The exercise of discretion contemp 2007Gunning v. State, 347 Md. 332, 351 , 701 A.2d 374 (1997) (A “judge’s unyielding adherence to [a] predetermined position amounts to a ... failure to properly exercise discretion.”); Maus v. State, 311 Md. 85, 108 , 532 A.2d 1066 (1987) (“When a court must *503 exercise discretion, failure to do so is error, and ordinarily requires reversal.”); Colter v. State, 297 Md. 423, 428 , 466 A.2d 1286 (1983) (trial judge committed reversible error when he “applied a hard and fast rule[ ] of not granting a continuance”); Taliaferro, supra, 295 Md. at 390 , 456 A.2d 29 (“The exercise of discretion contemp | 3 | 1997–2012 |
Webster v. Archer
green
2 sentences2012That discretion will naturally be affected by the character and location of the property and other circumstances peculiar to the case, so that it is impossible to lay down a hard and fast rule[.] Jackson, 249 Md. at 16-17 , 238 A.2d at 87 (quoting Webster, 176 Md. at 254-55 , 4 A.2d at 438 ); see Waters, 165 Md. at 75 , 166 A. at 432-33 . 2012That discretion will naturally be affected by the character and location of the property and other circumstances peculiar to the case, so that it is impossible to lay down a hard and fast rule[.] Jackson, 249 Md. at 16-17 , 238 A.2d at 87 (quoting Webster, 176 Md. at 254-55 , 4 A.2d at 438 ); see Waters, 165 Md. at 75 , 166 A. at 432-33 . | 3 | 1968–2012 |
Gunning v. State
green
2 sentences2007Gunning v. State, 347 Md. 332, 351 , 701 A.2d 374 (1997) (A “judge’s unyielding adherence to [a] predetermined position amounts to a ... failure to properly exercise discretion.”); Maus v. State, 311 Md. 85, 108 , 532 A.2d 1066 (1987) (“When a court must *503 exercise discretion, failure to do so is error, and ordinarily requires reversal.”); Colter v. State, 297 Md. 423, 428 , 466 A.2d 1286 (1983) (trial judge committed reversible error when he “applied a hard and fast rule[ ] of not granting a continuance”); Taliaferro, supra, 295 Md. at 390 , 456 A.2d 29 (“The exercise of discretion contemp 2007Gunning v. State, 347 Md. 332, 351 , 701 A.2d 374 (1997) (A “judge’s unyielding adherence to [a] predetermined position amounts to a ... failure to properly exercise discretion.”); Maus v. State, 311 Md. 85, 108 , 532 A.2d 1066 (1987) (“When a court must *503 exercise discretion, failure to do so is error, and ordinarily requires reversal.”); Colter v. State, 297 Md. 423, 428 , 466 A.2d 1286 (1983) (trial judge committed reversible error when he “applied a hard and fast rule[ ] of not granting a continuance”); Taliaferro, supra, 295 Md. at 390 , 456 A.2d 29 (“The exercise of discretion contemp | 2 | 2007–2013 |
Tracey v. Tracey
green
2 sentences1998Tracey, 328 Md. at 393 , 614 A.2d 590 . 1998Tracey, 328 Md. at 393 , 614 A.2d 590 . | 2 | 1995–1998 |
Lustine v. State Roads Commission
green
2 sentences1971This rule has been enunciated both with regard to sales of the land in question, Baltimore City v. Schreiber, supra, and also to comparable sales in the neighborhood, *210 Lustine v. State Roads Comm., 217 Md. 274 , 142 A. 2d 566 (1958), but nowhere have we established a hard and fast standard either for admission or exclusion of such evidence.” Id. at 373-74 . 1971This rule has been enunciated both with regard to sales of the land in question, Baltimore City v. Schreiber, supra, and also to comparable sales in the neighborhood, *210 Lustine v. State Roads Comm., 217 Md. 274 , 142 A. 2d 566 (1958), but nowhere have we established a hard and fast standard either for admission or exclusion of such evidence.” Id. at 373-74 . | 2 | 1970–1971 |
United States v. Certain Real Property and Premises Known As
green
1 sentence2022It is “not the province of appellate courts to try to set down a hard and fast rule when, typically, the trial court is in a better position to know what means will accomplish the end of accommodating all interests.” Id. (cleaned up); see also Graystone Nash, 25 F.3d at 192-94 (emphasizing “the circumstances of the particular litigation,” and, therefore, that an “appropriate remedy is within the discretion of the trial court”); Robert Heidt, The Conjurer’s Circle-The Fifth Amendment Privilege in Civil Cases, 91 Yale L.J. 1062 , 1131-32 (1982) (“When previously invoking defendants … indicate be | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Sawyer v. Humphries
green
2 sentences2020The Court did not disavow its statement in Sawyer that “courts tend to hold that” such conduct “in itself is sufficient to indicate that the motive was a purely personal one,” id. (quoting Sawyer, 322 Md. at 257 ), but reaffirmed that “[t]his language does not establish a hard-and-fast rule,” id. at 312 . 2020The Court did not disavow its statement in Sawyer that “courts tend to hold that” such conduct “in itself is sufficient to indicate that the motive was a purely personal one,” id. (quoting Sawyer, 322 Md. at 257 ), but reaffirmed that “[t]his language does not establish a hard-and-fast rule,” id. at 312 . | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Dallas v. State
green
2 sentences2018Id. at 598-99 , 993 A.2d at 672 . 2018Id. at 598-99 , 993 A.2d at 672 . | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Lee v. Cline
green
2 sentences2015The doctrine protects against errors in judgment that might expose an official to suit, and “is intended to be a defense against claims that a ‘better choice’ could have been made by an official.” Lee v. Cline, 384 Md. 245, 261 , 863 A.2d 297 (2004). 2015The doctrine protects against errors in judgment that might expose an official to suit, and “is intended to be a defense against claims that a ‘better choice’ could have been made by an official.” Lee v. Cline, 384 Md. 245, 261 , 863 A.2d 297 (2004). | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Jackson v. Townshend
green
2 sentences2012That discretion will naturally be affected by the character and location of the property and other circumstances peculiar to the case, so that it is impossible to lay down a hard and fast rule[.] Jackson, 249 Md. at 16-17 , 238 A.2d at 87 (quoting Webster, 176 Md. at 254-55 , 4 A.2d at 438 ); see Waters, 165 Md. at 75 , 166 A. at 432-33 . 2012That discretion will naturally be affected by the character and location of the property and other circumstances peculiar to the case, so that it is impossible to lay down a hard and fast rule[.] Jackson, 249 Md. at 16-17 , 238 A.2d at 87 (quoting Webster, 176 Md. at 254-55 , 4 A.2d at 438 ); see Waters, 165 Md. at 75 , 166 A. at 432-33 . | 1 | 2012–2012 |
MARIO W. v. Kaipio
green
1 sentence2012Id. [31] Analyzing the as-applied challenge first is, apparently, not a hard and fast rule. | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Bowers v. State
green
2 sentences2010Although as a general rule, Brady issues crystalize after the conclusion of trial, and indeed, often in the context of collateral attacks on criminal verdicts, see, e.g., Harris v. State, 407 Md. 503, 506 , 966 A.2d 925, 926-27 (2009) (post conviction proceeding); Williams, 392 Md. at 202 , 896 A.2d at 977 (same); Grandison, 390 Md. 412 , 889 A.2d 366 (fifth appeal from conviction); State v. Thomas, 325 Md. 160 , 599 A.2d 1171 (1992) (post conviction proceeding); Bowers v. State, 320 Md. 416 , 578 A.2d 734 (1990) (same), we hasten to add that this is not a hard- and-fast requirement. 2010Although as a general rule, Brady issues crystalize after the conclusion of trial, and indeed, often in the context of collateral attacks on criminal verdicts, see, e.g., Harris v. State, 407 Md. 503, 506 , 966 A.2d 925, 926-27 (2009) (post conviction proceeding); Williams, 392 Md. at 202 , 896 A.2d at 977 (same); Grandison, 390 Md. 412 , 889 A.2d 366 (fifth appeal from conviction); State v. Thomas, 325 Md. 160 , 599 A.2d 1171 (1992) (post conviction proceeding); Bowers v. State, 320 Md. 416 , 578 A.2d 734 (1990) (same), we hasten to add that this is not a hard- and-fast requirement. | 1 | 2010–2010 |
State v. Thomas
green
2 sentences2010Although as a general rule, Brady issues crystalize after the conclusion of trial, and indeed, often in the context of collateral attacks on criminal verdicts, see, e.g., Harris v. State, 407 Md. 503, 506 , 966 A.2d 925, 926-27 (2009) (post conviction proceeding); Williams, 392 Md. at 202 , 896 A.2d at 977 (same); Grandison, 390 Md. 412 , 889 A.2d 366 (fifth appeal from conviction); State v. Thomas, 325 Md. 160 , 599 A.2d 1171 (1992) (post conviction proceeding); Bowers v. State, 320 Md. 416 , 578 A.2d 734 (1990) (same), we hasten to add that this is not a hard- and-fast requirement. 2010Although as a general rule, Brady issues crystalize after the conclusion of trial, and indeed, often in the context of collateral attacks on criminal verdicts, see, e.g., Harris v. State, 407 Md. 503, 506 , 966 A.2d 925, 926-27 (2009) (post conviction proceeding); Williams, 392 Md. at 202 , 896 A.2d at 977 (same); Grandison, 390 Md. 412 , 889 A.2d 366 (fifth appeal from conviction); State v. Thomas, 325 Md. 160 , 599 A.2d 1171 (1992) (post conviction proceeding); Bowers v. State, 320 Md. 416 , 578 A.2d 734 (1990) (same), we hasten to add that this is not a hard- and-fast requirement. | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Grandison v. State
green
2 sentences2010Although as a general rule, Brady issues crystalize after the conclusion of trial, and indeed, often in the context of collateral attacks on criminal verdicts, see, e.g., Harris v. State, 407 Md. 503, 506 , 966 A.2d 925, 926-27 (2009) (post conviction proceeding); Williams, 392 Md. at 202 , 896 A.2d at 977 (same); Grandison, 390 Md. 412 , 889 A.2d 366 (fifth appeal from conviction); State v. Thomas, 325 Md. 160 , 599 A.2d 1171 (1992) (post conviction proceeding); Bowers v. State, 320 Md. 416 , 578 A.2d 734 (1990) (same), we hasten to add that this is not a hard- and-fast requirement. 2010Although as a general rule, Brady issues crystalize after the conclusion of trial, and indeed, often in the context of collateral attacks on criminal verdicts, see, e.g., Harris v. State, 407 Md. 503, 506 , 966 A.2d 925, 926-27 (2009) (post conviction proceeding); Williams, 392 Md. at 202 , 896 A.2d at 977 (same); Grandison, 390 Md. 412 , 889 A.2d 366 (fifth appeal from conviction); State v. Thomas, 325 Md. 160 , 599 A.2d 1171 (1992) (post conviction proceeding); Bowers v. State, 320 Md. 416 , 578 A.2d 734 (1990) (same), we hasten to add that this is not a hard- and-fast requirement. | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Ware v. State
green
2 sentences2010See, e.g., Diallo v. State, 413 Md. 678 , 994 A.2d 820 (2010) (issue raised by pre-trial motion, and addressed in direct appeal); Ware v. State, 348 Md. 19 , 702 A.2d 699 (1997) (direct appeal in capital case). 2010See, e.g., Diallo v. State, 413 Md. 678 , 994 A.2d 820 (2010) (issue raised by pre-trial motion, and addressed in direct appeal); Ware v. State, 348 Md. 19 , 702 A.2d 699 (1997) (direct appeal in capital case). | 1 | 2010–2010 |
| Taliaferro v. State green | 1 | 2007–2007 |
| Scully v. Tauber green | 1 | 2007–2007 |
| Nutter v. Non-Profit Housing green | 1 | 2007–2007 |
| Harris v. Bridgford green | 1 | 2005–2005 |
| Taylor v. Taylor green | 1 | 2002–2002 |
| Saltzgaver v. Saltzgaver green | 1 | 2001–2001 |
| City of Austin v. Cannizzo green | 1 | 2001–2001 |
| State Ex Rel. State Highway Commission v. Williams green | 1 | 2001–2001 |
| Comptroller of the Treasury v. Maryland State Bar Ass'n green | 1 | 2000–2000 |
| Ashburn v. Anne Arundel County green | 1 | 2000–2000 |
| In Re Application of George B. green | 1 | 1997–1997 |
| Dennison v. State green | 1 | 1997–1997 |
| Wallace v. Wallace green | 1 | 1992–1992 |
| Supervisor of Assessments v. Group Health Ass'n green | 1 | 1989–1989 |
| Miller v. Hospelhorn green | 1 | 1972–1972 |
| Jones, Adm. v. Hamilton, Adm. green | 1 | 1972–1972 |
| Mayor of Baltimore v. State Roads Commission green | 1 | 1971–1971 |
| Pumphrey v. State Roads Commission green | 1 | 1961–1961 |
| Bergeman v. State Roads Commission green | 1 | 1961–1961 |
| Belle Isle Cab Co. v. Pruitt green | 1 | 1953–1953 |
| Whitman v. Forney green | 1 | 1949–1949 |
| Hunter v. Highland Land Co. neutral | 1 | 1939–1939 |
| Long v. Worden green | 1 | 1939–1939 |
| Stirling v. McLane green | 1 | 1939–1939 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.