hard and fast rule in Pennsylvania

2021In concluding the officers’ [J-6-2021] [MO: Mundy, J.] - 8 movement of the suspect was reasonable, we were “persuaded that a hard and fast rule that would equate placing a suspect in a police vehicle and transporting him with an arrest requiring probable cause, in all instances, would be an arbitrarily crabbed view of Terry[.]” Id. at 706 .

2017In Commonwealth v. Revere, 888 A.2d 694 (Pa. 2005), the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania was “persuaded that a hard and fast rule that would equate placing a suspect in a police vehicle and transporting him with an arrest requiring probable cause, in all instances, would be an arbitrarily crabbed view of Terry.” Id. at 706 (footnote omitted). “[T]here is no hard and fast rule which prohibits the movement of suspects during the course of an investigative detention.” Id. at 703-04 .

1997Id. at 536 , 427 A.2d at 144 .

1997Id. at 536 , 427 A.2d at 144 .

2023See also Liberty Bank v. Ruder, 587 A.2d 761, 763 (Pa. Super. 1991) (“Rather than be bound by a hard and fast rule, we have repeatedly found that certain orders which have not put a litigant ‘out of court’ or completely terminated the litigation have nevertheless been held to possess sufficient aspects of finality to be appealable because the effect of the order has been to preclude the litigant from presenting her claim.”) (citation & some quotation marks omitted); West v. West, 446 A.2d 1342, 1342 (Pa. Super. 1982) (“The finality of an order is a judicial conclusion which can be reached only

2022Molnar & Associates, 950 A.2d 980, 986 (Pa. Super. 2008) (“[T]o determine whether finality is achieved, we must consider whether the practical ramification of the order will be to dispose of the case, making review appropriate.”) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted); Liberty Bank v. Ruder, 587 A.2d 761, 763 (Pa. Super. 1991) (“Rather than be bound by a hard and fast rule, we have repeatedly found that certain orders which have not put a litigant ‘out of court’ or completely terminated the litigation have nevertheless been held to possess sufficient aspects of finality to be appeala

2023See also Liberty Bank v. Ruder, 587 A.2d 761, 763 (Pa. Super. 1991) (“Rather than be bound by a hard and fast rule, we have repeatedly found that certain orders which have not put a litigant ‘out of court’ or completely terminated the litigation have nevertheless been held to possess sufficient aspects of finality to be appealable because the effect of the order has been to preclude the litigant from presenting her claim.”) (citation & some quotation marks omitted); West v. West, 446 A.2d 1342, 1342 (Pa. Super. 1982) (“The finality of an order is a judicial conclusion which can be reached only

2022Molnar & Associates, 950 A.2d 980, 986 (Pa. Super. 2008) (“[T]o determine whether finality is achieved, we must consider whether the practical ramification of the order will be to dispose of the case, making review appropriate.”) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted); Liberty Bank v. Ruder, 587 A.2d 761, 763 (Pa. Super. 1991) (“Rather than be bound by a hard and fast rule, we have repeatedly found that certain orders which have not put a litigant ‘out of court’ or completely terminated the litigation have nevertheless been held to possess sufficient aspects of finality to be appeala

2013Burns Int’l Detective Agency, 337 Pa. 587 , 12 A.2d 25 (1940) (a servant’s scope of employment is necessarily dependent on circumstances, a hard and fast rule cannot be laid down as to the scope of any employment; it is ordinarily a question for the jury whether or not a particular act comes within the scope of a servant’s employment).

2013Burns Int’l Detective Agency, 337 Pa. 587 , 12 A.2d 25 (1940) (a servant’s scope of employment is necessarily dependent on circumstances, a hard and fast rule cannot be laid down as to the scope of any employment; it is ordinarily a question for the jury whether or not a particular act comes within the scope of a servant’s employment).

2022Molnar & Associates, 950 A.2d 980, 986 (Pa. Super. 2008) (“[T]o determine whether finality is achieved, we must consider whether the practical ramification of the order will be to dispose of the case, making review appropriate.”) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted); Liberty Bank v. Ruder, 587 A.2d 761, 763 (Pa. Super. 1991) (“Rather than be bound by a hard and fast rule, we have repeatedly found that certain orders which have not put a litigant ‘out of court’ or completely terminated the litigation have nevertheless been held to possess sufficient aspects of finality to be appeala

2016See also 1198 Butler Street Associates v. Board of Assessment Appeals, County of Northampton, 946 A.2d 1131, 1140 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2008) (“A court must consider the economic realties [sic] associated with property when assessing its fair market value.”). 12 substantial evidence that the highest-and-best-use for the units was as a fractured condominium.10 Further, Dockside argued that the requirement in Section 3105 of the Uniform Condominium Act11 (UCA) that each residential (condominium) unit must be valued in isolation, rather than as part of an “integrated economic unit”, is not a hard-and-fast

2014Commonwealth v. Dennis, 618 A.2d 972, 981 (Pa. Super. 1992), appeal denied, 634 A.2d 218 (Pa. 1993).

2006See Cunningham v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Bd. (Inglis House), 156 Pa.Cmwlth. 241 , 627 A.2d 218 (1993). 8 In light of the timing of the decision, the Cunningham court was left to fill that gap and fix the point of obligation in the absence of any binding legislative or administrative direction.

2006See Cunningham v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Bd. (Inglis House), 156 Pa.Cmwlth. 241 , 627 A.2d 218 (1993). 8 In light of the timing of the decision, the Cunningham court was left to fill that gap and fix the point of obligation in the absence of any binding legislative or administrative direction.

2005See also United States v. Acosta-Colon, 157 F.3d 9, 17 (1st Cir.1998) ("Whatever might qualify as reasons of safety and security sufficient to justify moving a suspect from one location to another during an investigatory detention[,] ... the requisite justification cannot rest upon bald assertions, such as those offered by the government here. . . .

2005Id. at 635-36. 13 Finally, another common circumstance where courts have deemed police action consistent with Terry is when police transport a suspect back to the scene of the crime for purposes of a show-up identification, i.e., so as to immediately confirm or dispel reasonable suspicion that the suspect was involved in a recently reported crime. 14 Upon consideration of this significant authority, we are persuaded that a hard and fast rule that would equate placing a suspect in a police vehicle and transporting him with an arrest requiring probable cause, in all instances, would be an arbitr

2005Id. at 635-36. [13] Finally, another common circumstance where courts have deemed *706 police action consistent with Terry is when police transport a suspect back to the scene of the crime for purposes of a show-up identification, i.e., so as to immediately confirm or dispel reasonable suspicion that the suspect was involved in a recently reported crime. [14] Upon consideration of this significant authority, we are persuaded that a hard and fast rule that would equate placing a suspect in a police vehicle and transporting him with an arrest requiring probable cause, in all instances, would be

1992Although the nursing home contends that it admits patients without regard to their ability to pay, when the executive vice-president of the hospital was asked whether a nonpaying resident would be admitted over a paying resident, he responded, We would be really forced I would think to take—we don’t have a hard and fast rule to answer that' question, but we would be prudent to take the person who could afford to pay us for the care.’ At p. 623, 604 A.2d at p. 1123 (emphasis in original).

1991Rather than be bound by a hard and fast rule, we have repeatedly found that “[cjertain orders which have not put a litigant ‘out of court’ or completely terminated the litigation have nevertheless been held to possess sufficient aspects of finality to be appealable because the effect of the order has been to preclude the litigant from [presenting her claim].” Urban, 332 Pa.Super. at 377-80 , 481 A.2d at 664-65 (citations omitted).

1991Rather than be bound by a hard and fast rule, we have repeatedly found that “[cjertain orders which have not put a litigant ‘out of court’ or completely terminated the litigation have nevertheless been held to possess sufficient aspects of finality to be appealable because the effect of the order has been to preclude the litigant from [presenting her claim].” Urban, 332 Pa.Super. at 377-80 , 481 A.2d at 664-65 (citations omitted).

1991Id., 94 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. at 481-82, 504 A.2d at 389 (emphasis added).

1991Id., 94 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. at 481-82, 504 A.2d at 389 (emphasis added).

1983In Commonwealth v. Ryan, 300 Pa.Super. 156, 170 , 446 A.2d 277, 284 (1982) we wrote, “Courts are reluctant to set a hard and fast rule as to what constitutes staleness of information for a search; such a determination must be made on a case by case basis.” At the suppression hearing the officer who secured the search warrant testified that the address named as appellant’s residence was one he had given the police when he was arrested in October, 1977.

1983In Commonwealth v. Ryan, 300 Pa.Super. 156, 170 , 446 A.2d 277, 284 (1982) we wrote, “Courts are reluctant to set a hard and fast rule as to what constitutes staleness of information for a search; such a determination must be made on a case by case basis.” At the suppression hearing the officer who secured the search warrant testified that the address named as appellant’s residence was one he had given the police when he was arrested in October, 1977.

1981United States v. Harris, 403 U.S. 573 , 579 n.2, 91 S.Ct. 2075 , 2079 n.2, 29 L.Ed.2d 723 (1971); see Tolbert, 492 Pa. at 579 , 424 A.2d at 1344 ; Eazer, 455 Pa. at 324 , 312 A.2d at 400 ; Shaw, 444 Pa. at 113-14 , 281 A.2d at 899 .

1981United States v. Harris, 403 U.S. 573 , 579 n.2, 91 S.Ct. 2075 , 2079 n.2, 29 L.Ed.2d 723 (1971); see Tolbert, 492 Pa. at 579 , 424 A.2d at 1344 ; Eazer, 455 Pa. at 324 , 312 A.2d at 400 ; Shaw, 444 Pa. at 113-14 , 281 A.2d at 899 .