hard and fast rule in Connecticut

1991It denotes "the absence of a hard and fast rule or a mandatory procedure regardless of varying circumstances." State v. Wallach, 353 Mo. 312, 323 , 182 S.W.2d 313 (1944).

1991It denotes "the absence of a hard and fast rule or a mandatory procedure regardless of varying circumstances." State v. Wallach, 353 Mo. 312, 323 , 182 S.W.2d 313 (1944).

1994In Carlson , the Appellate Court cited with approval dicta from Dadukian v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 135 Conn. 706, 711-12 , 68 A.2d 123 (1949), in which Chief Justice Maltbie noted that the principle that a zoning authority should not be permitted to review its own decisions was “not a hard and fast rule, but a board’s reversal of its action should be permitted only when there is justification and good cause.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id.

1994In Carlson , the Appellate Court cited with approval dicta from Dadukian v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 135 Conn. 706, 711-12 , 68 A.2d 123 (1949), in which Chief Justice Maltbie noted that the principle that a zoning authority should not be permitted to review its own decisions was “not a hard and fast rule, but a board’s reversal of its action should be permitted only when there is justification and good cause.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id.

1991It means "`"a legal discretion to be exercised in conformity with the spirit of the law and in a manner to subserve and not to impede or defeat the ends of substantial justice."'" Buckley v. Warden, 181 Conn. 286 , 290 , 435 A.2d 348 (1980), quoting Hammerberg v. Leinert, 132 Conn. 596 , 604 , 46 A.2d 420 (1946); see State v. Battle, 170 Conn. 469 , 476 , 365 A.2d 1100 (1976)." State v. Corchado, 200 Conn. 453 , 464 , 512 A.2d 183 (1986).

1991It means "`"a legal discretion to be exercised in conformity with the spirit of the law and in a manner to subserve and not to impede or defeat the ends of substantial justice."'" Buckley v. Warden, 181 Conn. 286 , 290 , 435 A.2d 348 (1980), quoting Hammerberg v. Leinert, 132 Conn. 596 , 604 , 46 A.2d 420 (1946); see State v. Battle, 170 Conn. 469 , 476 , 365 A.2d 1100 (1976)." State v. Corchado, 200 Conn. 453 , 464 , 512 A.2d 183 (1986).

1991It means "`"a legal discretion to be exercised in conformity with the spirit of the law and in a manner to subserve and not to impede or defeat the ends of substantial justice."'" Buckley v. Warden, 181 Conn. 286 , 290 , 435 A.2d 348 (1980), quoting Hammerberg v. Leinert, 132 Conn. 596 , 604 , 46 A.2d 420 (1946); see State v. Battle, 170 Conn. 469 , 476 , 365 A.2d 1100 (1976)." State v. Corchado, 200 Conn. 453 , 464 , 512 A.2d 183 (1986).

1991It means "`"a legal discretion to be exercised in conformity with the spirit of the law and in a manner to subserve and not to impede or defeat the ends of substantial justice."'" Buckley v. Warden, 181 Conn. 286 , 290 , 435 A.2d 348 (1980), quoting Hammerberg v. Leinert, 132 Conn. 596 , 604 , 46 A.2d 420 (1946); see State v. Battle, 170 Conn. 469 , 476 , 365 A.2d 1100 (1976)." State v. Corchado, 200 Conn. 453 , 464 , 512 A.2d 183 (1986).

2017Cognizant that this doctrine is not " 'a hard and fast rule' "; State v. Brabham , supra, 301 Conn. at 380 , 21 A.3d 800 ; we conclude that, under these facts and circumstances, dismissal of the defendant's appeal is not warranted under the fugitive felon disentitlement doctrine.

2017Cognizant that this doctrine is not " 'a hard and fast rule' "; State v. Brabham , supra, 301 Conn. at 380 , 21 A.3d 800 ; we conclude that, under these facts and circumstances, dismissal of the defendant's appeal is not warranted under the fugitive felon disentitlement doctrine.

2011Ed. 2d 377 (1975) (discussing propriety of prior decisions “declining to review convictions” of fugitive felons in decision dismissing appeal by former fugitive restored to custody by time of appeal); Valle v. Commissioner of Correction, 244 Conn. 634, 638 , 711 A.2d 722 (1998) (Berdon, J., dissenting) (“[fugitive felon] disenti-tlement doctrine is not a hard and fast rule, and should be applied only” in certain circumstances); State v. Leslie, 166 Conn. 393, 395 , 349 A.2d 843 (1974) (while flight “does not strip the case of its character as an adjudica-ble case or controversy, we believe it

2011Ed. 2d 377 (1975) (discussing propriety of prior decisions “declining to review convictions” of fugitive felons in decision dismissing appeal by former fugitive restored to custody by time of appeal); Valle v. Commissioner of Correction, 244 Conn. 634, 638 , 711 A.2d 722 (1998) (Berdon, J., dissenting) (“[fugitive felon] disenti-tlement doctrine is not a hard and fast rule, and should be applied only” in certain circumstances); State v. Leslie, 166 Conn. 393, 395 , 349 A.2d 843 (1974) (while flight “does not strip the case of its character as an adjudica-ble case or controversy, we believe it

2011Ed. 2d 377 (1975) (discussing propriety of prior decisions “declining to review convictions” of fugitive felons in decision dismissing appeal by former fugitive restored to custody by time of appeal); Valle v. Commissioner of Correction, 244 Conn. 634, 638 , 711 A.2d 722 (1998) (Berdon, J., dissenting) (“[fugitive felon] disenti-tlement doctrine is not a hard and fast rule, and should be applied only” in certain circumstances); State v. Leslie, 166 Conn. 393, 395 , 349 A.2d 843 (1974) (while flight “does not strip the case of its character as an adjudica-ble case or controversy, we believe it

2011Ed. 2d 377 (1975) (discussing propriety of prior decisions “declining to review convictions” of fugitive felons in decision dismissing appeal by former fugitive restored to custody by time of appeal); Valle v. Commissioner of Correction, 244 Conn. 634, 638 , 711 A.2d 722 (1998) (Berdon, J., dissenting) (“[fugitive felon] disenti-tlement doctrine is not a hard and fast rule, and should be applied only” in certain circumstances); State v. Leslie, 166 Conn. 393, 395 , 349 A.2d 843 (1974) (while flight “does not strip the case of its character as an adjudica-ble case or controversy, we believe it

2011Ed. 2d 377 (1975) (discussing propriety of prior decisions “declining to review convictions” of fugitive felons in decision dismissing appeal by former fugitive restored to custody by time of appeal); Valle v. Commissioner of Correction, 244 Conn. 634, 638 , 711 A.2d 722 (1998) (Berdon, J., dissenting) (“[fugitive felon] disenti-tlement doctrine is not a hard and fast rule, and should be applied only” in certain circumstances); State v. Leslie, 166 Conn. 393, 395 , 349 A.2d 843 (1974) (while flight “does not strip the case of its character as an adjudica-ble case or controversy, we believe it

2011Ed. 2d 377 (1975) (discussing propriety of prior decisions “declining to review convictions” of fugitive felons in decision dismissing appeal by former fugitive restored to custody by time of appeal); Valle v. Commissioner of Correction, 244 Conn. 634, 638 , 711 A.2d 722 (1998) (Berdon, J., dissenting) (“[fugitive felon] disenti-tlement doctrine is not a hard and fast rule, and should be applied only” in certain circumstances); State v. Leslie, 166 Conn. 393, 395 , 349 A.2d 843 (1974) (while flight “does not strip the case of its character as an adjudica-ble case or controversy, we believe it

1998The following reasons have been given in support of the doctrine: (1) “the judgment on review may be impossible to enforce” because the prisoner has escaped, (2) the prisoner’s “escape disentitles him to call upon the resources of the Court for determination of his claims,” (3) dismissal will “[discourage] the felony of escape and [encourage] voluntary surrenders,” and (4) dismissal will “[promote] the efficient, dignified operation of the courts.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Degen v. United States, 517 U.S. 820, 824 , 116 S. Ct. 1777 , 135 L.

1998The following reasons have been given in support of the doctrine: (1) “the judgment on review may be impossible to enforce” because the prisoner has escaped, (2) the prisoner’s “escape disentitles him to call upon the resources of the Court for determination of his claims,” (3) dismissal will “[discourage] the felony of escape and [encourage] voluntary surrenders,” and (4) dismissal will “[promote] the efficient, dignified operation of the courts.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Degen v. United States, 517 U.S. 820, 824 , 116 S. Ct. 1777 , 135 L.

1985While we are not inclined to lay down a hard and fast rule for dealing with the prior statements of witnesses and prefer that the procedure to be followed be left to the discretion of the trial court, we see much merit in the prophylactic procedural suggestion outlined in United States v. Gardin, supra, 605 . 2 III Michael Barrett, a suspect sketch artist with the Westport police department, testified as a witness for the state.