hard and fast rule in New York

1958On the contrary, the principle applies, as we have said, only when ‘ the circumstances of the purchase amount to an admission of the validity and lien of the outstanding incumbrance’ (Purdy v. Coar, 109 N. Y. 448, 453 ; Morrill Realty Corp. v. Rayon Holding Corp., 254 N. Y. 268, 275 )." Defendant contends that the former owner of the premises obtained a fire insurance policy which named defendant as first mortgagee and had loss, if any, payable to the said first mortgagee.

1952On the contrary, the principle applies, as we have said, only when “ the circumstances of the purchase amount to an admission of the validity and lien of the outstanding incumbrance ” (Purdy v. Coar, 109 N. Y. 448, 453 ; Morrill Realty Corp v. Rayon Holding Corp., 254 N. Y. 268, 275 ).

1958On the contrary, the principle applies, as we have said, only when ‘ the circumstances of the purchase amount to an admission of the validity and lien of the outstanding incumbrance’ (Purdy v. Coar, 109 N. Y. 448, 453 ; Morrill Realty Corp. v. Rayon Holding Corp., 254 N. Y. 268, 275 )." Defendant contends that the former owner of the premises obtained a fire insurance policy which named defendant as first mortgagee and had loss, if any, payable to the said first mortgagee.

1952On the contrary, the principle applies, as we have said, only when “ the circumstances of the purchase amount to an admission of the validity and lien of the outstanding incumbrance ” (Purdy v. Coar, 109 N. Y. 448, 453 ; Morrill Realty Corp v. Rayon Holding Corp., 254 N. Y. 268, 275 ).

1958In Shohfi v. Shohfi ( 303 N. Y. 370, 376 ) the court stated: “ The principle that acceptance of a title subject to a mortgage can interrupt or suspend the Statute of Limitations has never been declared by this court to be a hard and fast rule.

1957In Shohfi v. Shohfi ( 303 N. Y. 370, 376 ) the Court of Appeals said: “ The principle that acceptance of a title subject to a mortgage can interrupt or suspend the Statute of Limitations has never been declared by this court to be a hard and fast rule.

1898Bishop v. Palmer, 146 Mass. 469 , 16 N. E. 299 ; Oil Co. v. Nunnemaker, 142 Ind. 560 , 41 N. E. 1048 .

1898Bishop v. Palmer, 146 Mass. 469 , 16 N. E. 299 ; Oil Co. v. Nunnemaker, 142 Ind. 560 , 41 N. E. 1048 .

1898Bishop v. Palmer, 146 Mass. 469 , 16 N. E. 299 ; Oil Co. v. Nunnemaker, 142 Ind. 560 , 41 N. E. 1048 .

1898Bishop v. Palmer, 146 Mass. 469 , 16 N. E. 299 ; Oil Co. v. Nunnemaker, 142 Ind. 560 , 41 N. E. 1048 .

2010Co. ( 11 NY3d 866 [2008]), the Court of Appeals does not adhere to a hard and fast rule that “[a]n issue is not actually litigated if . . . there has been a default” (Kaufman, 65 NY2d at 456-457).

2009Considering that no fundamental right is at stake— defendants are suffering no worse injustice than being called “sex offenders” instead of “child predators”—the Legislature could constitutionally provide that all those convicted of kidnapping or unlawfully imprisoning children not their own, or of attempting to commit those crimes, be conclusively deemed sex offenders. *70 In so deciding, we agree with the Illinois Supreme Court, which upheld in People v Johnson (225 Ill 2d 573, 870 NE2d 415 [2007]) an Illinois statute similar to SORA.

2005The emphasis is not on a hard and fast rule, but rather on prevention of ‘intentional self-contradiction ... as a means of obtaining unfair advantage.’ Scarano, 203 F.2d at 513 .” The alleged inconsistent theories here arising from a nonjudicial voluntary arbitration and the instant judicial proceeding do not fall within the proscriptions of either the Arizona case or the New York cases that rely upon it.

1997While many of the Federal circuits mandate the maintenance of contemporaneous time records as a prerequisite to recovery of fees (Hensley v Eckerhart, 461 US 424 ), the First Department, in Matter of Karp (supra, at 216 ), declined “to adopt such a hard and fast rule that reconstructed time records can never serve as a basis for compensation”.

1997While many of the Federal circuits mandate the maintenance of contemporaneous time records as a prerequisite to recovery of fees (Hensley v Eckerhart, 461 US 424 ), the First Department, in Matter of Karp (supra, at 216 ), declined “to adopt such a hard and fast rule that reconstructed time records can never serve as a basis for compensation”.

1997As the court said in Jobin Waterproofing Corp. v Riverbay Corp. (NYLJ, Nov. 4, 1992, at 25, col 5), a court should look at the big picture to see if the total time expended for each portion of the case was reasonable (see also, United States Football League v National Football League, 704 F Supp 474 ).

1997Particularly instructive is People v Ford ( 62 NY2d 275 ).

1984This six-month requirement was not set forth as a hard and fast rule (see Baldwin v New York, supra).

1976As Chief Judge Breitel noted in People v Hobson ( 39 NY2d 479, 488 ) "stare decisis does not spring full-grown from a 'precedent’ but from precedents which reflect principle and doctrine rationally evolved.” But the exception is not a hard and fast rule either.

1973(Uhlaender v. Henricksen, supra.) Although that conclusion - is reached in the present circumstances, the court does not wish or intend to formulate a hard and fast rule.

1961(Matter of Brokaw, supra; Matter of Strebeigh, supra; Matter of Patterson, supra.) In Matter of Galewitz (supra) the Appellate Division recognized the inequity which could result from such a hard and fast rule and the court required payment of taxes, despite a firm contract between a decedent and his son, on the excess between the purchase price of stock as fixed in the contract and its value as fixed for tax purposes.

1961(Matter of Brokaw, supra; Matter of Strebeigh, supra; Matter of Patterson, supra.) In Matter of Galewitz (supra) the Appellate Division recognized the inequity which could result from such a hard and fast rule and the court required payment of taxes, despite a firm contract between a decedent and his son, on the excess between the purchase price of stock as fixed in the contract and its value as fixed for tax purposes.

1959(Matter of Blackburn v. Macduff, 206 Misc. 393 .) “ The term ‘ discretion ’ denotes the absence of a hard and fast rule.” (Langnes v. Green, 282 U. S. 531, 541 .) In the present case, respondent had nothing before him except the fact of petitioner’s three convictions upon which to base his refusal to consider the application for relicensing.

1959(Matter of Blackburn v. Macduff, 206 Misc. 393 .) “ The term ‘ discretion ’ denotes the absence of a hard and fast rule.” (Langnes v. Green, 282 U. S. 531, 541 .) In the present case, respondent had nothing before him except the fact of petitioner’s three convictions upon which to base his refusal to consider the application for relicensing.

1941In a later decision the court had occasion to refer to the Stevens case (supra), wherein it stated, “ the very language of the opinion of this court in the Stevens case indicated that it would not control a different situation.” (Krause v. Krause, 282 N. Y. 355, 358 .) In the Krause case the husband procured an admittedly invalid Nevada decree.

1931At most it is to be granted or refused in the exercise of a discretion that will give heed to all the facts (Matter of Hughes, 95 N. Y. 55, 60 ; cf. Matter of Rogers, 225 App. Div. 286 ; 254 N. Y. 592 ).