hard and fast rule in Oregon

2024Therefore, “whether a denial of a continuance is an abuse of discretion depends on the particular facts of the case and the reasons presented to the court at the time the request was denied.” State v. Thomas, 266 Or App 642, 645 , 338 P3d 762 (2014).

2024Therefore, “whether a denial of a continuance is an abuse of discretion depends on the particular facts of the case and the reasons presented to the court at the time the request was denied.” State v. Thomas, 266 Or App 642, 645 , 338 P3d 762 (2014).

1947The term implies the absence of a hard and fast rule, yet it should not be another word for “arbitrary will,” “inconsiderate action,” or “unstable caprice.” ’ Other definitions as made by the courts are as follows: In Sharon v. Sharon, Exr., 75 Cal. 1 , 16 P. 345 , the court said: ‘ “Abuse of discretion” * * * does not necessarily imply a wilful abuse, or intentional wrong.

1947The term implies the absence of a hard and fast rule, yet it should not be another word for “arbitrary will,” “inconsiderate action,” or “unstable caprice.” ’ Other definitions as made by the courts are as follows: In Sharon v. Sharon, Exr., 75 Cal. 1 , 16 P. 345 , the court said: ‘ “Abuse of discretion” * * * does not necessarily imply a wilful abuse, or intentional wrong.

1953Attention has been directed to the broad and, in the opinion of the writer, inaccurate statement of this court in Hawkins v. Fuller, 116 Or. 434 ( 240 P. 549 ), wherein it was said: “ ** * # when one brings an action at law upon the note, he is deemed to have waived the mortgage.’ “The conclusion reached in that case was undoubtedly sound, but such statement can not be followed as a hard and fast rule, for to do so would *406 be in direct violation of Or.

1930Attention has been directed to the broad *141 and, in the opinion of the writer, inaccurate statement of this court in Hawkins v. Fuller, 116 Or. 434 ( 240 P. 549 ), wherein it was said: “* * * when one brings an action at law upon the note, he is deemed to have waived the mortgage. ’ ’ The conclusion reached in that case was undoubtedly sound, but such statement can not be followed as a hard and fast rule, for to do so would be in direct violation of Or.

1950We agree with the statement of the court in Chairman of Highway Commission v. Parker, 147 Va. 25 , 136 S. E. 496 , that “it would be unwise to lay down a hard and fast rule applicable to every case, as to what elements properly enter into consideration in determining the market value of property sought to *114 be condemned”.

1950We agree with the statement of the court in Chairman of Highway Commission v. Parker, 147 Va. 25 , 136 S. E. 496 , that “it would be unwise to lay down a hard and fast rule applicable to every case, as to what elements properly enter into consideration in determining the market value of property sought to *114 be condemned”.

1941Co. v. Smith, 34 Wash. 625 , 76 P. 267 .

1941Co. v. Smith, 34 Wash. 625 , 76 P. 267 .

2025“Whether a denial of a continuance is improper depends on the particular circumstances of the case and the reasons presented to the court at the time the request is denied.” Id. at 281 ; see also State v. Gallegos, 265 Or App 248, 251 , 336 P3d 515 (2014), rev den, 356 Or 685 (2015) (“As a general matter, denial of a motion for a continuance on the day of trial is unlikely to be an abuse of discretion * * * but that is not a hard-and-fast rule and instead depends on the circumstances.”).

2015As this court explained in State v. Cloutier, 351 Or 68, 97-98 , 261 P3d 1234 (2011), redundancy “is a fact of life and of law. * * * In some cases, it may be what the legislature intended.” See also Thomas Creek Lumber and Log Co. v. Dept. of Rev., 344 Or 131, 138 , 178 P3d 217 (2008) (“[N]othing prohibits the legislature from saying the same thing twice.”).

2015As this court explained in State v. Cloutier, 351 Or 68, 97-98 , 261 P3d 1234 (2011), redundancy “is a fact of life and of law. * * * In some cases, it may be what the legislature intended.” See also Thomas Creek Lumber and Log Co. v. Dept. of Rev., 344 Or 131, 138 , 178 P3d 217 (2008) (“[N]othing prohibits the legislature from saying the same thing twice.”).

2015Although the use of different terms usually is taken to connote different meanings to avoid redundancy, see, e.g., State v. Connally, 339 Or 583, 591 , 125 P3d 1254 (2005) (so stating), it is not a hard-and-fast rule.

2015Although the use of different terms usually is taken to connote different meanings to avoid redundancy, see, e.g., State v. Connally, 339 Or 583, 591 , 125 P3d 1254 (2005) (so stating), it is not a hard-and-fast rule.

2014The parties focus much of their attention on two significant circumstances described in State v. Moore, 324 Or 396 , 927 P2d 1073 (1996).

2014The parties focus much of their attention on two significant circumstances described in State v. Moore, 324 Or 396 , 927 P2d 1073 (1996).

2014As a general matter, denial of a motion for a continuance on the day of trial is unlikely to be an abuse of discretion, see, e.g., State v. Keerins, 145 Or App 491 , 932 P2d 65 (1996), but that is not a hard-and-fast rule and instead depends on the circumstances.

2014As a general matter, denial of a motion for a continuance on the day of trial is unlikely to be an abuse of discretion, see, e.g., State v. Keerins, 145 Or App 491 , 932 P2d 65 (1996), but that is not a hard-and-fast rule and instead depends on the circumstances.

2006Here, taxpayer argues that an agency which the legislature has granted discretionary decision-making power must make one of two choices: "It can either exercise that discretion on a case by case basis or it can exercise that discretion by adopting administrative rules setting out policies and standards." *Page 97 Taxpayer cites Rogue River Pack. for the principle that "the term `discretion' denotes the absence of a hard and fast rule; indeed, establishment of a clearly defined rule ends discretion." 6 OTR at 300 . 3.

1984To apply a hard and fast rule of nonliability to the facts in this case would, in our opinion, defeat justice and not subserve a sound public policy.” 189 Or at 301 .

1976Any method used must stand the test of reason. * * *” 123 Or at 290-91 .

1958The term implies the absence of a hard and fast rule, yet it should not be another word for ‘arbitrary will,’ ‘inconsiderate action,’ or ‘unstable caprice.’ ” Ibid.

1957Co., 36 Cal. App. 2d 700, 708 , [ 98 P. 2d 539 ], “This appellant, in common with many users of highways, seems to have the impression that every motorist who attempts to enter a main highway from a side road, does so at his peril.

1957Co., 36 Cal. App. 2d 700, 708 , [ 98 P. 2d 539 ], “This appellant, in common with many users of highways, seems to have the impression that every motorist who attempts to enter a main highway from a side road, does so at his peril.

1957At page 300-301 (P2d 37) the court said: “Section 552 does ‘not set a hard and fast rule for the conduct of drivers approaching through highways.’ Whether a driver acts with due care or negligently in proceeding across a through highway is a jury question. * * * In Glynn v. Vaccari, 64 Cal.App. 2d 718, 721 , [ 149 P. 2d 409 ], the court says: ‘As stated in Casselman v. Hartford, A. & I.

1957At page 300-301 (P2d 37) the court said: “Section 552 does ‘not set a hard and fast rule for the conduct of drivers approaching through highways.’ Whether a driver acts with due care or negligently in proceeding across a through highway is a jury question. * * * In Glynn v. Vaccari, 64 Cal.App. 2d 718, 721 , [ 149 P. 2d 409 ], the court says: ‘As stated in Casselman v. Hartford, A. & I.

1951The true rule is aptly expressed by Mr. Justice Hay, speaking for the court, in Kellogg v. Kellogg, 187 Or. 617, 621 , 213 P. 2d 172 , as follows: “The divorce decree in the present case, however, gave custody to plaintiff.

1951The true rule is aptly expressed by Mr. Justice Hay, speaking for the court, in Kellogg v. Kellogg, 187 Or. 617, 621 , 213 P. 2d 172 , as follows: “The divorce decree in the present case, however, gave custody to plaintiff.

1947In a legal sense, discretion is abused wherever, in its exercise, a court exceeds the bounds of reason— all the circumstances before it being considered.’ *716 In Murray v. Buell, 74 Wis. 14 , 41 N. W. 1010 , this definition was given: ‘The term * * * as used in the decision of courts and in books, implying, in common parlance, a bad motive or wrong purpose, is not the most appropriate.

1947In a legal sense, discretion is abused wherever, in its exercise, a court exceeds the bounds of reason— all the circumstances before it being considered.’ *716 In Murray v. Buell, 74 Wis. 14 , 41 N. W. 1010 , this definition was given: ‘The term * * * as used in the decision of courts and in books, implying, in common parlance, a bad motive or wrong purpose, is not the most appropriate.

1944As said in Chaffee v. Duclos, 105 Vt. 384 , 166 A. 2 : “ While the general rule that the driver of an automobile is as a matter of law guilty of negligence in driving at such a rate of speed as prevents stopping within time to avoid an obstruction within the range of his vision is supported by reason and the weight of authority, it is not a hard and fast rule that must be invariably applied in every case.

1944As said in Chaffee v. Duclos, 105 Vt. 384 , 166 A. 2 : “ While the general rule that the driver of an automobile is as a matter of law guilty of negligence in driving at such a rate of speed as prevents stopping within time to avoid an obstruction within the range of his vision is supported by reason and the weight of authority, it is not a hard and fast rule that must be invariably applied in every case.

1928It would be grossly unjust to lay down as a hard-and-fast rule that because A had used the property of B to some extent he should be compelled to buy the same or what is in the same effect, to pay as damages the full value of the property.” It is the policy of the law to allow full and complete compensation for damages sustained: Preble v. Hanna, 117 Or. 306 ( 244 Pac. 75 ); but to compel the purchase of these machines merely on account of an alleged wrongful use is not justice nor in keeping with well-established principles.

1928It would be grossly unjust to lay down as a hard-and-fast rule that because A had used the property of B to some extent he should be compelled to buy the same or what is in the same effect, to pay as damages the full value of the property.” It is the policy of the law to allow full and complete compensation for damages sustained: Preble v. Hanna, 117 Or. 306 ( 244 Pac. 75 ); but to compel the purchase of these machines merely on account of an alleged wrongful use is not justice nor in keeping with well-established principles.

1896Upon this subject there is some conflict in the decisions, but the doctrine which seems to be supported by authority and reason, at ' least with reference to electric and cable railways, is that “it is presumptively negligent on the part of a pedestrian to attempt to cross the track without looking or listening, when, if he had looked and listened, he could have discovered the approach of the car in ample time to avoid injury”: Booth on Street Railway Law, § 312; Fenton v. Second Avenue Railroad Company, 126 N. Y. 625 ( 26 N. E. 967 ); Meyer v. Lindell Railway Company, 6 Mo. App. 27 ; Scott v.

1896Upon this subject there is some conflict in the decisions, but the doctrine which seems to be supported by authority and reason, at ' least with reference to electric and cable railways, is that “it is presumptively negligent on the part of a pedestrian to attempt to cross the track without looking or listening, when, if he had looked and listened, he could have discovered the approach of the car in ample time to avoid injury”: Booth on Street Railway Law, § 312; Fenton v. Second Avenue Railroad Company, 126 N. Y. 625 ( 26 N. E. 967 ); Meyer v. Lindell Railway Company, 6 Mo. App. 27 ; Scott v.

1896Upon this subject there is some conflict in the decisions, but the doctrine which seems to be supported by authority and reason, at ' least with reference to electric and cable railways, is that “it is presumptively negligent on the part of a pedestrian to attempt to cross the track without looking or listening, when, if he had looked and listened, he could have discovered the approach of the car in ample time to avoid injury”: Booth on Street Railway Law, § 312; Fenton v. Second Avenue Railroad Company, 126 N. Y. 625 ( 26 N. E. 967 ); Meyer v. Lindell Railway Company, 6 Mo. App. 27 ; Scott v.