hard and fast rule in Indiana

2014Id.

2014Id.

1995"The term 'diseretion' implies the absence of a hard and fast rule or a mandatory procedure regardless of varying circumstances." Stone v. State (1989), Ind.App., 536 N.E.2d 534, 538 , trans. denied.

1992"The term 'discretion' implies the absence of a hard and fast rule or a mandatory procedure regardless of varying circumstances." Stone v. State (1989), Ind.App., 536 N.E.2d 534, 538 , trams. denied.

1955While it is true that the courts have not formulated a hard and fast rule by which the legal relationship of parties to labor contracts can, in every instance, be determined unfailingly, Allen v. Kraft Food,Co. (1948), 118 Ind. App. 467 , 76 N. E. 2d 845 , nevertheless we *692 think the foregoing facts are sufficient to warrant the Industrial Board in concluding that the appellee desired a certain result accomplished (the windows washed) and that the appellant undertook to do this and did so, using his own knowledge, experience, methods and tools in accomplishing the work with responsibility t

1955While it is true that the courts have not formulated a hard and fast rule by which the legal relationship of parties to labor contracts can, in every instance, be determined unfailingly, Allen v. Kraft Food,Co. (1948), 118 Ind. App. 467 , 76 N. E. 2d 845 , nevertheless we *692 think the foregoing facts are sufficient to warrant the Industrial Board in concluding that the appellee desired a certain result accomplished (the windows washed) and that the appellant undertook to do this and did so, using his own knowledge, experience, methods and tools in accomplishing the work with responsibility t

1976Co. v. Pinnell, Admx. (1942), (T.D.), 112 Ind. App. 116 , 40 N.E.2d 988 , the following definition of the word, ‘discretion’: ‘In the case of Langnes v. Green (1931), 282 U.S. 531, 541 , 51 S.Ct. 243, 247 , 75 L.Ed. 520 , . 526, the Supreme Court of the United States uses the following language in defining “discretion”: *422 “ ‘The term “discretion” denotes the absence of a hard and fast rule.

1976Co. v. Pinnell, Admx. (1942), (T.D.), 112 Ind. App. 116 , 40 N.E.2d 988 , the following definition of the word, ‘discretion’: ‘In the case of Langnes v. Green (1931), 282 U.S. 531, 541 , 51 S.Ct. 243, 247 , 75 L.Ed. 520 , . 526, the Supreme Court of the United States uses the following language in defining “discretion”: *422 “ ‘The term “discretion” denotes the absence of a hard and fast rule.

2024Our Court affirmed the trial court’s ruling, noting that the plaintiff’s “proffered amended complaint contain[ed] claims that [we]re virtually identical to those Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-PL-1685 | October 30, 2024 Page 37 of 44 that the trial court disposed of by judgment on the evidence and/or directed verdict[.]” Id. at 231 . [60] Brooks asserts that “what USATF presented to the trial court (and later to this Court) as a hard and fast rule against allowing amendments after a summary judgment is not accurate.” (Brooks’ Br. 30).

2012In support of that contention, Mitchell relies on our supreme court’s decision in HomEq Servicing Corp. v. Baker, 883 N.E.2d 95 (Ind.2008).

1994In Daube we also stated that, “[S]uch payment will not satisfy all claims unless the debtor specifically expresses such intention.” Id. (emphasis added).

1989Wagner v. State (1985), Ind., 474 N.E.2d 476, 490 . *538 The term "discretion" implies the absence of a hard and fast rule or a mandatory procedure regardless of varying circumstances.

1982Renard v. Renard (1956), 126 Ind.App. 245 , 132 N.E.2d 278 .

1982Renard v. Renard (1956), 126 Ind.App. 245 , 132 N.E.2d 278 .

1980Dubreuil v. Pinnick, (1978) Ind.App., 383 N.E.2d 420 ; Kavanagh v. Butorac, (1966) 140 Ind.App. 139 , 221 N.E.2d 824 , reh. den. (1967) 221 N.E.2d 824 .

1980Dubreuil v. Pinnick, (1978) Ind.App., 383 N.E.2d 420 ; Kavanagh v. Butorac, (1966) 140 Ind.App. 139 , 221 N.E.2d 824 , reh. den. (1967) 221 N.E.2d 824 .

1980Dubreuil v. Pinnick, (1978) Ind.App., 383 N.E.2d 420 ; Kavanagh v. Butorac, (1966) 140 Ind.App. 139 , 221 N.E.2d 824 , reh. den. (1967) 221 N.E.2d 824 .

1979Fitzgerald, supra. In reviewing the discretionary act of the trial court, we note that the term “discretion” implies flexibility in light of varying circumstances and the absence of a hard and fast rule or a mandatory procedure.

1978See Dingley v. Buckner (1909), 11 Cal.App. 181 , 104 P. 478 ; San Antonio Water Co. v. Bodenhamer and Sierra Water and Power Co. (1901), 133 Cal. 248 , 65 P. 471 ; 15 A.L.R.2d 213 , § 23, p. 274.

1978See Dingley v. Buckner (1909), 11 Cal.App. 181 , 104 P. 478 ; San Antonio Water Co. v. Bodenhamer and Sierra Water and Power Co. (1901), 133 Cal. 248 , 65 P. 471 ; 15 A.L.R.2d 213 , § 23, p. 274.

1976Co. v. Pinnell, Admx. (1942), (T.D.), 112 Ind. App. 116 , 40 N.E.2d 988 , the following definition of the word, ‘discretion’: ‘In the case of Langnes v. Green (1931), 282 U.S. 531, 541 , 51 S.Ct. 243, 247 , 75 L.Ed. 520 , . 526, the Supreme Court of the United States uses the following language in defining “discretion”: *422 “ ‘The term “discretion” denotes the absence of a hard and fast rule.

1976Co. v. Pinnell, Admx. (1942), (T.D.), 112 Ind. App. 116 , 40 N.E.2d 988 , the following definition of the word, ‘discretion’: ‘In the case of Langnes v. Green (1931), 282 U.S. 531, 541 , 51 S.Ct. 243, 247 , 75 L.Ed. 520 , . 526, the Supreme Court of the United States uses the following language in defining “discretion”: *422 “ ‘The term “discretion” denotes the absence of a hard and fast rule.

1975If such should become the hard and fast rule of law, the result inevitably would follow that the accused, with his counsel, may use the court as a pawn and gain the end sought when the judgment in any manner exceeded the lenient one hoped for, whether suggested by the counsel of the accused, or from the determined desire of the accused.” ( 197 Ind. at 343 , 149 N.E. at 447 .) We believe it to be equally improper to allow the prosecution in a criminal cause to circumvent the sentencing discretion of a trial judge by requiring a defendant to receive a certain minimum sentence as a condition of a

1975If such should become the hard and fast rule of law, the result inevitably would follow that the accused, with his counsel, may use the court as a pawn and gain the end sought when the judgment in any manner exceeded the lenient one hoped for, whether suggested by the counsel of the accused, or from the determined desire of the accused.” ( 197 Ind. at 343 , 149 N.E. at 447 .) We believe it to be equally improper to allow the prosecution in a criminal cause to circumvent the sentencing discretion of a trial judge by requiring a defendant to receive a certain minimum sentence as a condition of a

1971On the contrary the definition must be left sufficiently flexible to take care of the necessities of the future.” Department of Public Sanitation of City of Hammond v. Solan, supra, 229 Ind. at 240 , 97 N. E. 2d at 501 .

1971On the contrary the definition must be left sufficiently flexible to take care of the necessities of the future.” Department of Public Sanitation of City of Hammond v. Solan, supra, 229 Ind. at 240 , 97 N. E. 2d at 501 .

1970In holding for the contractor the opinion stated what we believe to represent the prevailing rule in Indiana. “* * * We do not intend to state a hard and fast rule which can be applied in every case, for each case has its special circumstances, but it is clear that in this case where the appellant has made substantial deviations of a nature which were unforeseen and unanticipated by the appellee; and, also, where the magnitude of deviation does not normally arise in such contracts, then we have no choice but to strike down the maximum price provision. * * *” (Emphasis supplied) 222 N. E. 2d 41

1956Crowe v. Crowe (1946), 116 Ind. App. 534 , 65 N. E. 2d 645 ; Weber v. Redding (1928), 200 Ind. 448 , 163 N. E. 269 ; Johnson v. Smith (1931), 203 Ind. 214 , 176 N. E. 705 ; 17 Am.

1956Crowe v. Crowe (1946), 116 Ind. App. 534 , 65 N. E. 2d 645 ; Weber v. Redding (1928), 200 Ind. 448 , 163 N. E. 269 ; Johnson v. Smith (1931), 203 Ind. 214 , 176 N. E. 705 ; 17 Am.

1956Crowe v. Crowe (1946), 116 Ind. App. 534 , 65 N. E. 2d 645 ; Weber v. Redding (1928), 200 Ind. 448 , 163 N. E. 269 ; Johnson v. Smith (1931), 203 Ind. 214 , 176 N. E. 705 ; 17 Am.

1956Crowe v. Crowe (1946), 116 Ind. App. 534 , 65 N. E. 2d 645 ; Weber v. Redding (1928), 200 Ind. 448 , 163 N. E. 269 ; Johnson v. Smith (1931), 203 Ind. 214 , 176 N. E. 705 ; 17 Am.

1956Crowe v. Crowe (1946), 116 Ind. App. 534 , 65 N. E. 2d 645 ; Weber v. Redding (1928), 200 Ind. 448 , 163 N. E. 269 ; Johnson v. Smith (1931), 203 Ind. 214 , 176 N. E. 705 ; 17 Am.

1956Crowe v. Crowe (1946), 116 Ind. App. 534 , 65 N. E. 2d 645 ; Weber v. Redding (1928), 200 Ind. 448 , 163 N. E. 269 ; Johnson v. Smith (1931), 203 Ind. 214 , 176 N. E. 705 ; 17 Am.

1955This, as was held in Gibbons v. Henke (1940), 108 Ind. App. 481 , 29 N. E. 2d 995 , made him an independent contractor.

1955This, as was held in Gibbons v. Henke (1940), 108 Ind. App. 481 , 29 N. E. 2d 995 , made him an independent contractor.

1953In the case of Loucks v. Diamond Chain & Manufacturing Company (1941), 218 Ind. 244 , 32 N. E. 2d 308 , the opinion of Fansler, J., broke somewhat from the former hard and fast rule by holding that: “. . . the absence of, and inability of the doctors to discover, any other possible cause for his condition, seem sufficient to establish that he was the victim of an occupational poisoning.” (Our emphasis.) Later, in 1942, Flanagan, J., speaking in the case of Harbison-Walker Refractories Company v. Turks et al. (1942) 110 Ind. App. 563, 566 , 39 N. E. 2d 791 , said: “The Workmen’s Occupational Di

1953In the case of Loucks v. Diamond Chain & Manufacturing Company (1941), 218 Ind. 244 , 32 N. E. 2d 308 , the opinion of Fansler, J., broke somewhat from the former hard and fast rule by holding that: “. . . the absence of, and inability of the doctors to discover, any other possible cause for his condition, seem sufficient to establish that he was the victim of an occupational poisoning.” (Our emphasis.) Later, in 1942, Flanagan, J., speaking in the case of Harbison-Walker Refractories Company v. Turks et al. (1942) 110 Ind. App. 563, 566 , 39 N. E. 2d 791 , said: “The Workmen’s Occupational Di

1953It should be mantled in the spirit of the objective, not shrouded in a haze of over-technical interpretations.” In Chevrolet-Muncie Division of General Motors Corporation v. Hirst (1943), 113 Ind. App. 181, 189 , 46 N. E. 2d 281 , Draper, J., held: “. . . that our statutes do not provide that ordinary diseases of life to which the general public is exposed outside the employment may not under proper circumstances be compensable. . . .” (Our emphasis.) In an able and cogent dissenting opinion in the case of McGill Manufacturing Company, Inc. v. Dodd (1945), 116 Ind. App. 66, 71 , 59 N. E. 2d 89

1953It should be mantled in the spirit of the objective, not shrouded in a haze of over-technical interpretations.” In Chevrolet-Muncie Division of General Motors Corporation v. Hirst (1943), 113 Ind. App. 181, 189 , 46 N. E. 2d 281 , Draper, J., held: “. . . that our statutes do not provide that ordinary diseases of life to which the general public is exposed outside the employment may not under proper circumstances be compensable. . . .” (Our emphasis.) In an able and cogent dissenting opinion in the case of McGill Manufacturing Company, Inc. v. Dodd (1945), 116 Ind. App. 66, 71 , 59 N. E. 2d 89