hard and fast rule in Nebraska

1960The establishment of a clearly defined rule of action would be the end of discretion, and yet discretion should not be a word for arbitrary will or inconsiderate action.’ ” By quotation from Langnes v. Green, 282 U. S. 531 , 51 S. Ct. 243 , 75 L.

1946Ed. 520 , 51 S. Ct. 243 , as follows: “ ‘The term “discretion” denotes the absence of a hard and fast rule. * * * When invoked as a guide to judicial action it means a sound discretion, that is to say, a discretion exercised not arbitrarily or wilfully, but with regard to what is right and equitable under the circumstances and the law, and directed by the reason and conscience of the judge to a just result.’ ” Section 13818 of the Iowa Code of 1927 defines the discretion required in passing upon applications for change of venue as follows: “The court, in the exercise of a sound discretion, mus

1950The Styria v. Morgan, 186 U.S. 1, 9 , 22 S.Ct. 731 , 46 L.Ed. 1027 .

1950The Styria v. Morgan, 186 U.S. 1, 9 , 22 S.Ct. 731 , 46 L.Ed. 1027 .

2019A statute specifically provides that a court may order joint custody “if 19 See Donald v. Donald, 296 Neb. 123 , 892 N.W.2d 100 (2017). - 914 - Nebraska Supreme Court A dvance Sheets 302 Nebraska R eports LENERS v. LENERS Cite as 302 Neb. 904 the court specifically finds, after a hearing in open court, that joint physical custody or joint legal custody, or both, is in the best interests of the minor child regardless of any parental agreement or consent.”20 And we have affirmed a trial court’s decision not to modify an award of joint legal custody even though the evidence showed that the partie

2019A statute specifically provides that a court may order joint custody “if 19 See Donald v. Donald, 296 Neb. 123 , 892 N.W.2d 100 (2017). - 914 - Nebraska Supreme Court A dvance Sheets 302 Nebraska R eports LENERS v. LENERS Cite as 302 Neb. 904 the court specifically finds, after a hearing in open court, that joint physical custody or joint legal custody, or both, is in the best interests of the minor child regardless of any parental agreement or consent.”20 And we have affirmed a trial court’s decision not to modify an award of joint legal custody even though the evidence showed that the partie

2019A statute specifically provides that a court may order joint custody “if 19 See Donald v. Donald, 296 Neb. 123 , 892 N.W.2d 100 (2017). - 914 - Nebraska Supreme Court A dvance Sheets 302 Nebraska R eports LENERS v. LENERS Cite as 302 Neb. 904 the court specifically finds, after a hearing in open court, that joint physical custody or joint legal custody, or both, is in the best interests of the minor child regardless of any parental agreement or consent.”20 And we have affirmed a trial court’s decision not to modify an award of joint legal custody even though the evidence showed that the partie

2019A statute specifically provides that a court may order joint custody “if 19 See Donald v. Donald, 296 Neb. 123 , 892 N.W.2d 100 (2017). - 914 - Nebraska Supreme Court A dvance Sheets 302 Nebraska R eports LENERS v. LENERS Cite as 302 Neb. 904 the court specifically finds, after a hearing in open court, that joint physical custody or joint legal custody, or both, is in the best interests of the minor child regardless of any parental agreement or consent.”20 And we have affirmed a trial court’s decision not to modify an award of joint legal custody even though the evidence showed that the partie

2026When invoked as a guide to judicial action it means a sound discretion, that is to say, a discretion exercised not arbitrarily or willfully, but with regard to what is right and equitable under the circumstances and the law, and directed by the reason and conscience of the judge to a just result”), overruled on other grounds, Anoka-Butte Lumber Co. v. Malerbi, 180 Neb. 256 , 142 N.W.2d 314 (1966).

2026When invoked as a guide to judicial action it means a sound discretion, that is to say, a discretion exercised not arbitrarily or willfully, but with regard to what is right and equitable under the circumstances and the law, and directed by the reason and conscience of the judge to a just result”), overruled on other grounds, Anoka-Butte Lumber Co. v. Malerbi, 180 Neb. 256 , 142 N.W.2d 314 (1966).

2026Dist., 211 Neb. 844 , 320 N.W.2d 763 (1982). 36 See Rice v. McGrath, 162 Neb. 511, 515 , 76 N.W.2d 428, 431 (1956) (“[t]he term ‘discretion’ denotes the absence of a hard and fast rule.

2026Dist., 211 Neb. 844 , 320 N.W.2d 763 (1982). 36 See Rice v. McGrath, 162 Neb. 511, 515 , 76 N.W.2d 428, 431 (1956) (“[t]he term ‘discretion’ denotes the absence of a hard and fast rule.

2026DAMORE Cite as 320 Neb. 914 endorsed the U.S. Supreme Court’s observation that judicial discretion “‘means a sound discretion, that is to say, a discre- tion exercised not arbitrarily or wil[l]fully, but with regard to what is right and equitable under the circumstances and the law, and directed by the reason and conscience of the judge to a just result.’” 29 Relatedly, when describing an abuse of discre- tion, Pettegrew quoted the Iowa Supreme Court’s observation that “‘[i]f the reasons given by the court for its action are clearly untenable or unreasonable, if its action clearly amounts to a

2026Regarding the concept of judicial discretion, Pettegrew noted that the term itself “‘denotes the absence of a hard and fast rule,’” 28 but we 24 Supplemental brief for appellant in support of petition for further review at 13-14. 25 Compare, e.g., Aldana Cardenas, supra note 17 , 314 Neb. at 549 , 990 N.W.2d at 921 (“[a]n abuse of discretion occurs when a trial court’s decision is based upon reasons that are untenable or unreasonable or if its action is clearly against justice or conscience, reason, and evidence”), and Hunt, supra note 9 (same), with Jeremiah T., supra note 2, 319 Neb. at 144

1991In Faretta, supra at 422 U.S. at 835 , the Court explained: Although a defendant need not himself have the skill and experience of a lawyer in order competently and intelligently to choose self-representation, he should be made aware of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation, so that the record will establish that “he knows what he is doing and his choice is made with his eyes open.” [Citation omitted.] While the Supreme Court has not laid down a hard-and-fast rule requiring a ritualized warning, a fair reading of Faretta, supra, leads to the conclusion that the Court strongly su

1991This conclusion is supported by the Court’s declaration in Patterson v. Illinois, 487 U.S. 285 , 108 S. Ct. 2389 , 101 L.

1991This conclusion is supported by the Court’s declaration in Patterson v. Illinois, 487 U.S. 285 , 108 S. Ct. 2389 , 101 L.

1981“In Michalson v. Michalson, 263 Minn. 356, 357 , 116 N.W.2d 545, 547 , we clarified this rule by cautioning that it is ‘not a hard-and-fast rule which must have strict application in each case’ to which it may appear to apply.

1981“In Michalson v. Michalson, 263 Minn. 356, 357 , 116 N.W.2d 545, 547 , we clarified this rule by cautioning that it is ‘not a hard-and-fast rule which must have strict application in each case’ to which it may appear to apply.

1956The holding of the majority appears to rest largely on the theory that public policy in relation to the protection and support of minor children in divorce actions requires an adherence to the hard and fast rule announced in Miller v. Miller, 153 Neb. 890 , 46 N. W. 2d 618 ; Wassung v. Wassung, 136 Neb. 440 , 286 N. W. 340 ; Clark v. Clark, 139 Neb. 446 , 297 N. W. 661 ; and similar cases.

1956The holding of the majority appears to rest largely on the theory that public policy in relation to the protection and support of minor children in divorce actions requires an adherence to the hard and fast rule announced in Miller v. Miller, 153 Neb. 890 , 46 N. W. 2d 618 ; Wassung v. Wassung, 136 Neb. 440 , 286 N. W. 340 ; Clark v. Clark, 139 Neb. 446 , 297 N. W. 661 ; and similar cases.

1956The holding of the majority appears to rest largely on the theory that public policy in relation to the protection and support of minor children in divorce actions requires an adherence to the hard and fast rule announced in Miller v. Miller, 153 Neb. 890 , 46 N. W. 2d 618 ; Wassung v. Wassung, 136 Neb. 440 , 286 N. W. 340 ; Clark v. Clark, 139 Neb. 446 , 297 N. W. 661 ; and similar cases.

1956The holding of the majority appears to rest largely on the theory that public policy in relation to the protection and support of minor children in divorce actions requires an adherence to the hard and fast rule announced in Miller v. Miller, 153 Neb. 890 , 46 N. W. 2d 618 ; Wassung v. Wassung, 136 Neb. 440 , 286 N. W. 340 ; Clark v. Clark, 139 Neb. 446 , 297 N. W. 661 ; and similar cases.

1956The holding of the majority appears to rest largely on the theory that public policy in relation to the protection and support of minor children in divorce actions requires an adherence to the hard and fast rule announced in Miller v. Miller, 153 Neb. 890 , 46 N. W. 2d 618 ; Wassung v. Wassung, 136 Neb. 440 , 286 N. W. 340 ; Clark v. Clark, 139 Neb. 446 , 297 N. W. 661 ; and similar cases.

1956The holding of the majority appears to rest largely on the theory that public policy in relation to the protection and support of minor children in divorce actions requires an adherence to the hard and fast rule announced in Miller v. Miller, 153 Neb. 890 , 46 N. W. 2d 618 ; Wassung v. Wassung, 136 Neb. 440 , 286 N. W. 340 ; Clark v. Clark, 139 Neb. 446 , 297 N. W. 661 ; and similar cases.

1946Fletcher v. District Court, 213 Iowa 822 , 238 N. W. 290 , 80 A. L.

1946Fletcher v. District Court, 213 Iowa 822 , 238 N. W. 290 , 80 A. L.

1942The one indispensable element to his character as an independent contractor is that he must have contracted to- do a specified work and have the right to control the mode and manner of doing it.” Again, in Prescher v. Baker Ice Machine Co., 132 Neb. 648 , 273 N. W. 48 , we said: “Whether the deceased was an employee or an independent contractor cannot be decided by a hard and fast rule.

1942The one indispensable element to his character as an independent contractor is that he must have contracted to- do a specified work and have the right to control the mode and manner of doing it.” Again, in Prescher v. Baker Ice Machine Co., 132 Neb. 648 , 273 N. W. 48 , we said: “Whether the deceased was an employee or an independent contractor cannot be decided by a hard and fast rule.

1936In the opinion the court said: “We have no doubt that cases may arise where it would be the duty of the court to rule, as a matter of law, that the failure of the driver of an automobile upon approaching an intersection to look ■in the direction from which other travelers upon the highway might be expected would amount to more than slight .negligence and prevent a recovery, but we do. not feel warranted in laying down a hard and fast rule governing all cases.” In Thieme v. Weyker, 205 Wis. 578 , 238 N. W. 389 , the court reversed a judgment for plaintiff and directed a judgment of. dismissal,

1936In the opinion the court said: “We have no doubt that cases may arise where it would be the duty of the court to rule, as a matter of law, that the failure of the driver of an automobile upon approaching an intersection to look ■in the direction from which other travelers upon the highway might be expected would amount to more than slight .negligence and prevent a recovery, but we do. not feel warranted in laying down a hard and fast rule governing all cases.” In Thieme v. Weyker, 205 Wis. 578 , 238 N. W. 389 , the court reversed a judgment for plaintiff and directed a judgment of. dismissal,

1923We are asked to apply a hard and fast rule that, where a driver of an automobile is going at such a rate of speed that he cannot stop within the distance that he can plainly see obstructions ahead of him, he is not using ordinary care, as approved in Lauson v. Fon du Lac, 141 Wis. 57 ; Scott v. O’Leary, 157 Ia. 222 ; West Construction Co. v. White, 130 Tenn. 520 ; Solomon v. Duncan, 194 Mo. App. 517 ; Ebling v. Nielsen, 109 Wash. 355 ; and Knoxville R. & Light Co. v. Vangilder, 132 Tenn. 487 .

1923We are asked to apply a hard and fast rule that, where a driver of an automobile is going at such a rate of speed that he cannot stop within the distance that he can plainly see obstructions ahead of him, he is not using ordinary care, as approved in Lauson v. Fon du Lac, 141 Wis. 57 ; Scott v. O’Leary, 157 Ia. 222 ; West Construction Co. v. White, 130 Tenn. 520 ; Solomon v. Duncan, 194 Mo. App. 517 ; Ebling v. Nielsen, 109 Wash. 355 ; and Knoxville R. & Light Co. v. Vangilder, 132 Tenn. 487 .

1923We are asked to apply a hard and fast rule that, where a driver of an automobile is going at such a rate of speed that he cannot stop within the distance that he can plainly see obstructions ahead of him, he is not using ordinary care, as approved in Lauson v. Fon du Lac, 141 Wis. 57 ; Scott v. O’Leary, 157 Ia. 222 ; West Construction Co. v. White, 130 Tenn. 520 ; Solomon v. Duncan, 194 Mo. App. 517 ; Ebling v. Nielsen, 109 Wash. 355 ; and Knoxville R. & Light Co. v. Vangilder, 132 Tenn. 487 .

1923We are asked to apply a hard and fast rule that, where a driver of an automobile is going at such a rate of speed that he cannot stop within the distance that he can plainly see obstructions ahead of him, he is not using ordinary care, as approved in Lauson v. Fon du Lac, 141 Wis. 57 ; Scott v. O’Leary, 157 Ia. 222 ; West Construction Co. v. White, 130 Tenn. 520 ; Solomon v. Duncan, 194 Mo. App. 517 ; Ebling v. Nielsen, 109 Wash. 355 ; and Knoxville R. & Light Co. v. Vangilder, 132 Tenn. 487 .

1923We are asked to apply a hard and fast rule that, where a driver of an automobile is going at such a rate of speed that he cannot stop within the distance that he can plainly see obstructions ahead of him, he is not using ordinary care, as approved in Lauson v. Fon du Lac, 141 Wis. 57 ; Scott v. O’Leary, 157 Ia. 222 ; West Construction Co. v. White, 130 Tenn. 520 ; Solomon v. Duncan, 194 Mo. App. 517 ; Ebling v. Nielsen, 109 Wash. 355 ; and Knoxville R. & Light Co. v. Vangilder, 132 Tenn. 487 .

1923We are asked to apply a hard and fast rule that, where a driver of an automobile is going at such a rate of speed that he cannot stop within the distance that he can plainly see obstructions ahead of him, he is not using ordinary care, as approved in Lauson v. Fon du Lac, 141 Wis. 57 ; Scott v. O’Leary, 157 Ia. 222 ; West Construction Co. v. White, 130 Tenn. 520 ; Solomon v. Duncan, 194 Mo. App. 517 ; Ebling v. Nielsen, 109 Wash. 355 ; and Knoxville R. & Light Co. v. Vangilder, 132 Tenn. 487 .

1904This vieAV is Avell illustrated by the holding of this court in Deweese v. Muff, 57 Neb. 17 , in Avhich Norval, J., after a careful review of the authorities, quotes with approval the folloAving language from the opinion in Ish v. Crane, 8 Ohio St. 520 , 540: “Now upon what principle does the obligation, imposed by the acts of the agent after his authority has terminated, really rest?