hard and fast rule in Florida

2020In closing argument, Wal-Mart conceded 2 It is unclear how these concepts relate to one another—“whether each operates independently, whether one is subordinate to another, or whether the cases focusing [on] an award of past medicals reflect no more than Judge Klein’s observation in Manasse that there is ‘generally something wrong,’ with a verdict that awards past medicals and no past noneconomic damages instead of a hard-and-fast rule.” Arias 276 So. 3d at 56 (quoting Manasse, 681 So. 2d at 785 (Klein, J., dissenting)).

2019It is not necessarily clear how these concepts relate to one another—whether each operates independently, whether one is subordinate to another, or whether the cases focusing an award of past medicals reflect no more than Judge Klein's observation in Manasse that there is "generally something wrong," 681 So. 2d at 785 (Klein, J., dissenting), with a verdict that awards past medicals and no past noneconomic damages instead of a hard-and-fast rule.

2016Tengbergen, 9 So.3d at 737 ; see also Alexander, 931 So.2d at 951 , Today we clarify that such practice is impermissible.

2015Co., 958 So.2d 565, 566 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007) (“We have now concluded that we should take this opportunity to recede from the cases indicating we have a hard and fast rule against reviewing orders denying discovery, and join our sister courts which have occasionally, but not routinely, granted review.”).

2011See Barnes v. State, 29 So.3d 1010, 1023 (Fla.) (“Muhammad does not set forth a hard and fast rule that a trial court has no discretion to order investigation and presentation of mitigation without first reviewing a PSI and without first making an express determination that the PSI suggests the existence of mitigation.”), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 131 S.Ct. 234 , 178 L.Ed.2d 155 (2010).

2011See Barnes v. State, 29 So.3d 1010, 1023 (Fla.) (“Muhammad does not set forth a hard and fast rule that a trial court has no discretion to order investigation and presentation of mitigation without first reviewing a PSI and without first making an express determination that the PSI suggests the existence of mitigation.”), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 131 S.Ct. 234 , 178 L.Ed.2d 155 (2010).

2011See Barnes v. State, 29 So.3d 1010, 1023 (Fla.) (“Muhammad does not set forth a hard and fast rule that a trial court has no discretion to order investigation and presentation of mitigation without first reviewing a PSI and without first making an express determination that the PSI suggests the existence of mitigation.”), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 131 S.Ct. 234 , 178 L.Ed.2d 155 (2010).

2010We note, however, that in any subsequent enforcement proceeding brought by the State, the prosecution would have to prove that the “ ‘probationer willfully violated a substantial condition of probation.’” E.P. v. State, 901 So.2d 193, 195 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005) (quoting Van Wagner v. State, 677 So.2d 314, 316 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996)).

2010We note, however, that in any subsequent enforcement proceeding brought by the State, the prosecution would have to prove that the “ ‘probationer willfully violated a substantial condition of probation.’” E.P. v. State, 901 So.2d 193, 195 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005) (quoting Van Wagner v. State, 677 So.2d 314, 316 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996)).

2007See, e.g., Bush v. Schiavo, 866 So.2d 136 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004); Lifemark Hosps. v. Izquierdo, 899 So.2d 478 (Fla. 3d DCA 2005); Beekie v. Morgan, 751 So.2d 694 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000).

2005Hence, we reject the notion espoused by Quick Sign that these cases adopt a hard and fast rule applicable to the instant case that no easement was created as a matter of law and that resort to extrinsic evidence is inappropriate. [4] See Rancourt v. Town of Glenburn, 635 A.2d 964, 965 (Me.1993) ("When the purposes of an express easement are not specifically stated, a court must `ascertain the objectively manifested intention of the parties in light of circumstances in existence recently prior to the execution of the conveyance.'") (quoting Englishmans Bay Co. v. Jackson, 340 A.2d 198, 200 (Me.

2005Hence, we reject the notion espoused by Quick Sign that these cases adopt a hard and fast rule applicable to the instant case that no easement was created as a matter of law and that resort to extrinsic evidence is inappropriate. [4] See Rancourt v. Town of Glenburn, 635 A.2d 964, 965 (Me.1993) ("When the purposes of an express easement are not specifically stated, a court must `ascertain the objectively manifested intention of the parties in light of circumstances in existence recently prior to the execution of the conveyance.'") (quoting Englishmans Bay Co. v. Jackson, 340 A.2d 198, 200 (Me.

2005Hence, we reject the notion espoused by Quick Sign that these cases adopt a hard and fast rule applicable to the instant case that no easement was created as a matter of law and that resort to extrinsic evidence is inappropriate. [4] See Rancourt v. Town of Glenburn, 635 A.2d 964, 965 (Me.1993) ("When the purposes of an express easement are not specifically stated, a court must `ascertain the objectively manifested intention of the parties in light of circumstances in existence recently prior to the execution of the conveyance.'") (quoting Englishmans Bay Co. v. Jackson, 340 A.2d 198, 200 (Me.

2005This reflects the salutary view that the discovery may be justified in some cases but not in others and that it is a matter that should rest within the sound discretion of the trial court. 739 So.2d at 724 (emphasis added).

2001Birch v. Albert, 761 So.2d 355, 359 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000).

1997In addition, if Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.070(j) (1997) 2 were revised as set forth in my special concurrences in Taco Bell Corp. v. Costanza, 686 So.2d 773, 773-74 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997), and O’Leary v. MacDonald, 657 So.2d 81, 81-82 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995), the trial court would have flexibility in cases such as this one to fulfill the purpose of the rule as a ease management tool, without the harsh effects caused by a mechanical application.

1997In addition, if Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.070(j) (1997) 2 were revised as set forth in my special concurrences in Taco Bell Corp. v. Costanza, 686 So.2d 773, 773-74 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997), and O’Leary v. MacDonald, 657 So.2d 81, 81-82 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995), the trial court would have flexibility in cases such as this one to fulfill the purpose of the rule as a ease management tool, without the harsh effects caused by a mechanical application.