exercise privilege in Maryland

2016And, we begin this analysis by noting, once again, “the importance of the peremptory challenge,” which the Court of Appeals has said, “requires that any significant deviation from the prescribed procedure that impairs or denies the privilege’s full exercise is error that, unless waived, ordinarily will require reversal without the necessity of showing prejudice.” King, 284 Md. at 371 , 396 A.2d 267 (emphasis added).

2016And, we begin this analysis by noting, once again, “the importance of the peremptory challenge,” which the Court of Appeals has said, “requires that any significant deviation from the prescribed procedure that impairs or denies the privilege’s full exercise is error that, unless waived, ordinarily will require reversal without the necessity of showing prejudice.” King, 284 Md. at 371 , 396 A.2d 267 (emphasis added).

1996Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 , 85 S.Ct. 1229 , 14 L.Ed.2d 106 (1965) held simply that neither the judge nor the prosecutor may urge the fact finder to draw an adverse inference from a defendant’s choice not to take the stand and thereby use the defendant’s exercise of the privilege as affirmative evidence of his guilt.

1996Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 , 85 S.Ct. 1229 , 14 L.Ed.2d 106 (1965) held simply that neither the judge nor the prosecutor may urge the fact finder to draw an adverse inference from a defendant’s choice not to take the stand and thereby use the defendant’s exercise of the privilege as affirmative evidence of his guilt.

1995Although the State’s explanation need not meet the standard for justifying the exercise of a challenge for cause, the prosecutor is required to give a clear and reasonably specific explanation, constituting legitimate reasons for exercising the challenges, Stanley, 313 Md. at 78 , 542 A.2d at 1280 (quoting Batson , 476 at 98 n. 20, 106 S.Ct. at 1723 n. 20, 90 L.Ed.2d at 88 n. 20), and the explanation must be sufficient to establish that the exclusion does not constitute purposeful and racially discriminatory exclusion of venirepersons.

1995Although the State’s explanation need not meet the standard for justifying the exercise of a challenge for cause, the prosecutor is required to give a clear and reasonably specific explanation, constituting legitimate reasons for exercising the challenges, Stanley, 313 Md. at 78 , 542 A.2d at 1280 (quoting Batson , 476 at 98 n. 20, 106 S.Ct. at 1723 n. 20, 90 L.Ed.2d at 88 n. 20), and the explanation must be sufficient to establish that the exclusion does not constitute purposeful and racially discriminatory exclusion of venirepersons.

2016Id. at 453-54 , 92 S.Ct. 1653 .

2016Id. at 453-54 , 92 S.Ct. 1653 .

2005Several cases were cited for that proposition. 8 Without the benefit of any analysis, the court then simply concluded that, if the contested case part of the APA did not apply, neither did the rule-making requirements: “We are persuaded by the rationale of the foregoing federal and state cases [all of which involved only the contested case provisions of the APA] that the intricate structure of our APA provisions relating both to contested cases and to the exercise of the rule-making power would be ill suited to the management of the often volatile population of the ACI.” L’Heureux, supra, 708

2005Several cases were cited for that proposition. [8] Without the benefit of any analysis, the court then simply concluded that, if the contested case part of the APA did not apply, neither did the rule-making requirements: "We are persuaded by the rationale of the foregoing federal and state cases [all of which involved only the contested case provisions of the APA] that the intricate structure of our APA provisions relating both to contested cases and to the exercise of the rule-making power would be ill suited to the management of the often volatile population of the ACI." L'Heureux, supra, 70

2004Cf. Miller, [ 231 Md. at 218 , 189 A.2d at 636 ].

2004Cf. Miller, [ 231 Md. at 218 , 189 A.2d at 636 ].

2004Combs, 205 F.3d at 283 .

2004Combs, 205 F.3d at 283 .

2003In United States v. Martinez-Salazar, 528 U.S. 304 , 317 n. 4, 120 S.Ct. 774 , 782 n. 4, 145 L.Ed.2d 792 (2000), however, the Supreme Court disavowed their own language in Swain , char acterizing it as “unnecessary to the decision in that case,” and “founded on a series of our early cases decided long before the adoption of harmless-error review.” The Martinez-Salazar Court held that “a defendant’s exercise of peremptory challenges ... is not denied or impaired when the defendant chooses to use a peremptory challenge- to remove a juror who should have been excused for cause.” Id., 528 U.S. at

2003In United States v. Martinez-Salazar, 528 U.S. 304 , 317 n. 4, 120 S.Ct. 774 , 782 n. 4, 145 L.Ed.2d 792 (2000), however, the Supreme Court disavowed their own language in Swain , char acterizing it as “unnecessary to the decision in that case,” and “founded on a series of our early cases decided long before the adoption of harmless-error review.” The Martinez-Salazar Court held that “a defendant’s exercise of peremptory challenges ... is not denied or impaired when the defendant chooses to use a peremptory challenge- to remove a juror who should have been excused for cause.” Id., 528 U.S. at

2001This does not smack of an invalid attempt by the State to compel testimony without granting immunity or to penalize the exercise of the privilege.” Id. at 318 , 96 S.Ct. 1551 .

2001This does not smack of an invalid attempt by the State to compel testimony without granting immunity or to penalize the exercise of the privilege.” Id. at 318 , 96 S.Ct. 1551 .

2001In Whitaker v. Prince George’s County, 307 Md. 368 , 514 A.2d 4 (1986), the Court of Appeals expressly adopted the rule in Baxter .

2001In Whitaker v. Prince George’s County, 307 Md. 368 , 514 A.2d 4 (1986), the Court of Appeals expressly adopted the rule in Baxter .

1995Although the State’s explanation need not meet the standard for justifying the exercise of a challenge for cause, the prosecutor is required to give a clear and reasonably specific explanation, constituting legitimate reasons for exercising the challenges, Stanley, 313 Md. at 78 , 542 A.2d at 1280 (quoting Batson , 476 at 98 n. 20, 106 S.Ct. at 1723 n. 20, 90 L.Ed.2d at 88 n. 20), and the explanation must be sufficient to establish that the exclusion does not constitute purposeful and racially discriminatory exclusion of venirepersons.

1995In rejecting both challenges, this Court noted, “[although it would have been better practice that the witness should first have been put under oath, we cannot find any prejudice to the defendant from the manner in which [the invocation of his privilege] was handled.” 223 Md. at 292 , 164 A.2d at 531 .

1995In rejecting both challenges, this Court noted, “[although it would have been better practice that the witness should first have been put under oath, we cannot find any prejudice to the defendant from the manner in which [the invocation of his privilege] was handled.” 223 Md. at 292 , 164 A.2d at 531 .

1992Maryland Code (1974, 1989 Repl.Vol.), Courts & Judicial Proceedings Article, § 9-107; Carter v. Kentucky, 450 U.S. 288 , 101 S.Ct. 1112 , 67 L.Ed.2d 241 (1981).

1992Maryland Code (1974, 1989 Repl.Vol.), Courts & Judicial Proceedings Article, § 9-107; Carter v. Kentucky, 450 U.S. 288 , 101 S.Ct. 1112 , 67 L.Ed.2d 241 (1981).

1991Tolbert v. State, 315 *383 Md. 13, 22-23, 553 A.2d 228 (1989); Stanley, 313 Md. at 92-93 , 542 A.2d 1267 .

1989Miranda and Field Sobriety Tests In Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 , 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), the Supreme Court held that in order to *514 combat the “inherently compelling pressures” of custodial interrogation and to permit a full opportunity to make an intelligent decision concerning the exercise of the privilege against self-incrimination, it was necessary to mandate the exclusion from evidence of statements obtained by custodial interrogation unless the record demonstrated that the defendant had been advised of certain rights, understood them, and voluntarily waived them.

1989Miranda and Field Sobriety Tests In Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 , 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), the Supreme Court held that in order to *514 combat the “inherently compelling pressures” of custodial interrogation and to permit a full opportunity to make an intelligent decision concerning the exercise of the privilege against self-incrimination, it was necessary to mandate the exclusion from evidence of statements obtained by custodial interrogation unless the record demonstrated that the defendant had been advised of certain rights, understood them, and voluntarily waived them.

1987The Court stated that Griffin concerned only “adverse” comments and, further, that “a judge’s instruction that the jury must draw no adverse inferences of any kind from the defendant’s exercise of his privilege not to testify is ‘comment’ of an entirely different order”, (emphasis in original) 435 U.S. at 338-39 , 98 S.Ct. at 1094 .

1987The Court stated that Griffin concerned only “adverse” comments and, further, that “a judge’s instruction that the jury must draw no adverse inferences of any kind from the defendant’s exercise of his privilege not to testify is ‘comment’ of an entirely different order”, (emphasis in original) 435 U.S. at 338-39 , 98 S.Ct. at 1094 .

1984Where, as in this case, they fail to meet the Constitutional or statutory requirements which authorize the exercise of the privilege granted, the proposed referendum must fail.” 38 Md.App. at 680-81 , 382 A.2d at 353 .

1984Where, as in this case, they fail to meet the Constitutional or statutory requirements which authorize the exercise of the privilege granted, the proposed referendum must fail.” 38 Md.App. at 680-81 , 382 A.2d at 353 .

1981In addition to the foregoing arguments, the County asserts that this Court "is inherently empowered to review and correct the actions of an inferior tribunal which are contrary to law or beyond the scope of its jurisdiction.” It cites Criminal Injuries Compensation Board v. Gould, 273 Md. 486 , 331 A.2d 55 (1975).

1981In addition to the foregoing arguments, the County asserts that this Court "is inherently empowered to review and correct the actions of an inferior tribunal which are contrary to law or beyond the scope of its jurisdiction.” It cites Criminal Injuries Compensation Board v. Gould, 273 Md. 486 , 331 A.2d 55 (1975).