26 Tennessee opinions name it 3 courts 1918–2026 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Tennessee courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Ellisongreen2 sentences2012This explanation “must be based on something more than stereotypical assumptions, but it need not rise to the level required to justify the exercise of a challenge for cause.” State v. Ellison, 841 S.W.2d 824, 826 (Tenn. 1992) (citing Batson, 476 U.S. at 97 ). 2006This explanation “must be based on something more than stereotypical assumptions, but it need not rise to the level required to justify the exercise of a challenge for cause.” State v. Ellison, 841 S.W.2d 824, 826 (Tenn. 1992) (citing -9- Batson, 476 U.S. at 97 , 106 S. Ct. at 1723 ). | 5 | 6 |
Hayes v. Gibson Countygreen2 sentences2010(Emphasis added.) It is my opinion that the term “gross square foot of new . . . development” plainly refers to the square footage of the new development as built, and not the estimate provided in the pre-construction plan. “[W]hen the import of a statute is unambiguous, we discern legislative intent ‘from the natural and ordinary meaning of the statutory language within the context of the entire statute without any forced or subtle construction that would extend or limit the statute’s meaning.’” Hayes v. Gibson County, 288 S.W.3d 334, 337 (Tenn. 2009) (quoting State v. Flemming, 19 S.W.3d 195 2010(Emphasis added.) It is my opinion that the term “gross square foot of new ... development” plainly refers to the square footage of the new development as built, and not the estimate provided in the pre-construction plan. “[W]hen the import of a statute is unambiguous, we discern legislative intent ‘from the natural and ordinary meaning of the statutory language within the context of the entire statute without any forced or subtle construction that would extend or limit the statute’s meaning.’ ” Hayes v. Gibson County, 288 S.W.3d 334, 337 (Tenn.2009) (quoting State v. Flemming, 19 S.W.3d 195, | 2 | 2 |
State v. Flemminggreen2 sentences2010(Emphasis added.) It is my opinion that the term “gross square foot of new . . . development” plainly refers to the square footage of the new development as built, and not the estimate provided in the pre-construction plan. “[W]hen the import of a statute is unambiguous, we discern legislative intent ‘from the natural and ordinary meaning of the statutory language within the context of the entire statute without any forced or subtle construction that would extend or limit the statute’s meaning.’” Hayes v. Gibson County, 288 S.W.3d 334, 337 (Tenn. 2009) (quoting State v. Flemming, 19 S.W.3d 195 2010(Emphasis added.) It is my opinion that the term “gross square foot of new ... development” plainly refers to the square footage of the new development as built, and not the estimate provided in the pre-construction plan. “[W]hen the import of a statute is unambiguous, we discern legislative intent ‘from the natural and ordinary meaning of the statutory language within the context of the entire statute without any forced or subtle construction that would extend or limit the statute’s meaning.’ ” Hayes v. Gibson County, 288 S.W.3d 334, 337 (Tenn.2009) (quoting State v. Flemming, 19 S.W.3d 195, | 2 | 2 |
State v. Thomasgreen2 sentences1999State v. Hale, 672 S.W .2d 201 , 202 (T enn. 19 84); State v. Thomas, 818 S.W.2d 350, 364 (Tenn. Crim. 1996State v. Hale, 672 S.W.2d 201, 202 (Tenn. 1984); Thomas, 818 S.W.2d at 364 . | 1 | 2 |
Jones v. Barnesgreen1 sentence2021These decisions, on which the defendant retains “‘the ultimate authority,’” include “‘whether to plead guilty, waive a jury, testify in his or her own behalf, or take an appeal.’” Id. (quoting Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751 (1983)). | 1 | 1 |
Colemill Enterprises, Inc. v. Huddlestongreen1 sentence2005The Act imposes a sales tax on the sale of tangible personal property in this state, providing: For the exercise of the privilege of engaging in the business of selling tangible personal property at retail in this state, a tax is levied on the sales price of each item or article of tangible personal property when sold at retail in this state; the tax is to be computed on gross sales for the purpose of remitting the amount of tax due the state and is to include each and every retail sale. *516 Tenn.Code Ann. § 67-6-202(a) (2003); see also Colemill Enters., Inc. v. Huddleston, 967 S.W.2d 753, 75 | 1 | 1 |
State v. Halegreen1 sentence1996State v. Hale, 672 S.W.2d 201, 202 (Tenn. 1984); Thomas, 818 S.W.2d at 364 . | 1 | 1 |
In re Dixongreen2 sentences1995“The profession [the practice of law] has no special privilege from that of other occupations.” Ex parte Dixon, 43 Nev. 196 , 183 P. 642, 643 (1919). 1995“The profession [the practice of law] has no special privilege from that of other occupations.” Ex parte Dixon, 43 Nev. 196 , 183 P. 642, 643 (1919). | 1 | 1 |
Volunteer Val-Pak v. Celaurogreen1 sentence1991(Emphasis added.) “The elements necessary to constitute a sale are (1) transfer of title or possession, or both, of (2) tangible personal property, for a (3) consideration.” Volunteer Val-Pak v. Celauro, 767 S.W.2d 635, 636 (Tenn.1989); Tenn.Code Ann. § 67-6-102(23)(A). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Tennessee. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Batson v. Kentucky
green
2 sentences2012This explanation “must be based on something more than stereotypical assumptions, but it need not rise to the level required to justify the exercise of a challenge for cause.” State v. Ellison, 841 S.W.2d 824, 826 (Tenn. 1992) (citing Batson, 476 U.S. at 97 ). 2006This explanation “must be based on something more than stereotypical assumptions, but it need not rise to the level required to justify the exercise of a challenge for cause.” State v. Ellison, 841 S.W.2d 824, 826 (Tenn. 1992) (citing -9- Batson, 476 U.S. at 97 , 106 S. Ct. at 1723 ). | 7 | 1992–2012 |
Purkett v. Elem
green
2 sentences2012The race-neutral explanation need not be “persuasive, or even plausible.” Purkett, 514 U.S. at 768 . 2006The race-neutral explanation need not be “persuasive, or even plausible.” Purkett, 514 U.S. at 768 , 115 S. Ct. at 1771 . | 3 | 2005–2012 |
Woodson v. Porter Brown Limestone Co.
green
2 sentences1999“Thereafter, the judge must determine, based on all the evidence, whether purposeful discrimination has been established.” Id. at 904 . 1999Woodson, 916 S.W.2d at 906 . | 3 | 1998–1999 |
Garrity v. New Jersey
green
1 sentence2026Garrity, 385 U.S. at 497-98 ; Murphy, 465 U.S. at 435 . | 1 | 2026–2026 |
Minnesota v. Murphy
green
1 sentence2026Garrity, 385 U.S. at 497-98 ; Murphy, 465 U.S. at 435 . | 1 | 2026–2026 |
Florida v. Nixon
green
2 sentences2021The Court observed that “certain decisions regarding the exercise or waiver of basic trial rights are of such moment that they cannot be made for the defendant by a surrogate.” Id. at 187 . 2021These decisions, on which the defendant retains “‘the ultimate authority,’” include “‘whether to plead guilty, waive a jury, testify in his or her own behalf, or take an appeal.’” Id. (quoting Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751 (1983)). | 1 | 2021–2021 |
International Shoe Co. v. Washington
green
2 sentences2013International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 319 , 66 S.Ct. 154 . 2013International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 319 , 66 S.Ct. 154 . | 1 | 2013–2013 |
United States v. Boyd
green
1 sentence2002In Boyd, the contractors and the Federal Government argued that the contractors were “agents of the Federal Government engaged in the exercise of a privilege on behalf of said Government.” Boyd, 363 S.W.2d at 196 . | 1 | 2002–2002 |
L'Heureux v. State Department of Corrections
green
1 sentence1998In L’Heureux v. Dept. of Corr., 708 A.2d 549 (R.I.1998), the Rhode Island Supreme Court reviewed an administrative procedures act similar to the UAPA: We are persuaded by the rationale of the foregoing federal and state cases that the intricate structure of our APA provisions relating both to contested cases and to the exercise of the rule-making power would be ill suited to the management of the often volatile population of the [Adult Correctional Institution].... | 1 | 1998–1998 |
Murdock v. Pennsylvania
green
2 sentences1996In Murdock , where the challenged ordinance provided that a license be purchased by persons canvassing or soliciting within the city, the Court stated, “The power to tax the exercise of a privilege is the power to control or suppress its enjoyment.” Id. at 112 , 63 S.Ct. at 874 . 1996In Murdock , where the challenged ordinance provided that a license be purchased by persons canvassing or soliciting within the city, the Court stated, “The power to tax the exercise of a privilege is the power to control or suppress its enjoyment.” Id. at 112 , 63 S.Ct. at 874 . | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Silver Homes, Inc. v. Marx & Bensdorf, Inc.
green
2 sentences1975Silver Homes, Inc. v. Marx & Bensdorf, Inc., 206 Tenn. 361 , 333 S.W.2d 810 (1960). 1975Silver Homes, Inc. v. Marx & Bensdorf, Inc., 206 Tenn. 361 , 333 S.W.2d 810 (1960). | 1 | 1975–1975 |
M'culloch v. State of Maryland
green
1 sentence1962Therefore, they claim to be immune from state taxation by virtue of Article VI, Clause 2 of the Constitution of the United States, commonly called the “Supremacy Clause”, as interpreted in a line of decisions beginning with M’Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat) 316, 4 L.Ed. 579 , in which Chief Justice John Marshall denied that the State of Maryland could impose a tax on an instrumentality of the United States stating that: “The States have no power, by taxation or otherwise, to retard, impede, burden, or in any manner control, the operations of the constitutional laws enacted by Congress t | 1 | 1962–1962 |
Maxwell v. Corporation of Jonesboro
neutral
1 sentence1945For example, in the early case of Maxwell v. Corporation of Jonesboro, 58 Tenn. 257 , an ordinance regulating the hours of closing of retailers of liquor was challenged as unreasonable. | 1 | 1945–1945 |
Railroad v. Harris
green
1 sentence1918The difference between the exercise of a privilege and the ownership of property is further illustrated in Railroad v. Harris, 99 Tenn., 684 , 43 S. W., 115 , 53 L. | 1 | 1918–1918 |
Blake v. State
green
1 sentence1918The difference between the exercise of a privilege and the ownership of property is further illustrated in Railroad v. Harris, 99 Tenn., 684 , 43 S. W., 115 , 53 L. | 1 | 1918–1918 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.