exercise privilege in Florida

2025That is, when the legislative power waives sovereign immunity to allow for the determination of claims against the government, “[t]he mode of determining matters of this class is completely within [legislative] control,” meaning the legislative power can “reserve to itself the power to decide, may delegate that power to executive officers, or may commit it to judicial tribunals.” Bakelite Corp., 279 U.S. at 451 ; see also Oil States Energy Servs., LLC, 584 U.S. at 334 (noting the “significant latitude” given by 27 precedent to the legislative power “to assign adjudication of public rights to e

2024That is, when the legislative power waives sovereign immunity to allow for the determination of claims against the government, “[t]he mode of determining matters of this class is completely within [legislative] control,” meaning the legislative power can “reserve to itself the power to decide, may delegate that power to executive officers, or may commit it to judicial tribunals.” Bakelite Corp., 279 U.S. at 451 ; see also Oil States Energy Servs., LLC, 584 U.S. at 334 (noting the “significant latitude” given by precedent to the legislative power “to assign adjudication of public rights to enti

1991In State v. Slappy, 522 So.2d 18 (Fla.), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1219 , 108 S.Ct. 2873 , 101 L.Ed.2d 909 (1988), the supreme court established a nonexclusive list of factors for the court to consider when it evaluates whether the state has given non-racially related reasons for the exercise of a peremptory challenge or whether those reasons constitute a mere pretext.

1990While I confess myself unable to reconcile Bryant v. State, 565 So.2d 1298 (Fla.1990) and Reed v. State, 560 So.2d 203 (Fla.1990), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 111 S.Ct. 230 , — L.Ed.2d - (1990), upon which the majority relies and which seems quite similar to Bryant but is not cited in that decision, I believe that because of the sensitivity of the issue and the announced policy that “any doubts as to the existence of a ‘likelihood’ of impermissible bias must be resolved in the objecting party’s favor,” Thompson v. State, 548 So.2d 198, 200 (Fla.1989) (citing State v. Slappy, 522 So.2d 18, 21-22 (F

1991In State v. Slappy, 522 So.2d 18 (Fla.), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1219 , 108 S.Ct. 2873 , 101 L.Ed.2d 909 (1988), the supreme court established a nonexclusive list of factors for the court to consider when it evaluates whether the state has given non-racially related reasons for the exercise of a peremptory challenge or whether those reasons constitute a mere pretext.

1990While I confess myself unable to reconcile Bryant v. State, 565 So.2d 1298 (Fla.1990) and Reed v. State, 560 So.2d 203 (Fla.1990), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 111 S.Ct. 230 , — L.Ed.2d - (1990), upon which the majority relies and which seems quite similar to Bryant but is not cited in that decision, I believe that because of the sensitivity of the issue and the announced policy that “any doubts as to the existence of a ‘likelihood’ of impermissible bias must be resolved in the objecting party’s favor,” Thompson v. State, 548 So.2d 198, 200 (Fla.1989) (citing State v. Slappy, 522 So.2d 18, 21-22 (F

1991In State v. Slappy, 522 So.2d 18 (Fla.), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1219 , 108 S.Ct. 2873 , 101 L.Ed.2d 909 (1988), the supreme court established a nonexclusive list of factors for the court to consider when it evaluates whether the state has given non-racially related reasons for the exercise of a peremptory challenge or whether those reasons constitute a mere pretext.

1990While I confess myself unable to reconcile Bryant v. State, 565 So.2d 1298 (Fla.1990) and Reed v. State, 560 So.2d 203 (Fla.1990), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 111 S.Ct. 230 , — L.Ed.2d - (1990), upon which the majority relies and which seems quite similar to Bryant but is not cited in that decision, I believe that because of the sensitivity of the issue and the announced policy that “any doubts as to the existence of a ‘likelihood’ of impermissible bias must be resolved in the objecting party’s favor,” Thompson v. State, 548 So.2d 198, 200 (Fla.1989) (citing State v. Slappy, 522 So.2d 18, 21-22 (F

2019Id. at 437 , 104 S.Ct. at 1148 .

2019Id. at 437 , 104 S.Ct. at 1148 .

2014“Commenting on a defendant’s failure to testify is a serious error.” Kinchen, 490 So.2d at 22 . “[C]omments on silence are high risk errors because there is a substantial likelihood that meaningful comments will vitiate the right to a fair trial.” DiGuilio, 491 So.2d at 1136 . “[The purpose of the] judge’s instruction that the jury must draw no adverse inferences of any kind from the defendant’s exercise of his privilege not to testify ... is to remove from the jury’s deliberations any influence of unspoken adverse inferences.” Lakeside v. Oregon, 435 U.S. 333, 339 , 98 S.Ct. 1091 , 55 L.Ed.2d

1993State v. DiGuilio, 491 So.2d 1129 (Fla.1986).

1990While I confess myself unable to reconcile Bryant v. State, 565 So.2d 1298 (Fla.1990) and Reed v. State, 560 So.2d 203 (Fla.1990), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 111 S.Ct. 230 , — L.Ed.2d - (1990), upon which the majority relies and which seems quite similar to Bryant but is not cited in that decision, I believe that because of the sensitivity of the issue and the announced policy that “any doubts as to the existence of a ‘likelihood’ of impermissible bias must be resolved in the objecting party’s favor,” Thompson v. State, 548 So.2d 198, 200 (Fla.1989) (citing State v. Slappy, 522 So.2d 18, 21-22 (F

1990While I confess myself unable to reconcile Bryant v. State, 565 So.2d 1298 (Fla. 1990) and Reed v. State, 560 So.2d 203 (Fla. 1990), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 111 S.Ct. 230 , ___ L.Ed.2d ___ (1990), upon which the majority relies and which seems quite similar to Bryant but is not cited in that decision, I believe that because of the sensitivity of the issue and the announced policy that "any doubts as to the existence of a `likelihood' of impermissible bias must be resolved in the objecting party's favor," Thompson v. State, 548 So.2d 198, 200 (Fla. 1989) (citing State v. Slappy, 522 So.2d 1

1990While I confess myself unable to reconcile Bryant v. State, 565 So.2d 1298 (Fla.1990) and Reed v. State, 560 So.2d 203 (Fla.1990), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 111 S.Ct. 230 , — L.Ed.2d - (1990), upon which the majority relies and which seems quite similar to Bryant but is not cited in that decision, I believe that because of the sensitivity of the issue and the announced policy that “any doubts as to the existence of a ‘likelihood’ of impermissible bias must be resolved in the objecting party’s favor,” Thompson v. State, 548 So.2d 198, 200 (Fla.1989) (citing State v. Slappy, 522 So.2d 18, 21-22 (F

1990While I confess myself unable to reconcile Bryant v. State, 565 So.2d 1298 (Fla. 1990) and Reed v. State, 560 So.2d 203 (Fla. 1990), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 111 S.Ct. 230 , ___ L.Ed.2d ___ (1990), upon which the majority relies and which seems quite similar to Bryant but is not cited in that decision, I believe that because of the sensitivity of the issue and the announced policy that "any doubts as to the existence of a `likelihood' of impermissible bias must be resolved in the objecting party's favor," Thompson v. State, 548 So.2d 198, 200 (Fla. 1989) (citing State v. Slappy, 522 So.2d 1

1990While I confess myself unable to reconcile Bryant v. State, 565 So.2d 1298 (Fla.1990) and Reed v. State, 560 So.2d 203 (Fla.1990), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 111 S.Ct. 230 , — L.Ed.2d - (1990), upon which the majority relies and which seems quite similar to Bryant but is not cited in that decision, I believe that because of the sensitivity of the issue and the announced policy that “any doubts as to the existence of a ‘likelihood’ of impermissible bias must be resolved in the objecting party’s favor,” Thompson v. State, 548 So.2d 198, 200 (Fla.1989) (citing State v. Slappy, 522 So.2d 18, 21-22 (F

1990While I confess myself unable to reconcile Bryant v. State, 565 So.2d 1298 (Fla. 1990) and Reed v. State, 560 So.2d 203 (Fla. 1990), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 111 S.Ct. 230 , ___ L.Ed.2d ___ (1990), upon which the majority relies and which seems quite similar to Bryant but is not cited in that decision, I believe that because of the sensitivity of the issue and the announced policy that "any doubts as to the existence of a `likelihood' of impermissible bias must be resolved in the objecting party's favor," Thompson v. State, 548 So.2d 198, 200 (Fla. 1989) (citing State v. Slappy, 522 So.2d 1

2020The First District concluded that the issue was unpreserved because Harper only objected to the State’s exercise of the challenge on the basis of race and did not articulate an objection that the State was exercising its peremptory challenges to unconstitutionally exclude women from the jury. 549 So. 2d at 1122 .

2018On this point, Boedy signaled that a tradeoff exists in physician discipline cases between the exercise of the privilege and the retention of the “benefits of the status of being a licensed physician.” Id.

2014“Commenting on a defendant’s failure to testify is a serious error.” Kinchen, 490 So.2d at 22 . “[C]omments on silence are high risk errors because there is a substantial likelihood that meaningful comments will vitiate the right to a fair trial.” DiGuilio, 491 So.2d at 1136 . “[The purpose of the] judge’s instruction that the jury must draw no adverse inferences of any kind from the defendant’s exercise of his privilege not to testify ... is to remove from the jury’s deliberations any influence of unspoken adverse inferences.” Lakeside v. Oregon, 435 U.S. 333, 339 , 98 S.Ct. 1091 , 55 L.Ed.2d

2014“Commenting on a defendant’s failure to testify is a serious error.” Kinchen, 490 So.2d at 22 . “[C]omments on silence are high risk errors because there is a substantial likelihood that meaningful comments will vitiate the right to a fair trial.” DiGuilio, 491 So.2d at 1136 . “[The purpose of the] judge’s instruction that the jury must draw no adverse inferences of any kind from the defendant’s exercise of his privilege not to testify ... is to remove from the jury’s deliberations any influence of unspoken adverse inferences.” Lakeside v. Oregon, 435 U.S. 333, 339 , 98 S.Ct. 1091 , 55 L.Ed.2d

2014“Commenting on a defendant’s failure to testify is a serious error.” Kinchen, 490 So.2d at 22 . “[C]omments on silence are high risk errors because there is a substantial likelihood that meaningful comments will vitiate the right to a fair trial.” DiGuilio, 491 So.2d at 1136 . “[The purpose of the] judge’s instruction that the jury must draw no adverse inferences of any kind from the defendant’s exercise of his privilege not to testify ... is to remove from the jury’s deliberations any influence of unspoken adverse inferences.” Lakeside v. Oregon, 435 U.S. 333, 339 , 98 S.Ct. 1091 , 55 L.Ed.2d

2010Although appellant’s attorney generally objected to the exercise of the challenge, he did not directly refute the prosecutor’s adamant claim that the juror had been sleeping. 1 Appellant mainly relies on Dorsey v. State, 868 So.2d 1192 (Fla.2003).

2010There, the state exercised a peremptory challenge against an African-American woman, on the ground that she “appeared disinterested throughout” and “was sort of staring at the wall.” Id. at 1194 .

2008Id. at 106-07 (emphasis added); see also Aronovitz, 114 So.2d at 787 ("We have expressly decided that the requirement of obtaining a driver's license and the exercise of the privilege of driving over the public highways, together with the correlative loss of the privilege under certain conditions, is a reasonable regulation of an individual right in the interest of the public good."); cf. United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 324 , 106 Ct.Cl. 856 , 66 S.Ct. 1073 , 90 L.Ed. 1252 (1946) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) ("Figuratively speaking all discomforting action may be deemed punishment becau

2008Id. at 106-07 (emphasis added); see also Aronovitz, 114 So.2d at 787 ("We have expressly decided that the requirement of obtaining a driver's license and the exercise of the privilege of driving over the public highways, together with the correlative loss of the privilege under certain conditions, is a reasonable regulation of an individual right in the interest of the public good."); cf. United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 324 , 106 Ct.Cl. 856 , 66 S.Ct. 1073 , 90 L.Ed. 1252 (1946) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) ("Figuratively speaking all discomforting action may be deemed punishment becau

2008Id. at 106-07 (emphasis added); see also Aronovitz, 114 So.2d at 787 ("We have expressly decided that the requirement of obtaining a driver's license and the exercise of the privilege of driving over the public highways, together with the correlative loss of the privilege under certain conditions, is a reasonable regulation of an individual right in the interest of the public good."); cf. United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 324 , 106 Ct.Cl. 856 , 66 S.Ct. 1073 , 90 L.Ed. 1252 (1946) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) ("Figuratively speaking all discomforting action may be deemed punishment becau

1999In Amado v. State, 585 So.2d 282 (Fla. 1991), the supreme court expressly approved Essex v. State, 539 So.2d 559 (Fla. 4th DCA 1989), wherein it was held that a requested jury instruction on simple possession, as a permissive lesser included offense of trafficking by possession, must be given as an exercise of the doctrine of jury pardon.

1999In Amado v. State, 585 So.2d 282 (Fla. 1991), the supreme court expressly approved Essex v. State, 539 So.2d 559 (Fla. 4th DCA 1989), wherein it was held that a requested jury instruction on simple possession, as a permissive lesser included offense of trafficking by possession, must be given as an exercise of the doctrine of jury pardon.