exercise privilege in Oregon

1994The court recognized, however, that an exception to that general rule exists in situations where the state threatens to sanction the exercise of the privilege. 5 The Court reasoned that such a threat penalizes the assertion of the privilege “so as to.‘foreclos[e] a free choice to remain silent, and * * * competí] * * * incriminating testimony.’ ” 465 US at 434 (quoting Garner v. United States, supra, 424 US at 661 ). *643 The Court then addressed the issue in the context of probation and stated: “[I]f the State, either expressly or by implication, asserts that invocation of the privilege would

1994The court recognized, however, that an exception to that general rule exists in situations where the state threatens to sanction the exercise of the privilege. 5 The Court reasoned that such a threat penalizes the assertion of the privilege “so as to.‘foreclos[e] a free choice to remain silent, and * * * competí] * * * incriminating testimony.’ ” 465 US at 434 (quoting Garner v. United States, supra, 424 US at 661 ). *643 The Court then addressed the issue in the context of probation and stated: “[I]f the State, either expressly or by implication, asserts that invocation of the privilege would

2021See Woolston, 297 Or at 558 (“The invitee is required to exercise that same standard of care in avoiding harm from a condition of the premises of which he knows, or, in the exercise of that standard of care, of which he should know.”); cf. Bowlds v. Taggesell Pontiac Co., 245 Or 86, 95 , 419 P2d 414 (1966) (stating, before contributory negligence was abol- ished as a complete defense, that “[t]he law which requires a plaintiff to exercise the measure of care for his own safety that would be exercised by a reasonably prudent person for his own safety in the same or similar circumstances does no

2021See Woolston, 297 Or at 558 (“The invitee is required to exercise that same standard of care in avoiding harm from a condition of the premises of which he knows, or, in the exercise of that standard of care, of which he should know.”); cf. Bowlds v. Taggesell Pontiac Co., 245 Or 86, 95 , 419 P2d 414 (1966) (stating, before contributory negligence was abol- ished as a complete defense, that “[t]he law which requires a plaintiff to exercise the measure of care for his own safety that would be exercised by a reasonably prudent person for his own safety in the same or similar circumstances does no

2018Because "certain decisions regarding the exercise or waiver of basic trial rights are of such moment that they cannot be made for the defendant by a *439 surrogate[,]" a defendant has the " 'ultimate authority' to determine 'whether to plead guilty, waive a jury, testify in her or her own behalf, or take an appeal.' " Nixon , 543 U.S. at 187 , 125 S.Ct. 551 (quoting *776 Jones v. Barnes , 463 U.S. 745 , 751, 103 S.Ct. 3308 , 77 L.Ed.2d 987 (1983) ).

2018Because "certain decisions regarding the exercise or waiver of basic trial rights are of such moment that they cannot be made for the defendant by a *439 surrogate[,]" a defendant has the " 'ultimate authority' to determine 'whether to plead guilty, waive a jury, testify in her or her own behalf, or take an appeal.' " Nixon , 543 U.S. at 187 , 125 S.Ct. 551 (quoting *776 Jones v. Barnes , 463 U.S. 745 , 751, 103 S.Ct. 3308 , 77 L.Ed.2d 987 (1983) ).

2018Because "certain decisions regarding the exercise or waiver of basic trial rights are of such moment that they cannot be made for the defendant by a *439 surrogate[,]" a defendant has the " 'ultimate authority' to determine 'whether to plead guilty, waive a jury, testify in her or her own behalf, or take an appeal.' " Nixon , 543 U.S. at 187 , 125 S.Ct. 551 (quoting *776 Jones v. Barnes , 463 U.S. 745 , 751, 103 S.Ct. 3308 , 77 L.Ed.2d 987 (1983) ).

2018Because "certain decisions regarding the exercise or waiver of basic trial rights are of such moment that they cannot be made for the defendant by a *439 surrogate[,]" a defendant has the " 'ultimate authority' to determine 'whether to plead guilty, waive a jury, testify in her or her own behalf, or take an appeal.' " Nixon , 543 U.S. at 187 , 125 S.Ct. 551 (quoting *776 Jones v. Barnes , 463 U.S. 745 , 751, 103 S.Ct. 3308 , 77 L.Ed.2d 987 (1983) ).

2017The exercise of that privilege may give rise to obligations, and, so far as those obligations arise out of or are connected with the activities within the state, a procedure which requires the corporation to respond to a suit brought to enforce them can, in most instances, hardly be said to be undue.” Id.

2017It followed, the Court explained, that courts will have specific jurisdiction “when the activities of the corporation [in the forum state] have not only been continuous and systematic, but also give rise to the liabilities sued on.” Id. at 317 .

1994The court recognized, however, that an exception to that general rule exists in situations where the state threatens to sanction the exercise of the privilege. 5 The Court reasoned that such a threat penalizes the assertion of the privilege “so as to.‘foreclos[e] a free choice to remain silent, and * * * competí] * * * incriminating testimony.’ ” 465 US at 434 (quoting Garner v. United States, supra, 424 US at 661 ). *643 The Court then addressed the issue in the context of probation and stated: “[I]f the State, either expressly or by implication, asserts that invocation of the privilege would

1961As stated in Sorenson et ux v. Gardner et ux, 215 Or 255 , 334 P2d 471 , and in Hon v. Moore Timber Products, Inc., 215 Or 628 , 337 P2d 321 , the error must be palpable and the exercise of the rule must be necessary in order to avoid a miscarriage of justice.

1961As stated in Sorenson et ux v. Gardner et ux, 215 Or 255 , 334 P2d 471 , and in Hon v. Moore Timber Products, Inc., 215 Or 628 , 337 P2d 321 , the error must be palpable and the exercise of the rule must be necessary in order to avoid a miscarriage of justice.

1961The plaintiff’s brief sets forth the following proposition : “Where land is surrendered to the possession of a cemetery association when it is already a cemetery and the organization receiving the possession of the land continuously occupies it and manages and controls it as a cemetery, title to the cemetery is vested in the organization receiving the possesison [sic] and occupying it by acts in pais.” *26 In support Bitney v. Grim, 73 Or 257, 261 , 144 P 490 , is cited.

1961The plaintiff’s brief sets forth the following proposition : “Where land is surrendered to the possession of a cemetery association when it is already a cemetery and the organization receiving the possession of the land continuously occupies it and manages and controls it as a cemetery, title to the cemetery is vested in the organization receiving the possesison [sic] and occupying it by acts in pais.” *26 In support Bitney v. Grim, 73 Or 257, 261 , 144 P 490 , is cited.

1961As stated in Sorenson et ux v. Gardner et ux, 215 Or 255 , 334 P2d 471 , and in Hon v. Moore Timber Products, Inc., 215 Or 628 , 337 P2d 321 , the error must be palpable and the exercise of the rule must be necessary in order to avoid a miscarriage of justice.

1961As stated in Sorenson et ux v. Gardner et ux, 215 Or 255 , 334 P2d 471 , and in Hon v. Moore Timber Products, Inc., 215 Or 628 , 337 P2d 321 , the error must be palpable and the exercise of the rule must be necessary in order to avoid a miscarriage of justice.

1955Likewise, a measure enacted solely as a taxation act does not legalize the possession of the object which it taxes of the exercise of the privilege upon which it lays its burden: Enloe v. Lawson, 146 Or 621 , 31 P2d 171 ; License Tax Cases, supra; United States v. Yuginovich, supra; United States v. Sullivan, 274 US 259 , 71 L ed 1037, 47 S Ct 607 , 51 ALR 1020 ; Mitchell v. City of Birmingham, 222 Ala 389, 133 So 13; Miller v. Memphis, 181 Tenn 15, 178 SW2d 382 , 511 ALR 1172 .

1955Likewise, a measure enacted solely as a taxation act does not legalize the possession of the object which it taxes of the exercise of the privilege upon which it lays its burden: Enloe v. Lawson, 146 Or 621 , 31 P2d 171 ; License Tax Cases, supra; United States v. Yuginovich, supra; United States v. Sullivan, 274 US 259 , 71 L ed 1037, 47 S Ct 607 , 51 ALR 1020 ; Mitchell v. City of Birmingham, 222 Ala 389, 133 So 13; Miller v. Memphis, 181 Tenn 15, 178 SW2d 382 , 511 ALR 1172 .

1955Likewise, a measure enacted solely as a taxation act does not legalize the possession of the object which it taxes of the exercise of the privilege upon which it lays its burden: Enloe v. Lawson, 146 Or 621 , 31 P2d 171 ; License Tax Cases, supra; United States v. Yuginovich, supra; United States v. Sullivan, 274 US 259 , 71 L ed 1037, 47 S Ct 607 , 51 ALR 1020 ; Mitchell v. City of Birmingham, 222 Ala 389, 133 So 13; Miller v. Memphis, 181 Tenn 15, 178 SW2d 382 , 511 ALR 1172 .

1955Likewise, a measure enacted solely as a taxation act does not legalize the possession of the object which it taxes of the exercise of the privilege upon which it lays its burden: Enloe v. Lawson, 146 Or 621 , 31 P2d 171 ; License Tax Cases, supra; United States v. Yuginovich, supra; United States v. Sullivan, 274 US 259 , 71 L ed 1037, 47 S Ct 607 , 51 ALR 1020 ; Mitchell v. City of Birmingham, 222 Ala 389, 133 So 13; Miller v. Memphis, 181 Tenn 15, 178 SW2d 382 , 511 ALR 1172 .

1955Likewise, a measure enacted solely as a taxation act does not legalize the possession of the object which it taxes of the exercise of the privilege upon which it lays its burden: Enloe v. Lawson, 146 Or 621 , 31 P2d 171 ; License Tax Cases, supra; United States v. Yuginovich, supra; United States v. Sullivan, 274 US 259 , 71 L ed 1037, 47 S Ct 607 , 51 ALR 1020 ; Mitchell v. City of Birmingham, 222 Ala 389, 133 So 13; Miller v. Memphis, 181 Tenn 15, 178 SW2d 382 , 511 ALR 1172 .

1955Likewise, a measure enacted solely as a taxation act does not legalize the possession of the object which it taxes of the exercise of the privilege upon which it lays its burden: Enloe v. Lawson, 146 Or 621 , 31 P2d 171 ; License Tax Cases, supra; United States v. Yuginovich, supra; United States v. Sullivan, 274 US 259 , 71 L ed 1037, 47 S Ct 607 , 51 ALR 1020 ; Mitchell v. City of Birmingham, 222 Ala 389, 133 So 13; Miller v. Memphis, 181 Tenn 15, 178 SW2d 382 , 511 ALR 1172 .

1955Likewise, a measure enacted solely as a taxation act does not legalize the possession of the object which it taxes of the exercise of the privilege upon which it lays its burden: Enloe v. Lawson, 146 Or 621 , 31 P2d 171 ; License Tax Cases, supra; United States v. Yuginovich, supra; United States v. Sullivan, 274 US 259 , 71 L ed 1037, 47 S Ct 607 , 51 ALR 1020 ; Mitchell v. City of Birmingham, 222 Ala 389, 133 So 13; Miller v. Memphis, 181 Tenn 15, 178 SW2d 382 , 511 ALR 1172 .

1955Likewise, a measure enacted solely as a taxation act does not legalize the possession of the object which it taxes of the exercise of the privilege upon which it lays its burden: Enloe v. Lawson, 146 Or 621 , 31 P2d 171 ; License Tax Cases, supra; United States v. Yuginovich, supra; United States v. Sullivan, 274 US 259 , 71 L ed 1037, 47 S Ct 607 , 51 ALR 1020 ; Mitchell v. City of Birmingham, 222 Ala 389, 133 So 13; Miller v. Memphis, 181 Tenn 15, 178 SW2d 382 , 511 ALR 1172 .

1955Likewise, a measure enacted solely as a taxation act does not legalize the possession of the object which it taxes of the exercise of the privilege upon which it lays its burden: Enloe v. Lawson, 146 Or 621 , 31 P2d 171 ; License Tax Cases, supra; United States v. Yuginovich, supra; United States v. Sullivan, 274 US 259 , 71 L ed 1037, 47 S Ct 607 , 51 ALR 1020 ; Mitchell v. City of Birmingham, 222 Ala 389, 133 So 13; Miller v. Memphis, 181 Tenn 15, 178 SW2d 382 , 511 ALR 1172 .

1955Likewise, a measure enacted solely as a taxation act does not legalize the possession of the object which it taxes of the exercise of the privilege upon which it lays its burden: Enloe v. Lawson, 146 Or 621 , 31 P2d 171 ; License Tax Cases, supra; United States v. Yuginovich, supra; United States v. Sullivan, 274 US 259 , 71 L ed 1037, 47 S Ct 607 , 51 ALR 1020 ; Mitchell v. City of Birmingham, 222 Ala 389, 133 So 13; Miller v. Memphis, 181 Tenn 15, 178 SW2d 382 , 511 ALR 1172 .

1914B. & N. Co., 11 Or. 257 ( 4 Pac. 121 ); Knahtla v. O.

1914B. & N. Co., 11 Or. 257 ( 4 Pac. 121 ); Knahtla v. O.