exercise privilege in California

2014The exercise of that privilege may give rise to obligations; and, so far as those obligations arise out of or are connected with the activities within the state, a procedure which requires the corporation to respond to a suit brought to enforce them can, in most instances, hardly be said to be undue.” (International Shoe, supra, 326 U.S. at p. 319 , italics added.) The court found that International Shoe’s activities were “systematic and continuous throughout the years in question.

2014The exercise of that privilege may give rise to obligations; and, so far as those obligations arise out of or are connected with the activities within the state, a procedure which requires the corporation to respond to a suit brought to enforce them can, in most instances, hardly be said to be undue.” (International Shoe, supra, 326 U.S. at p. 319 .) In other words, in analyzing the exercise of specific jurisdiction, “[o]nce it has been decided that a defendant purposely established minimum contacts with the forum State, these contacts may be considered in light of other factors to determine w

2008As to defendant’s first claim, we have observed: “Allowing a witness to be put on the stand to have the witness exercise the privilege before the jury would only invite the jury to make an improper inference. [Citations.] Therefore, ‘it is the better practice for the court to require the exercise of the privilege out of the presence of the jury.’ [Citation.] We have ‘commend[ed]’ the approach ‘as a means by which to avoid the potentially prejudicial impact of file witness asserting the privilege before the jury.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Frierson (1991) 53 Cal.3d 730, 743 [ 280 Cal.Rptr. 440 ,

2008As to defendant’s first claim, we have observed: “Allowing a witness to be put on the stand to have the witness exercise the privilege before the jury would only invite the jury to make an improper inference. [Citations.] Therefore, ‘it is the better practice for the court to require the exercise of the privilege out of the presence of the jury.’ [Citation.] We have ‘commend[ed]’ the approach ‘as a means by which to avoid the potentially prejudicial impact of file witness asserting the privilege before the jury.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Frierson (1991) 53 Cal.3d 730, 743 [ 280 Cal.Rptr. 440 ,

2013Ford expressly did not follow that older case. ( Ford, supra, at pp. 444-445 .) Therefore, Coleman remains the pertinent law, and the defendant‟s contention is without merit. 8 Finally, the defendant cites Evidence Code section 913, subdivision (a), which states that the prosecution may not comment on the exercise of a privilege.2 That statute, however, “has no application unless the privilege has actually been exercised.” (Ford, supra, 45 Cal.3d at p. 444 .) Since the marital privilege was not invoked, Evidence Code section 913 does not apply here.

2013Ford expressly did not follow that older case. ( Ford, supra, at pp. 444-445 .) Therefore, Coleman remains the pertinent law, and the defendant‟s contention is without merit. 8 Finally, the defendant cites Evidence Code section 913, subdivision (a), which states that the prosecution may not comment on the exercise of a privilege.2 That statute, however, “has no application unless the privilege has actually been exercised.” (Ford, supra, 45 Cal.3d at p. 444 .) Since the marital privilege was not invoked, Evidence Code section 913 does not apply here.

2026(People v. Orozco (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 802, 811 (Orozco).) Miranda was based on the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, which “has consistently been accorded a liberal construction.” ( Miranda, supra, 384 U.S. 8 at p. 461 .) The exercise of that privilege “will be scrupulously honored,” and “the privilege is fulfilled only when the person is guaranteed the right ‘to remain silent unless he chooses to speak in the unfettered exercise of his own will.’ ” (Id. at pp. 460, 479.) “Critically, however, Miranda’s rule has a limit: It only applies when the suspect-defendant was the

2013To protect the exercise of the privilege against self-incrimination, persons subject to custodial interrogation must be informed of certain rights, including the right to counsel, and once such a person invokes the right to counsel, the police must cease interrogation until counsel is provided or the suspect initiates further contact and makes it clear that he or she wishes to proceed without counsel. ( Miranda, supra, 384 U.S. at pp. 473-474 [ 16 L.Ed.2d at p. 723 ]; Edwards v. Arizona (1981) 451 U.S. 477, 482 , 484- 485 [ 68 L.Ed.2d 378, 384, 386-387 ]; see also Rhode Island v. Innis (1980)

2015(See Brokopp v. Ford Motor Co. (1977) 71 Cal.App.3d 841, 860 [Fourth Dist., Div. Two].) Next, Shelby’s conduct in deciding to waive his privilege only after opening statements and after the close of discovery smacks of the conduct condemned in A & M Records, Inc. v. Heilman (1977) 75 Cal.App.3d 554 , in which the court stated: “[T]he enactment of the Discovery Act of 1957 was intended to take the ‘game element’ out of trial preparation and do away with surprise at trial. [Citation.] The accomplishment of this purpose compels the court to prevent a litigant claiming his constitutional privilege

2015(See Brokopp v. Ford Motor Co. (1977) 71 Cal.App.3d 841, 860 [Fourth Dist., Div. Two].) Next, Shelby’s conduct in deciding to waive his privilege only after opening statements and after the close of discovery smacks of the conduct condemned in A & M Records, Inc. v. Heilman (1977) 75 Cal.App.3d 554 , in which the court stated: “[T]he 60 enactment of the Discovery Act of 1957 was intended to take the ‘game element’ out of trial preparation and do away with surprise at trial. [Citation.] The accomplishment of this purpose compels the court to prevent a litigant claiming his constitutional privil

1989The privilege must be taken with the limitations placed upon the manner of its exercise.’ (Italics added.) (250 U.S. at pp. 587-588, 63 L.Ed. at pp. 1156-1157; see also Schaefer v. United States (1920) 251 U.S. 466, 470 [ 64 L.Ed. 360, 362 , 40 S.Ct. 259 ].)” {People v. King (1966) 240 Cal.App.2d 389, 400 [ 49 Cal.Rptr. 562 , 21 A.L.R.3d 706 ].) Thus, unlike the requirements of proof beyond a reasonable doubt and a unanimous jury verdict, peremptory challenges are not mandated by due process.

1989The privilege must be taken with the limitations placed upon the manner of its exercise.’ (Italics added.) (250 U.S. at pp. 587-588, 63 L.Ed. at pp. 1156-1157; see also Schaefer v. United States (1920) 251 U.S. 466, 470 [ 64 L.Ed. 360, 362 , 40 S.Ct. 259 ].)” {People v. King (1966) 240 Cal.App.2d 389, 400 [ 49 Cal.Rptr. 562 , 21 A.L.R.3d 706 ].) Thus, unlike the requirements of proof beyond a reasonable doubt and a unanimous jury verdict, peremptory challenges are not mandated by due process.

2024Prosecutors may not comment “on the accused’s silence or instructions by the court that such silence is evidence of guilt.” (Griffin, supra, 380 U.S. at p. 615 .) Griffin violations occur where a prosecutor’s or trial court’s remarks draw attention to a 4 defendant’s Fifth Amendment privilege while implying the exercise of that privilege infers guilt.

2018Discussion The Fifth Amendment of the federal Constitution provides that "[n]o person ... shall be compelled in any criminal case to **763 be a witness against himself." ( U.S. Const., 5th Amend.) That provision "forbids either comment by the prosecution on the accused's silence or instructions by the court that such silence is evidence of guilt." ( Griffin v. California (1965) 380 U.S. 609 , 615, 85 S.Ct. 1229 , 14 L.Ed.2d 106 ; accord, People v. Thompson , supra , 1 Cal.5th at p. 1117, 210 Cal.Rptr.3d 667 , 384 P.3d 693 .) But as the high court explained in Lakeside v. Oregon (1978) 435 U.S.

2024Cir. 1970) 439 F.2d 536 .) Our Supreme Court has consistently held that “permitting the jury to learn that a witness invoked the privilege against self-incrimination serves no legitimate purpose and may cause the jury to draw an improper inference of the witness’s guilt or complicity in the charged offense.” (Cudjo, supra, 7 6 Cal.4th at p. 619 , italics added; Smith, supra, 40 Cal.4th at pp. 516−517; People v. Mincey (1992) 2 Cal.4th 408, 441 .) For this reason, trial courts are encouraged to observe the better practice of requiring the exercise of privilege out of the presence of the jury.

2022“To avoid the potentially prejudicial impact of having a witness assert the privilege against self-incrimination before the jury, [it is] recommended that, in determining the propriety of the witness’s invocation of the privilege, the trial court hold a pretestimonial hearing outside the jury’s presence.” (People v. Mincey (1992) 2 Cal.4th 408, 441 .) When there is a dispute about 16 whether a witness may legitimately rely on the privilege, “[s]uch a procedure makes sense under the appropriate circumstances.” (People v. Doolin (2009) 45 Cal.4th 390, 442 .) “[I]t is the better practice for the

2022“To avoid the potentially prejudicial impact of having a witness assert the privilege against self-incrimination before the jury, [it is] recommended that, in determining the propriety of the witness’s invocation of the privilege, the trial court hold a pretestimonial hearing outside the jury’s presence.” (People v. Mincey (1992) 2 Cal.4th 408, 441 .) When there is a dispute about 16 whether a witness may legitimately rely on the privilege, “[s]uch a procedure makes sense under the appropriate circumstances.” (People v. Doolin (2009) 45 Cal.4th 390, 442 .) “[I]t is the better practice for the

2021“To avoid the potentially prejudicial impact of having a witness assert the privilege against self-incrimination before the jury, [it is] recommended that, in determining the propriety of the witness’s invocation of the privilege, the trial court hold a pretestimonial hearing outside the jury’s presence.” (People v. Mincey (1992) 2 Cal.4th 408, 441 .) When there is a dispute about whether a witness may legitimately rely on the privilege, “[s]uch a procedure makes sense under the appropriate circumstances.” (People v. Doolin (2009) 45 Cal.4th 390, 442 .) “[I]t is the better practice for the cou

2026(People v. Orozco (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 802, 811 (Orozco).) Miranda was based on the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, which “has consistently been accorded a liberal construction.” ( Miranda, supra, 384 U.S. 8 at p. 461 .) The exercise of that privilege “will be scrupulously honored,” and “the privilege is fulfilled only when the person is guaranteed the right ‘to remain silent unless he chooses to speak in the unfettered exercise of his own will.’ ” (Id. at pp. 460, 479.) “Critically, however, Miranda’s rule has a limit: It only applies when the suspect-defendant was the

2013To protect the exercise of the privilege against self-incrimination, persons subject to custodial interrogation must be informed of certain rights, including the right to counsel, and once such a person invokes the right to counsel, the police must cease interrogation until counsel is provided or the suspect initiates further contact and makes it clear that he or she wishes to proceed without counsel. ( Miranda, supra, 384 U.S. at pp. 473-474 [ 16 L.Ed.2d at p. 723 ]; Edwards v. Arizona (1981) 451 U.S. 477, 482 , 484- 485 [ 68 L.Ed.2d 378, 384, 386-387 ]; see also Rhode Island v. Innis (1980)

1978A privilege tax “does not become a property tax simply because it is proportioned in amount to the value of the property used in connection with the privilege which is taxed.” (Ingels v. Riley, supra, 5 Cal.2d 154, 160 .) Plaintiffs rely upon the statement in Ingels v. Riley, supra, 5 Cal.2d 154, 159 , that a “privilege tax ... is imposed upon the right to exercise a privilege, and its payment is invariably made a condition precedent to the exercise of the privilege involved.” It is urged that since the city ordinance did not make actual payment of the tax a “condition precedent” for effectuat

1978A privilege tax “does not become a property tax simply because it is proportioned in amount to the value of the property used in connection with the privilege which is taxed.” (Ingels v. Riley, supra, 5 Cal.2d 154, 160 .) Plaintiffs rely upon the statement in Ingels v. Riley, supra, 5 Cal.2d 154, 159 , that a “privilege tax ... is imposed upon the right to exercise a privilege, and its payment is invariably made a condition precedent to the exercise of the privilege involved.” It is urged that since the city ordinance did not make actual payment of the tax a “condition precedent” for effectuat

2025They not only “involve[] the exercise of analysis and judgment as to what is just and proper under the circumstances” (Kemmerer, supra, 200 Cal.App.3d at p. 1438 ) but also constitute “sensitive policy decision[s] that require[] judicial abstention to avoid affecting a coordinate governmental entity’s decisionmaking or planning process” (Barner v. Leeds (2000) 24 Cal.4th 676, 688 (Barner)).

2025Analysis Decisions regarding the removal, detention, and placement of children in the foster care system are not “ ‘administrative acts implementing policy decisions.’ ” (Gabriella A. v. County of Orange, supra, 10 Cal.App.5th at p. 1287.) Rather, these decisions not only “involve[] the exercise of analysis and judgment as to what is just and proper under the circumstances” (Kemmerer v. County of Fresno (1988) 200 Cal.App.3d 1426, 1438 , disapproved on another ground in Quigley v. Garden Valley Fire Protection Dist. (2019) 7 Cal.5th 798, 815, fn. 8 ), they implicate “sensitive policy decision[

1988According to defendant, a properly worded instruction on the right of self-representation could avoid these misconceptions. *877 (36a) If a criminal defendant does not testify, the trial court is required, on the defendant's request, to inform the jury of the privilege against self-incrimination and to instruct them to draw no inference of guilt from the exercise of the privilege. ( Carter v. Kentucky (1981) 450 U.S. 288, 305 [ 67 L.Ed.2d 241, 254 , 101 S.Ct. 1112 ].) (35b) Defendant maintains that the privilege of self-representation is similar to the privilege against self-incrimination, and

1988According to defendant, a properly worded instruction on the right of self-representation could avoid these misconceptions. *877 (36a) If a criminal defendant does not testify, the trial court is required, on the defendant's request, to inform the jury of the privilege against self-incrimination and to instruct them to draw no inference of guilt from the exercise of the privilege. ( Carter v. Kentucky (1981) 450 U.S. 288, 305 [ 67 L.Ed.2d 241, 254 , 101 S.Ct. 1112 ].) (35b) Defendant maintains that the privilege of self-representation is similar to the privilege against self-incrimination, and

2026(People v. Orozco (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 802, 811 (Orozco).) Miranda was based on the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, which “has consistently been accorded a liberal construction.” ( Miranda, supra, 384 U.S. 8 at p. 461 .) The exercise of that privilege “will be scrupulously honored,” and “the privilege is fulfilled only when the person is guaranteed the right ‘to remain silent unless he chooses to speak in the unfettered exercise of his own will.’ ” (Id. at pp. 460, 479.) “Critically, however, Miranda’s rule has a limit: It only applies when the suspect-defendant was the

2013To protect the exercise of the privilege against self-incrimination, persons subject to custodial interrogation must be informed of certain rights, including the right to counsel, and once such a person invokes the right to counsel, the police must cease interrogation until counsel is provided or the suspect initiates further contact and makes it clear that he or she wishes to proceed without counsel. ( Miranda, supra, 384 U.S. at pp. 473-474 [ 16 L.Ed.2d at p. 723 ]; Edwards v. Arizona (1981) 451 U.S. 477, 482 , 484- 485 [ 68 L.Ed.2d 378, 384, 386-387 ]; see also Rhode Island v. Innis (1980)

2025Regarding the drawing of an adverse inference from the invocation of the Fifth Amendment privilege, the relevant section of the Benchbook cited by the trial court states: “On the request of a party who may be adversely affected by an unfavorable inference that may be drawn by the jurors from the exercise of the privilege, the judge must instruct the jurors that no presumption arises because of the exercise of the privilege, and that they may not draw any inference from the exercise of the privilege. [Citations.] The judge should give CACI 215 (Exercise of a Communication Privilege) and 216 (Ex

2022“To avoid the potentially prejudicial impact of having a witness assert the privilege against self-incrimination before the jury, [it is] recommended that, in determining the propriety of the witness’s invocation of the privilege, the trial court hold a pretestimonial hearing outside the jury’s presence.” (People v. Mincey (1992) 2 Cal.4th 408, 441 .) When there is a dispute about 16 whether a witness may legitimately rely on the privilege, “[s]uch a procedure makes sense under the appropriate circumstances.” (People v. Doolin (2009) 45 Cal.4th 390, 442 .) “[I]t is the better practice for the

2024Cir. 1970) 439 F.2d 536 .) Our Supreme Court has consistently held that “permitting the jury to learn that a witness invoked the privilege against self-incrimination serves no legitimate purpose and may cause the jury to draw an improper inference of the witness’s guilt or complicity in the charged offense.” (Cudjo, supra, 7 6 Cal.4th at p. 619 , italics added; Smith, supra, 40 Cal.4th at pp. 516−517; People v. Mincey (1992) 2 Cal.4th 408, 441 .) For this reason, trial courts are encouraged to observe the better practice of requiring the exercise of privilege out of the presence of the jury.

2007This court has noted that “permitting the jury to learn that a witness has invoked the privilege against self-incrimination serves no legitimate purpose *517 and may cause the jury to draw an improper inference of the witness’s guilt or complicity in the charged offense.” (People v. Cudjo (1993) 6 Cal.4th 585, 619 [ 25 Cal.Rptr.2d 390 , 863 P.2d 635 ]; see also People v. Hill (1992) 3 Cal.4th 959, 992 [ 13 Cal.Rptr.2d 475 , 839 P.2d 984 ]; People v. Mincey (1992) 2 Cal.4th 408, 441 [ 6 Cal.Rptr.2d 822 , 827 P.2d 388 ].) Indeed, we have noted that “ ‘it is the better practice for the court to r

2023Co. (1970) 10 Cal.App.3d 376 , 395–396.) The FAC alleges that “[t]he sale of the campus, refusal to maintain the Pasadena [C]ampus in perpetuity, and the refusal of a refund are extreme and outrageous conduct, acts that are so extreme as to exceed all bounds of decency that are usually tolerated in a civilized community.” We agree with the trial court that it was not extreme or outrageous for defendants to pursue their legal interests by declining to honor an agreement restraining alienation that was void and contrary to public policy.

2007“Undoubtedly an insurance company is privileged, in pursuing its own economic interests, to assert in a permissible way its legal rights and to communicate its position in good faith to its insured even though it is *476 substantially certain that in so doing emotional distress will be caused. [Citation.] . . . [][] Nevertheless, the exercise of the privilege to assert one’s legal rights must be done in a permissible way and with a good faith belief in the existence of the rights asserted. [Citation.] It is well established that one who, in exercising the privilege of asserting his own economi

1991(People v. Johnson (1974) 39 Cal.App.3d 749, 760 [ 114 Cal.Rptr. 545 ]; Bowles v. United States (1970) 439 F.2d 536, 541-542 [ 142 App.D.C. 26 ].) Therefore, “it is the better practice for the court to require the exercise of the privilege out of the presence of the jury.” (People v. Johnson, supra, 39 Cal.App.3d at p. 759 .) We have “commend[ed]” the approach “as a means by which to avoid the potentially prejudicial impact of the witness asserting the privilege before the jury.” (People v. Ford (1988) 45 Cal.3d 431, 441, fn. 6 [ 247 Cal.Rptr. 121 , 754 P.2d 168 , 76 A.L.R.4th 785 ].) Citing P

1991(People v. Johnson (1974) 39 Cal.App.3d 749, 760 [ 114 Cal.Rptr. 545 ]; Bowles v. United States (1970) 439 F.2d 536, 541-542 [ 142 App.D.C. 26 ].) Therefore, “it is the better practice for the court to require the exercise of the privilege out of the presence of the jury.” (People v. Johnson, supra, 39 Cal.App.3d at p. 759 .) We have “commend[ed]” the approach “as a means by which to avoid the potentially prejudicial impact of the witness asserting the privilege before the jury.” (People v. Ford (1988) 45 Cal.3d 431, 441, fn. 6 [ 247 Cal.Rptr. 121 , 754 P.2d 168 , 76 A.L.R.4th 785 ].) Citing P

2024Concerning those decisions, an attorney must both consult with the defendant and obtain consent to the recommended course of action.” (Florida v. Nixon (2004) 543 U.S. 175, 187 (Nixon).) A defendant’s right to determine the objective of his defense falls within this category.

2023Concerning those decisions, an attorney must both consult with the defendant and obtain consent to the recommended course of action.” (Florida v. Nixon (2004) 543 U.S. 175, 187 .) A defendant’s right to determine the objective of his defense falls within this category.

2020Indeed, it is precisely because a witness’s refusal to testify in front of the jury may, in certain circumstances, unduly prejudice a criminal defendant that our Supreme Court has “noted that ‘ “it is the better practice for the court to require the exercise of the privilege out of the presence of the jury.” ’ [Citations.]” (Smith, supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 517 .) Because the record does not affirmatively disclose defense counsel had no rational tactical purpose for not objecting to the trial court’s procedure, we cannot reverse for ineffective assistance of counsel.

2008As to defendant’s first claim, we have observed: “Allowing a witness to be put on the stand to have the witness exercise the privilege before the jury would only invite the jury to make an improper inference. [Citations.] Therefore, ‘it is the better practice for the court to require the exercise of the privilege out of the presence of the jury.’ [Citation.] We have ‘commend[ed]’ the approach ‘as a means by which to avoid the potentially prejudicial impact of file witness asserting the privilege before the jury.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Frierson (1991) 53 Cal.3d 730, 743 [ 280 Cal.Rptr. 440 ,

2014(Id. at p. 258.) The court found the provisions in harmony with the Supreme Court’s decision in Ferguson v. Keays (1971) 4 Cal.3d 649 [ 94 Cal.Rptr. 398 , 484 P.2d 70 ] that “ ‘the Judicial Council could, in the exercise of its rule-making power, promulgate rules governing applications for in forma pauperis relief.

2014(Id. at p. 258.) The court found the provisions in harmony with the Supreme Court’s decision in Ferguson v. Keays (1971) 4 Cal.3d 649 [ 94 Cal.Rptr. 398 , 484 P.2d 70 ] that “ ‘the Judicial Council could, in the exercise of its rule-making power, promulgate rules governing applications for in forma pauperis relief.

2004In these cases, then, ‘. . . the defendant police officer is in the exercise of the privilege of protecting the public peace and order [and] he is entitled to the even greater use of force than might be in the same circumstances required for self-defense. [f] . . . [f] . . . [T]he burden of proof [is] upon the plaintiff to establish the use of excessive force . . . .’ (Wirsing v. Krzeminski [(Wis. 1973)] 61 Wis.2d 513 [ 213 N.W.2d 37, 41 ].) “Equally important, a police officer must have control over the manner and means of making an arrest or detention.

2004In these cases, then, ‘. . . the defendant police officer is in the exercise of the privilege of protecting the public peace and order [and] he is entitled to the even greater use of force than might be in the same circumstances required for self-defense. [f] . . . [f] . . . [T]he burden of proof [is] upon the plaintiff to establish the use of excessive force . . . .’ (Wirsing v. Krzeminski [(Wis. 1973)] 61 Wis.2d 513 [ 213 N.W.2d 37, 41 ].) “Equally important, a police officer must have control over the manner and means of making an arrest or detention.

2025(See Alicia, supra, at p. 883 [continuing exercise of discretion “in favor of the protection of minor children”].) These qualities hold true for, as here, “preliminary determinations” that “reports of 10. possible abuse” “did not warrant initiation” of further action.7, 8 ( Jacqueline, supra, at p. 468 ; see Ortega v. Sacramento County Dept. of Health & Human Services (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 713, 733 [“[E]valuation of information is an integral part of ‘the exercise of the discretion’ immunized by [Government Code] section 820.2.”]; cf. Conway v. County of Tuolumne, supra, 231 Cal.App.4th at p.

2025(See Jacqueline T. v. Alameda County Child Protective Services (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 456, 467 [the preliminary determination regarding whether to investigate reported sexual abuse falls within the scope of discretionary immunity under Gov.

2024Cir. 1970) 439 F.2d 536 .) Our Supreme Court has consistently held that “permitting the jury to learn that a witness invoked the privilege against self-incrimination serves no legitimate purpose and may cause the jury to draw an improper inference of the witness’s guilt or complicity in the charged offense.” (Cudjo, supra, 7 6 Cal.4th at p. 619 , italics added; Smith, supra, 40 Cal.4th at pp. 516−517; People v. Mincey (1992) 2 Cal.4th 408, 441 .) For this reason, trial courts are encouraged to observe the better practice of requiring the exercise of privilege out of the presence of the jury.

1991(People v. Johnson (1974) 39 Cal.App.3d 749, 760 [ 114 Cal.Rptr. 545 ]; Bowles v. United States (1970) 439 F.2d 536, 541-542 [ 142 App.D.C. 26 ].) Therefore, “it is the better practice for the court to require the exercise of the privilege out of the presence of the jury.” (People v. Johnson, supra, 39 Cal.App.3d at p. 759 .) We have “commend[ed]” the approach “as a means by which to avoid the potentially prejudicial impact of the witness asserting the privilege before the jury.” (People v. Ford (1988) 45 Cal.3d 431, 441, fn. 6 [ 247 Cal.Rptr. 121 , 754 P.2d 168 , 76 A.L.R.4th 785 ].) Citing P