exercise privilege in Pennsylvania

2022“The privilege exists only to aid in the administration of justice, and when it is shown that the interests of the administration of justice can only be frustrated by the exercise of the privilege, the trial judge may require that the communication be disclosed.” Id. (quoting Cohen v. Jenkintown Cab Co., 357 A.2d 689, 693-94 (Pa.Super. 1976)).

2021“The privilege exists only to aid in the administration of justice, and when it is shown that the interests of the administration of justice can only be frustrated by the exercise of the privilege, the trial judge may require that the communication be disclosed.” Id. (quoting Cohen v. Jenkintown Cab Co., 357 A.2d 689, 693-94 (Pa.Super. 1976)).

2013“The privilege of doing business in the [taxing municipality] like the privilege of owning and transferring property ... can be taxed only to the extent that the exercise of the privilege occurs within the [taxing municipality].” Id.

2004Rather, in Gilberti , this Court concluded that a taxing jurisdiction is not required to ignore the contribution provided by a business maintaining a base of operations within the taxing jurisdiction.... ”) (emphasis in original); Gilberti, 511 Pa. 100, 108-109 , 511 A.2d 1321, 1326 (1986) ("[Mjaintaining a business office in the City is an exercise of a privilege ‘within the limits’ of the taxing district, and, thus, a tax can thereupon be levied.

2019A defendant, this Court affirmed, has “the ultimate authority” to determine “whether to plead guilty, waive a jury, testify in his or her own behalf, or take an appeal.” Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751 [] (1983); Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 93, n.1 [] (1977) - 16 - J-S14010-19 (Burger, C.

2015A defendant, this Court affirmed, has “the ultimate authority” to determine “whether to plead guilty, waive a jury, testify in his or her own behalf, or take an appeal.” Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751 , 103 S.Ct. 3308 , 77 L.Ed.2d 987 (1983); Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 93, n. 1 , 97 S.Ct. 2497 , 53 L.Ed.2d 594 (1977) (Burger, C.

2014(Emphasis [omitted], citations omitted.) Id. at 553-54 , 227 A.2d at 629 . - 10 - J-S74009-14 If an individual possesses reasonable cause to apprehend danger of prosecution, “it is not necessary that a real danger of prosecution exist to justify the exercise of the privilege against self-incrimination.” Id.

2014(Emphasis [omitted], citations omitted.) Id. at 553-54 , 227 A.2d at 629 . - 10 - J-S74009-14 If an individual possesses reasonable cause to apprehend danger of prosecution, “it is not necessary that a real danger of prosecution exist to justify the exercise of the privilege against self-incrimination.” Id.

2022“The privilege exists only to aid in the administration of justice, and when it is shown that the interests of the administration of justice can only be frustrated by the exercise of the privilege, the trial judge may require that the communication be disclosed.” Id. (quoting Cohen v. Jenkintown Cab Co., 357 A.2d 689, 693-94 (Pa.Super. 1976)).

2021“The privilege exists only to aid in the administration of justice, and when it is shown that the interests of the administration of justice can only be frustrated by the exercise of the privilege, the trial judge may require that the communication be disclosed.” Id. (quoting Cohen v. Jenkintown Cab Co., 357 A.2d 689, 693-94 (Pa.Super. 1976)).

2019A defendant, this Court affirmed, has “the ultimate authority” to determine “whether to plead guilty, waive a jury, testify in his or her own behalf, or take an appeal.” Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751 [] (1983); Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 93, n.1 [] (1977) - 16 - J-S14010-19 (Burger, C.

2015A defendant, this Court affirmed, has “the ultimate authority” to determine “whether to plead guilty, waive a jury, testify in his or her own behalf, or take an appeal.” Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751 , 103 S.Ct. 3308 , 77 L.Ed.2d 987 (1983); Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 93, n. 1 , 97 S.Ct. 2497 , 53 L.Ed.2d 594 (1977) (Burger, C.

2018For example, there is an exception to the privilege where "the client has attacked the integrity and professionalism of counsel." Salsman v. Brown , 51 A.3d 892 , 895 (Pa. Super. 2012).

2015For example, there is an exception to the privilege where “the client has attacked the integrity and professionalism of counsel.” Salsman v. Brown, 51 A.3d 892, 895 (Pa.Super.2012).

2005“Moreover, the privilege extends not only to the disclosure of facts which would in themselves establish guilt, but also to any fact which might constitute an essential link in a chain of evidence by which guilt can be established.” Id.; see Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479 , 71 S.Ct. 814 , 95 L.Ed. 1118 (1951).

2005“Moreover, the privilege extends not only to the disclosure of facts which would in themselves establish guilt, but also to any fact which might constitute an essential link in a chain of evidence by which guilt can be established.” Id.; see Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479 , 71 S.Ct. 814 , 95 L.Ed. 1118 (1951).

2026Indeed, “[t]he privilege exists only to aid in the administration of justice, and when it is shown that the interests of the administration of justice can only be frustrated by the exercise of the privilege, the trial judge may require that the communication be disclosed.” Perelman, 259 A.3d at 1007 (citation omitted).

2024Nixon, 543 U.S. at 178-179 (stating that, “certain decisions regarding the exercise or waiver of basic trial rights are of such moment that they cannot be made for the defendant by a surrogate”).

2024Nixon, 543 U.S. at 178-179 (stating that, “certain decisions regarding the exercise or waiver of basic trial rights are of such moment that they cannot be made for the defendant by a surrogate”).

2015Commonwealth v. Stewart, 547 Pa. 277 , 690 A.2d 195, 197 (1997) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). *62 “The privilege exists only to aid in the administration of justice, and when it is shown that the interests of the administration of justice can only be frustrated by the exercise of the privilege, the trial judge may require that the communication be disclosed.” Cohen v. Jenkintown Cab Co., 238 Pa.Super. 456 , 357 A.2d 689, 693-94 (1976) (en banc).

2015Commonwealth v. Stewart, 547 Pa. 277 , 690 A.2d 195, 197 (1997) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). *62 “The privilege exists only to aid in the administration of justice, and when it is shown that the interests of the administration of justice can only be frustrated by the exercise of the privilege, the trial judge may require that the communication be disclosed.” Cohen v. Jenkintown Cab Co., 238 Pa.Super. 456 , 357 A.2d 689, 693-94 (1976) (en banc).

2014See, Rossino v. Kovacs, 718 A.2d 755 (Pa. 1998), commenting that to do so, then “every possessor of land in the Commonwealth, no matter how remote the location, would face civil liability every time police or firemen entered his land ....”.

2010See Gilligan v. Pa. Horse Racing Comm'n, 492 Pa. 92 , 422 A.2d 487 (1980) (finding that the legislature's acquiescence to the manner of the commission's exercise of its rule-making authority manifested approval thereof); Estate of Loeb, 400 Pa. 368 , 162 A.2d 207, 211 (1960) ("Where ... the words of a statute are not clear or explicit the contemporaneous construction of a statute by those charged with its execution and application, especially when it has long prevailed, is entitled to great weight and should not be disregarded or overturned except for clear language in the [Pennsylvania Transf

2010See Gilligan v. Pa. Horse Racing Comm'n, 492 Pa. 92 , 422 A.2d 487 (1980) (finding that the legislature's acquiescence to the manner of the commission's exercise of its rule-making authority manifested approval thereof); Estate of Loeb, 400 Pa. 368 , 162 A.2d 207, 211 (1960) ("Where ... the words of a statute are not clear or explicit the contemporaneous construction of a statute by those charged with its execution and application, especially when it has long prevailed, is entitled to great weight and should not be disregarded or overturned except for clear language in the [Pennsylvania Transf

2010See Gilligan v. Pa. Horse Racing Comm'n, 492 Pa. 92 , 422 A.2d 487 (1980) (finding that the legislature's acquiescence to the manner of the commission's exercise of its rule-making authority manifested approval thereof); Estate of Loeb, 400 Pa. 368 , 162 A.2d 207, 211 (1960) ("Where ... the words of a statute are not clear or explicit the contemporaneous construction of a statute by those charged with its execution and application, especially when it has long prevailed, is entitled to great weight and should not be disregarded or overturned except for clear language in the [Pennsylvania Transf

2010See Gilligan v. Pa. Horse Racing Comm'n, 492 Pa. 92 , 422 A.2d 487 (1980) (finding that the legislature's acquiescence to the manner of the commission's exercise of its rule-making authority manifested approval thereof); Estate of Loeb, 400 Pa. 368 , 162 A.2d 207, 211 (1960) ("Where ... the words of a statute are not clear or explicit the contemporaneous construction of a statute by those charged with its execution and application, especially when it has long prevailed, is entitled to great weight and should not be disregarded or overturned except for clear language in the [Pennsylvania Transf

2010Our Courts have long recognized that “if an individual possesses reasonable cause to apprehend danger of prosecution, ‘it is not necessary that a real danger of prosecution exist to justify the exercise of the privilege against self incrimination.’ ” Commonwealth v. Saranchak, 581 Pa. 490 , 866 A.2d 292, 303 (2005) (quoting Commonwealth v. Carrera, 424 Pa. 551 , 227 A.2d 627, 629 (1967) (emphasis added)).

2010Our Courts have long recognized that “if an individual possesses reasonable cause to apprehend danger of prosecution, ‘it is not necessary that a real danger of prosecution exist to justify the exercise of the privilege against self incrimination.’ ” Commonwealth v. Saranchak, 581 Pa. 490 , 866 A.2d 292, 303 (2005) (quoting Commonwealth v. Carrera, 424 Pa. 551 , 227 A.2d 627, 629 (1967) (emphasis added)).

2006“In the context of a psychotherapist, the client must be seeking treatment, counseling or advice for a mental or emotional problem.” M. v. State Board of Medicine, 725 A.2d 1266, 1268 (Pa. Commw. 1999) (“A court-ordered examination does not invoke this privilege because treatment is not contemplated in conducting the examination.”); Matter of Adoption of Embick, 351 Pa. Super. 491 , 506 A.2d 455 (1986), appeal denied, 513 Pa. 634 , 520 A.2d 1385 (1987) (holding that a parent’s voluntary submission to examination at the request of a county children and youth agency for purposes of assessing the