11 District of Columbia opinions name it 1 courts 1975–2008 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by District of Columbia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
International Shoe Co. v. Washingtongreen2 sentences1976The exercise of that privilege may give rise to obligations; and, so far as those obligations arise out of or are connected with the activities within the state, a procedure which requires the corporation to respond to a suit brought to enforce them can, in most instances, hardly be said to be undue. [ 326 U.S. at 319 , 66 S.Ct. at 160 , 90 L. 1976The exercise of that privilege may give rise to obligations; and, so far as those obligations arise out of or are connected with the activities within the state, a procedure which requires the corporation to respond to a suit brought to enforce them can, in most instances, hardly be said to be undue. [ 326 U.S. at 319 , 66 S.Ct. at 160 , 90 L. | 1 | 3 |
Gould v. Stategreen2 sentences2008Gould v. State of Florida, 99 Fla. 662 , 127 So. 309, 311 (1930) (emphasis added). 2 . 2008Gould v. State of Florida, 99 Fla. 662 , 127 So. 309, 311 (1930) (emphasis added). 2 . | 1 | 1 |
Littlejohn v. United Statesgreen1 sentence1999See, e.g., Littlejohn v. United States, 705 A.2d 1077, 1082-83 (D.C.1997). 7 . | 1 | 1 |
Lyons v. United Statesgreen1 sentence1999The government fittingly responds that he has no standing to assert that right, see, e.g., Lyons v. United States, 683 A.2d 1080, 1084 (D.C.1996), and argues that in any event the judge correctly tested the witness’s exercise of the privilege on a question by question basis. | 1 | 1 |
Hueschen v. Staliegreen2 sentences1994At best, it is but 'a right of election in the party securing the same to exercise a privilege,’ and only when that privilege has been exercised by acceptance does it become a contract to sell") (emphasis supplied) (citation omitted); Tate v. Wood, 169 W.Va. 584 , 289 S.E.2d 432, 434 (1982) ("An option to purchase is not a sale nor an agreement to sell: it becomes an executory contract only when properly accepted within the stipulated time ") (emphasis supplied); Hueschen v. Stalie, 98 N.M. 696 , 652 P.2d 246, 248 (1982) ("A lease with an option to purchase real estate creates no estate in the 1994At best, it is but 'a right of election in the party securing the same to exercise a privilege,’ and only when that privilege has been exercised by acceptance does it become a contract to sell") (emphasis supplied) (citation omitted); Tate v. Wood, 169 W.Va. 584 , 289 S.E.2d 432, 434 (1982) ("An option to purchase is not a sale nor an agreement to sell: it becomes an executory contract only when properly accepted within the stipulated time ") (emphasis supplied); Hueschen v. Stalie, 98 N.M. 696 , 652 P.2d 246, 248 (1982) ("A lease with an option to purchase real estate creates no estate in the | 1 | 1 |
Tate v. Woodgreen2 sentences1994At best, it is but 'a right of election in the party securing the same to exercise a privilege,’ and only when that privilege has been exercised by acceptance does it become a contract to sell") (emphasis supplied) (citation omitted); Tate v. Wood, 169 W.Va. 584 , 289 S.E.2d 432, 434 (1982) ("An option to purchase is not a sale nor an agreement to sell: it becomes an executory contract only when properly accepted within the stipulated time ") (emphasis supplied); Hueschen v. Stalie, 98 N.M. 696 , 652 P.2d 246, 248 (1982) ("A lease with an option to purchase real estate creates no estate in the 1994At best, it is but 'a right of election in the party securing the same to exercise a privilege,’ and only when that privilege has been exercised by acceptance does it become a contract to sell") (emphasis supplied) (citation omitted); Tate v. Wood, 169 W.Va. 584 , 289 S.E.2d 432, 434 (1982) ("An option to purchase is not a sale nor an agreement to sell: it becomes an executory contract only when properly accepted within the stipulated time ") (emphasis supplied); Hueschen v. Stalie, 98 N.M. 696 , 652 P.2d 246, 248 (1982) ("A lease with an option to purchase real estate creates no estate in the | 1 | 1 |
Ottman, Trustees v. Albert Co.green2 sentences1994At best, it is but 'a right of election in the party securing the same to exercise a privilege,’ and only when that privilege has been exercised by acceptance does it become a contract to sell") (emphasis supplied) (citation omitted); Tate v. Wood, 169 W.Va. 584 , 289 S.E.2d 432, 434 (1982) ("An option to purchase is not a sale nor an agreement to sell: it becomes an executory contract only when properly accepted within the stipulated time ") (emphasis supplied); Hueschen v. Stalie, 98 N.M. 696 , 652 P.2d 246, 248 (1982) ("A lease with an option to purchase real estate creates no estate in the 1994At best, it is but 'a right of election in the party securing the same to exercise a privilege,’ and only when that privilege has been exercised by acceptance does it become a contract to sell") (emphasis supplied) (citation omitted); Tate v. Wood, 169 W.Va. 584 , 289 S.E.2d 432, 434 (1982) ("An option to purchase is not a sale nor an agreement to sell: it becomes an executory contract only when properly accepted within the stipulated time ") (emphasis supplied); Hueschen v. Stalie, 98 N.M. 696 , 652 P.2d 246, 248 (1982) ("A lease with an option to purchase real estate creates no estate in the | 1 | 1 |
United States v. J. Marshall Browngreen1 sentence1993See also United States v. Brown, 634 F.2d 819, 824 (5th Cir.1981) (en banc) (“[I]n some cases, a privilege or rule of evidence must give way to the defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights”). 3 The question before us, then, is whether in the circumstances of this case appellant’s right to confront Carter with an alleged inconsistent statement should have prevailed over Carter’s assertion of the attorney-client privilege. | 1 | 1 |
Salazar v. Stategreen1 sentence1993State and lower federal courts have recognized that a criminal accused’s right to confront the evidence and cross-examine witnesses against him may supplant a common law privilege. “[W]hen conflict is found between the constitutional right of confrontation and the exercise of a privilege based on public policy, the constitutional right must control.” Salazar v. State, 559 P.2d 66, 78 (Alaska 1976) (Sixth Amendment right overrides the marital privilege). | 1 | 1 |
Beasley v. United Statesgreen1 sentence1991Cf. Beasley v. United States, 512 A.2d 1007, 1016 (D.C.1986) (promises of leniency insufficient to "overbear [suspect’s] free will”), cert. denied, 482 U.S. 907 , 107 S.Ct. 2485 , 96 L.Ed.2d 377 (1987); United States v. Guerrero, 847 F.2d 1363 (9th Cir.1988) (speculation that cooperation will have positive effect and promise to inform prosecutor of cooperation and recommend leniency does not render statement involuntary). | 1 | 1 |
National Labor Relations Board v. Majestic Weaving Co., Inc., Local 815, International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Intervenorgreen1 sentence1987Because an administrative agency usually has “ ‘the ability to make new law prospectively through the exercise of its rule-making powers, it has less reason [than a court] to rely upon ad hoc adjudication to formulate new standards of conduct.’ ” National Labor Relations Bd. v. Majestic Weaving Co., 355 F.2d 854, 860 (2d Cir.1966) (quoting Securities & Exchange Comm’n v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 202 , 67 S.Ct. 1575, 1580 , 91 L.Ed. 1995 (1947)). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Boyd v. District of Columbia Department of Human Servicesgreen1 sentence1987But see Boyd, 524 A.2d at 747 (department takes position it lacks general rulemaking authority). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Securities & Exchange Commission v. Chenery Corp.
green
2 sentences1989The Board’s new interpretation, which may well upset a long practice of cash discounts, suggests the wisdom of the Supreme Court’s observation (adapted slightly to this ease) in Securities Exchange Commission v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 202 , 67 S.Ct. 1575, 1580 , 91 L.Ed. 1995 (1947): Since the [Board], unlike the court, [has] the ability to make new law prospectively through the exercise of its rule-making powers, it has less reason to rely upon ad hoc adjudication to formulate new standards of conduct within the framework of the [D.C. 1989The Board’s new interpretation, which may well upset a long practice of cash discounts, suggests the wisdom of the Supreme Court’s observation (adapted slightly to this ease) in Securities Exchange Commission v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 202 , 67 S.Ct. 1575, 1580 , 91 L.Ed. 1995 (1947): Since the [Board], unlike the court, [has] the ability to make new law prospectively through the exercise of its rule-making powers, it has less reason to rely upon ad hoc adjudication to formulate new standards of conduct within the framework of the [D.C. | 2 | 1987–1989 |
Quigley v. Capolongo
green
2 sentences1994In particular, appellants cite Quigley v. Capolongo, 53 A.D.2d 714 , 383 N.Y.S.2d 935 (1976), aff'd sub nom., Quigley v. Ithaca College, 43 N.Y.2d 748 , 401 N.Y.S.2d 1009 , 372 N.E.2d 797 (1977) for the proposition that, despite the denomination given by the parties, an option to purchase is a “sale” and triggers tenants’ rights to purchase. 1994In particular, appellants cite Quigley v. Capolongo, 53 A.D.2d 714 , 383 N.Y.S.2d 935 (1976), aff'd sub nom., Quigley v. Ithaca College, 43 N.Y.2d 748 , 401 N.Y.S.2d 1009 , 372 N.E.2d 797 (1977) for the proposition that, despite the denomination given by the parties, an option to purchase is a “sale” and triggers tenants’ rights to purchase. | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Quigley v. Capolongo
green
1 sentence1994In particular, appellants cite Quigley v. Capolongo, 53 A.D.2d 714 , 383 N.Y.S.2d 935 (1976), aff'd sub nom., Quigley v. Ithaca College, 43 N.Y.2d 748 , 401 N.Y.S.2d 1009 , 372 N.E.2d 797 (1977) for the proposition that, despite the denomination given by the parties, an option to purchase is a “sale” and triggers tenants’ rights to purchase. | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Bielinski v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc.
neutral
1 sentence1994In particular, appellants cite Quigley v. Capolongo, 53 A.D.2d 714 , 383 N.Y.S.2d 935 (1976), aff'd sub nom., Quigley v. Ithaca College, 43 N.Y.2d 748 , 401 N.Y.S.2d 1009 , 372 N.E.2d 797 (1977) for the proposition that, despite the denomination given by the parties, an option to purchase is a “sale” and triggers tenants’ rights to purchase. | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Coppola Bros. Excavation Corp. v. M. Melnick & Co.
neutral
1 sentence1994In particular, appellants cite Quigley v. Capolongo, 53 A.D.2d 714 , 383 N.Y.S.2d 935 (1976), aff'd sub nom., Quigley v. Ithaca College, 43 N.Y.2d 748 , 401 N.Y.S.2d 1009 , 372 N.E.2d 797 (1977) for the proposition that, despite the denomination given by the parties, an option to purchase is a “sale” and triggers tenants’ rights to purchase. | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Detwiler v. Capone
green
2 sentences1994At best, it is but 'a right of election in the party securing the same to exercise a privilege,’ and only when that privilege has been exercised by acceptance does it become a contract to sell") (emphasis supplied) (citation omitted); Tate v. Wood, 169 W.Va. 584 , 289 S.E.2d 432, 434 (1982) ("An option to purchase is not a sale nor an agreement to sell: it becomes an executory contract only when properly accepted within the stipulated time ") (emphasis supplied); Hueschen v. Stalie, 98 N.M. 696 , 652 P.2d 246, 248 (1982) ("A lease with an option to purchase real estate creates no estate in the 1994At best, it is but 'a right of election in the party securing the same to exercise a privilege,’ and only when that privilege has been exercised by acceptance does it become a contract to sell") (emphasis supplied) (citation omitted); Tate v. Wood, 169 W.Va. 584 , 289 S.E.2d 432, 434 (1982) ("An option to purchase is not a sale nor an agreement to sell: it becomes an executory contract only when properly accepted within the stipulated time ") (emphasis supplied); Hueschen v. Stalie, 98 N.M. 696 , 652 P.2d 246, 248 (1982) ("A lease with an option to purchase real estate creates no estate in the | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Minnesota v. Murphy
green
2 sentences1991Therefore, they form “no reasonable basis for concluding that [the government] attempted to attach an impermissible penalty to the exercise of the privilege against self-incrimination.” Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 437 , 104 S.Ct. 1136, 1148 , 79 L.Ed.2d 409 (1984). 8 . 1991Therefore, they form “no reasonable basis for concluding that [the government] attempted to attach an impermissible penalty to the exercise of the privilege against self-incrimination.” Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 437 , 104 S.Ct. 1136, 1148 , 79 L.Ed.2d 409 (1984). 8 . | 1 | 1991–1991 |
United States v. Danny Leon Guerrero
green
1 sentence1991Cf. Beasley v. United States, 512 A.2d 1007, 1016 (D.C.1986) (promises of leniency insufficient to "overbear [suspect’s] free will”), cert. denied, 482 U.S. 907 , 107 S.Ct. 2485 , 96 L.Ed.2d 377 (1987); United States v. Guerrero, 847 F.2d 1363 (9th Cir.1988) (speculation that cooperation will have positive effect and promise to inform prosecutor of cooperation and recommend leniency does not render statement involuntary). | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Beasley v. United States
green
1 sentence1991Cf. Beasley v. United States, 512 A.2d 1007, 1016 (D.C.1986) (promises of leniency insufficient to "overbear [suspect’s] free will”), cert. denied, 482 U.S. 907 , 107 S.Ct. 2485 , 96 L.Ed.2d 377 (1987); United States v. Guerrero, 847 F.2d 1363 (9th Cir.1988) (speculation that cooperation will have positive effect and promise to inform prosecutor of cooperation and recommend leniency does not render statement involuntary). | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Sweetman v. Township of Pennsauken
green
1 sentence1991Cf. Beasley v. United States, 512 A.2d 1007, 1016 (D.C.1986) (promises of leniency insufficient to "overbear [suspect’s] free will”), cert. denied, 482 U.S. 907 , 107 S.Ct. 2485 , 96 L.Ed.2d 377 (1987); United States v. Guerrero, 847 F.2d 1363 (9th Cir.1988) (speculation that cooperation will have positive effect and promise to inform prosecutor of cooperation and recommend leniency does not render statement involuntary). | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Lefkowitz v. Cunningham
green
2 sentences1986Cf. Lefkowitz v. Cunningham, 431 U.S. 801 , 97 S.Ct. 2132 , 53 L.Ed.2d 1 (1977). 1986Cf. Lefkowitz v. Cunningham, 431 U.S. 801 , 97 S.Ct. 2132 , 53 L.Ed.2d 1 (1977). | 1 | 1986–1986 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.