exercise privilege in Michigan

2004The propriety of the rule of lenity was recently reaffirmed by the Supreme Court in United States v Granderson, 511 US 39, 54 ; 114 S Ct 1259 ; 127 L Ed 2d 611 (1994).

2004The propriety of the rule of lenity was recently reaffirmed by the Supreme Court in United States v Granderson, 511 US 39, 54 ; 114 S Ct 1259 ; 127 L Ed 2d 611 (1994).

2000This, the Court of Appeals determined, “constitutes an impermissible penalty for the exercise of the privilege against self-incrimination.” Id.

2000This, the Court of Appeals determined, "constitutes an impermissible penalty for the exercise of the privilege against self-incrimination." Id.

1998Batson, supra at 97 , 106 S.Ct. at 1723 ; People v. Barker, 179 Mich. App. 702, 706 , 446 N.W.2d 549 (1989), aff'd. 437 Mich. 161 , 468 N.W.2d 492 (1991). *23 The trial court accepted the prosecutor's race-neutral explanations for dismissing the three African-American jurors in question and concluded that the prosecutor did not excuse the jurors on account of their race.

1998Batson, supra at 97 ; People v Barker, 179 Mich App 702, 706 ; 446 NW2d 549 (1989), aff’d 437 Mich 161 ; 468 NW2d 492 (1991).

1977This means reading transcripts, weighing the testimony, scrutinizing the reasons advanced for ordering and sustaining the waiver, and, where unconvinced, unhesitating intervention.’ ” 397 Mich at 369 , quoting 391 Mich at 251-252 .

1976This means reading transcripts, weighing the testimony, scrutinizing the reasons advanced for ordering and sustaining the waiver, and, where unconvinced, unhesitating intervention.” 391 Mich at 251-252 .

2025A defendant, this Court affirmed, has “the ultimate authority” to determine “whether to plead guilty, waive a jury, testify in his or her own behalf, or take an appeal.” Concerning those decisions, an attorney must both consult with the defendant and obtain consent to the recommended course of action. [Florida v Nixon, 543 US 175, 187 ; 125 S Ct 551 ; 160 L Ed 2d 565 (2004) (citations omitted).] Thus, although “[t]rial management is the lawyer’s province” and “[c]ounsel provides his or her assistance by making decisions such as what arguments to pursue, what evidentiary objections to raise, an

2025A defendant, this Court affirmed, has “the ultimate authority” to determine “whether to plead guilty, waive a jury, testify in his or her own behalf, or take an appeal.” Concerning those decisions, an attorney must both consult with the defendant and obtain consent to the recommended course of action. [Florida v Nixon, 543 US 175, 187 ; 125 S Ct 551 ; 160 L Ed 2d 565 (2004) (citations omitted).] Thus, although “[t]rial management is the lawyer’s province” and “[c]ounsel provides his or her assistance by making decisions such as what arguments to pursue, what evidentiary objections to raise, an

2009In addition, an attorney cannot waive the right to a jury trial “without the fully informed and publicly acknowledged consent of the client. . . .” Taylor v Illinois, 484 US 400 , 418 & n 24; 108 S Ct 646 ; 98 L Ed 2d 798 (1988); see also Florida v Nixon, 543 US 175, 187 ; 125 S Ct 551 ; 160 L Ed 2d 565 (2004) (noting that “certain decisions regarding the exercise or waiver of basic trial rights are of such moment that they cannot be made for the defendant by a surrogate”); People v Newson, 173 Mich App 160, 165 ; 433 NW2d 386 (1988) (noting that a defendant’s trial counsel may not waive the d

2009In addition, an attorney cannot waive the right to a jury trial “without the fully informed and publicly acknowledged consent of the client. . . .” Taylor v Illinois, 484 US 400 , 418 & n 24; 108 S Ct 646 ; 98 L Ed 2d 798 (1988); see also Florida v Nixon, 543 US 175, 187 ; 125 S Ct 551 ; 160 L Ed 2d 565 (2004) (noting that “certain decisions regarding the exercise or waiver of basic trial rights are of such moment that they cannot be made for the defendant by a surrogate”); People v Newson, 173 Mich App 160, 165 ; 433 NW2d 386 (1988) (noting that a defendant’s trial counsel may not waive the d

2009In addition, an attorney cannot waive the right to a jury trial “without the fully informed and publicly acknowledged consent of the client. . . .” Taylor v Illinois, 484 US 400 , 418 & n 24; 108 S Ct 646 ; 98 L Ed 2d 798 (1988); see also Florida v Nixon, 543 US 175, 187 ; 125 S Ct 551 ; 160 L Ed 2d 565 (2004) (noting that “certain decisions regarding the exercise or waiver of basic trial rights are of such moment that they cannot be made for the defendant by a surrogate”); People v Newson, 173 Mich App 160, 165 ; 433 NW2d 386 (1988) (noting that a defendant’s trial counsel may not waive the d

2009In addition, an attorney cannot waive the right to a jury trial “without the fully informed and publicly acknowledged consent of the client. . . .” Taylor v Illinois, 484 US 400 , 418 & n 24; 108 S Ct 646 ; 98 L Ed 2d 798 (1988); see also Florida v Nixon, 543 US 175, 187 ; 125 S Ct 551 ; 160 L Ed 2d 565 (2004) (noting that “certain decisions regarding the exercise or waiver of basic trial rights are of such moment that they cannot be made for the defendant by a surrogate”); People v Newson, 173 Mich App 160, 165 ; 433 NW2d 386 (1988) (noting that a defendant’s trial counsel may not waive the d

2009In addition, an attorney cannot waive the right to a jury trial “without the fully informed and publicly acknowledged consent of the client. . . .” Taylor v Illinois, 484 US 400 , 418 & n 24; 108 S Ct 646 ; 98 L Ed 2d 798 (1988); see also Florida v Nixon, 543 US 175, 187 ; 125 S Ct 551 ; 160 L Ed 2d 565 (2004) (noting that “certain decisions regarding the exercise or waiver of basic trial rights are of such moment that they cannot be made for the defendant by a surrogate”); People v Newson, 173 Mich App 160, 165 ; 433 NW2d 386 (1988) (noting that a defendant’s trial counsel may not waive the d

2004This is an exercise of the rule of lenity, [22] which should control the resolution of this case and cause us to conclude that all the felony-firearm statute criminalizes is aiding and abetting the carrying or possessing of a firearm, nothing more. [23] NOTES [1] M.C.L. § 750.227b. [2] M.C.L. § 767.39. [3] Id. [4] M.C.L. § 750.316. [5] M.C.L. § 750.83. [6] M.C.L. § 750.227b. [7] M.C.L. § 767.39. [8] M.C.L. § 750.529. [9] M.C.L. § 750.227b. [10] M.C.L. § 767.39. [11] M.C.L. § 750.479a(3). [12] Contrast People v. Tavolacci, 88 Mich.App. 470, 475 , 276 N.W.2d 919 (1979), rev'd People v. Johnson,

2004This is an exercise of the rule of lenity, [22] which should control the resolution of this case and cause us to conclude that all the felony-firearm statute criminalizes is aiding and abetting the carrying or possessing of a firearm, nothing more. [23] NOTES [1] M.C.L. § 750.227b. [2] M.C.L. § 767.39. [3] Id. [4] M.C.L. § 750.316. [5] M.C.L. § 750.83. [6] M.C.L. § 750.227b. [7] M.C.L. § 767.39. [8] M.C.L. § 750.529. [9] M.C.L. § 750.227b. [10] M.C.L. § 767.39. [11] M.C.L. § 750.479a(3). [12] Contrast People v. Tavolacci, 88 Mich.App. 470, 475 , 276 N.W.2d 919 (1979), rev'd People v. Johnson,

2004This is an exercise of the rule of lenity, [22] which should control the resolution of this case and cause us to conclude that all the felony-firearm statute criminalizes is aiding and abetting the carrying or possessing of a firearm, nothing more. [23] NOTES [1] M.C.L. § 750.227b. [2] M.C.L. § 767.39. [3] Id. [4] M.C.L. § 750.316. [5] M.C.L. § 750.83. [6] M.C.L. § 750.227b. [7] M.C.L. § 767.39. [8] M.C.L. § 750.529. [9] M.C.L. § 750.227b. [10] M.C.L. § 767.39. [11] M.C.L. § 750.479a(3). [12] Contrast People v. Tavolacci, 88 Mich.App. 470, 475 , 276 N.W.2d 919 (1979), rev'd People v. Johnson,

2004This is an exercise of the rule of lenity, [22] which should control the resolution of this case and cause us to conclude that all the felony-firearm statute criminalizes is aiding and abetting the carrying or possessing of a firearm, nothing more. [23] NOTES [1] M.C.L. § 750.227b. [2] M.C.L. § 767.39. [3] Id. [4] M.C.L. § 750.316. [5] M.C.L. § 750.83. [6] M.C.L. § 750.227b. [7] M.C.L. § 767.39. [8] M.C.L. § 750.529. [9] M.C.L. § 750.227b. [10] M.C.L. § 767.39. [11] M.C.L. § 750.479a(3). [12] Contrast People v. Tavolacci, 88 Mich.App. 470, 475 , 276 N.W.2d 919 (1979), rev'd People v. Johnson,

2004This is an exercise of the rule of lenity, [22] which should control the resolution of this case and cause us to conclude that all the felony-firearm statute criminalizes is aiding and abetting the carrying or possessing of a firearm, nothing more. [23] NOTES [1] M.C.L. § 750.227b. [2] M.C.L. § 767.39. [3] Id. [4] M.C.L. § 750.316. [5] M.C.L. § 750.83. [6] M.C.L. § 750.227b. [7] M.C.L. § 767.39. [8] M.C.L. § 750.529. [9] M.C.L. § 750.227b. [10] M.C.L. § 767.39. [11] M.C.L. § 750.479a(3). [12] Contrast People v. Tavolacci, 88 Mich.App. 470, 475 , 276 N.W.2d 919 (1979), rev'd People v. Johnson,

2004This is an exercise of the rule of lenity, [22] which should control the resolution of this case and cause us to conclude that all the felony-firearm statute criminalizes is aiding and abetting the carrying or possessing of a firearm, nothing more. [23] NOTES [1] M.C.L. § 750.227b. [2] M.C.L. § 767.39. [3] Id. [4] M.C.L. § 750.316. [5] M.C.L. § 750.83. [6] M.C.L. § 750.227b. [7] M.C.L. § 767.39. [8] M.C.L. § 750.529. [9] M.C.L. § 750.227b. [10] M.C.L. § 767.39. [11] M.C.L. § 750.479a(3). [12] Contrast People v. Tavolacci, 88 Mich.App. 470, 475 , 276 N.W.2d 919 (1979), rev'd People v. Johnson,

2004This is an exercise of the rule of lenity, [22] which should control the resolution of this case and cause us to conclude that all the felony-firearm statute criminalizes is aiding and abetting the carrying or possessing of a firearm, nothing more. [23] NOTES [1] M.C.L. § 750.227b. [2] M.C.L. § 767.39. [3] Id. [4] M.C.L. § 750.316. [5] M.C.L. § 750.83. [6] M.C.L. § 750.227b. [7] M.C.L. § 767.39. [8] M.C.L. § 750.529. [9] M.C.L. § 750.227b. [10] M.C.L. § 767.39. [11] M.C.L. § 750.479a(3). [12] Contrast People v. Tavolacci, 88 Mich.App. 470, 475 , 276 N.W.2d 919 (1979), rev'd People v. Johnson,

2004This is an exercise of the rule of lenity, [22] which should control the resolution of this case and cause us to conclude that all the felony-firearm statute criminalizes is aiding and abetting the carrying or possessing of a firearm, nothing more. [23] NOTES [1] M.C.L. § 750.227b. [2] M.C.L. § 767.39. [3] Id. [4] M.C.L. § 750.316. [5] M.C.L. § 750.83. [6] M.C.L. § 750.227b. [7] M.C.L. § 767.39. [8] M.C.L. § 750.529. [9] M.C.L. § 750.227b. [10] M.C.L. § 767.39. [11] M.C.L. § 750.479a(3). [12] Contrast People v. Tavolacci, 88 Mich.App. 470, 475 , 276 N.W.2d 919 (1979), rev'd People v. Johnson,

2004This is an exercise of the rule of lenity, [22] which should control the resolution of this case and cause us to conclude that all the felony-firearm statute criminalizes is aiding and abetting the carrying or possessing of a firearm, nothing more. [23] NOTES [1] M.C.L. § 750.227b. [2] M.C.L. § 767.39. [3] Id. [4] M.C.L. § 750.316. [5] M.C.L. § 750.83. [6] M.C.L. § 750.227b. [7] M.C.L. § 767.39. [8] M.C.L. § 750.529. [9] M.C.L. § 750.227b. [10] M.C.L. § 767.39. [11] M.C.L. § 750.479a(3). [12] Contrast People v. Tavolacci, 88 Mich.App. 470, 475 , 276 N.W.2d 919 (1979), rev'd People v. Johnson,

2004This is an exercise of the rule of lenity, [22] which should control the resolution of this case and cause us to conclude that all the felony-firearm statute criminalizes is aiding and abetting the carrying or possessing of a firearm, nothing more. [23] NOTES [1] M.C.L. § 750.227b. [2] M.C.L. § 767.39. [3] Id. [4] M.C.L. § 750.316. [5] M.C.L. § 750.83. [6] M.C.L. § 750.227b. [7] M.C.L. § 767.39. [8] M.C.L. § 750.529. [9] M.C.L. § 750.227b. [10] M.C.L. § 767.39. [11] M.C.L. § 750.479a(3). [12] Contrast People v. Tavolacci, 88 Mich.App. 470, 475 , 276 N.W.2d 919 (1979), rev'd People v. Johnson,

2004This is an exercise of the rule of lenity, [22] which should control the resolution of this case and cause us to conclude that all the felony-firearm statute criminalizes is aiding and abetting the carrying or possessing of a firearm, nothing more. [23] NOTES [1] M.C.L. § 750.227b. [2] M.C.L. § 767.39. [3] Id. [4] M.C.L. § 750.316. [5] M.C.L. § 750.83. [6] M.C.L. § 750.227b. [7] M.C.L. § 767.39. [8] M.C.L. § 750.529. [9] M.C.L. § 750.227b. [10] M.C.L. § 767.39. [11] M.C.L. § 750.479a(3). [12] Contrast People v. Tavolacci, 88 Mich.App. 470, 475 , 276 N.W.2d 919 (1979), rev'd People v. Johnson,

2000Therefore, the Court decided that it would “adopt” the following “procedure”: [A]ny evidence derived from testimony at a disciplinary hearing is inadmissible at subsequent criminal proceedings on the underlying charge, save for impeachment or rebuttal, and the accused must be advised before testifying at the disciplinary hearing that his testimony will not be admissible against him at a subsequent criminal trial on the underlying offense. [Id] A. THE FIFTH AMENDMENT PRIVILEGE The Fifth Amendment provides that no person “shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.”

2000Therefore, the Court decided that it would “adopt” the following “procedure”: [A]ny evidence derived from testimony at a disciplinary hearing is inadmissible at subsequent criminal proceedings on the underlying charge, save for impeachment or rebuttal, and the accused must be advised before testifying at the disciplinary hearing that his testimony will not be admissible against him at a subsequent criminal trial on the underlying offense. [Id] A. THE FIFTH AMENDMENT PRIVILEGE The Fifth Amendment provides that no person “shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.”

2000Thus, as the Supreme Court explained in Baxter v Palmigiano, 425 US 308, 316 ; 96 S Ct 1551 ; 47 L Ed 2d 810 (1976), “if inmates are compelled in those proceedings to furnish testimonial evidence that might incriminate them in later criminal proceedings, they must be offered ‘whatever immunity is required to supplant the privilege’ . . . .” As stated, the Carr Court believed that the so-called “Catch 22” choice faced by inmates in the prison discipline setting—either incriminate themselves or forgo the right to offer exculpatory or mitigating statements—“constitutes an impermissible penalty fo

2000Thus, as the Supreme Court explained in Baxter v Palmigiano, 425 US 308, 316 ; 96 S Ct 1551 ; 47 L Ed 2d 810 (1976), “if inmates are compelled in those proceedings to furnish testimonial evidence that might incriminate them in later criminal proceedings, they must be offered ‘whatever immunity is required to supplant the privilege’ . . . .” As stated, the Carr Court believed that the so-called “Catch 22” choice faced by inmates in the prison discipline setting—either incriminate themselves or forgo the right to offer exculpatory or mitigating statements—“constitutes an impermissible penalty fo

1998Batson, supra at 97 ; People v Barker, 179 Mich App 702, 706 ; 446 NW2d 549 (1989), aff’d 437 Mich 161 ; 468 NW2d 492 (1991).

1998Batson, supra at 97 ; People v Barker, 179 Mich App 702, 706 ; 446 NW2d 549 (1989), aff’d 437 Mich 161 ; 468 NW2d 492 (1991).

1998Batson, supra at 97 ; People v Barker, 179 Mich App 702, 706 ; 446 NW2d 549 (1989), aff’d 437 Mich 161 ; 468 NW2d 492 (1991).

1998Batson, supra at 97 ; People v Barker, 179 Mich App 702, 706 ; 446 NW2d 549 (1989), aff’d 437 Mich 161 ; 468 NW2d 492 (1991).

1987That section provides: "(1) Except as stated in Subsection (2), the liability of a possessor of land to one who enters the land only in the exercise of a privilege, for either a public or a private purpose, and irrespective of the possessor's consent, is the same as the liability to a licensee. "(2) The liability of a possessor of land to a public officer or employee who enters the land in the performance of his public duty, and suffers harm because of a condition of a part of the land held open to the public, is the same as the liability to an invitee." [ Reetz, supra, 154 .] Therefore, since

1987That section provides: "(1) Except as stated in Subsection (2), the liability of a possessor of land to one who enters the land only in the exercise of a privilege, for either a public or a private purpose, and irrespective of the possessor’s consent, is the same as the liability to a licensee. "(2) The liability of a possessor of land to a public officer or employee who enters the land in the performance of his public duty, and suffers harm because of a condition of a part of the land held open to the public, is the same as the liability to an invitee.” [Reetz, supra, 154 .] Therefore, since

1987Mutual Life Ins Co of New York v Ins Bureau, 424 Mich 656, 662-664 ; 384 NW2d 25 (1986).

1987Mutual Life Ins Co of New York v Ins Bureau, 424 Mich 656, 662-664 ; 384 NW2d 25 (1986).

1987The Court cited with approval Nared v Omaha School Dist, 191 Neb 376; 215 NW2d 115 (1974), in which the Nebraska Supreme Court, applying § 345, held that the defendant did not breach a duty to a police officer injured by falling through a false ceiling from a *357 catwalk.

1987The Court cited with approval Nared v Omaha School Dist, 191 Neb 376; 215 NW2d 115 (1974), in which the Nebraska Supreme Court, applying § 345, held that the defendant did not breach a duty to a police officer injured by falling through a false ceiling from a catwalk.

1986Cf. Rocha, supra, p 504 .

1985Tallman v Dep’t of Natural Resources, 123 Mich App 132 ; 333 NW2d 193 (1983). 2 MCL 308.1; MSA 13.1491. 3 US Const, Am IV, applicable to the states under the Fourteenth Amendment, Mapp v Ohio, 367 US 643 ; 81 S Ct 1684 ; 6 L Ed 2d 1081 (1961); Const 1963, art 1, § 11. 4 "[T]he right to continue the exercise of a privilege granted by the state cannot be made to depend upon the grantee’s submission to a condition prescribed by the state which is hostile to the provisions of the federal Constitution.” United States v Chicago, M, St P & P R Co, 282 US 311, 328-329 ; 51 S Ct 159 ; 75 L Ed 359 (1931

1985Tallman v Dep’t of Natural Resources, 123 Mich App 132 ; 333 NW2d 193 (1983). 2 MCL 308.1; MSA 13.1491. 3 US Const, Am IV, applicable to the states under the Fourteenth Amendment, Mapp v Ohio, 367 US 643 ; 81 S Ct 1684 ; 6 L Ed 2d 1081 (1961); Const 1963, art 1, § 11. 4 "[T]he right to continue the exercise of a privilege granted by the state cannot be made to depend upon the grantee’s submission to a condition prescribed by the state which is hostile to the provisions of the federal Constitution.” United States v Chicago, M, St P & P R Co, 282 US 311, 328-329 ; 51 S Ct 159 ; 75 L Ed 359 (1931

1985See People v Lansing Municipal Judge, 327 Mich 410 ; 42 NW2d 120 (1950) (exercise of privilege to hunt or fish may not be conditioned on waiver of right against unreasonable searches and seizures); Spevack v Klein, 385 US 511 ; 87 S Ct 625 ; 17 L Ed 2d 574 (1967) (disbarment held an impermissible penalty for lawyer’s invocation of right against self-incrimination); 1 LaFave & Israel, Criminal Procedure, § 3.9, p 322. 5 In United States v Biswell, 406 US 311 ; 92 S Ct 1593 ; 32 L Ed 2d 87 (1972), the United States Supreme Court sustained a statutory inspection scheme that authorized the search

1985See People v Lansing Municipal Judge, 327 Mich 410 ; 42 NW2d 120 (1950) (exercise of privilege to hunt or fish may not be conditioned on waiver of right against unreasonable searches and seizures); Spevack v Klein, 385 US 511 ; 87 S Ct 625 ; 17 L Ed 2d 574 (1967) (disbarment held an impermissible penalty for lawyer’s invocation of right against self-incrimination); 1 LaFave & Israel, Criminal Procedure, § 3.9, p 322. 5 In United States v Biswell, 406 US 311 ; 92 S Ct 1593 ; 32 L Ed 2d 87 (1972), the United States Supreme Court sustained a statutory inspection scheme that authorized the search

1985Tallman v Dep’t of Natural Resources, 123 Mich App 132 ; 333 NW2d 193 (1983). 2 MCL 308.1; MSA 13.1491. 3 US Const, Am IV, applicable to the states under the Fourteenth Amendment, Mapp v Ohio, 367 US 643 ; 81 S Ct 1684 ; 6 L Ed 2d 1081 (1961); Const 1963, art 1, § 11. 4 "[T]he right to continue the exercise of a privilege granted by the state cannot be made to depend upon the grantee’s submission to a condition prescribed by the state which is hostile to the provisions of the federal Constitution.” United States v Chicago, M, St P & P R Co, 282 US 311, 328-329 ; 51 S Ct 159 ; 75 L Ed 359 (1931

1985Tallman v Dep’t of Natural Resources, 123 Mich App 132 ; 333 NW2d 193 (1983). 2 MCL 308.1; MSA 13.1491. 3 US Const, Am IV, applicable to the states under the Fourteenth Amendment, Mapp v Ohio, 367 US 643 ; 81 S Ct 1684 ; 6 L Ed 2d 1081 (1961); Const 1963, art 1, § 11. 4 "[T]he right to continue the exercise of a privilege granted by the state cannot be made to depend upon the grantee’s submission to a condition prescribed by the state which is hostile to the provisions of the federal Constitution.” United States v Chicago, M, St P & P R Co, 282 US 311, 328-329 ; 51 S Ct 159 ; 75 L Ed 359 (1931

1985Tallman v Dep’t of Natural Resources, 123 Mich App 132 ; 333 NW2d 193 (1983). 2 MCL 308.1; MSA 13.1491. 3 US Const, Am IV, applicable to the states under the Fourteenth Amendment, Mapp v Ohio, 367 US 643 ; 81 S Ct 1684 ; 6 L Ed 2d 1081 (1961); Const 1963, art 1, § 11. 4 "[T]he right to continue the exercise of a privilege granted by the state cannot be made to depend upon the grantee’s submission to a condition prescribed by the state which is hostile to the provisions of the federal Constitution.” United States v Chicago, M, St P & P R Co, 282 US 311, 328-329 ; 51 S Ct 159 ; 75 L Ed 359 (1931

1985Tallman v Dep’t of Natural Resources, 123 Mich App 132 ; 333 NW2d 193 (1983). 2 MCL 308.1; MSA 13.1491. 3 US Const, Am IV, applicable to the states under the Fourteenth Amendment, Mapp v Ohio, 367 US 643 ; 81 S Ct 1684 ; 6 L Ed 2d 1081 (1961); Const 1963, art 1, § 11. 4 "[T]he right to continue the exercise of a privilege granted by the state cannot be made to depend upon the grantee’s submission to a condition prescribed by the state which is hostile to the provisions of the federal Constitution.” United States v Chicago, M, St P & P R Co, 282 US 311, 328-329 ; 51 S Ct 159 ; 75 L Ed 359 (1931

1985See People v Lansing Municipal Judge, 327 Mich 410 ; 42 NW2d 120 (1950) (exercise of privilege to hunt or fish may not be conditioned on waiver of right against unreasonable searches and seizures); Spevack v Klein, 385 US 511 ; 87 S Ct 625 ; 17 L Ed 2d 574 (1967) (disbarment held an impermissible penalty for lawyer’s invocation of right against self-incrimination); 1 LaFave & Israel, Criminal Procedure, § 3.9, p 322. 5 In United States v Biswell, 406 US 311 ; 92 S Ct 1593 ; 32 L Ed 2d 87 (1972), the United States Supreme Court sustained a statutory inspection scheme that authorized the search

1985See People v Lansing Municipal Judge, 327 Mich 410 ; 42 NW2d 120 (1950) (exercise of privilege to hunt or fish may not be conditioned on waiver of right against unreasonable searches and seizures); Spevack v Klein, 385 US 511 ; 87 S Ct 625 ; 17 L Ed 2d 574 (1967) (disbarment held an impermissible penalty for lawyer’s invocation of right against self-incrimination); 1 LaFave & Israel, Criminal Procedure, § 3.9, p 322. 5 In United States v Biswell, 406 US 311 ; 92 S Ct 1593 ; 32 L Ed 2d 87 (1972), the United States Supreme Court sustained a statutory inspection scheme that authorized the search