exercise privilege in Illinois

2007The exercise of that privilege may give rise to obligations, and, so far as those obligations arise out of[,] or are connected with[,] the activities within the state, a procedure which requires the corporation to respond to a suit brought to enforce them can, in most instances, hardly be said to be undue.” International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 319 , 90 L.

2007The exercise of that privilege may give rise to obligations, and, so far as those obligations arise out of[,] or are connected with[,] the activities within the state, a procedure which requires the corporation to respond to a suit brought to enforce them can, in most instances, hardly be said to be undue.” International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 319 , 90 L.

2009Murphy, 465 U.S. at 435 , 104 S.Ct. at 1146 , 79 L.Ed.2d at 424 .

2009Murphy, 465 U.S. at 435 , 104 S.Ct. at 1146 , 79 L.Ed.2d at 424 .

2004The exercise of that privilege may give rise to obligations, and, so far as those obligations arise out of or are connected with the activities within the state, a ■ procedure which requires the corporation to respond to a suit brought to enforce them can, in most instances, hardly be said to be undue.’ ” Maunder, 102 Ill. 2d at 348-49 , 466 N.E.2d at 220 , quoting International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 319 , 90 L.

2004The exercise of that privilege may give rise to obligations, and, so far as those obligations arise out of or are connected with the activities within the state, a ■ procedure which requires the corporation to respond to a suit brought to enforce them can, in most instances, hardly be said to be undue.’ ” Maunder, 102 Ill. 2d at 348-49 , 466 N.E.2d at 220 , quoting International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 319 , 90 L.

2001Hudson, 195 Ill. 2d at 133 , 745 N.E.2d at 1256 , quoting United States v. Tokars, 95 F.3d 1520, 1533 (11th Cir. 1996).

2001Hudson, 195 Ill. 2d at 133 , 745 N.E.2d at 1256 , quoting United States v. Tokars, 95 F.3d 1520, 1533 (11th Cir. 1996).

1995(In re Samuels, 126 Ill. 2d at 531 .) As this court has noted, attorneys have a duty to cooperate with the Administrator in a disciplinary proceeding: "Inasmuch as an attorney is an officer of this court and is licensed by this court to exercise the privilege of practicing law, an attorney has an obligation to cooperate with this court and its agency, the Attorney Registration and • Disciplinary Commission, in the performance of its duty to police the legal profession in this State.” (In re Zisook (1981), 88 Ill. 2d 321, 331 .) In this case, the record reflects that respondent’s efforts to coo

1988Attorneys licensed to practice in this State are “officer[s] of this court and : [are] licensed by this court to exercise the privilege of practicing law.” (In re Zisook (1981), 88 Ill. 2d 321, 331 .) This court has a duty to protect the public from an at- ; torney’s improper practices.

1983To subject the prosecutor’s challenge in any particular case to the demands and traditional standards of the Equal Protection Clause would entail a radical change in the nature and operation of the challenge. *** In the light of the purpose of the peremptory system and the function it serves in a pluralistic society in connection with the institution of jury trial, we cannot hold that the Constitution requires an examination of the prosecutor’s reasons for the exercise of his challenge's in any given case.” 380 U.S. 202, 220-22 , 13 L.

1983To subject the prosecutor’s challenge in any particular case to the demands and traditional standards of the Equal Protection Clause would entail a radical change in the nature and operation of the challenge. *** In the light of the purpose of the peremptory system and the function it serves in a pluralistic society in connection with the institution of jury trial, we cannot hold that the Constitution requires an examination of the prosecutor’s reasons for the exercise of his challenge's in any given case.” 380 U.S. 202, 220-22 , 13 L.

1977“The underlying Violation’ in each case was the exercise of the privilege against self-incrimination before the grand jury, which was prohibited by Rule 51.” 489 F.2d 891, 895 .

1975The court of appeals held that “Rule 51, to the extent that it denies police officers the privilege against self-incrimination where criminal prosecution may follow, is constitutionally invalid.” The court also held that the remaining rules involved (2, 5 and 6) were unconstitutional as applied in the case because they were used only in conjunction with Rule 51 in effecting the discharge of plaintiffs and that “[t]he underlying ‘violation’ in each case was the exercise of the privilege against self-incrimination before the grand jury, which was prohibited by Rule 51.” ( 489 F.2d 891 , 895.) In

1995(In re Samuels, 126 Ill. 2d at 531 .) As this court has noted, attorneys have a duty to cooperate with the Administrator in a disciplinary proceeding: "Inasmuch as an attorney is an officer of this court and is licensed by this court to exercise the privilege of practicing law, an attorney has an obligation to cooperate with this court and its agency, the Attorney Registration and • Disciplinary Commission, in the performance of its duty to police the legal profession in this State.” (In re Zisook (1981), 88 Ill. 2d 321, 331 .) In this case, the record reflects that respondent’s efforts to coo

1992Plaintiff argues he was forced to designate Dr. Finn as an expert because a local court rule required that treating physicians be designated as experts. ( Cf. Tzystuck v. Chicago Transit Authority (1988), 124 Ill.2d 226 , 124 Ill.Dec. 544 , 529 N.E.2d 525 .) It is still clear the reason Dr. Finn was designated was because plaintiff wanted to be free to call him at trial.

1992Plaintiff argues he was forced to designate Dr. Finn as an expert because a local court rule required that treating physicians be designated as experts. ( Cf. Tzystuck v. Chicago Transit Authority (1988), 124 Ill.2d 226 , 124 Ill.Dec. 544 , 529 N.E.2d 525 .) It is still clear the reason Dr. Finn was designated was because plaintiff wanted to be free to call him at trial.

1992(Jackson, 145 Ill. 2d at 99 .) Such a procedure ignores the first-step requirement that the trial court find a prima facie showing of purposeful discrimination.

1992See People v. Garrett (1990), 139 Ill. 2d 189, 203-05 , 564 N.E.2d 784 ; People v. Beviel (1992), 250 Ill.

1991Indeed, when an administrative agency exercises its rule making power, it performs a quasi-legislative function. [Citation.] Administrative rules and regulations have the force and effect of law and, like a statute, enjoy a presumption of validity. [Citations.] Neither at the trial court level nor on appeal has the defendant challenged the validity of the regulation in question on the basis that it was not properly promulgated pursuant to legislative authority or that it was not binding on him.” (Emphasis added.) Samel, 115 Ill.

1990(Salazar v. State, 559 P.2d at 79 .) There, the State’s chief witness in a murder prosecution told his wife that he and not the defendant was responsible for the murder involved.

1989(See United States v. Mathews (7th Cir. 1986), 803 F.2d 325, 332 ; State v. Antwine (Mo. 1987), 743 S.W.2d 51, 67 .) We would note, too, that the Supreme Court in Batson stated that the prosecution’s explanations for the exercise of peremptory challenges “need not rise to the level justifying the exercise of a challenge for cause.” (Batson v. Kentucky (1986), 476 U.S. 79, 97 , 90 L.

1989(See United States v. Mathews (7th Cir. 1986), 803 F.2d 325, 332 ; State v. Antwine (Mo. 1987), 743 S.W.2d 51, 67 .) We would note, too, that the Supreme Court in Batson stated that the prosecution’s explanations for the exercise of peremptory challenges “need not rise to the level justifying the exercise of a challenge for cause.” (Batson v. Kentucky (1986), 476 U.S. 79, 97 , 90 L.

1989(See United States v. Mathews (7th Cir. 1986), 803 F.2d 325, 332 ; State v. Antwine (Mo. 1987), 743 S.W.2d 51, 67 .) We would note, too, that the Supreme Court in Batson stated that the prosecution’s explanations for the exercise of peremptory challenges “need not rise to the level justifying the exercise of a challenge for cause.” (Batson v. Kentucky (1986), 476 U.S. 79, 97 , 90 L.

1989The Court of Appeals held that although there may be facts in the record which support the finding of the magistrate, "[t]he difficulty here, however, is that defendant never articulated to the magistrate that these were in fact the reasons for the particular challenged action." (Emphasis in original.) ( 738 F.2d at 1429 .) The language quoted in the majority opinion in the context of the Uviedo case does not preclude a reviewing court from considering reasons that are in the record which the prosecutor articulated for the exercise of peremptory challenge, whether or not they are the reasons g

1989(See United States v. Mathews (7th Cir. 1986), 803 F.2d 325, 332 ; State v. Antwine (Mo. 1987), 743 S.W.2d 51, 67 .) We would note, too, that the Supreme Court in Batson stated that the prosecution’s explanations for the exercise of peremptory challenges “need not rise to the level justifying the exercise of a challenge for cause.” (Batson v. Kentucky (1986), 476 U.S. 79, 97 , 90 L.

1989As this court in People v. Young (1989), 128 Ill. 2d 1, 23 , observed, this argument cannot be lightly dismissed.