14 Arizona opinions name it 2 courts 1970–2019 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Arizona courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Corralesgreen2 sentences2019To determine whether it is proper to call the witness, the court must balance “the interest of the person calling the witness . . . [against] the possible prejudice resulting from the inferences the jury may draw from the witness’ exercise of the privilege.” Corrales, 138 Ariz. at 588 . 2018It is, however, “well settled that in criminal cases the jury is not entitled to draw any inferences from the decision of a witness to exercise his Fifth Amendment privilege.” State v. McDaniel, 136 Ariz. 188, 194 (1983), abrogated on other grounds by State v. Walton, 159 Ariz. 571 (App. 1989) (citations omitted); see also State v. Corrales, 138 Ariz. 583, 588 (1983) (“The decision to permit counsel to call a witness who has indicated he or she will refuse to testify is ordinarily discretionary with the trial court, which must determine whether the interest of the person calling the witness ou | 1 | 3 |
Markowitz v. Arizona Parks Boardgreen2 sentences1989Yuma Furniture Company v. Rehwinkel, 8 Ariz.App. 576 , 448 P.2d 420 (1968). “[I]t is not a factor to be used in determining the very existence of the duty which is a precondition for the exercise of the standard of care.” Markowitz, 146 Ariz. at 356 , 706 P.2d at 368 . 1989Yuma Furniture Company v. Rehwinkel, 8 Ariz.App. 576 , 448 P.2d 420 (1968). “[I]t is not a factor to be used in determining the very existence of the duty which is a precondition for the exercise of the standard of care.” Markowitz, 146 Ariz. at 356 , 706 P.2d at 368 . | 1 | 2 |
State v. McDanielgreen1 sentence2018It is, however, “well settled that in criminal cases the jury is not entitled to draw any inferences from the decision of a witness to exercise his Fifth Amendment privilege.” State v. McDaniel, 136 Ariz. 188, 194 (1983), abrogated on other grounds by State v. Walton, 159 Ariz. 571 (App. 1989) (citations omitted); see also State v. Corrales, 138 Ariz. 583, 588 (1983) (“The decision to permit counsel to call a witness who has indicated he or she will refuse to testify is ordinarily discretionary with the trial court, which must determine whether the interest of the person calling the witness ou | 1 | 1 |
Graville v. Dodgegreen2 sentences2001Graville v. Dodge, 195 Ariz. 119, 124, ¶ 20 , 985 P.2d 604, 609 (App.1999). 2001Graville v. Dodge, 195 Ariz. 119, 124, ¶ 20 , 985 P.2d 604, 609 (App.1999). | 1 | 1 |
Mahne v. Mahnegreen2 sentences1992Although there are no Arizona cases on point, the decision of the New Jersey court in Mahne v. Mahne, 66 N.J. 53 , 328 A.2d 225 (1974), is helpful. 1992This “imposed an undue cost on the exercise of the privilege.” Mahne, 66 N.J. at 61, 328 A.2d at 229; see also Alvarez v. Sanchez, 158 Cal.App.3d 709 , 204 Cal.Rptr. 864 (Cal.App. 1 Dist.1984); Steinbrecher v. Wapnick, 24 N.Y.2d 354 , 300 N.Y.S.2d 555 , 248 N.E.2d 419 (1969). | 1 | 1 |
Alvarez v. Sanchezgreen2 sentences1992This “imposed an undue cost on the exercise of the privilege.” Mahne, 66 N.J. at 61, 328 A.2d at 229; see also Alvarez v. Sanchez, 158 Cal.App.3d 709 , 204 Cal.Rptr. 864 (Cal.App. 1 Dist.1984); Steinbrecher v. Wapnick, 24 N.Y.2d 354 , 300 N.Y.S.2d 555 , 248 N.E.2d 419 (1969). 1992This “imposed an undue cost on the exercise of the privilege.” Mahne, 66 N.J. at 61, 328 A.2d at 229; see also Alvarez v. Sanchez, 158 Cal.App.3d 709 , 204 Cal.Rptr. 864 (Cal.App. 1 Dist.1984); Steinbrecher v. Wapnick, 24 N.Y.2d 354 , 300 N.Y.S.2d 555 , 248 N.E.2d 419 (1969). | 1 | 1 |
Mahne v. Mahnegreen2 sentences1992Although there are no Arizona cases on point, the decision of the New Jersey court in Mahne v. Mahne, 66 N.J. 53 , 328 A.2d 225 (1974), is helpful. 1992This “imposed an undue cost on the exercise of the privilege.” Mahne, 66 N.J. at 61, 328 A.2d at 229; see also Alvarez v. Sanchez, 158 Cal.App.3d 709 , 204 Cal.Rptr. 864 (Cal.App. 1 Dist.1984); Steinbrecher v. Wapnick, 24 N.Y.2d 354 , 300 N.Y.S.2d 555 , 248 N.E.2d 419 (1969). | 1 | 1 |
Beach v. City of Phoenixgreen2 sentences1985Beach v. City of Phoenix, 136 Ariz. at 603, 667 P.2d at 1319. 1985Beach v. City of Phoenix, 136 Ariz. at 603, 667 P.2d at 1319. | 1 | 1 |
Beach v. City of Phoenixgreen2 sentences1985Beach v. City of Phoenix, 136 Ariz. at 603, 667 P.2d at 1319. 1985Beach v. City of Phoenix, 136 Ariz. at 603, 667 P.2d at 1319. | 1 | 1 |
United States v. William J. Vandettigreen1 sentence1983United States v. Vandetti, supra, n. 1; People v. Berg, 59 N.Y.2d 294 , 464 N.Y.S.2d 703, 704-05 , 451 N.E.2d 450, 451-52 (1983); cf., State v. McDaniel, supra. 3 The court also has discretion to force the privilege to be taken before the jury in cases where, despite his avowed intention, it is possible that the witness will not exercise his privilege or will answer some questions and not others. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Berggreen2 sentences1983United States v. Vandetti, supra, n. 1; People v. Berg, 59 N.Y.2d 294 , 464 N.Y.S.2d 703, 704-05 , 451 N.E.2d 450, 451-52 (1983); cf., State v. McDaniel, supra. 3 The court also has discretion to force the privilege to be taken before the jury in cases where, despite his avowed intention, it is possible that the witness will not exercise his privilege or will answer some questions and not others. 1983United States v. Vandetti, supra, n. 1; People v. Berg, 59 N.Y.2d 294 , 464 N.Y.S.2d 703, 704-05 , 451 N.E.2d 450, 451-52 (1983); cf., State v. McDaniel, supra. 3 The court also has discretion to force the privilege to be taken before the jury in cases where, despite his avowed intention, it is possible that the witness will not exercise his privilege or will answer some questions and not others. | 1 | 1 |
Stults Eagle Drug Co. v. Lukegreen2 sentences1971It must be then an excise tax under the rule stated in Gila Meat Company v. State, 35 Ariz. 194 , 276 P. 1, 2 , for there we said: ‘Excise has come to include every form of taxation which is not a burden laid directly on persons or property, and a tax on the privilege of engaging in an occupation is clearly an excise.’ ” 48 Ariz. at 474, 475 , 62 P.2d at 1129, 1130 . 1971It must be then an excise tax under the rule stated in Gila Meat Company v. State, 35 Ariz. 194 , 276 P. 1, 2 , for there we said: ‘Excise has come to include every form of taxation which is not a burden laid directly on persons or property, and a tax on the privilege of engaging in an occupation is clearly an excise.’ ” 48 Ariz. at 474, 475 , 62 P.2d at 1129, 1130 . | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Arizona. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Walton
green
1 sentence2018It is, however, “well settled that in criminal cases the jury is not entitled to draw any inferences from the decision of a witness to exercise his Fifth Amendment privilege.” State v. McDaniel, 136 Ariz. 188, 194 (1983), abrogated on other grounds by State v. Walton, 159 Ariz. 571 (App. 1989) (citations omitted); see also State v. Corrales, 138 Ariz. 583, 588 (1983) (“The decision to permit counsel to call a witness who has indicated he or she will refuse to testify is ordinarily discretionary with the trial court, which must determine whether the interest of the person calling the witness ou | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Switzer v. Superior Court
green
2 sentences2009On special action to this court, the petitioners argued it was “unfair to deny a latecomer to the case the right to a change of judge.” Switzer, 176 Ariz. at 287 , 860 P.2d at 1340 . ¶ 16 We denied relief, holding the various subparts of Rule 42(f)(1) together “simply mean that each side has a peremptory notice and that any party can either exercise or waive that notice, even though the other parties on that side do not concur in the exercise or waiver and may not have been parties at the time the exercise or waiver occurred.” Id. 2009On special action to this court, the petitioners argued it was “unfair to deny a latecomer to the case the right to a change of judge.” Switzer, 176 Ariz. at 287 , 860 P.2d at 1340 . ¶ 16 We denied relief, holding the various subparts of Rule 42(f)(1) together “simply mean that each side has a peremptory notice and that any party can either exercise or waive that notice, even though the other parties on that side do not concur in the exercise or waiver and may not have been parties at the time the exercise or waiver occurred.” Id. | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Garner v. United States
green
1 sentence2001Accordingly, the State cannot, “expressly or by implication,” impose “a penalty for the exercise of the privilege.” Id. ¶ 14 Parents have a fundamental right to raise their children as they see fit, but that right is not without limitation. | 1 | 2001–2001 |
Steinbrecher v. Wapnick
green
2 sentences1992This “imposed an undue cost on the exercise of the privilege.” Mahne, 66 N.J. at 61, 328 A.2d at 229; see also Alvarez v. Sanchez, 158 Cal.App.3d 709 , 204 Cal.Rptr. 864 (Cal.App. 1 Dist.1984); Steinbrecher v. Wapnick, 24 N.Y.2d 354 , 300 N.Y.S.2d 555 , 248 N.E.2d 419 (1969). 1992This “imposed an undue cost on the exercise of the privilege.” Mahne, 66 N.J. at 61, 328 A.2d at 229; see also Alvarez v. Sanchez, 158 Cal.App.3d 709 , 204 Cal.Rptr. 864 (Cal.App. 1 Dist.1984); Steinbrecher v. Wapnick, 24 N.Y.2d 354 , 300 N.Y.S.2d 555 , 248 N.E.2d 419 (1969). | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Yuma Furniture Company v. Rehwinkel
green
2 sentences1989Yuma Furniture Company v. Rehwinkel, 8 Ariz.App. 576 , 448 P.2d 420 (1968). “[I]t is not a factor to be used in determining the very existence of the duty which is a precondition for the exercise of the standard of care.” Markowitz, 146 Ariz. at 356 , 706 P.2d at 368 . 1989Yuma Furniture Company v. Rehwinkel, 8 Ariz.App. 576 , 448 P.2d 420 (1968). “[I]t is not a factor to be used in determining the very existence of the duty which is a precondition for the exercise of the standard of care.” Markowitz, 146 Ariz. at 356 , 706 P.2d at 368 . | 1 | 1989–1989 |
Kennecott Copper Corp. v. Industrial Commission
green
2 sentences1978To otherwise operate would be an administrative usurpation of the constitutional authority of the legislature.” Kennecott Copper Corporation v. Industrial Commission, 115 Ariz. 184 , 564 P.2d 407 (1977). 1978To otherwise operate would be an administrative usurpation of the constitutional authority of the legislature.” Kennecott Copper Corporation v. Industrial Commission, 115 Ariz. 184 , 564 P.2d 407 (1977). | 1 | 1978–1978 |
Securities & Exchange Commission v. Chenery Corp.
green
2 sentences1975The rationale of this concept is well set forth in the leading case of Securities and Exchange Commission v. Chenery Corporation, 332 U.S. 194 , 67 S.Ct. 1575 , 91 L.Ed. 1995 (1947) as follows: "Since the Commission, unlike a court, does have the ability to make new law prospectively through the exercise of its rule-making powers, it has less reason to rely upon ad hoc adjudication to formulate new standards of conduct within the framework of the Holding Company Act. 1975The rationale of this concept is well set forth in the leading case of Securities and Exchange Commission v. Chenery Corporation, 332 U.S. 194 , 67 S.Ct. 1575 , 91 L.Ed. 1995 (1947) as follows: "Since the Commission, unlike a court, does have the ability to make new law prospectively through the exercise of its rule-making powers, it has less reason to rely upon ad hoc adjudication to formulate new standards of conduct within the framework of the Holding Company Act. | 1 | 1975–1975 |
Gila Meat Co. v. State
green
2 sentences1971It must be then an excise tax under the rule stated in Gila Meat Company v. State, 35 Ariz. 194 , 276 P. 1, 2 , for there we said: ‘Excise has come to include every form of taxation which is not a burden laid directly on persons or property, and a tax on the privilege of engaging in an occupation is clearly an excise.’ ” 48 Ariz. at 474, 475 , 62 P.2d at 1129, 1130 . 1971It must be then an excise tax under the rule stated in Gila Meat Company v. State, 35 Ariz. 194 , 276 P. 1, 2 , for there we said: ‘Excise has come to include every form of taxation which is not a burden laid directly on persons or property, and a tax on the privilege of engaging in an occupation is clearly an excise.’ ” 48 Ariz. at 474, 475 , 62 P.2d at 1129, 1130 . | 1 | 1971–1971 |
Phoenix Newspapers, Inc. v. Choisser
green
1 sentence1970The burden then shifts to the plaintiff to prove the-falsity of such publication and that the defendant was actuated in publishing the same by malice in fact.” 312 P.2d at 154 . | 1 | 1970–1970 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.