consequences waiver in North Carolina

2012Defendant’s waiver of counsel must be “knowing and voluntary, and the record must show that the defendant was literate and competent, that he understood the consequences of his waiver, and that, in waiving his right, he was voluntarily exercising his own free will.” State v. Thacker, 301 N.C. 348, 354 , 271 S.E.2d 252, 256 (1980).

2012Defendant’s waiver of counsel must be “knowing and voluntary, and the record must show that the defendant was literate and competent, that he understood the consequences of his waiver, and that, in waiving his right, he was voluntarily exercising his own free will.” State v. Thacker, 301 N.C. 348, 354 , 271 S.E.2d 252, 256 (1980).

2021In the case of a valid waiver, “[t]he record must affirmatively show that the inquiry was made and that the defendant, by his answers, was literate, competent, understood the consequences of his waiver, and voluntarily exercised his own free will.” Callahan, 83 N.C.

2021In the case of a valid waiver, “[t]he record must affirmatively show that the inquiry was made and that the defendant, by his answers, was literate, competent, understood the consequences of his waiver, and voluntarily exercised his own free will.” Callahan, 83 N.C.

1998"Implicit in defendant's constitutional right to counsel is the right to refuse the assistance of counsel and conduct his own defense." State v. Gerald, 304 N.C. 511, 516 , 284 S.E.2d 312, 316 (1981). "[T]he waiver of counsel, like the waiver of all constitutional rights, must be knowing and voluntary, and the record must show that the defendant was literate and competent, that he understood the consequences of his waiver, and that, in waiving his right, he was voluntarily exercising his own free will." State v. Thacker, 301 N.C. 348, 354 , 271 S.E.2d 252, 256 (1980).

1998"Implicit in defendant's constitutional right to counsel is the right to refuse the assistance of counsel and conduct his own defense." State v. Gerald, 304 N.C. 511, 516 , 284 S.E.2d 312, 316 (1981). "[T]he waiver of counsel, like the waiver of all constitutional rights, must be knowing and voluntary, and the record must show that the defendant was literate and competent, that he understood the consequences of his waiver, and that, in waiving his right, he was voluntarily exercising his own free will." State v. Thacker, 301 N.C. 348, 354 , 271 S.E.2d 252, 256 (1980).

2011App. 646, 648 , 406 S.E.2d 654, 655 (1991) (“The record must affirmatively show that the inquiry mandated by N.C.G.S. § 15A-1242 was made and that the defendant, by his answers, was literate, competent, understood the consequences of his waiver, and voluntarily exercised his own free will.” (emphasis added)).

2011See also State v. Lamb, 103 N.C.App. 646, 648 , 406 S.E.2d 654, 655 (1991) ("The record must affirmatively show that the inquiry mandated by N.C.G.S. § 15A-1242 was made and that the defendant, by his answers, was literate, competent, understood the consequences of his waiver, and voluntarily exercised his own free will." (emphasis added)).

2011“Once a defendant clearly and unequivocally states that he wants to proceed pro se, the trial court . . . must determine whether the defendant knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waives the right to in-court representation by counsel.” Thomas, 331 N.C. at 674 , 417 S.E.2d at 476 (citations omitted). “[T]he record must show that the defendant was literate and competent, that he understood the consequences of his waiver, and that, in waiving his right, he was voluntarily exercising his own free will.” State v. Thacker, 301 N.C. 348, 354 , 271 S.E.2d 252, 256 (1980).

2011“Once a defendant clearly and unequivocally states that he wants to proceed pro se, the trial court . . . must determine whether the defendant knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waives the right to in-court representation by counsel.” Thomas, 331 N.C. at 674 , 417 S.E.2d at 476 (citations omitted). “[T]he record must show that the defendant was literate and competent, that he understood the consequences of his waiver, and that, in waiving his right, he was voluntarily exercising his own free will.” State v. Thacker, 301 N.C. 348, 354 , 271 S.E.2d 252, 256 (1980).

2011Accord State v. Hardy, 78 N.C.

2011Accord State v. Hardy, 78 N.C.App. 175, 179 , 336 S.E.2d 661, 663 (1985) ("[W]aiver of counsel must be voluntarily and knowingly made, and the record must show that the defendant was literate and competent, and that he voluntarily and of his own free will waived this right.").

2020App. 362 , 365 605 S.E.2d 498, 500 (2004) (concluding that “the trial court erred by equating respondent’s request for new counsel with a waiver of court-appointed counsel, and requiring respondent to proceed to trial pro se”).

2018However, unlike forfeiture, a “[d]efendant’s waiver of counsel must be ‘knowing and voluntary, and the record must show that the defendant was literate and competent, that he understood the consequences of his waiver, and that, in waiving his right, he was voluntarily exercising his own free will.’ ” State v. Reid, 224 N.C.

2018App. 181, 190 , 735 S.E.2d 389, 396 (2012) (quoting State v. Thacker 301 N.C. 348, 354 , 271 S.E.2d 252, 256 (1980)).

2008Thus, as a unanimous United States Supreme Court stressed: "Competence to stand trial is rudimentary, for upon it depends the main part of those rights deemed essential to a fair trial, including the right to effective assistance of counsel, the rights to summon, to confront, and to cross-examine witnesses, and the right to testify on one's own behalf or to remain silent without penalty for doing so." *58 Cooper v. Oklahoma, 517 U.S. 348, 354 , 116 S.Ct. 1373, 1376-77 , 134 L.Ed.2d 498, 506 (1996) (quoting Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127, 139-40 , 112 S.Ct. 1810, 1817-18 , 118 L.Ed.2d 479, 492

2008Thus, as a unanimous United States Supreme Court stressed: "Competence to stand trial is rudimentary, for upon it depends the main part of those rights deemed essential to a fair trial, including the right to effective assistance of counsel, the rights to summon, to confront, and to cross-examine witnesses, and the right to testify on one's own behalf or to remain silent without penalty for doing so." *58 Cooper v. Oklahoma, 517 U.S. 348, 354 , 116 S.Ct. 1373, 1376-77 , 134 L.Ed.2d 498, 506 (1996) (quoting Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127, 139-40 , 112 S.Ct. 1810, 1817-18 , 118 L.Ed.2d 479, 492

2008Thus, as a unanimous United States Supreme Court stressed: "Competence to stand trial is rudimentary, for upon it depends the main part of those rights deemed essential to a fair trial, including the right to effective assistance of counsel, the rights to summon, to confront, and to cross-examine witnesses, and the right to testify on one's own behalf or to remain silent without penalty for doing so." *58 Cooper v. Oklahoma, 517 U.S. 348, 354 , 116 S.Ct. 1373, 1376-77 , 134 L.Ed.2d 498, 506 (1996) (quoting Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127, 139-40 , 112 S.Ct. 1810, 1817-18 , 118 L.Ed.2d 479, 492

2008Thus, as a unanimous United States Supreme Court stressed: "Competence to stand trial is rudimentary, for upon it depends the main part of those rights deemed essential to a fair trial, including the right to effective assistance of counsel, the rights to summon, to confront, and to cross-examine witnesses, and the right to testify on one's own behalf or to remain silent without penalty for doing so." *58 Cooper v. Oklahoma, 517 U.S. 348, 354 , 116 S.Ct. 1373, 1376-77 , 134 L.Ed.2d 498, 506 (1996) (quoting Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127, 139-40 , 112 S.Ct. 1810, 1817-18 , 118 L.Ed.2d 479, 492

2001Before a defendant may be permitted to proceed without the assistance of counsel, the trial court must make thorough inquiry and be “satisfied that the defendant... [h]as been clearly advised of his right to the assistance of counsel, including his right to the assignment of counsel[;] . . . [understands and appreciates the consequences of this decision; and . . . [cjomprehends the nature of the charges and proceedings and the range of permissible punishments.” N.C.G.S. § 15A-1242. “[A]n indigent person may waive counsel provided ‘the court finds of record that at the time of waiver the indige

2001App. 498, 504 , 309 S.E.2d 721, 725 (1983) (quoting G.S. § 7A-457).

1984Given the fundamental nature of the right to counsel, we ought not to indulge in the presumption that it has been waived by anything less than an express indication of such an intention. *481 State v. Hutchins, 303 N.C. 321, 339 , 279 S.E. 2d 788, 800 (1981) (citations omitted). [T]he waiver of counsel, like the waiver of all constitutional rights, must be knowing and voluntary, and the record must show that the defendant was literate and competent, that he understood the consequences of his waiver, and that, in waiving his right, he was voluntarily exercising his own free will.

1984Given the fundamental nature of the right to counsel, we ought not to indulge in the presumption that it has been waived by anything less than an express indication of such an intention. *481 State v. Hutchins, 303 N.C. 321, 339 , 279 S.E. 2d 788, 800 (1981) (citations omitted). [T]he waiver of counsel, like the waiver of all constitutional rights, must be knowing and voluntary, and the record must show that the defendant was literate and competent, that he understood the consequences of his waiver, and that, in waiving his right, he was voluntarily exercising his own free will.