consequences waiver in Florida

2008This Court has required that either a written waiver, which is signed by the defendant (not merely defense counsel), pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.260, see Upton, 658 So.2d at 87 , or an oral waiver, which is preceded by a proper colloquy during which the trial judge focuses on the value of a jury trial and provides a full explanation of the consequences of a waiver, see Tucker, 559 So.2d at 220 , is necessary to constitute a sufficient waiver.

2006We have previously stated that "[a] defendant may orally waive the right to jury trial if the defendant is represented by counsel and receives full explanation of the consequences of the waiver by the trial judge." Kelly v. State, 797 So.2d 1278, 1280 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001) ( citing Tucker v. State, 559 So.2d 218, 220 (Fla.1990)).

1996The third district thus adopted the solution of the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals in Sanchez v. United States, 782 F.2d 928, 934 (11th Cir.1986), imposing certain prerequisites to a valid waiver: (1) the waiver should be initiated by the defendant, not the judge or prosecutor; (2) the jury must have had a reasonable time to deliberate and should have told the court only that it could not reach a decision, but not how it stood numerically; (3) the judge should carefully explain to the defendant the right to a unanimous verdict and the consequences of the waiver of that right; and (4) the ju

1992Before allowing the defendant to waive the right, the following *868 criteria should be met: (1) the waiver should be initiated by the defendant, not the judge or prosecutor; (2) the jury must have had a reasonable time to deliberate and should have told the court only that it could not reach a decision, but not how it stood numerically; (3) the judge should carefully explain to the defendant the right to a unanimous verdict and the consequences of a waiver of that right; and (4) the judge should question the defendant directly to determine whether the waiver is being made knowingly and volunt

2024At the commencement of each such stage, an unrepresented defendant must be informed of the right to counsel and the consequences of waiver. 596 So. 2d at 1087–88.

2010In view of this right, the Traylor court further held that “[a]t the commencement of each such stage, an unrepresented defendant must be informed of the right to counsel and the consequences of waiver.” Id.

2018See, e.g. , Alvarado v. State , 205 So.3d 810 , 810-11 (Fla. 2d DCA 2016) (Villanti, C.J., concurring) (describing the consequences of the requirement that sexual offenders not live within 1000 feet of a childcare facility, school, park, or playground).

2018See, e.g., Alvarado v. State, 205 So. 3d 810, 810-11 (Fla. 2d DCA 2016) (Villanti, C.J., concurring) (describing the consequences of the requirement that sexual offenders not live within 1000 feet of a childcare facility, school, park, or playground).

2018Wilson v. State , 76 So.3d 1085 , 1087-88 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011) (quoting Traylor v. State , 596 So.2d 957 , 968 (Fla. 1992) ).

2018Wilson v. State, 76 So. 3d 1085, 1087-88 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011) (quoting Traylor v. State, 596 So. 2d 957, 968 (Fla. 1992)).

2011Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 819-20 , 95 S.Ct. 2525 , 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975) ("The right to defend is given directly to the accused; for it is he who suffers the consequences if the defense fails."). [4] Sixth Amendment rights "are part of the `due process of law' that is guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment to defendants in the criminal courts of the States." Id. at 818 , 95 S.Ct. 2525 (footnote omitted).

2011Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 819-20 , 95 S.Ct. 2525 , 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975) ("The right to defend is given directly to the accused; for it is he who suffers the consequences if the defense fails."). [4] Sixth Amendment rights "are part of the `due process of law' that is guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment to defendants in the criminal courts of the States." Id. at 818 , 95 S.Ct. 2525 (footnote omitted).

2024This requirement is codified in rule 3.111(d)(5): “[i]f a waiver is accepted at any stage of the proceedings, the offer of assistance of counsel shall be renewed by the court at each subsequent stage of the proceedings at which the defendant appears without counsel.” A motion to withdraw plea filed pursuant to rule 3.170(l) is a “critical stage of the proceedings.” See Wofford v. State, 819 So. 2d 891 , 891–92 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002); Padgett v. State, 743 So. 2d 70, 73 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999) (“[W]e conclude that a motion filed pursuant to rule 3.170(l) does not amount to a collateral attack upon the

2017In view of this right, the Traylor court clarified that “[a]t the commencement of each such stage, an unrepresented defendant must be informed of the right to counsel and the consequences of waiver.” Id.; see also Sproule v. State, 719 So.2d 349, 350 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998). (“A defendant’s waiver of the right to counsel applies only to the stage of the proceedings during which the waiver is made.”).

2017Thus, “[w]here the right to counsel has been properly waived, the State may proceed with the stage in issue; but the waiver applies only to the present stage and must be renewed at each subsequent crucial stage where the defendant is unrepresented.” Sproule, 719 So.2d at 350 (quoting Traylor, 596 So.2d at 968 ); see also Segal v. State, 920 So.2d 1279, 1280 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006) (“Although a full Faretta inquiry need not be conducted at every stage of criminal proceedings, once counsel has been waived under Faretta, the offer of assistance of counsel must be renewed by the court at each subseque

2017Thus, “[w]here the right to counsel has been properly waived, the State may proceed with the stage in issue; but the waiver applies only to the present stage and must be renewed at each subsequent crucial stage where the defendant is unrepresented.” Sproule, 719 So.2d at 350 (quoting Traylor, 596 So.2d at 968 ); see also Segal v. State, 920 So.2d 1279, 1280 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006) (“Although a full Faretta inquiry need not be conducted at every stage of criminal proceedings, once counsel has been waived under Faretta, the offer of assistance of counsel must be renewed by the court at each subseque

2013See id.

2006We have previously stated that "[a] defendant may orally waive the right to jury trial if the defendant is represented by counsel and receives full explanation of the consequences of the waiver by the trial judge." Kelly v. State, 797 So.2d 1278, 1280 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001) ( citing Tucker v. State, 559 So.2d 218, 220 (Fla.1990)).

2005In Industrial Casualty Insurance Company. v. Consultant Assocs., Inc., 603 So.2d 1355, 1356 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992), the appellant, a foreign corporation, contacted the appellee, a Florida corporation, for the purpose of obtaining its data conversion services.

1990Compare Global Servicios, S.A. v. Toplis & Harding, Inc., 561 So.2d 674 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990) (where foreign corporation's contact with Florida merely fortuitous, personal jurisdiction did not lie).

1989As the Florida Supreme Court said in Mullin, 76 So.2d at 284 (which was relied upon in Passantino ) regarding a tax receipt, "[I]f the receipt did not reach the taxpayer by mail, he would be on notice to inquire about its absence... ." Thus, it is not determinative that in this case the appellants' address was wrongly corrected for two of the lots so as to accurately change the city and country but not the post office box number.