consequences defense in Louisiana

2016State v. Cisco, supra; State v. Sartain, 98-0378 (La.App. 4th Cir. 12/01/99), 746 So.2d 837 , writ denied, 00-0341 (La. 09/15/00), 769 So.2d 4 .

2003Sartain , 98-0378 at 12, 746 So.2d at 846 (citing State v. Castaneda, 94-1118, p. 5 (La.App. 1st Cir.6/23/95), 658 So.2d 297, 301 )); see also United States v. Garcia, 517 F.2d 272, 276 (5th Cir.1975); State v. Salinas, 97-0716, p. 5 (La.App. 3d Cir.10/29/97), 703 So.2d 671, 674 ; Duncan v. Alabama, 881 F.2d 1013, 1017 (11th Cir.1989). [21] Applying the waiver requirements to the instant case, we find the waiver was not knowingly and intelligently entered into, nor did the trial court adequately facilitate such a waiver by ensuring that the defendant was fully informed of the consequences of p

2009As noted in State v. Harper, 07-299, p. 18 (La.App. 1 Cir. 9/5/07), 970 So.2d 592, 604 , writ denied, 07-1921 (La.2/15/08), 976 So.2d 173 , “[tjhere is no absolute requirement that an attorney or guardian must be present with a juvenile suspect at the time he makes the statement.” hfiThe presence of an interested adult, like age, however, is a factor to consider.

2009As noted in State v. Harper, 07-299, p. 18 (La.App. 1 Cir. 9/5/07), 970 So.2d 592, 604 , writ denied, 07-1921 (La.2/15/08), 976 So.2d 173 , "[t]here is no absolute requirement that an attorney or guardian must be present with a juvenile suspect at the time he makes the statement." *1274 The presence of an interested adult, like age, however, is a factor to consider.

2009Pursuant to the free and voluntary rule set forth in La.R.S. 15:451, before a purported confession can be introduced in evidence, the State must show “[t]hat it |swas free and voluntary, and not made under the influence of fear, duress, intimidation, menaces, threats, inducements or promises.” Also, as noted in State v. Terrick, 03-515, pp. 9-10 (La.App. 5 Cir. 9/30/03), 857 So.2d 1153, 1159 , writ denied, 03-3272 (La.3/26/04), 871 So.2d 346 , Before introducing a defendant’s statement into evidence, the state must show that the statement did not result from fear, duress, intimidation, menace,

2009Pursuant to the free and voluntary rule set forth in La.R.S. 15:451, before a purported confession can be introduced in evidence, the State must show "[t]hat it was free and voluntary, and not made under the influence of fear, duress, intimidation, menaces, threats, inducements or promises." Also, as noted in State v. Terrick, 03-515, pp. 9-10 (La.App. 5 Cir. 9/30/03), 857 So.2d 1153, 1159 , writ denied, 03-3272 (La.3/26/04), 871 So.2d 346 , Before introducing a defendant's statement into evidence, the state must show that the statement did not result from fear, duress, intimidation, menace, t

2009Pursuant to the free and voluntary rule set forth in La.R.S. 15:451, before a purported confession can be introduced in evidence, the State must show “[t]hat it |swas free and voluntary, and not made under the influence of fear, duress, intimidation, menaces, threats, inducements or promises.” Also, as noted in State v. Terrick, 03-515, pp. 9-10 (La.App. 5 Cir. 9/30/03), 857 So.2d 1153, 1159 , writ denied, 03-3272 (La.3/26/04), 871 So.2d 346 , Before introducing a defendant’s statement into evidence, the state must show that the statement did not result from fear, duress, intimidation, menace,

2009Pursuant to the free and voluntary rule set forth in La.R.S. 15:451, before a purported confession can be introduced in evidence, the State must show "[t]hat it was free and voluntary, and not made under the influence of fear, duress, intimidation, menaces, threats, inducements or promises." Also, as noted in State v. Terrick, 03-515, pp. 9-10 (La.App. 5 Cir. 9/30/03), 857 So.2d 1153, 1159 , writ denied, 03-3272 (La.3/26/04), 871 So.2d 346 , Before introducing a defendant's statement into evidence, the state must show that the statement did not result from fear, duress, intimidation, menace, t

2009As noted in State v. Harper, 07-299, p. 18 (La.App. 1 Cir. 9/5/07), 970 So.2d 592, 604 , writ denied, 07-1921 (La.2/15/08), 976 So.2d 173 , “[tjhere is no absolute requirement that an attorney or guardian must be present with a juvenile suspect at the time he makes the statement.” hfiThe presence of an interested adult, like age, however, is a factor to consider.

2009As noted in State v. Harper, 07-299, p. 18 (La.App. 1 Cir. 9/5/07), 970 So.2d 592, 604 , writ denied, 07-1921 (La.2/15/08), 976 So.2d 173 , "[t]here is no absolute requirement that an attorney or guardian must be present with a juvenile suspect at the time he makes the statement." *1274 The presence of an interested adult, like age, however, is a factor to consider.

2003Sartain , 98-0378 at 12, 746 So.2d at 846 (citing State v. Castaneda, 94-1118, p. 5 (La.App. 1st Cir.6/23/95), 658 So.2d 297, 301 )); see also United States v. Garcia, 517 F.2d 272, 276 (5th Cir.1975); State v. Salinas, 97-0716, p. 5 (La.App. 3d Cir.10/29/97), 703 So.2d 671, 674 ; Duncan v. Alabama, 881 F.2d 1013, 1017 (11th Cir.1989). [21] Applying the waiver requirements to the instant case, we find the waiver was not knowingly and intelligently entered into, nor did the trial court adequately facilitate such a waiver by ensuring that the defendant was fully informed of the consequences of p

1999State v. Castaneda, 94-1118, La.App. 1 Cir. 6/23/95, 658 So.2d 297 .

1985As indicated in Downer, 460 So.2d at 1188 , the apparent purpose of this amendment was to close the loophole in the statute which was exposed in Spence .

1985Defendant relied on State v. Downer, 460 So.2d 1184 (La.

2025Id. at 421 , 106 S.Ct. at 1141 .

2025Id. at 421 , 106 S.Ct. at 1141 .

2018Implicit in this right is the accused's authority "to make certain fundamental decisions regarding the case, as to whether to plead guilty, waive a jury, testify in his or her own behalf, or take an appeal." Jones v. Barnes , 463 U.S. 745 , 751, 103 S.Ct. 3308 , 3312, 77 L.Ed.2d 987 (1983).

2018Implicit in this right is the accused's authority "to make certain fundamental decisions regarding the case, as to whether to plead guilty, waive a jury, testify in his or her own behalf, or take an appeal." Jones v. Barnes , 463 U.S. 745 , 751, 103 S.Ct. 3308 , 3312, 77 L.Ed.2d 987 (1983).

2016State v. Cisco, supra; State v. Sartain, 98-0378 (La.App. 4th Cir. 12/01/99), 746 So.2d 837 , writ denied, 00-0341 (La. 09/15/00), 769 So.2d 4 .

2016Id. (citing Cisco, 861 So.2d at 132-33 ).

2012If a defendant does not raise the issue until after trial, he “must establish that an actual conflict of interest adversely affected his lawyer's performance.” Sullivan, 446 U.S. at 350-51 , 100 S.Ct. at 1719 .

2012If a defendant does not raise the issue until after trial, he “must establish that an actual conflict of interest adversely affected his lawyer's performance.” Sullivan, 446 U.S. at 350-51 , 100 S.Ct. at 1719 .

2003Sartain , 98-0378 at 12, 746 So.2d at 846 (citing State v. Castaneda, 94-1118, p. 5 (La.App. 1st Cir.6/23/95), 658 So.2d 297, 301 )); see also United States v. Garcia, 517 F.2d 272, 276 (5th Cir.1975); State v. Salinas, 97-0716, p. 5 (La.App. 3d Cir.10/29/97), 703 So.2d 671, 674 ; Duncan v. Alabama, 881 F.2d 1013, 1017 (11th Cir.1989). [21] Applying the waiver requirements to the instant case, we find the waiver was not knowingly and intelligently entered into, nor did the trial court adequately facilitate such a waiver by ensuring that the defendant was fully informed of the consequences of p

1987We also find no merit in defendant's contention that the blood test results should have been suppressed because defendant was not advised of the irrebuttable presumption of intoxication if his blood-alcohol exceeded .10% as required by State v. Singer, supra. At the time defendant was arrested and the blood test conducted, LSA-R.S. 32:661(C) provided: "When a law enforcement officer requests that a person submit to a chemical test as provided for above, he shall first inform the person of the consequences of a refusal and the consequences if the test is conducted and the results indicate a blo

1986Although the rights form, presented to the defendant before the withdrawal of the blood sample, apparently informed the defendant of the consequences of his refusal to submit to the test and of the consequences if the test results evidenced a blood alcohol level of .10% or above, there was no evidence presented which would indicate the form advised defendant of his rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 , 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966) nor is there any evidence that the form was read to the defendant.

1986Although the rights form, presented to the defendant before the withdrawal of the blood sample, apparently informed the defendant of the consequences of his refusal to submit to the test and of the consequences if the test results evidenced a blood alcohol level of .10% or above, there was no evidence presented which would indicate the form advised defendant of his rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 , 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966) nor is there any evidence that the form was read to the defendant.

1986As noted in State v. Phillips, 365 So.2d 1304 (La.1978), U.S. cert. denied, 442 U.S. 919 , 99 S.Ct. 2843 , 61 L.Ed.2d 287 (1979), the Supreme Court has refused to adopt an absolute rule that no jury waiver can be effective unless the record reflects that the accused was personally informed by the judge of his right to a jury trial.

1986As noted in State v. Phillips, 365 So.2d 1304 (La.1978), U.S. cert. denied, 442 U.S. 919 , 99 S.Ct. 2843 , 61 L.Ed.2d 287 (1979), the Supreme Court has refused to adopt an absolute rule that no jury waiver can be effective unless the record reflects that the accused was personally informed by the judge of his right to a jury trial.

1986As noted in State v. Phillips, 365 So.2d 1304 (La.1978), U.S. cert. denied, 442 U.S. 919 , 99 S.Ct. 2843 , 61 L.Ed.2d 287 (1979), the Supreme Court has refused to adopt an absolute rule that no jury waiver can be effective unless the record reflects that the accused was personally informed by the judge of his right to a jury trial.

1986As noted in State v. Phillips, 365 So.2d 1304 (La.1978), U.S. cert. denied, 442 U.S. 919 , 99 S.Ct. 2843 , 61 L.Ed.2d 287 (1979), the Supreme Court has refused to adopt an absolute rule that no jury waiver can be effective unless the record reflects that the accused was personally informed by the judge of his right to a jury trial.

1985LSA-R.S. 15:451; former LSA-C.Cr.P. art. 703(C); State v. Hills, 354 So.2d 186 (La., 1977); State v. Collum, supra. The state cannot simply rely on general testimony of officers not present that they witnessed no coercion, intimidation, or other undue influence.

1983In State v. Gould, 395 So.2d 647 (La.1981) a case involving the sufficiency of evidence to support a finding of the existence of a dangerous weapon, supra at 656, and decided under the Jackson standard, this Court quoted with approval a jury charge from the earlier case of State v. Jefferson, 43 La.Ann. 995 , 10 So. 199 (1891) It is not sufficient you should believe his guilt only probable.

1983In State v. Gould, 395 So.2d 647 (La.1981) a case involving the sufficiency of evidence to support a finding of the existence of a dangerous weapon, supra at 656, and decided under the Jackson standard, this Court quoted with approval a jury charge from the earlier case of State v. Jefferson, 43 La.Ann. 995 , 10 So. 199 (1891) It is not sufficient you should believe his guilt only probable.

1905As the court said in the ease of Forsten v. Legendre, supra: “Even if she made an unintentional mistake, her innocence cannot protect her; for the rule is that, where one of two innocent persons must suffer, he must suffer who by his own act occasioned the confidence and loss.” The learned counsel for Mrs. Scarborough seek to relieve her altogether from the consequences of the error by contending that the error was superinduced by plaintiffs, be cause the messenger upon whose information she acted was the agent of plaintiffs.