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9 Colorado opinions name it 2 courts 1985–2012 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Colorado courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Faretta v. Californiagreen2 sentences2008A. The Distinction Between "Fundamental" Decisions Made by Defendants and "Strategic" Decisions Made by Counsel The Supreme Court has interpreted the Sixth Amendment as providing an "implied" right (one "not stated in the Amendment in so many words") "to defend [that] is given directly to the accused; for it is he who suffers the consequences if the defense fails." *583 Faretto v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 819-20 , 95 S.Ct. 2525 , 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975). 2008A. The Distinction Between "Fundamental" Decisions Made by Defendants and "Strategic" Decisions Made by Counsel The Supreme Court has interpreted the Sixth Amendment as providing an "implied" right (one "not stated in the Amendment in so many words") "to defend [that] is given directly to the accused; for it is he who suffers the consequences if the defense fails." *583 Faretto v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 819-20 , 95 S.Ct. 2525 , 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975). | 2 | 3 |
People v. Maderagreen1 sentence2012People v. Madera, 112 P.3d 688, 690 (Colo.2005). 116 Even if defendant's trial testimony about his discussions with counsel could be viewed as having waived the attorney-client privilege, the record does not reflect any explanation to defendant that he had made such a waiver or what the consequences of such a waiver would be. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Sepulvedagreen2 sentences2011See People v. Sepulveda, 65 P.3d 1002, 1008 (Colo.2003) (noting "social costs of reversal and retrial," including "witnesses' memories fade, witnesses move away and victims hesitate to testify again"). 2011See People v. Sepulveda, 65 P.3d 1002, 1008 (Colo.2008) (noting "social costs of reversal and retrial," including "witnesses' memories fade, witnesses move away and victims hesitate to testify again"). | 1 | 1 |
People v. Bernascogreen2 sentences2002As the Illinois Supreme Court has noted, "[To waive rights intelligently and knowingly, one must at least understand basically what those rights encompass and minimally what their waiver will entail." People v. Bernaseo, 138 Ill.2d 349 , 150 Ill.Dec. 155 , 562 N.E.2d 958, 964 (1990) (holding that the waiver of a seventeen-year-old who had a fourth-grade comprehension level was invalid). 2002As the Illinois Supreme Court has noted, "[To waive rights intelligently and knowingly, one must at least understand basically what those rights encompass and minimally what their waiver will entail." People v. Bernaseo, 138 Ill.2d 349 , 150 Ill.Dec. 155 , 562 N.E.2d 958, 964 (1990) (holding that the waiver of a seventeen-year-old who had a fourth-grade comprehension level was invalid). | 1 | 1 |
People in Interest of GLgreen1 sentence2001See Nicholas v. People, supra. Specifically, as is relevant here, the statute requires that the juvenile's parent be present when he is advised of his rights and interrogated by police, see People in Interest of G.L., 631 P.2d 1118 (Colo.1981), and it operates as 'a per se rule of exclusion whenever the juvenile has not been afforded the special assistance required. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Colorado. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Miranda v. Arizona
green
2 sentences2001The rule sets forth initial safeguards for the interrogation process to ensure that the juvenile defendant understands the benefits of his rights guaranteed under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 , 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), and the consequences of waiver. 2001The rule sets forth initial safeguards for the interrogation process to ensure that the juvenile defendant understands the benefits of his rights guaranteed under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 , 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), and the consequences of waiver. | 1 | 2001–2001 |
Bell v. Hood
green
2 sentences1996But “it is ... well settled that where legal rights have been invaded, and a federal statute provides for a general right to sue for such invasion, federal courts may use any available remedy to make good the wrong done.” Id. at 396 , 91 S.Ct. at 2004 (quoting Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 684 , 66 S.Ct. 773, 777 , 90 L.Ed. 939 (1946)). 10 The Bivens Court also noted two instances where creation of an implied remedy would be unwarranted: (1) if “special factors counselling hesitation in the absence of affirmative action by Congress” were present; or (2) if there was an “explicit congressional de 1996But “it is ... well settled that where legal rights have been invaded, and a federal statute provides for a general right to sue for such invasion, federal courts may use any available remedy to make good the wrong done.” Id. at 396 , 91 S.Ct. at 2004 (quoting Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 684 , 66 S.Ct. 773, 777 , 90 L.Ed. 939 (1946)). 10 The Bivens Court also noted two instances where creation of an implied remedy would be unwarranted: (1) if “special factors counselling hesitation in the absence of affirmative action by Congress” were present; or (2) if there was an “explicit congressional de | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics
green
2 sentences1996But “it is ... well settled that where legal rights have been invaded, and a federal statute provides for a general right to sue for such invasion, federal courts may use any available remedy to make good the wrong done.” Id. at 396 , 91 S.Ct. at 2004 (quoting Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 684 , 66 S.Ct. 773, 777 , 90 L.Ed. 939 (1946)). 10 The Bivens Court also noted two instances where creation of an implied remedy would be unwarranted: (1) if “special factors counselling hesitation in the absence of affirmative action by Congress” were present; or (2) if there was an “explicit congressional de 1996But “it is ... well settled that where legal rights have been invaded, and a federal statute provides for a general right to sue for such invasion, federal courts may use any available remedy to make good the wrong done.” Id. at 396 , 91 S.Ct. at 2004 (quoting Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 684 , 66 S.Ct. 773, 777 , 90 L.Ed. 939 (1946)). 10 The Bivens Court also noted two instances where creation of an implied remedy would be unwarranted: (1) if “special factors counselling hesitation in the absence of affirmative action by Congress” were present; or (2) if there was an “explicit congressional de | 1 | 1996–1996 |
People v. Arguello
green
1 sentence1994People v. Arguello, supra. It is the defendant’s understanding of the consequences of his waiver of counsel and of the dangers of self-representation that is important. | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.