consequences defense in Kansas

2024A knowing and intelligent waiver requires that the defendant be informed of 'the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation, so that the record will establish that he knows what he is doing and his choice is made with eyes open.' The right to represent oneself is implicit in the structure of the Sixth Amendment. 'The right 9 to defend is given directly to the accused; for it is he who suffers the consequences if the defense fails.' A trial court may not measure a defendant's competence to waive his or her right to counsel by evaluating the defendant's 'technical legal knowledge.' [Citati

2024A knowing and intelligent waiver requires that the defendant be informed of 'the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation, so that the record will establish that he knows what he is doing and his choice is made with eyes open.' The right to represent oneself is implicit in the structure of the Sixth Amendment. 'The right 9 to defend is given directly to the accused; for it is he who suffers the consequences if the defense fails.' A trial court may not measure a defendant's competence to waive his or her right to counsel by evaluating the defendant's 'technical legal knowledge.' [Citati

2021State v. Burden, 311 Kan. 859 , 863, 467 P.3d 495 (2020); see Faretta, 422 U.S. at 819-21 . "'"The right to defend is given directly to the accused; for it is he who suffers the consequences if the defense fails."' "'A criminal defendant who before trial clearly and unequivocally expresses a wish to proceed pro se has the right to self-representation after a knowing and intelligent waiver of the right to counsel.

2021State v. Reu-El, 306 Kan. 460 , 473-74, 394 P.3d 884 (2017); State v. Beauclair, 281 Kan. 230, 237-41 , 130 P.3d 40 (2006).

2021State v. Reu-El, 306 Kan. 460 , 473-74, 394 P.3d 884 (2017); State v. Beauclair, 281 Kan. 230, 237-41 , 130 P.3d 40 (2006).

2018The United States Supreme Court has held "that the Sixth Amendment, as made applicable to the states by the Fourteenth Amendment, guarantees that a defendant in a state criminal trial has an independent constitutional right to self-representation." Vann , 280 Kan. at 793 , 127 P.3d 307 (citing Faretta v. California , 422 U.S. 806 , 95 S.Ct. 2525 , 45 L.Ed. 2d 562 [1975] ). " 'The right to defend is given directly to the accused; for it is he who suffers the consequences if the defense fails.' " Jones , 290 Kan. at 377 , 228 P.3d 394 (quoting Faretta , 422 U.S. at 819 , 95 S.Ct. 2525 ).

2018The United States Supreme Court has held "that the Sixth Amendment, as made applicable to the states by the Fourteenth Amendment, guarantees that a defendant in a state criminal trial has an independent constitutional right to self-representation." Vann , 280 Kan. at 793 , 127 P.3d 307 (citing Faretta v. California , 422 U.S. 806 , 95 S.Ct. 2525 , 45 L.Ed. 2d 562 [1975] ). " 'The right to defend is given directly to the accused; for it is he who suffers the consequences if the defense fails.' " Jones , 290 Kan. at 377 , 228 P.3d 394 (quoting Faretta , 422 U.S. at 819 , 95 S.Ct. 2525 ).

2016As the United States Supreme Court noted in Satterwhite, "the evaluation of the consequences of an error in the sentencing phase of a capital case may be more difficult because of the discretion that is given to the sentencer." 486 U.S. at 258 .

2010A trial court may not measure a defendant’s competence to waive his or her right to counsel by evaluating the defendant’s “technical legal knowledge.” Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 399-400 , 125 L.

2010A trial court may not measure a defendant’s competence to waive his or her right to counsel by evaluating the defendant’s “technical legal knowledge.” Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 399-400 , 125 L.

2007Third, he or she must comprehend the nature of the charges and proceedings, the range of punishments, and all facts necessary to a broad understanding of the case. [Citation omitted.]” State v. Mixon, 27 Kan.

2007K.S.A. 2006 Supp. 8-1001(m) provides: “It shall not be a defense that the person did not understand the written or oral notice required by this section.” Robinson equates his case with Meigs v. Kansas Dept. of Revenue, 251 Kan. 677 , 840 P.2d 448 (1992), and claims the notices provided by the trooper did not substantially comply with die requirements of the implied consent law.

2007K.S.A. 2006 Supp. 8-1001(m) provides: “It shall not be a defense that the person did not understand the written or oral notice required by this section.” Robinson equates his case with Meigs v. Kansas Dept. of Revenue, 251 Kan. 677 , 840 P.2d 448 (1992), and claims the notices provided by the trooper did not substantially comply with die requirements of the implied consent law.

2004In contrast, our facts here are more similar to State v. Clemons, 273 Kan. 328, 337 , 45 P.3d 384 (2002), where an examination of the totality of the circumstances demonstrated that a defendant knowingly and voluntarily waived his right, notwithstanding the trial court’s failure to specify his right to a 12-person jury.

2004In contrast, our facts here are more similar to State v. Clemons, 273 Kan. 328, 337 , 45 P.3d 384 (2002), where an examination of the totality of the circumstances demonstrated that a defendant knowingly and voluntarily waived his right, notwithstanding the trial court’s failure to specify his right to a 12-person jury.

1926In Barber County v. Bank Commissioner, 113 Kan. 180 , 213 Pac. 1054 , it was held that the deposits here in controversy did not come within the bank guaranty law.

1926In Barber County v. Bank Commissioner, 113 Kan. 180 , 213 Pac. 1054 , it was held that the deposits here in controversy did not come within the bank guaranty law.

1925(The State v. Smiley, supra; The State v. Aikins, 83 Kan. 792 , 112 Pac. 605 .) Upon the testimony we conclude that while the H.

1925(The State v. Smiley, supra; The State v. Aikins, 83 Kan. 792 , 112 Pac. 605 .) Upon the testimony we conclude that while the H.

1916(Clark v. Nichols, 79 Kan. 612 , 100 Pac. 626 .) In behalf of the defendants it is argued that the mistake made was one of law, that the receiver had no right to rely upon the judgment of the clerk in the matter, and was therefore guilty of such negligence as to prevent a court of equity from relieving him from the consequences of his error.

1916(Clark v. Nichols, 79 Kan. 612 , 100 Pac. 626 .) In behalf of the defendants it is argued that the mistake made was one of law, that the receiver had no right to rely upon the judgment of the clerk in the matter, and was therefore guilty of such negligence as to prevent a court of equity from relieving him from the consequences of his error.

1907The court held as a conclusion of law that this absolved plaintiff from the consequences of the doctrine declared in Yount v. Denning, 52 Kan. 629 , 35 Pac. 207 .

1907The court held as a conclusion of law that this absolved plaintiff from the consequences of the doctrine declared in Yount v. Denning, 52 Kan. 629 , 35 Pac. 207 .