consequences waiver in Maryland

2010We emphasized that, without advisement of the more severe potential penalties resulting from prior convictions, a defendant cannot effectively “evaluate the risks of forgoing the assistance of counsel,” id. at 91 , 945 A.2d at 647 , and therefore “cannot have full understanding of the consequences of the waiver of counsel,” id., 945 A.2d at 647 .

2010We emphasized that, without advisement of the more severe potential penalties resulting from prior convictions, a defendant cannot effectively “evaluate the risks of forgoing the assistance of counsel,” id. at 91 , 945 A.2d at 647 , and therefore “cannot have full understanding of the consequences of the waiver of counsel,” id., 945 A.2d at 647 .

2007The right to defend is given directly to the accused; for it is he who suffers the consequences if the defense fails. 422 U.S. at 819 , 95 S.Ct. 2525 (emphasis supplied).

2007The right to defend is given directly to the accused; for it is he who suffers the consequences if the defense fails. 422 U.S. at 819 , 95 S.Ct. 2525 (emphasis supplied).

1997Nor ... was there any indication that McIntyre “was of insufficient intelligence to understand the rights he was waiving, or what the consequences of that waiver would be ... [and] he was not worn down by improper interrogation tactics or lengthy questioning or by trickery or deceit.” McIntyre, 309 Md. at 624-625 , 526 A.2d 30 (quoting Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 726-27 , 99 S.Ct. 2560, 2572-73 , 61 L.Ed.2d 197 (1979)).

1997Nor ... was there any indication that McIntyre “was of insufficient intelligence to understand the rights he was waiving, or what the consequences of that waiver would be ... [and] he was not worn down by improper interrogation tactics or lengthy questioning or by trickery or deceit.” McIntyre, 309 Md. at 624-625 , 526 A.2d 30 (quoting Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 726-27 , 99 S.Ct. 2560, 2572-73 , 61 L.Ed.2d 197 (1979)).

2020TR § 16-205.1(a)(1)(iii). 17 This Court recently reaffirmed “that due process is satisfied when the motorist reads or is read the DR-15 because the DR-15 ‘accurately and adequately conveys to the driver the rights granted by the statute’ and ‘the consequences of a test refusal.’” Barrett, 467 Md. at 70 (quoting Motor Vehicle Admin. v. Delawter, 403 Md. 243, 262 (2008)).

2020We have repeatedly held that due process is satisfied when the motorist reads or is read the DR-15 because the DR-15 “accurately and adequately conveys to the driver the rights granted by the statute” and “the consequences of a test refusal.” Motor Vehicle Admin. v. Delawter, 403 Md. 243, 262 (2008) (citing Forman v. Motor Vehicle Admin., 4 The DR-15 includes a provision regarding test refusals by CDL holders: If you hold a commercial driver’s license (CDL) and were driving a non- commercial motor vehicle when you were stopped, and you refuse to submit to a test, your CDL or privilege shall be

2020We have repeatedly held that due process is satisfied when the motorist reads or is read the DR-15 because the DR-15 “accurately and adequately conveys to the driver the rights granted by the statute” and “the consequences of a test refusal.” Motor Vehicle Admin. v. Delawter, 403 Md. 243, 262 (2008) (citing Forman v. Motor Vehicle Admin., 4 The DR-15 includes a provision regarding test refusals by CDL holders: If you hold a commercial driver’s license (CDL) and were driving a non- commercial motor vehicle when you were stopped, and you refuse to submit to a test, your CDL or privilege shall be

2019Examiners , 678 F.3d at 744 -45 . *586 The absence of a procedure to intercept an erroneous cease-and-desist order before it is issued "makes the consequences of an error by the Board more severe, but it has no bearing on whether the error [was] ultimately correctable." Id. at 744 .

2019Examiners , 678 F.3d at 744 -45 . *586 The absence of a procedure to intercept an erroneous cease-and-desist order before it is issued "makes the consequences of an error by the Board more severe, but it has no bearing on whether the error [was] ultimately correctable." Id. at 744 .

2016Id.

2014I agree with Judge Watts, in her concurring and dissenting opinion in the companion cases of Nalls & Melvin v. State, that the Court need not reverse those convictions. 437 Md. 674 , 89 A.3d 1126 , 2014 WL 1613399 (2014).

2014I agree with Judge Watts, in her concurring and dissenting opinion in the companion cases of Nalls & Melvin v. State, that the Court need not reverse those convictions. 437 Md. 674 , 89 A.3d 1126 , 2014 WL 1613399 (2014).

2013Counsel then asked, “It is my understanding you are waiving your right to a jury trial and have His Honor hear the case today?” Mr. Valonis replied, “Yes.” Id. at 554 , 66 A.3d 661 .

2013Counsel then asked, “It is my understanding you are waiving your right to a jury trial and have His Honor hear the case today?” Mr. Valonis replied, “Yes.” Id. at 554 , 66 A.3d 661 .

2011A chilling effect, if any, is de minimis compared to the surprise at the end of the day when a defendant learns of the mandatory penalty, after trial and just before sentencing.” More recently, in Brye v. State, supra, 410 Md. 623 , 980 A.2d 435 , the defendant was charged with various offenses, some of which carried mandatory penalties and some of which carried enhanced penalties.

2011A chilling effect, if any, is de minimis compared to the surprise at the end of the day when a defendant learns of the mandatory penalty, after trial and just before sentencing.” More recently, in Brye v. State, supra, 410 Md. 623 , 980 A.2d 435 , the defendant was charged with various offenses, some of which carried mandatory penalties and some of which carried enhanced penalties.

2008The DR-15 is “a standardized statement of a detained driver’s rights and the adverse administrative consequences,” Willis v. State, 302 Md. 363 , 368 n. 3, 488 A.2d 171 , 174 n. 3 (1985), which, “in addition to advising individuals of the consequences of a test refusal, sets forth the sanctions for having a blood alcohol concentration in excess of the statutory limit, explains the administrative review process, and advises of the potential disqualification of a suspected drunk driver’s Commercial Driver’s License for a test refusal.” MVA v. Atterbeary, 368 Md. 480, 496 , 796 A.2d 75, 85 (2002)

2008The DR-15 is “a standardized statement of a detained driver’s rights and the adverse administrative consequences,” Willis v. State, 302 Md. 363 , 368 n. 3, 488 A.2d 171 , 174 n. 3 (1985), which, “in addition to advising individuals of the consequences of a test refusal, sets forth the sanctions for having a blood alcohol concentration in excess of the statutory limit, explains the administrative review process, and advises of the potential disqualification of a suspected drunk driver’s Commercial Driver’s License for a test refusal.” MVA v. Atterbeary, 368 Md. 480, 496 , 796 A.2d 75, 85 (2002)

2002Acknowledging that § 11-106 does not provide *47 for a sanction expressly, but, relying on Lussier v. Maryland Racing Comm'n, 343 Md. 681, 686-87 , 684 A.2d 804, 806-07 (1996), the intermediate appellate court noted that "[w]hen a statute that imposes a duty does not prescribe the consequences for a violation of that duty, the particular sanction must be within the spirit and purpose of the applicable law" and concluded: "In examining § 11-106 within the context of the Act's overall statutory scheme and as it relates to the agency's own implementing regulations, it appears that the prime reaso

2002Acknowledging that § 11-106 does not provide *47 for a sanction expressly, but, relying on Lussier v. Maryland Racing Comm'n, 343 Md. 681, 686-87 , 684 A.2d 804, 806-07 (1996), the intermediate appellate court noted that "[w]hen a statute that imposes a duty does not prescribe the consequences for a violation of that duty, the particular sanction must be within the spirit and purpose of the applicable law" and concluded: "In examining § 11-106 within the context of the Act's overall statutory scheme and as it relates to the agency's own implementing regulations, it appears that the prime reaso

1997Nor ... was there any indication that McIntyre “was of insufficient intelligence to understand the rights he was waiving, or what the consequences of that waiver would be ... [and] he was not worn down by improper interrogation tactics or lengthy questioning or by trickery or deceit.” McIntyre, 309 Md. at 624-625 , 526 A.2d 30 (quoting Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 726-27 , 99 S.Ct. 2560, 2572-73 , 61 L.Ed.2d 197 (1979)).

1997Nor ... was there any indication that McIntyre “was of insufficient intelligence to understand the rights he was waiving, or what the consequences of that waiver would be ... [and] he was not worn down by improper interrogation tactics or lengthy questioning or by trickery or deceit.” McIntyre, 309 Md. at 624-625 , 526 A.2d 30 (quoting Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 726-27 , 99 S.Ct. 2560, 2572-73 , 61 L.Ed.2d 197 (1979)).

1989In concluding that the waiver in Sanchez was knowingly and intelligently given, the Court stated: “Clearly there is a constitutional right to a unanimous verdict, but in exceptional circumstances the defendant should be allowed to waive that right____ Before allowing the defendant to waive the right, the following criteria should be met: (1) the waiver should be initiated by the defendant, not the judge or prosecutor; (2) the jury must have had a reasonable time to deliberate and should have told the court only that it could not reach a decision, but not how it stood numerically; (3) the judge

1987As the Court so recently stated in Colorado v. Connelly, supra, 107 S.Ct. at 523 , the “sole concern of the Fifth Amendment, on which Miranda was based, is governmental coercion,” and the voluntariness of the Miranda waiver “has always depended on the absence of police overreaching.” Id.

1987As the Court so recently stated in Colorado v. Connelly, supra, 107 S.Ct. at 523 , the “sole concern of the Fifth Amendment, on which Miranda was based, is governmental coercion,” and the voluntariness of the Miranda waiver “has always depended on the absence of police overreaching.” Id.

1987In State v. Werkheiser, 299 Md. 529 , 474 A.2d 898 (1984), a police officer had failed to obtain a blood chemical test within a statutorily prescribed time limit from a person whom the officer had reasonable grounds to believe was driving or attempting to drive while under the influence of alcohol.

1987In State v. Werkheiser, 299 Md. 529 , 474 A.2d 898 (1984), a police officer had failed to obtain a blood chemical test within a statutorily prescribed time limit from a person whom the officer had reasonable grounds to believe was driving or attempting to drive while under the influence of alcohol.

1945Sugarman v. State, 173 Md. 52, 59-61 , 195 A. 324 ; Mazer v. State, supra, 179 Md. 302, 303 , 18 A. 2d 217 .

1945Sugarman v. State, 173 Md. 52, 59-61 , 195 A. 324 ; Mazer v. State, supra, 179 Md. 302, 303 , 18 A. 2d 217 .

1945Sugarman v. State, 173 Md. 52, 59-61 , 195 A. 324 ; Mazer v. State, supra, 179 Md. 302, 303 , 18 A. 2d 217 .

1943As in Young v. State, 90 Md. 579 , at page 585, 45 A. 531 , it was said: “* * * the general practice that prevails here, and in most, if not all, of the courts having our system of jurisprudence, is that challenges for cause must be made before the juror is sworn; and that rule is without exception in all cases where the party object *419 ing to the qualifications of the juror had knowledge at that time of the circumstances tending to disqualify, or could have known of them by the exercise of proper diligence in making inquiries or otherwise; and if, with such knowledge, express or implied, he

1943As in Young v. State, 90 Md. 579 , at page 585, 45 A. 531 , it was said: “* * * the general practice that prevails here, and in most, if not all, of the courts having our system of jurisprudence, is that challenges for cause must be made before the juror is sworn; and that rule is without exception in all cases where the party object *419 ing to the qualifications of the juror had knowledge at that time of the circumstances tending to disqualify, or could have known of them by the exercise of proper diligence in making inquiries or otherwise; and if, with such knowledge, express or implied, he

1943And as the consequences of such an error can be readily obviated by inqdiry and challenge when they come to be sworn, it is laches not to avail of so simple and efficacious a means of protection, where prejudice is apprehended or may be rendered impossible, as examination and challenge before the jury is empaneled.” The case of Busey v. State, 85 Md. 115 , 36 A. 257 , is authority for the proposition that it is a general rule that if a party knows a cause of challenge and does not exercise it at the proper time, that is, while the jury is being impaneled, he cannot avail himself of the defect

1943And as the consequences of such an error can be readily obviated by inqdiry and challenge when they come to be sworn, it is laches not to avail of so simple and efficacious a means of protection, where prejudice is apprehended or may be rendered impossible, as examination and challenge before the jury is empaneled.” The case of Busey v. State, 85 Md. 115 , 36 A. 257 , is authority for the proposition that it is a general rule that if a party knows a cause of challenge and does not exercise it at the proper time, that is, while the jury is being impaneled, he cannot avail himself of the defect

1937That at least appears to have been the view of this court in such cases as Bastable v. Bastable, 144 Md. 213 , 124 A. 866 , where the appeal was dismissed because the bills of exceptions were *215 not signed within the statutory period.

1937That at least appears to have been the view of this court in such cases as Bastable v. Bastable, 144 Md. 213 , 124 A. 866 , where the appeal was dismissed because the bills of exceptions were *215 not signed within the statutory period.