consequences waiver in Hawaii

1982Lumsden v. Lumsden, 61 Haw. 338 , 603 P.2d 564 (1979); Richards, supra. Fourth, the paying party is always under a duty to exert reasonable efforts to maintain his or her ability to pay what he or she has been required to pay and will not be allowed to benefit from the consequences of a violation of that duty.

1982Lumsden v. Lumsden, 61 Haw. 338 , 603 P.2d 564 (1979); Richards, supra. Fourth, the paying party is always under a duty to exert reasonable efforts to maintain his or her ability to pay what he or she has been required to pay and will not be allowed to benefit from the consequences of a violation of that duty.

2018As stated, Murray requires a trial court to conduct an on-the-record colloquy with the defendant before accepting a waiver of the fundamental right to have all elements of a charge proven beyond a reasonable doubt. 116 Hawai'i at 12 , 169 P.3d at 964 .

2018As stated, Murray requires a trial court to conduct an on-the-record colloquy with the defendant before accepting a waiver of the fundamental right to have all elements of a charge proven beyond a reasonable doubt. 116 Hawai'i at 12 , 169 P.3d at 964 .

2009See also People v. Johnson, 20 Cal.App.4th 106 , 24 Cal.Rptr.2d 628, 631 (1993) (holding that a defendant could not be held in contempt for violating a no-eontact condition of probation because probation is an act of grace and the consequences of a violation of probation are governed by Penal Code § 1203.2 et seq. which makes clear that “upon revocation, the trial court may either pronounce judgment for any time within the longest period the defendant might have been sentenced if imposition of the sentence previously had been suspended or if the judgment previously had been pronounced and exec

2006In so doing, we reexamined our decision in State v. Kupau, 76 Hawai'i 387 , 879 P.2d 492 (1994), and rejected the ICA's view that a defendant’s sufficient understanding of the consequences of the waiver of the right to have a lesser included offense instruction should measure a trial court’s decision to give or not give an otherwise proper included offense instruction.

2006In so doing, we reexamined our decision in State v. Kupau, 76 Hawai'i 387 , 879 P.2d 492 (1994), and rejected the ICA's view that a defendant’s sufficient understanding of the consequences of the waiver of the right to have a lesser included offense instruction should measure a trial court’s decision to give or not give an otherwise proper included offense instruction.

2006In so doing, we reexamined our decision in State v. Kupau, 76 Hawai`i 387, 879 P.2d 492 (1994), and rejected the ICA's view that a defendant's sufficient understanding of the consequences of the waiver of the right to have a lesser included offense instruction should measure a trial court's decision to give or not give an otherwise proper included offense instruction.

2006Id. at 412-13 , 16 P.3d at 253-54 .

2006Id. at 412-13, 16 P.3d at 253-54 .

1998The same imperfection in the appellate remedy would be present if the attorney-client privilege were violated, not by a pretrial disclosure order, but by a ruling on evidence during trial, which would have to await final judgment for appellate review unless trials were to be interrupted whenever such a ruling occurred. 520 A.2d at 607 .

1997United States v. Wild, 551 F.2d 418, 424-25 (D.C.Cir.) (footnotes omitted), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 916 , 97 S.Ct. 2178 , 53 L.Ed.2d 226 (1977).

1997United States v. Wild, 551 F.2d 418, 424-25 (D.C.Cir.) (footnotes omitted), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 916 , 97 S.Ct. 2178 , 53 L.Ed.2d 226 (1977).

1997United States v. Wild, 551 F.2d 418, 424-25 (D.C.Cir.) (footnotes omitted), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 916 , 97 S.Ct. 2178 , 53 L.Ed.2d 226 (1977).

1997United States v. Wild, 551 F.2d 418, 424-25 (D.C.Cir.) (footnotes omitted), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 916 , 97 S.Ct. 2178 , 53 L.Ed.2d 226 (1977).

1997United States v. Wild, 551 F.2d 418, 424-25 (D.C.Cir.) (footnotes omitted), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 916 , 97 S.Ct. 2178 , 53 L.Ed.2d 226 (1977).

1997United States v. Wild, 551 F.2d 418, 424-25 (D.C.Cir.) (footnotes omitted), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 916 , 97 S.Ct. 2178 , 53 L.Ed.2d 226 (1977).

1996Merino challenges the aforementioned FOF/COL on appeal as being “clearly erroneous” on the ground that he was not “made aware of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation, so that the record will establish that he knows what he is doing and his choice is made with eyes open” (quoting Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 , 95 S.Ct. 2525 , 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975), and citing State v. Vares, 71 Haw. 617 , 801 P.2d 555 (1990)) (emphases added).

1996Merino challenges the aforementioned FOF/COL on appeal as being “clearly erroneous” on the ground that he was not “made aware of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation, so that the record will establish that he knows what he is doing and his choice is made with eyes open” (quoting Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 , 95 S.Ct. 2525 , 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975), and citing State v. Vares, 71 Haw. 617 , 801 P.2d 555 (1990)) (emphases added).

1996He chose to represent himself and[,] in so doing, was fully aware of the pitfalls of his decision” (FOF/ COL No. 2); (3) “[u]nder the ... circumstances, if the Court had compelled [Merino] to accept legal counsel or denied [Merino] the right to appear without counsel, [Merino] would have been deprived of his constitutional right pursuant to Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 [ 95 S.Ct. 2525 , 45 L.Ed.2d 562 ] (1975)” (FOF/COL No. 3); 21 (4) Merino “voluntarily waived his right to be represented by legal counsel, with a full and complete understanding of the nature of this right and the conseq

1996He chose to represent himself and[,] in so doing, was fully aware of the pitfalls of his decision” (FOF/ COL No. 2); (3) “[u]nder the ... circumstances, if the Court had compelled [Merino] to accept legal counsel or denied [Merino] the right to appear without counsel, [Merino] would have been deprived of his constitutional right pursuant to Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 [ 95 S.Ct. 2525 , 45 L.Ed.2d 562 ] (1975)” (FOF/COL No. 3); 21 (4) Merino “voluntarily waived his right to be represented by legal counsel, with a full and complete understanding of the nature of this right and the conseq

1988App. 20 , 641 P.2d 1342 (1982), we articulated the rule that a party paying court-ordered spousal support is always under a duty to exert reasonable efforts *289 to maintain his or her ability to pay what he or she has been required to pay and will not be allowed to benefit from the consequences of a violation of that duty.