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98 California opinions name it 3 courts 1871–2025 14 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Satterwhite v. Texasgreen2 sentences1994In Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18 [ 17 L.Ed.2d 705 , 87 S.Ct. 824 , 24 A.L.R.3d 1065 ], the high court stated that "before a federal constitutional error can be held harmless, the court must be able to declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt." ( Id. at p. 24 [17 L.Ed.2d at pp. 710-711].) When, as here, the violation of the federal Constitution occurs at the penalty phase of a capital trial, a reviewing court must proceed with particular caution. ( People v. Haskett (1990) 52 Cal.3d 210, 253 [ 276 Cal. Rptr. 80 , 801 P.2d 323 ] (dis. opn. of Mosk, J.); see Satt 1994In Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18 [ 17 L.Ed.2d 705 , 87 S.Ct. 824 , 24 A.L.R.3d 1065 ], the high court stated that "before a federal constitutional error can be held harmless, the court must be able to declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt." ( Id. at p. 24 [17 L.Ed.2d at pp. 710-711].) When, as here, the violation of the federal Constitution occurs at the penalty phase of a capital trial, a reviewing court must proceed with particular caution. ( People v. Haskett (1990) 52 Cal.3d 210, 253 [ 276 Cal. Rptr. 80 , 801 P.2d 323 ] (dis. opn. of Mosk, J.); see Satt | 4 | 4 |
People v. Howardgreen2 sentences2003"A `knowing and intelligent waiver' of a right implies that *827 the waiver was entered into with awareness of its consequences. [Citations.]" ( People v. Harris (1987) 195 Cal.App.3d 717, 725 , 240 Cal.Rptr. 891 .) "[B]efore a defendant agrees to waive custody credit to which he is entitled, he should understand the full consequences of the waiver." ( People v. Ambrose, supra, 7 Cal.App.4th at pp.1922-1923, 9 Cal.Rptr.2d 812 , italics added.) "An awareness of the [full] consequences of waiving any right should include an understanding of the impact of that waiver on the amount of time a defen 2003"A `knowing and intelligent waiver' of a right implies that *827 the waiver was entered into with awareness of its consequences. [Citations.]" ( People v. Harris (1987) 195 Cal.App.3d 717, 725 , 240 Cal.Rptr. 891 .) "[B]efore a defendant agrees to waive custody credit to which he is entitled, he should understand the full consequences of the waiver." ( People v. Ambrose, supra, 7 Cal.App.4th at pp.1922-1923, 9 Cal.Rptr.2d 812 , italics added.) "An awareness of the [full] consequences of waiving any right should include an understanding of the impact of that waiver on the amount of time a defen | 3 | 4 |
People v. Watsongreen2 sentences2025If the failure to appoint counsel would not be an abuse of discretion, the consequences of the error are properly assessed by employing the Watson harmless error standard.” (People v. Morelos (2022) 13 Cal.5th 722, 738 (Morelos) [cleaned up], citing People v. Crandell (1988) 46 Cal.3d 833, 861 (Crandell) and People v. Bigelow (1984) 37 Cal.3d 731 , 742–746 (Bigelow); People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 (Watson).) We acknowledge that our court previously declined to extend Bigelow’s reasoning regarding advisory counsel to a non-capital case. 1988(Cf. People v. Chavez (1980) 26 Cal.3d 334, 348-349 [ 161 Cal. Rptr. 762 , 605 P.2d 401 ] [abuse of discretion in failing to appoint particular attorneys held harmless error].) No federal constitutional right being implicated, the consequences of the error are properly assessed *865 by employing the Watson harmless error standard. ( People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 [ 299 P.2d 243 ].) Defendant proved to be an aggressive, thorough, and skillful advocate in superior court. | 3 | 3 |
Faretta v. Californiagreen2 sentences2018The right to defend is given directly to the accused; for it is he who suffers the consequences if the defense fails .' (Italics added; fn. omitted.) ( Id . at pp. 819-820 [ 95 S.Ct. 2525 ].) *422 "The Attorney General in effect stands Faretta on its head: from the defendant's conceded right to 'make a defense' in 'an adversary criminal trial,' the Attorney General attempts to infer a defendant's right to make no such defense and to have no such trial, even when his life is at stake. 2007The right of self-representation is based on the recognition that “[t]he right to defend is given directly to the accused; for it is he who suffers the consequences if the defense fails.” (Faretta v. California, supra, 422 U.S. at pp. 819-820 [ 45 L.Ed.2d 562, 573 ].) A defendant’s choice of self-representation “must be honored out of ‘that respect for the individual which is the lifeblood of the law.’ [Citation.]” (Id. at p. 834.) These policies are not impaired by holding a defendant to account for what he says while representing himself. | 2 | 7 |
People v. Collinsgreen2 sentences2016(Collins, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 305, fn. 2 ; People v. Smith (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 492, 500 .) A defendant’s waiver of the right to a jury trial may be accepted only if it is knowing and intelligent—made with full awareness of the nature of the right being waived and the consequences of the waiver. 2003(People v. Collins (2001) 26 Cal.4th 297, 305 [ 109 Cal.Rptr.2d 836 , 27 P.3d 726 ] [defendant may waive fundamental constitutional right to jury trial].) A defendant’s waiver of the right to jury trial, as with other fundamental rights, may be accepted by the court only if knowing and intelligent—made with a full awareness of the nature of the right being waived and the consequences of the waiver. | 2 | 5 |
People v. Partidagreen2 sentences2022However, since we have not found that the admission of the evidence 46 was error under state law, we need not decide “the consequences of that error, including . . . whether the error was so serious as to violate due process.” (Partida, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 437 .) E. 2022However, since we have not found that the admission of the evidence 46 was error under state law, we need not decide “the consequences of that error, including . . . whether the error was so serious as to violate due process.” (Partida, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 437 .) E. | 2 | 4 |
People v. Walkergreen2 sentences2007Although these possible violations are related, they must be analyzed separately, for the nature of the rights involved and the consequences of a violation differ substantially." ( Id. at p. 1020, 1 Cal.Rptr.2d 902 , 819 P.2d 861 .) In Walker , both types of error were present. 2007Although these possible violations are related, they must be analyzed separately, for the nature of the rights involved and the consequences of a violation differ substantially." ( Id. at p. 1020, 1 Cal.Rptr.2d 902 , 819 P.2d 861 .) In Walker , both types of error were present. | 2 | 4 |
People v. Morelosgreen2 sentences2025If the failure to appoint counsel would not be an abuse of discretion, the consequences of the error are properly assessed by employing the Watson harmless error standard.” (People v. Morelos (2022) 13 Cal.5th 722, 738 (Morelos) [cleaned up], citing People v. Crandell (1988) 46 Cal.3d 833, 861 (Crandell) and People v. Bigelow (1984) 37 Cal.3d 731 , 742–746 (Bigelow); People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 (Watson).) We acknowledge that our court previously declined to extend Bigelow’s reasoning regarding advisory counsel to a non-capital case. 2022(People v. Morelos (2022) 13 Cal.5th 722, 753 [review of jury waiver considers the totality of circumstances “unique to each case”].) Porter initiated the request for a court trial and the record reveals no hesitation by Porter in entering the waiver or 9 any confusion regarding the consequences of the waiver. | 2 | 2 |
People v. McClellangreen2 sentences2004Indeed, much of the confusion engendered by the appellate decisions on this issue results from a blurring of the distinction between these principles." ( Ibid. ; accord, In re Moser, supra, 6 Cal.4th at pp. 350-351, 24 Cal.Rptr.2d 723 , 862 P.2d 723 ; People v. McClellan, supra, 6 Cal.4th at p. 375, 24 Cal.Rptr.2d 739 , 862 P.2d 739 .) The Walker case involved the imposition of a restitution fine, which the court never disclosed to the defendant prior to his plea. 2004Indeed, much of the confusion engendered by the appellate decisions on this issue results from a blurring of the distinction between these principles.” (Ibid.; accord, In re Moser, supra, 6 Cal.4th at pp. 350-351; People v. McClellan, supra, 6 Cal.4th at p. 375.) The Walker case involved the imposition of a restitution fine, which the court never disclosed to the defendant prior to his plea. | 2 | 2 |
Fare v. Michael C.green2 sentences1998The totality approach permits—indeed, it mandates—inquiry into all the circumstances surrounding the interrogation.” (442 U.S. at pp. 724-725 [99 S.Ct. at pp. 2571-2572].) In following this approach, the court in Fare concluded there was “no indication that [the defendant] was of insufficient intelligence to understand the rights he was waiving, or what the consequences of that waiver would be.” ( 442 U.S. at p. 726 [99 S.Ct. at p. 2572].) In Moran v. Burbine (1986) 475 U.S. 412 [ 106 S.Ct. 1135 , 89 L.Ed.2d 410 ] (Moran), a case involving the defendant’s execution of a written form acknowledg 1998As was true with regard to the defendant in Fare, supra, 442 U.S. 707, 726 [ 99 S.Ct. 2560, 2572 ], there was no evidence that defendant in the present case lacked sufficient intelligence to understand those rights or the consequences of his waiver. | 2 | 2 |
In Re Tahlgreen2 sentences1992(See People v. Howard (1992) 1 Cal.4th 1132, 1174-1180 [ 5 Cal.Rptr.2d 268 , 824 P.2d 1315 ] reinterpreting In re Tahl (1969) 1 Cal.3d 122, 132-133 [ 81 Cal.Rptr. 577 , 460 P.2d 449 ] and In re Yurko (1974) 10 Cal.3d 857, 864-865 [ 112 Cal.Rptr. 513 , 519 P.2d 561 ].) It follows from these principles that, before a defendant agrees to waive custody credit to which he is entitled, he should understand the full consequences of the waiver. 1992(See People v. Howard (1992) 1 Cal.4th 1132, 1174-1180 [ 5 Cal.Rptr.2d 268 , 824 P.2d 1315 ] reinterpreting In re Tahl (1969) 1 Cal.3d 122, 132-133 [ 81 Cal.Rptr. 577 , 460 P.2d 449 ] and In re Yurko (1974) 10 Cal.3d 857, 864-865 [ 112 Cal.Rptr. 513 , 519 P.2d 561 ].) It follows from these principles that, before a defendant agrees to waive custody credit to which he is entitled, he should understand the full consequences of the waiver. | 2 | 2 |
In Re Yurkogreen2 sentences1992(See People v. Howard (1992) 1 Cal.4th 1132, 1174-1180 [ 5 Cal.Rptr.2d 268 , 824 P.2d 1315 ] reinterpreting In re Tahl (1969) 1 Cal.3d 122, 132-133 [ 81 Cal.Rptr. 577 , 460 P.2d 449 ] and In re Yurko (1974) 10 Cal.3d 857, 864-865 [ 112 Cal.Rptr. 513 , 519 P.2d 561 ].) It follows from these principles that, before a defendant agrees to waive custody credit to which he is entitled, he should understand the full consequences of the waiver. 1992(See People v. Howard (1992) 1 Cal.4th 1132, 1174-1180 [ 5 Cal.Rptr.2d 268 , 824 P.2d 1315 ] reinterpreting In re Tahl (1969) 1 Cal.3d 122, 132-133 [ 81 Cal.Rptr. 577 , 460 P.2d 449 ] and In re Yurko (1974) 10 Cal.3d 857, 864-865 [ 112 Cal.Rptr. 513 , 519 P.2d 561 ].) It follows from these principles that, before a defendant agrees to waive custody credit to which he is entitled, he should understand the full consequences of the waiver. | 2 | 2 |
People v. Weavergreen2 sentences2017For instance, this court has upheld an express jury waiver made "with counsel's consent and agreement" where other circumstances bolstered the conclusion that defendant's waiver was knowing and intelligent. ( People v. Cunningham (2015) 61 Cal.4th 609 , 637, 189 Cal.Rptr.3d 737 , 352 P.3d 318 .) In Cunningham , the represented defendant received "a full explanation from the court of the right and the consequences of the waiver." ( Ibid. ) The defendant expressly acknowledged, moreover, that "(1) he had an absolute right to a jury trial in both the guilt and penalty phases of his trial, (2) in 2017For instance, this court has upheld an express jury waiver made "with counsel's consent and agreement" where other circumstances bolstered the conclusion that defendant's waiver was knowing and intelligent. ( People v. Cunningham (2015) 61 Cal.4th 609 , 637, 189 Cal.Rptr.3d 737 , 352 P.3d 318 .) In Cunningham , the represented defendant received "a full explanation from the court of the right and the consequences of the waiver." ( Ibid. ) The defendant expressly acknowledged, moreover, that "(1) he had an absolute right to a jury trial in both the guilt and penalty phases of his trial, (2) in | 1 | 4 |
People v. D'Arcygreen2 sentences2018(See, e.g., *833 People v. D'Arcy (2010) 48 Cal.4th 257 , 286-287, 106 Cal.Rptr.3d 459 , 226 P.3d 949 [waiver of right to self-representation]; People v. Fox (2014) 224 Cal.App.4th 424 , 437, 168 Cal.Rptr.3d 615 [waiver of right to counsel].) Arevalo can claim no such reliance. 2018(See, e.g., *833 People v. D'Arcy (2010) 48 Cal.4th 257 , 286-287, 106 Cal.Rptr.3d 459 , 226 P.3d 949 [waiver of right to self-representation]; People v. Fox (2014) 224 Cal.App.4th 424 , 437, 168 Cal.Rptr.3d 615 [waiver of right to counsel].) Arevalo can claim no such reliance. | 1 | 2 |
People v. Foxgreen2 sentences2018(See, e.g., *833 People v. D'Arcy (2010) 48 Cal.4th 257 , 286-287, 106 Cal.Rptr.3d 459 , 226 P.3d 949 [waiver of right to self-representation]; People v. Fox (2014) 224 Cal.App.4th 424 , 437, 168 Cal.Rptr.3d 615 [waiver of right to counsel].) Arevalo can claim no such reliance. 2018(See, e.g., *833 People v. D'Arcy (2010) 48 Cal.4th 257 , 286-287, 106 Cal.Rptr.3d 459 , 226 P.3d 949 [waiver of right to self-representation]; People v. Fox (2014) 224 Cal.App.4th 424 , 437, 168 Cal.Rptr.3d 615 [waiver of right to counsel].) Arevalo can claim no such reliance. | 1 | 2 |
| People v. Crandellgreen | 1 | 1 |
People v. Garciagreen1 sentence2025(People v. Thompson (2022) 83 Cal.App.5th 69 , 113 [“[S]ince we have not found that the admission of the evidence was error under state law, we need not decide ‘the consequences of that error, including . . . whether the error was so serious as to violate due process.’ ”]; People v. Garcia (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 261, 275 [“ ‘ “Only if there are no permissible inferences the jury may draw from the evidence can its admission violate due process.” ’ ”].) And we need not discuss the parties’ arguments regarding prejudice or alleged ineffective assistance of counsel arising from the failure to obje | 1 | 1 |
People v. Williamsgreen1 sentence2025(People v. Williams (2010) 49 Cal.4th 405, 468, fn. 9 [“We need not reach the question [of] whether [a] claim of error was forfeited or error was invited, because it is clear no error occurred.”].) 2. | 1 | 1 |
| Holbrook & Tarr v. Thomsongreen | 1 | 1 |
| Harmon v. Hopkinsgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Danielsgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Medinagreen | 1 | 1 |
| United States v. Manuel Delgadogreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Marshallgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Cromergreen | 1 | 1 |
| In Re SBred | 1 | 1 |
| Langley v. Rodriguezgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Rosen v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Scoggin v. Kaisergreen | 1 | 1 |
| Wilson-Bey v. United Statesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Mroczkogreen | 1 | 1 |
| Benjamin Adams v. Midge Carroll, Wardengreen | 1 | 1 |
| Brady v. United Statesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Cartergreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Montanogreen | 1 | 1 |
| Fireman's Fund Insurance v. Morse Signal Devicesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Rosenthal v. Great Western Financial Securities Corp.green | 1 | 1 |
| Rush v. Oppenheimer & Co., Inc.green | 1 | 1 |
| In Re Mosergreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Salazargreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
People v. Smith
green
2 sentences2016(Collins, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 305, fn. 2 ; People v. Smith (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 492, 500 .) A defendant’s waiver of the right to a jury trial may be accepted only if it is knowing and intelligent—made with full awareness of the nature of the right being waived and the consequences of the waiver. 2015A defendant’s guilty plea and waiver of constitutional rights must be knowing, intelligent, and voluntary—“made with a full awareness of the nature of the right being waived and the consequences of the waiver….” (People v. Smith (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 492, 500 .) As set forth above, the court carefully advised defendant of the consequences of his plea to attempted murder. | 6 | 2013–2016 |
People v. . Scott
green
2 sentences2017For instance, this court has upheld an express jury waiver made "with counsel's consent and agreement" where other circumstances bolstered the conclusion that defendant's waiver was knowing and intelligent. ( People v. Cunningham (2015) 61 Cal.4th 609 , 637, 189 Cal.Rptr.3d 737 , 352 P.3d 318 .) In Cunningham , the represented defendant received "a full explanation from the court of the right and the consequences of the waiver." ( Ibid. ) The defendant expressly acknowledged, moreover, that "(1) he had an absolute right to a jury trial in both the guilt and penalty phases of his trial, (2) in 2017For instance, this court has upheld an express jury waiver made "with counsel's consent and agreement" where other circumstances bolstered the conclusion that defendant's waiver was knowing and intelligent. ( People v. Cunningham (2015) 61 Cal.4th 609 , 637, 189 Cal.Rptr.3d 737 , 352 P.3d 318 .) In Cunningham , the represented defendant received "a full explanation from the court of the right and the consequences of the waiver." ( Ibid. ) The defendant expressly acknowledged, moreover, that "(1) he had an absolute right to a jury trial in both the guilt and penalty phases of his trial, (2) in | 4 | 2016–2018 |
People v. Robertson
green
2 sentences2018(See Sivongxxay, supra, 3 Cal.5th at pp. 167-168, 174, 189-190 ; People v. Cunningham (2015) 61 Cal.4th 609 , 636-637, 189 Cal.Rptr.3d 737 , 352 P.3d 318 (Cunningham ); People v. Weaver (2012) 53 Cal.4th 1056 , 1070-1071, 139 Cal.Rptr.3d 355 , 273 P.3d 546 (Weaver ); Collins, supra, 26 Cal.4th at pp. 307-309, 109 Cal.Rptr.2d 836 , 27 P.3d 726 ; People v. Scott (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1188 , 1208-1210, 65 Cal.Rptr.2d 240 , 939 P.2d 354 (Scott ); People v. Diaz (1992) 3 Cal.4th 495 , 570-571, 11 Cal.Rptr.2d 353 , 834 P.2d 1171 (Diaz ); People v. Robertson (1989) 48 Cal.3d 18 , 37-38, 255 Cal.Rptr. 631 2018(See Sivongxxay, supra, 3 Cal.5th at pp. 167-168, 174, 189-190 ; People v. Cunningham (2015) 61 Cal.4th 609 , 636-637, 189 Cal.Rptr.3d 737 , 352 P.3d 318 (Cunningham ); People v. Weaver (2012) 53 Cal.4th 1056 , 1070-1071, 139 Cal.Rptr.3d 355 , 273 P.3d 546 (Weaver ); Collins, supra, 26 Cal.4th at pp. 307-309, 109 Cal.Rptr.2d 836 , 27 P.3d 726 ; People v. Scott (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1188 , 1208-1210, 65 Cal.Rptr.2d 240 , 939 P.2d 354 (Scott ); People v. Diaz (1992) 3 Cal.4th 495 , 570-571, 11 Cal.Rptr.2d 353 , 834 P.2d 1171 (Diaz ); People v. Robertson (1989) 48 Cal.3d 18 , 37-38, 255 Cal.Rptr. 631 | 4 | 2016–2018 |
People v. Cunningham
green
2 sentences2017For instance, this court has upheld an express jury waiver made "with counsel's consent and agreement" where other circumstances bolstered the conclusion that defendant's waiver was knowing and intelligent. ( People v. Cunningham (2015) 61 Cal.4th 609 , 637, 189 Cal.Rptr.3d 737 , 352 P.3d 318 .) In Cunningham , the represented defendant received "a full explanation from the court of the right and the consequences of the waiver." ( Ibid. ) The defendant expressly acknowledged, moreover, that "(1) he had an absolute right to a jury trial in both the guilt and penalty phases of his trial, (2) in 2017For instance, this court has upheld an express jury waiver made "with counsel's consent and agreement" where other circumstances bolstered the conclusion that defendant's waiver was knowing and intelligent. ( People v. Cunningham (2015) 61 Cal.4th 609 , 637, 189 Cal.Rptr.3d 737 , 352 P.3d 318 .) In Cunningham , the represented defendant received "a full explanation from the court of the right and the consequences of the waiver." ( Ibid. ) The defendant expressly acknowledged, moreover, that "(1) he had an absolute right to a jury trial in both the guilt and penalty phases of his trial, (2) in | 4 | 2016–2018 |
People v. Sivongxxay
green
2 sentences2022(Sivongxxay, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 164 .) The trial judge informed the defendant that he had a right to a trial by jury, that the jury would be made up of 12 members of the 3 PEOPLE v. MORELOS Liu, J., dissenting community, that he would participate in the selection of the jury, and that the judge would determine his guilt or innocence and any penalty in the absence of a jury. 2018(See Sivongxxay, supra, 3 Cal.5th at pp. 167–168, 174, 189–190; People v. Cunningham (2015) 61 Cal.4th 609 , 636–637 (Cunningham); People v. Weaver (2012) 53 Cal.4th 1056 , 1070– 1071 (Weaver); Collins, supra, 26 Cal.4th at pp. 307–309; People v. Scott (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1188 , 1208–1210 (Scott); People v. Diaz (1992) 3 Cal.4th 495 , 570– 571 (Diaz); People v. Robertson (1989) 48 Cal.3d 18 , 37–38 (Robertson); People v. Deere (1985) 41 Cal.3d 354 , 359–360 (Deere).) In Deere, the defendant and his counsel waived a jury trial at the penalty phase of a capital trial. | 3 | 2016–2022 |
People v. Diaz
green
2 sentences2018(See Sivongxxay, supra, 3 Cal.5th at pp. 167-168, 174, 189-190 ; People v. Cunningham (2015) 61 Cal.4th 609 , 636-637, 189 Cal.Rptr.3d 737 , 352 P.3d 318 (Cunningham ); People v. Weaver (2012) 53 Cal.4th 1056 , 1070-1071, 139 Cal.Rptr.3d 355 , 273 P.3d 546 (Weaver ); Collins, supra, 26 Cal.4th at pp. 307-309, 109 Cal.Rptr.2d 836 , 27 P.3d 726 ; People v. Scott (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1188 , 1208-1210, 65 Cal.Rptr.2d 240 , 939 P.2d 354 (Scott ); People v. Diaz (1992) 3 Cal.4th 495 , 570-571, 11 Cal.Rptr.2d 353 , 834 P.2d 1171 (Diaz ); People v. Robertson (1989) 48 Cal.3d 18 , 37-38, 255 Cal.Rptr. 631 2018(See Sivongxxay, supra, 3 Cal.5th at pp. 167-168, 174, 189-190 ; People v. Cunningham (2015) 61 Cal.4th 609 , 636-637, 189 Cal.Rptr.3d 737 , 352 P.3d 318 (Cunningham ); People v. Weaver (2012) 53 Cal.4th 1056 , 1070-1071, 139 Cal.Rptr.3d 355 , 273 P.3d 546 (Weaver ); Collins, supra, 26 Cal.4th at pp. 307-309, 109 Cal.Rptr.2d 836 , 27 P.3d 726 ; People v. Scott (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1188 , 1208-1210, 65 Cal.Rptr.2d 240 , 939 P.2d 354 (Scott ); People v. Diaz (1992) 3 Cal.4th 495 , 570-571, 11 Cal.Rptr.2d 353 , 834 P.2d 1171 (Diaz ); People v. Robertson (1989) 48 Cal.3d 18 , 37-38, 255 Cal.Rptr. 631 | 3 | 2016–2018 |
United States v. Lorenzo Nichols, Howard Mason
green
2 sentences2013(See United States v. Nichols (2d Cir. 1995) 56 F.3d 403, 416-417 .) [¶] Here, there is scant evidence of consent, and even less evidence that defendant understood the right he was waiving and the consequences of his waiver. 2013(See United States v. Nichols (2d Cir. 1995) 56 F.3d 403, 416-417 .) [][] Here, there is scant evidence of consent, and even less evidence that defendant understood the right he was waiving and the consequences of his waiver. | 3 | 2005–2013 |
Hardwick v. Wilcox
green
2 sentences2023(Id. at pp. 984-985.) After a bench trial, the trial court concluded the forbearance agreement did not contain a valid waiver of usury violations. ( Hardwick, supra, 11 Cal.App.5th at pp. 985, 988.) The court made factual findings that the forbearance agreement was a “‘descendant obligation growing out of the original usurious loans,’” “an extension of that original usurious transaction,” and “usurious in and of itself.” (Id. at p. 985.) “Under these circumstances, the court found, interpreting the release as a waiver of a usury claim would exempt Wilcox from the consequences of his violation 2023The appellate court concluded that “the record supports the trial court’s finding that construing this particular release as a waiver of usury would violate public policy.” (Hardwick, supra, 11 Cal.App.5th at p. 989 , emphasis added.) It observed that “the interconnection between the series of 15 notes and amendments to the notes substantially supports the trial court’s finding that the Forbearance Agreement was an extension of the underlying usurious loan transaction,” and “construing the unilateral general release . . . as a waiver of usury would allow Wilcox to escape the consequences of hi | 2 | 2021–2023 |
People v. Deere
green
2 sentences2018(See Sivongxxay, supra, 3 Cal.5th at pp. 167-168, 174, 189-190 ; People v. Cunningham (2015) 61 Cal.4th 609 , 636-637, 189 Cal.Rptr.3d 737 , 352 P.3d 318 (Cunningham ); People v. Weaver (2012) 53 Cal.4th 1056 , 1070-1071, 139 Cal.Rptr.3d 355 , 273 P.3d 546 (Weaver ); Collins, supra, 26 Cal.4th at pp. 307-309, 109 Cal.Rptr.2d 836 , 27 P.3d 726 ; People v. Scott (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1188 , 1208-1210, 65 Cal.Rptr.2d 240 , 939 P.2d 354 (Scott ); People v. Diaz (1992) 3 Cal.4th 495 , 570-571, 11 Cal.Rptr.2d 353 , 834 P.2d 1171 (Diaz ); People v. Robertson (1989) 48 Cal.3d 18 , 37-38, 255 Cal.Rptr. 631 2018(See Sivongxxay, supra, 3 Cal.5th at pp. 167-168, 174, 189-190 ; People v. Cunningham (2015) 61 Cal.4th 609 , 636-637, 189 Cal.Rptr.3d 737 , 352 P.3d 318 (Cunningham ); People v. Weaver (2012) 53 Cal.4th 1056 , 1070-1071, 139 Cal.Rptr.3d 355 , 273 P.3d 546 (Weaver ); Collins, supra, 26 Cal.4th at pp. 307-309, 109 Cal.Rptr.2d 836 , 27 P.3d 726 ; People v. Scott (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1188 , 1208-1210, 65 Cal.Rptr.2d 240 , 939 P.2d 354 (Scott ); People v. Diaz (1992) 3 Cal.4th 495 , 570-571, 11 Cal.Rptr.2d 353 , 834 P.2d 1171 (Diaz ); People v. Robertson (1989) 48 Cal.3d 18 , 37-38, 255 Cal.Rptr. 631 | 2 | 2016–2018 |
Sullivan v. Louisiana
green
2 sentences2012In holding that the constitutional violation was “structural,” the court emphasized that the consequences of that error were “ ‘necessarily unquantifiable and indeterminate.’ ” (Id. at p. 150.) Noting the myriad ways that representation might have proceeded had the trial court not erroneously disqualified the defendant’s chosen attorney, the court observed that conducting a harmless error analysis of that error “would be a speculative inquiry into what might have occurred in an alternate universe.” (Ibid.) The high court had relied on similar reasoning in Sullivan v. Louisiana (1993) 508 U.S. 2012In holding that the constitutional violation was “structural,” the court emphasized that the consequences of that error were “ ‘necessarily unquantifiable and indeterminate.’ ” (Id. at p. 150.) Noting the myriad ways that representation might have proceeded had the trial court not erroneously disqualified the defendant’s chosen attorney, the court observed that conducting a harmless error analysis of that error “would be a speculative inquiry into what might have occurred in an alternate universe.” (Ibid.) The high court had relied on similar reasoning in Sullivan v. Louisiana (1993) 508 U.S. | 2 | 1994–2012 |
People v. Harris
green
2 sentences1992Appellant clearly understood that the full consequence of his waiver would be to deny him any custody credit for time spent at the ranch. 4 In People v. Harris (1991) 227 Cal.App.3d 1223 , the Second Appellate District recognized that the defendant could knowingly and intelligently waive custody credit already accrued. 1992Appellant clearly understood that the full consequence of his waiver would be to deny him any custody credit for time spent at the ranch. [4] In People v. Harris (1991) 227 Cal. App.3d 1223 , the Second Appellate District recognized that the defendant could knowingly and intelligently waive custody credit already accrued. | 2 | 1992–1992 |
People v. Garcia
green
1 sentence2025(See People v. Garcia (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 1422, 1429 .) Because it is unnecessary for us to decide the question, we will nevertheless assume without deciding that the reasoning in Bigelow, Crandell, and Morelos applies here. 24 “A defendant seeking appointment of advisory counsel must make a showing of need and the decision to grant or deny the request rests in the sound discretion of the trial court. | 1 | 2025–2025 |
| Health Net of California, Inc. v. Department of Health Services green | 1 | 2025–2025 |
People v. Bigelow
green
1 sentence2025If the failure to appoint counsel would not be an abuse of discretion, the consequences of the error are properly assessed by employing the Watson harmless error standard.” (People v. Morelos (2022) 13 Cal.5th 722, 738 (Morelos) [cleaned up], citing People v. Crandell (1988) 46 Cal.3d 833, 861 (Crandell) and People v. Bigelow (1984) 37 Cal.3d 731 , 742–746 (Bigelow); People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 (Watson).) We acknowledge that our court previously declined to extend Bigelow’s reasoning regarding advisory counsel to a non-capital case. | 1 | 2025–2025 |
| Byram v. Superior Ct. of Sacramento Cty. green | 1 | 2024–2024 |
| Tyler v. Norton green | 1 | 2024–2024 |
| Glogau v. Hagan green | 1 | 2024–2024 |
| Oakes v. McCarthy Co. green | 1 | 2024–2024 |
| People v. Davis green | 1 | 2023–2023 |
| Stock v. Meek green | 1 | 2021–2021 |
| Zimmerman v. Industrial Accident Commission neutral | 1 | 2021–2021 |
| In Re Jackson W. green | 1 | 2020–2020 |
| In Re SD green | 1 | 2020–2020 |
| People v. Noriega green | 1 | 2017–2017 |
| People v. Bloom green | 1 | 2017–2017 |
| People v. Conners green | 1 | 2017–2017 |
| Dyna-Med, Inc. v. Fair Employment & Housing Commission red | 1 | 2017–2017 |
| People v. Nance green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| People v. Knight green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| Del Real v. City of Riverside green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| People v. Ernst green | 1 | 2013–2013 |
| Cage v. Louisiana green | 1 | 2012–2012 |
| State v. Peteja green | 1 | 2012–2012 |
| In Re CT green | 1 | 2011–2011 |
| In Re Miguel E. green | 1 | 2011–2011 |
| Ronald Skipworth v. United States green | 1 | 2010–2010 |
| Simmons v. United States green | 1 | 2007–2007 |
| People v. Harris green | 1 | 2003–2003 |
| People v. Ambrose green | 1 | 2003–2003 |
| People v. Butler green | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.