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15 Vermont opinions name it 1 courts 1848–2017 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Vermont courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Pollardgreen2 sentences2013Citing State v. Pollard, 163 Vt. 199, 206 (1995), defendant asserts that the court must first be satisfied that the defendant is competent to waive counsel, and if so, the court must determine if the waiver is made knowingly with full awareness of the consequences of the waiver. 2005A defendant may waive his right to counsel if he is mentally competent and does so “knowingly, with full awareness of the consequences of the waiver.” State v. Pollard, 163 Vt. 199, 206 , 657 A.2d 185, 190 (1995). | 2 | 2 |
State v. Beangreen2 sentences2017See Gilman , 173 Vt. at 117 , 787 A.2d at 1244 (holding that suppression was appropriate when "[n]oncompliance with the statute produced exactly the situation the Legislature sought to avoid"); State v. Bean , 163 Vt. 457 , 465, 658 A.2d 940 , 946 (1995) (holding that suppression was appropriate when "the consequences of the violation are exactly what the rule was intended to prevent."). 2017See Gilman , 173 Vt. at 117 , 787 A.2d at 1244 (holding that suppression was appropriate when "[n]oncompliance with the statute produced exactly the situation the Legislature sought to avoid"); State v. Bean , 163 Vt. 457 , 465, 658 A.2d 940 , 946 (1995) (holding that suppression was appropriate when "the consequences of the violation are exactly what the rule was intended to prevent."). | 1 | 2 |
State v. Gilmangreen2 sentences2017See Gilman , 173 Vt. at 117 , 787 A.2d at 1244 (holding that suppression was appropriate when "[n]oncompliance with the statute produced exactly the situation the Legislature sought to avoid"); State v. Bean , 163 Vt. 457 , 465, 658 A.2d 940 , 946 (1995) (holding that suppression was appropriate when "the consequences of the violation are exactly what the rule was intended to prevent."). 2017See Gilman , 173 Vt. at 117 , 787 A.2d at 1244 (holding that suppression was appropriate when "[n]oncompliance with the statute produced exactly the situation the Legislature sought to avoid"); State v. Bean , 163 Vt. 457 , 465, 658 A.2d 940 , 946 (1995) (holding that suppression was appropriate when "the consequences of the violation are exactly what the rule was intended to prevent."). | 1 | 1 |
Edwards v. Arizonagreen1 sentence2011The State was required'to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that defendant’s waiver was voluntary, and that it constituted “a knowing and intelligent relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege, a matter which depends in each case upon the particular facts and circumstances surrounding that case, including the background, experience, and conduct of the accused.” Edwards, 451 U.S. at 482 (quotations omitted); State v. Ives, 162 Vt. 131, 134 , 648 A.2d 129, 131 (1994) (identifying *105 State’s burden of proof); see also 13 V.S.A. § 5237 (providing that waiver of rights is | 1 | 1 |
State v. Ivesgreen2 sentences2011The State was required'to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that defendant’s waiver was voluntary, and that it constituted “a knowing and intelligent relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege, a matter which depends in each case upon the particular facts and circumstances surrounding that case, including the background, experience, and conduct of the accused.” Edwards, 451 U.S. at 482 (quotations omitted); State v. Ives, 162 Vt. 131, 134 , 648 A.2d 129, 131 (1994) (identifying *105 State’s burden of proof); see also 13 V.S.A. § 5237 (providing that waiver of rights is 2011The State was required'to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that defendant’s waiver was voluntary, and that it constituted “a knowing and intelligent relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege, a matter which depends in each case upon the particular facts and circumstances surrounding that case, including the background, experience, and conduct of the accused.” Edwards, 451 U.S. at 482 (quotations omitted); State v. Ives, 162 Vt. 131, 134 , 648 A.2d 129, 131 (1994) (identifying *105 State’s burden of proof); see also 13 V.S.A. § 5237 (providing that waiver of rights is | 1 | 1 |
Woodson v. Stategreen1 sentence2005See, e.g., People v. Todd, 687 N.E.2d 998, 1008 (Ill. 1997) (“The question of whether a jury waiver may be withdrawn rests within the discretion of the trial court unless the circumstances indicate the defendant was unaware of the consequences of the waiver.” (quotation omitted)); Woodson v. State, 501 N.E.2d 409, 411 (Ind. 1986) (“Once appellant had effectively waived his right to trial by jury, the withdrawal of the waiver rested within the sound discretion of the trial court.”); State v. Fisher, 891 P.2d 1065, 1069 (Kan. 1995) (noting that a knowing waiver of right to jury trial “cannot aft | 1 | 1 |
People v. Toddgreen1 sentence2005See, e.g., People v. Todd, 687 N.E.2d 998, 1008 (Ill. 1997) (“The question of whether a jury waiver may be withdrawn rests within the discretion of the trial court unless the circumstances indicate the defendant was unaware of the consequences of the waiver.” (quotation omitted)); Woodson v. State, 501 N.E.2d 409, 411 (Ind. 1986) (“Once appellant had effectively waived his right to trial by jury, the withdrawal of the waiver rested within the sound discretion of the trial court.”); State v. Fisher, 891 P.2d 1065, 1069 (Kan. 1995) (noting that a knowing waiver of right to jury trial “cannot aft | 1 | 1 |
State v. Fishergreen1 sentence2005See, e.g., People v. Todd, 687 N.E.2d 998, 1008 (Ill. 1997) (“The question of whether a jury waiver may be withdrawn rests within the discretion of the trial court unless the circumstances indicate the defendant was unaware of the consequences of the waiver.” (quotation omitted)); Woodson v. State, 501 N.E.2d 409, 411 (Ind. 1986) (“Once appellant had effectively waived his right to trial by jury, the withdrawal of the waiver rested within the sound discretion of the trial court.”); State v. Fisher, 891 P.2d 1065, 1069 (Kan. 1995) (noting that a knowing waiver of right to jury trial “cannot aft | 1 | 1 |
State v. Merrillgreen2 sentences2005We have explained that waiver of counsel may not be presumed from a silent record and the best practice is for the trial court to “conduct sufficient inquiry into the defendant’s experience, motives, and understanding of what he is undertaking to determine the quality of his purported waiver, and then to provide a clear explanation of the adverse consequences of pro se representation.” State v. Merrill, 155 Vt. 422, 425 , 584 A.2d 1129, 1131 (1990) (citation omitted). 2005We have explained that waiver of counsel may not be presumed from a silent record and the best practice is for the trial court to “conduct sufficient inquiry into the defendant’s experience, motives, and understanding of what he is undertaking to determine the quality of his purported waiver, and then to provide a clear explanation of the adverse consequences of pro se representation.” State v. Merrill, 155 Vt. 422, 425 , 584 A.2d 1129, 1131 (1990) (citation omitted). | 1 | 1 |
Cason v. Stategreen1 sentence2005See, e.g., People v. Todd, 687 N.E.2d 998, 1008 (Ill. 1997) (“The question of whether a jury waiver may be withdrawn rests within the discretion of the trial court unless the circumstances indicate the defendant was unaware of the consequences of the waiver.” (quotation omitted)); Woodson v. State, 501 N.E.2d 409, 411 (Ind. 1986) (“Once appellant had effectively waived his right to trial by jury, the withdrawal of the waiver rested within the sound discretion of the trial court.”); State v. Fisher, 891 P.2d 1065, 1069 (Kan. 1995) (noting that a knowing waiver of right to jury trial “cannot aft | 1 | 1 |
State v. Conngreen2 sentences1995In State v. Conn, 152 Vt. 99, 103 , 565 A.2d 246, 248 (1989), we determined that an on-the-record colloquy between a defendant and the trial court is desirable to assure that defendant's jury trial waiver is voluntary, knowing and intelligent, and we quoted at length from a decision of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, which had required such a colloquy. 1995In State v. Conn, 152 Vt. 99, 103 , 565 A.2d 246, 248 (1989), we determined that an on-the-record colloquy between a defendant and the trial court is desirable to assure that defendant's jury trial waiver is voluntary, knowing and intelligent, and we quoted at length from a decision of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, which had required such a colloquy. | 1 | 1 |
Valley Acceptance Corp. v. Glasbygreen1 sentence1995See Usury and Consumer Credit Regulation, supra, § 9.2.1., at 215; see also Glasby, 337 S.E.2d at 295 (small loans act is remedial in nature and must be liberally construed to advance remedy for which it was promulgated). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Busheygreen2 sentences1994Id. at 1268. 1994Id. at 1268. | 1 | 1 |
Patterson v. Illinoisgreen2 sentences1994See Patterson v. Illinois, 487 U.S. 285, 292-93 (1988). 1994See Patterson v. Illinois, 487 U.S. 285, 292-93 , 108 S.Ct. 2389, 2394-95 , 101 L.Ed.2d 261 (1988). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Vermont. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
S.B. v. A.C.C.
green
2 sentences2017The New York Court of Appeals recently recognized the negative impact on children of a doctrine that entirely foreclosed nonbiological and nonadoptive parents from seeking parental rights, even when they had planned with a partner to bring a child into the family, noting that "[a] growing body of social science reveals the trauma children suffer as a result of separation from a primary attachment figure ... regardless of that figure's biological or adoptive ties to the children." Brooke S.B. v. Elizabeth A.C.C. , 28 N.Y.3d 1 , 39 N.Y.S.3d 89 , 61 N.E.3d 488 , 499 (2016). 2017The New York Court of Appeals recently recognized the negative impact on children of a doctrine that entirely foreclosed nonbiological and nonadoptive parents from seeking parental rights, even when they had planned with a partner to bring a child into the family, noting that "[a] growing body of social science reveals the trauma children suffer as a result of separation from a primary attachment figure ... regardless of that figure's biological or adoptive ties to the children." Brooke S.B. v. Elizabeth A.C.C. , 28 N.Y.3d 1 , 39 N.Y.S.3d 89 , 61 N.E.3d 488 , 499 (2016). | 1 | 2017–2017 |
State v. Nicasio
green
2 sentences1995The rationale applies to “any statement obtained otherwise than by statutory compliance.” Nicasio, 136 Vt. at 166 , 385 A.2d at 1099 . ' -In essence, the State asks that we not fashion remedy to redress the violation of the rule, even though the consequences of the violation are exactly what the rule was intended to prevent. 1995The rationale applies to “any statement obtained otherwise than by statutory compliance.” Nicasio, 136 Vt. at 166 , 385 A.2d at 1099 . ' -In essence, the State asks that we not fashion remedy to redress the violation of the rule, even though the consequences of the violation are exactly what the rule was intended to prevent. | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Godinez v. Moran
green
2 sentences1995Godinez, 509 U.S. at 400 -01 & n.12, 113 S. Ct. at 2687 & n.12. 1995Godinez , ___ U.S. at ___ & n. 12, 113 S.Ct. at 2687 & n. 12. | 1 | 1995–1995 |
State v. Caron
green
2 sentences1995We construed § 5237 in State v. Caron, 155 Vt. 492 , 586 A.2d 1127 (1990), where we held that a waiver of the right to counsel under Miranda must be in a writing created by the defendant's own actions. 1995We construed § 5237 in State v. Caron, 155 Vt. 492 , 586 A.2d 1127 (1990), where we held that a waiver of the right to counsel under Miranda must be in a writing created by the defendant's own actions. | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Faretta v. California
green
2 sentences1990There, the Court characterized the defendant as “literate, competent, and understanding and ... voluntarily exercising his informed free will” and found that “Faretta clearly and unequivocally declared to the trial judge that he wanted to represent himself and did not want counsel.” 422 U.S. at 835 . 1990There, the Court characterized the defendant as "literate, competent, and understanding and ... voluntarily exercising his informed free will" and found that "Faretta clearly and unequivocally declared to the trial judge that he wanted to represent himself and did not want counsel." 422 U.S. at 835 , 95 S.Ct. at 2541 . | 1 | 1990–1990 |
Clark v. Marsiglia
green
1 sentence1848In Clark v. Marsiglia, 1 Denio 317 , it was held, that the employer, in a contract for labor, had the power to stop the completion of it, if he chose, — subjecting himself thereby to the consequences of a violation of his contract; and that the workman, after notice to quit work, had not the right to continue his labor and claim pay for it. | 1 | 1848–1848 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.