consequences error in District of Columbia

2015See Hairston, supra, 905 A.2d at 782 (assessing the effectiveness and adequacy of a Miranda warning — in spite of pre-Miranda interactions — based on the totality bf circumstances, looking to see whether appellant made a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary choice to waive his rights); Seibert, supra, 542 U.S. at 613-14 , 124 S.Ct. 2601 (asking whether the tactic at issue was “likely to mislead and deprive a defendant of knowledge essential to his ability to understand the nature of his rights and the consequences of abandoning them”); Gonzalez-Lauzan, supra, 437 F.3d at 1139 (upholding the val

2015See Hairston, supra, 905 A.2d at 782 (assessing the effectiveness and adequacy of a Miranda warning — in spite of pre-Miranda interactions — based on the totality of circumstances, looking to see whether appellant made a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary choice to waive his rights); 15 Seibert, supra, 542 U.S. at 613–14 (asking whether the tactic at issue was “likely to mislead and deprive a defendant of knowledge essential to his ability to understand the nature of his rights and the consequences of abandoning them”); Gonzalez-Lauzan, supra, 437 F.3d at 1139 (upholding the validity of a Mir

2015See Hairston, supra, 905 A.2d at 782 (assessing the effectiveness and adequacy of a Miranda warning — in spite of pre-Miranda interactions — based on the totality bf circumstances, looking to see whether appellant made a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary choice to waive his rights); Seibert, supra, 542 U.S. at 613-14 , 124 S.Ct. 2601 (asking whether the tactic at issue was “likely to mislead and deprive a defendant of knowledge essential to his ability to understand the nature of his rights and the consequences of abandoning them”); Gonzalez-Lauzan, supra, 437 F.3d at 1139 (upholding the val

2015See Hairston, supra, 905 A.2d at 782 (assessing the effectiveness and adequacy of a Miranda warning — in spite of pre-Miranda interactions — based on the totality bf circumstances, looking to see whether appellant made a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary choice to waive his rights); Seibert, supra, 542 U.S. at 613-14 , 124 S.Ct. 2601 (asking whether the tactic at issue was “likely to mislead and deprive a defendant of knowledge essential to his ability to understand the nature of his rights and the consequences of abandoning them”); Gonzalez-Lauzan, supra, 437 F.3d at 1139 (upholding the val

2015See Hairston, supra, 905 A.2d at 782 (assessing the effectiveness and adequacy of a Miranda warning — in spite of pre-Miranda interactions — based on the totality bf circumstances, looking to see whether appellant made a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary choice to waive his rights); Seibert, supra, 542 U.S. at 613-14 , 124 S.Ct. 2601 (asking whether the tactic at issue was “likely to mislead and deprive a defendant of knowledge essential to his ability to understand the nature of his rights and the consequences of abandoning them”); Gonzalez-Lauzan, supra, 437 F.3d at 1139 (upholding the val

2015See Hairston, supra, 905 A.2d at 782 (assessing the effectiveness and adequacy of a Miranda warning — in spite of pre-Miranda interactions — based on the totality of circumstances, looking to see whether appellant made a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary choice to waive his rights); 15 Seibert, supra, 542 U.S. at 613–14 (asking whether the tactic at issue was “likely to mislead and deprive a defendant of knowledge essential to his ability to understand the nature of his rights and the consequences of abandoning them”); Gonzalez-Lauzan, supra, 437 F.3d at 1139 (upholding the validity of a Mir

2014See, e.g., Smith v. United States, 356 A.2d 650 , 652 & n.6 (D.C. 1976) (noting that remand was necessary because, while the court passed no judgment on whether any challenge under § 23-111 would be successful, appellate counsel at least represented that there was a basis for challenging the prior conviction). 29 Rather, appellant hangs his hat on the notion that remand is warranted simply because “[t]his [c]ourt has never tolerated a trial court’s failure to comply with its duty to inform a defendant of the consequences of waiver under § 23-111 (b),” and that the trial court’s failure to comp

1994Id. at 210 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).

1994Id. at 210 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).

1992The court in United States v. Davis, 199 U.S.App.D.C. 95, 112 , 617 F.2d 677, 694 (1979) agreed that officers cannot be required "to describe in minute detail all matters surrounding how they have obtained statements, for such a requirement would make the process of applying for a search warrant a cumbersome procedure inimical to effective law enforcement." 4 .

1992The court in United States v. Davis, 199 U.S.App.D.C. 95, 112 , 617 F.2d 677, 694 (1979) agreed that officers cannot be required "to describe in minute detail all matters surrounding how they have obtained statements, for such a requirement would make the process of applying for a search warrant a cumbersome procedure inimical to effective law enforcement." 4 .

1992See, e.g., Ross v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 81, 91 , 108 S.Ct. 2273, 2280 , 101 L.Ed.2d 80 (1988).” Allen v. United States, 603 A.2d 1219, 1228 (D.C.1992) (en banc). 12 Hence, not every error at a trial warrants a reversal, and the quest in every appeal in which some error has been found is to determine whether, in the context of the record of the trial, and by what standard that error should be deemed “reversible error.” In general, it may be said that an appellate court may select from four articulated standards, depending upon the nature of the error and the presence or absence of an objection at

1992See, e.g., Ross v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 81, 91 , 108 S.Ct. 2273, 2280 , 101 L.Ed.2d 80 (1988).” Allen v. United States, 603 A.2d 1219, 1228 (D.C.1992) (en banc). 12 Hence, not every error at a trial warrants a reversal, and the quest in every appeal in which some error has been found is to determine whether, in the context of the record of the trial, and by what standard that error should be deemed “reversible error.” In general, it may be said that an appellate court may select from four articulated standards, depending upon the nature of the error and the presence or absence of an objection at

1992See, e.g., Ross v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 81, 91 , 108 S.Ct. 2273, 2280 , 101 L.Ed.2d 80 (1988).” Allen v. United States, 603 A.2d 1219, 1228 (D.C.1992) (en banc). 12 Hence, not every error at a trial warrants a reversal, and the quest in every appeal in which some error has been found is to determine whether, in the context of the record of the trial, and by what standard that error should be deemed “reversible error.” In general, it may be said that an appellate court may select from four articulated standards, depending upon the nature of the error and the presence or absence of an objection at

1987If such admission of this confession denied a constitutional right to defendant the error requires reversal"); Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 541 , 18 S.Ct. 183, 186 , 42 L.Ed. 568 (1897) ("If [a confession is] found to have been illegally admitted, reversible error will result, since the prosecution cannot on the one hand offer evidence to prove guilt, and which by the very offer is vouched for as tending to that end, and on the other hand for the purpose of avoiding the consequences of the error caused by its wrongful admission, be heard to assert that the matter offered as a confessio

1987If such admission of this confession denied a constitutional right to defendant the error requires reversal"); Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 541 , 18 S.Ct. 183, 186 , 42 L.Ed. 568 (1897) (“If [a confession is] found to have been illegally admitted, reversible error will result, since the prosecution cannot on the one hand offer evidence to prove guilt, and which by the very offer is vouched for as tending to that end, and on the other hand for the purpose of avoiding the consequences of the error caused by its wrongful admission, be heard to assert that the matter offered as a confessio

1982But “it is ... well settled that where legal rights have been invaded, and a federal statute provides for a general right to sue for such invasion, federal courts may use any available remedy to make good the wrong done.” [Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. at 396 [91 S.Ct. at 2004] (quoting Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 684 [ 66 S.Ct. 773, 777 , 90 L.Ed. 939 ] (1964) (footnote omitted)).] In Bivens, the Supreme Court held that in the absence of an explicit congressional declaration confining them to a particular remedy, petitioners who had been injur

1982But “it is ... well settled that where legal rights have been invaded, and a federal statute provides for a general right to sue for such invasion, federal courts may use any available remedy to make good the wrong done.” [Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. at 396 [91 S.Ct. at 2004] (quoting Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 684 [ 66 S.Ct. 773, 777 , 90 L.Ed. 939 ] (1964) (footnote omitted)).] In Bivens, the Supreme Court held that in the absence of an explicit congressional declaration confining them to a particular remedy, petitioners who had been injur

1982But “it is ... well settled that where legal rights have been invaded, and a federal statute provides for a general right to sue for such invasion, federal courts may use any available remedy to make good the wrong done.” [Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. at 396 [91 S.Ct. at 2004] (quoting Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 684 [ 66 S.Ct. 773, 777 , 90 L.Ed. 939 ] (1964) (footnote omitted)).] In Bivens, the Supreme Court held that in the absence of an explicit congressional declaration confining them to a particular remedy, petitioners who had been injur

1982But “it is ... well settled that where legal rights have been invaded, and a federal statute provides for a general right to sue for such invasion, federal courts may use any available remedy to make good the wrong done.” [Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. at 396 [91 S.Ct. at 2004] (quoting Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 684 [ 66 S.Ct. 773, 777 , 90 L.Ed. 939 ] (1964) (footnote omitted)).] In Bivens, the Supreme Court held that in the absence of an explicit congressional declaration confining them to a particular remedy, petitioners who had been injur