foundational requirement in New Mexico

2024Cf. Martinez, 2007-NMSC-025, ¶ 23 (holding that this foundational requirement was satisfied by the hearsay testimony that a sticker on the breathalyzer instrument indicated that it was certified at the time of the defendant’s BAT).

2023See Martinez, 2007-NMSC-025, ¶ 23 (affirming that the foundational requirement for establishing certification of a breathalyzer is sufficiently established by an officer’s testimony that “he saw an SLD sticker on the machine indicating that it was certified by SLD when he conducted the test”).

2007See 7.33.2.13 NMAC (pertaining to certification of equipment operators); 7.33.2.14 NMAC (pertaining to certification of key operators); 7.33.2.7(N), (0) NMAC (relating to certified key operators and certified operators); Garza v. State Taxation & Revenue Dep’t, 2004-NMCA-061, ¶ 15 , 135 N.M. 673 , 92 P.3d 685 (stating that, in administrative breath test proceedings, to satisfy the foundational requirement of showing annual SLD certification, “the State could satisfy its threshold showing by affidavit, certification by an appropriately qualified witness, or proof of annual certification records

2007See 7.33.2.13 NMAC (pertaining to certification of equipment operators); 7.33.2.14 NMAC (pertaining to certification of key operators); 7.33.2.7(N), (0) NMAC (relating to certified key operators and certified operators); Garza v. State Taxation & Revenue Dep’t, 2004-NMCA-061, ¶ 15 , 135 N.M. 673 , 92 P.3d 685 (stating that, in administrative breath test proceedings, to satisfy the foundational requirement of showing annual SLD certification, “the State could satisfy its threshold showing by affidavit, certification by an appropriately qualified witness, or proof of annual certification records

2024See State v. Clark, 1999- 7 NMSC-035, ¶ 5, 128 N.M. 119 , 990 P.2d 793 (“[A] juror is properly excludable for 8 cause if the juror’s views would prevent or substantially impair the performance of 9 his or her duties as a juror in accordance with his or her instructions and his or her 10 oath.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). 11 {48} Not only was the question proper, but the district court had adequate reason 12 to strike Juror based on her answer.

2024See State v. Clark, 1999- 7 NMSC-035, ¶ 5, 128 N.M. 119 , 990 P.2d 793 (“[A] juror is properly excludable for 8 cause if the juror’s views would prevent or substantially impair the performance of 9 his or her duties as a juror in accordance with his or her instructions and his or her 10 oath.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). 11 {48} Not only was the question proper, but the district court had adequate reason 12 to strike Juror based on her answer.

2013Id. at 469; 936 A.2d at 810 ; see also Gardner v. United States, 999 A.2d 55, 61 (D.C. 2010) (stating that Veney concluded that the foundational test results were offered as substantive evidence because the testifying expert referred to them). {62} Veney and Roberts are directly on point.

2012Id. at 469; 936 A.2d at 810 ; see also Gardner v. United States, 999 A.2d 55, 61 (D.C. 2010) (stating that Veney concluded that the foundational test results were offered as substantive evidence because the testifying expert referred to them). {62} Veney and Roberts are directly on point.

2012In Crawford, the initial case that started a shift in modern Confrontation Clause jurisprudence, the United States Supreme Court established a new test for evaluating Sixth Amendment claims, only admitting “testimonial” statements of a witness not present at trial “where the declarant is unavailable, and only where the defendant has had a prior opportunity to cross-examine [the declarant].” 541 U.S. at59, 61-62 (overruling the decision in Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980) which held that evidence with “particularized guarantees of trustworthiness” was admissible notwithstanding the Confr

2012In Crawford, the initial case that started a shift in modern Confrontation Clause jurisprudence, the United States Supreme Court established a new test for evaluating Sixth Amendment claims, only admitting “testimonial” statements of a witness not present at trial “where the declarant is unavailable, and only where the defendant has had a prior opportunity to cross-examine [the declarant].” 541 U.S. at 59, 61-62 (overruling the decision in Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980) which held that evidence with “particularized guarantees of trustworthiness” was admissible notwithstanding the Conf

2016This Court reached a similar conclusion in Anaya, 2012-NMCA-094, ¶ 22 , stating, “[i]f [a d]efendant desires to put the statutorily accepted scientific process on trial, then he must do so by calling an expert witness to testify pursuant to Rule 11-702 NMRA and properly raise a foundational challenge to the SLD’s scientific procedure for establishing the reliability of the [machine].” Defendants have raised such challenges in these cases.1 {15} Unlike some jurisdictions, our appellate courts do not interpret the Implied Consent 1 In its answer brief, the State argues without citation to legal

2016This Court reached a similar conclusion in Anaya, 2012-NMCA-094, ¶ 22 , stating, “[i]f [a d]efendant desires to put the statutorily accepted scientific process on trial, then he must do so by calling an expert witness to testify pursuant to Rule 11-702 NMRA and properly raise a foundational challenge to the SLD’s scientific procedure for establishing the reliability of the [machine].” Defendants have raised such challenges in these cases.1 {15} Unlike some jurisdictions, our appellate courts do not interpret the Implied Consent 1 In its answer brief, the State argues without citation to legal

2007See Smith, 1999-NMCA-154, ¶ 11 , 128 N.M. 467 , 994 P.2d 47 (holding that the foundational requirement of calibration was satisfied when the officer conducting the test testified as to his experience and “that the log attached to the machine indicated that it had been calibrated within the previous seven days”). {22} Martinez argues that Rule 11-104(B) should apply because, according to him, Officer Sandoval must have had personal knowledge of the certification process.

2007See Smith, 1999-NMCA-154, ¶ 11 , 128 N.M. 467 , 994 P.2d 47 (holding that the foundational requirement of calibration was satisfied when the officer conducting the test testified as to his experience and “that the log attached to the machine indicated that it had been calibrated within the previous seven days”). {22} Martinez argues that Rule 11-104(B) should apply because, according to him, Officer Sandoval must have had personal knowledge of the certification process.

2022See Torrez, 2009-NMSC-029, ¶ 22 (providing that, while both foundational prerequisites consider the witness’s skills, experiences, training, and education, “the two inquiries are not identical”).

2020We held that, while the regulation’s two-hour testing requirement was accuracy-ensuring, and therefore would be a foundational requirement for admission of blood-alcohol test results in evidence, the amendment to the ICA in Section 66-8-110(E) superseded the regulation by permitting the introduction of results of tests administered after three hours as “evidence of the alcohol concentration in the person’s blood or breath at the time of the test,” with “the trier of fact” to “determine what weight to give the test result.” Bowden, 2010-NMCA-070, ¶¶ 7-11 (internal quotation marks and citation o

2016Compare King, 2012-NMCA-119, ¶ 16 (“Nothing in ... the Implied Consent Act, or the SLD regulations indicates that the Legislature intended that the results produced by a machine approved by the SLD that has been operated and maintained in accordance with the SLD regulations [are] conclusively reliable.”), with State v. Vega, 465 N.E.2d 1303, 1307 (Ohio 1984) (“The judiciary must recognize the necessary legislative determination that breath tests, properly conducted, are reliable irrespective that not all experts wholly agree and that the common law foundational evidence has, for admissibility,

2016See Rule 11-901(A) NMRA (governing authentication); see, e.g., State v. 3 Henderson, 1983-NMCA-094 , ¶¶ 7, 12, 100 N.M. 260 , 669 P.2d 736 (holding that 4 photographic evidence generated by an ATM machine was properly authenticated 5 where an officer testified that she had requested the film be developed for a specific 6 time and date); see generally State v. Martinez, 2007-NMSC-025, ¶ 21 , 141 N.M. 713 , 7 160 P.3d 894 (“[I]n considering whether a foundational requirement has been met . 8 . . the trial court must satisfy itself by a preponderance of the evidence . . . when 9 making its decisi

2016See Rule 11-901(A) NMRA (governing authentication); see, e.g., State v. 3 Henderson, 1983-NMCA-094 , ¶¶ 7, 12, 100 N.M. 260 , 669 P.2d 736 (holding that 4 photographic evidence generated by an ATM machine was properly authenticated 5 where an officer testified that she had requested the film be developed for a specific 6 time and date); see generally State v. Martinez, 2007-NMSC-025, ¶ 21 , 141 N.M. 713 , 7 160 P.3d 894 (“[I]n considering whether a foundational requirement has been met . 8 . . the trial court must satisfy itself by a preponderance of the evidence . . . when 9 making its decisi

2016Compare King, 2012-NMCA-119, ¶ 16 (“Nothing in ... the Implied Consent Act, or the SLD regulations indicates that the Legislature intended that the results produced by a machine approved by the SLD that has been operated and maintained in accordance with the SLD regulations [are] conclusively reliable.”), with State v. Vega, 465 N.E.2d 1303, 1307 (Ohio 1984) (“The judiciary must recognize the necessary legislative determination that breath tests, properly conducted, are reliable irrespective that not all experts wholly agree and that the common law foundational evidence has, for admissibility,

2012In Crawford, the initial case that started a shift in modern Confrontation Clause jurisprudence, the United States Supreme Court established a new test for evaluating Sixth Amendment claims, only admitting “testimonial” statements of a witness not present at trial “where the declarant is unavailable, and only where the defendant has had a prior opportunity to cross-examine [the declarant].” 541 U.S. at 59, 61-62 (overruling the decision in Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980) which held that evidence with “particularized guarantees of trustworthiness” was admissible notwithstanding the Conf

2010State v. Case, 100 N.M. 714, 718 , 676 P.2d 241, 245 (1984) (holding that the lower court did not abuse its discretion by excluding an absent declarant’s statement of identification after a fleeting view of a person, where the testifying witness was unable to verify the accuracy of the identification).

2010State v. Case, 100 N.M. 714, 718 , 676 P.2d 241, 245 (1984) (holding that the lower court did not abuse its discretion by excluding an absent declarant’s statement of identification after a fleeting view of a person, where the testifying witness was unable to verify the accuracy of the identification).

2004See generally Santillanes v. State, 115 N.M. 215, 223 , 849 P.2d 358, 366 (1993) (“The issue of retroactive effect arises only when a court’s decision overturns prior case law or makes new law when law enforcement officials have relied on the prior state of the law.”).

2004See generally Santillanes v. State, 115 N.M. 215, 223 , 849 P.2d 358, 366 (1993) (“The issue of retroactive effect arises only when a court’s decision overturns prior case law or makes new law when law enforcement officials have relied on the prior state of the law.”).

2004See Bransford v. State Taxation & Revenue Dep't, 1998-NMCA-077 , 125 N.M. 285 , 960 P.2d 827 .

2004See Bransford v. State Taxation & Revenue Dep't, 1998-NMCA-077 , 125 N.M. 285 , 960 P.2d 827 .

2004See Gardner, 1998-NMCA-160, ¶ 9 , 126 N.M. 125 , 967 P.2d 465 . {12} As noted in Onsurez, “the foundational requirements cited by the State remain viable, but the regulations require more.” Onsurez, 2002-NMCA-082, ¶ 13 , 132 N.M. 485 , 51 P.3d 528 .

2004See Gardner, 1998-NMCA-160, ¶ 9 , 126 N.M. 125 , 967 P.2d 465 . {12} As noted in Onsurez, “the foundational requirements cited by the State remain viable, but the regulations require more.” Onsurez, 2002-NMCA-082, ¶ 13 , 132 N.M. 485 , 51 P.3d 528 .

2003See State v. Woodward, 121 N.M. 1, 12 , 908 P.2d 231, 242 (1995) (concluding that the refusal to admit cumulative evidence was not an abuse of discretion).

2003See State v. Woodward, 121 N.M. 1, 12 , 908 P.2d 231, 242 (1995) (concluding that the refusal to admit cumulative evidence was not an abuse of discretion).