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6 Maine opinions name it 1 courts 1978–2020 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Maine courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Department of Homeland Security v. Regents of Univ. of Cal.green1 sentence2020See Zegel, 2004 ME 31, ¶ 24 , 843 A.2d 18 ; see also Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 591 U.S. ___ , 140 S. Ct. 1891, 1907 (2020) (“It is a foundational principle of administrative law that judicial review of agency action is limited to the grounds that the agency invoked when it took the action. | 1 | 1 |
Zegel v. Board of Social Worker Licensuregreen2 sentences2020See Zegel, 2004 ME 31, ¶ 24 , 843 A.2d 18 ; see also Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 591 U.S. ___ , 140 S. Ct. 1891, 1907 (2020) (“It is a foundational principle of administrative law that judicial review of agency action is limited to the grounds that the agency invoked when it took the action. 2020See Zegel, 2004 ME 31, ¶ 24 , 843 A.2d 18 ; see also Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 591 U.S. ___ , 140 S. Ct. 1891, 1907 (2020) (“It is a foundational principle of administrative law that judicial review of agency action is limited to the grounds that the agency invoked when it took the action. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Bleylgreen1 sentence2016Id.; State v. Knight, 2002 ME 35, ¶ 10 , 791 A.2d 110 ; State v. Bleyl, 435 A.2d 1349, 1367 (Me.1981). [¶ 9] The rule, which originates in the common law, Fundalewicz, 2012 ME 107 , ¶ 8, 49 A.3d 1277 , prescribes a foundational requirement for the admissibility of evidence of the accused’s statements. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Wallacegreen1 sentence1997State v. Wallace, 431 A.2d 613, 616 (Me.1981). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Hebertgreen1 sentence1987In a case in which a misdemeanor conviction for speeding in violation of 29 M.R.S.A. § 1251 (1978) was challenged on appeal on the ground that a speedometer reading was inadmissible because the prosecution failed to establish the accuracy of the speedometer, we held “that evidence of the accuracy of the speedometer goes only to the weight to be assigned the speed reading and is not a foundational requirement for admission of the speedometer reading into evidence.” State v. Herbert, 437 A.2d 185, 186 (Me.1981). | 1 | 1 |
Payson v. Bombardier, Ltd.green1 sentence1983In Payson v. Bombardier, Ltd., 435 A.2d 411, 413 (Me.1981), this Court held that evidence of absence of similar accidents is relevant on the issues of defective condition, notice, or causation as long as the foundational requirement of substantial similarity of conditions or of an adequate number of situations are met. | 1 | 1 |
Simon v. Town of Kennebunkportgreen1 sentence1983See also Simon v. Town of Kennebunkport, 417 A.2d 982, 984-86 (Me.1980) (discussing other-accident evidence). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Bordeleaugreen2 sentences1978In State v. Bordeleau, 118 Me. 424, 426 , 108 A. 464, 465 (1920), this court elaborated upon the degree of belief of impending death necessary to satisfy the foundational requirement: “[I]t must appear to the presiding justice that at the time of making the statements, the deceased must be conscious of the certainty of approaching speedy death; if any hope of recovery remains, the declarations are inadmissible; nor is it sufficient that the deceased has only the belief that he may ultimately die of his injuries.” 3 . 1978In State v. Bordeleau, 118 Me. 424, 426 , 108 A. 464, 465 (1920), this court elaborated upon the degree of belief of impending death necessary to satisfy the foundational requirement: “[I]t must appear to the presiding justice that at the time of making the statements, the deceased must be conscious of the certainty of approaching speedy death; if any hope of recovery remains, the declarations are inadmissible; nor is it sufficient that the deceased has only the belief that he may ultimately die of his injuries.” 3 . | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Maine. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Knight
green
2 sentences2016Id.; State v. Knight, 2002 ME 35, ¶ 10 , 791 A.2d 110 ; State v. Bleyl, 435 A.2d 1349, 1367 (Me.1981). [¶ 9] The rule, which originates in the common law, Fundalewicz, 2012 ME 107 , ¶ 8, 49 A.3d 1277 , prescribes a foundational requirement for the admissibility of evidence of the accused’s statements. 2016Id.; State v. Knight, 2002 ME 35, ¶ 10 , 791 A.2d 110 ; State v. Bleyl, 435 A.2d 1349, 1367 (Me.1981). [¶ 9] The rule, which originates in the common law, Fundalewicz, 2012 ME 107 , ¶ 8, 49 A.3d 1277 , prescribes a foundational requirement for the admissibility of evidence of the accused’s statements. | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.