foundational doctrine in Colorado

2022See People v. Czemerynski, 786 P.2d 1100, 1109 (Colo. 1990); Quintana, 882 P.2d at 1373–74; Rollins, 892 P.2d at 872–73; People v. Skufca, 176 P.3d 83 , 86–87 (Colo. 2008); People v. Merklin, 80 P.3d 921 , 924–25 (Colo. App. 2003); People v. Thomeczek, 284 P.3d 110 , 114–15 (Colo. App. 2011); People v. Cisneros, 2014 COA 49 , ¶¶ 105–06, 108, 356 P.3d 877, 898 ; People v. Knapp, 2020 COA 107 , ¶¶ 32–34, 44, 487 P.3d 1243 , 1252–53. ¶80 The majority justifies discarding this foundational doctrine by pointing to its inconsistent application and misuse in Colorado’s courts, see Maj. op. ¶ 41, whic

2022See People v. Czemerynski , 786 P.2d 1100, 1109 ( Colo. 1990 ) ; Quintana , 882 P.2d at 1373 -74 ; Rollins , 892 P.2d at 872 -73 ; People v. Skufca , 176 P.3d 83, 86-87 ( Colo. 2008 ) ; People v. Merklin , 80 P.3d 921, 924-25 ( Colo.App. 2003 ) ; People v. Thomeczek , 284 P.3d 110, 114-15 ( Colo.App. 2011 ) ; People v. Cisneros , 2014 COA 49 , ¶¶ 105-06 , 108, 356 P.3d 877 , 898 ; People v. Knapp , 2020 COA 107 , ¶¶ 32-34 , 44, 487 P.3d 1243 , 1252-53 . ¶80 The majority justifies discarding this foundational doctrine by pointing to its inconsistent application and misuse in Colorado's courts ,

2022See People v. Czemerynski, 786 P.2d 1100, 1109 (Colo. 1990); Quintana, 882 P.2d at 1373–74; Rollins, 892 P.2d at 872–73; People v. Skufca, 176 P.3d 83 , 86–87 (Colo. 2008); People v. Merklin, 80 P.3d 921 , 924–25 (Colo. App. 2003); People v. Thomeczek, 284 P.3d 110 , 114–15 (Colo. App. 2011); People v. Cisneros, 2014 COA 49 , ¶¶ 105–06, 108, 356 P.3d 877, 898 ; People v. Knapp, 2020 COA 107 , ¶¶ 32–34, 44, 487 P.3d 1243 , 1252–53. ¶80 The majority justifies discarding this foundational doctrine by pointing to its inconsistent application and misuse in Colorado’s courts, see Maj. op. ¶ 41, whic

2022See People v. Czemerynski , 786 P.2d 1100, 1109 ( Colo. 1990 ) ; Quintana , 882 P.2d at 1373 -74 ; Rollins , 892 P.2d at 872 -73 ; People v. Skufca , 176 P.3d 83, 86-87 ( Colo. 2008 ) ; People v. Merklin , 80 P.3d 921, 924-25 ( Colo.App. 2003 ) ; People v. Thomeczek , 284 P.3d 110, 114-15 ( Colo.App. 2011 ) ; People v. Cisneros , 2014 COA 49 , ¶¶ 105-06 , 108, 356 P.3d 877 , 898 ; People v. Knapp , 2020 COA 107 , ¶¶ 32-34 , 44, 487 P.3d 1243 , 1252-53 . ¶80 The majority justifies discarding this foundational doctrine by pointing to its inconsistent application and misuse in Colorado's courts ,

2022See People v. Czemerynski, 786 P.2d 1100, 1109 (Colo. 1990); Quintana, 882 P.2d at 1373–74; Rollins, 892 P.2d at 872–73; People v. Skufca, 176 P.3d 83 , 86–87 (Colo. 2008); People v. Merklin, 80 P.3d 921 , 924–25 (Colo. App. 2003); People v. Thomeczek, 284 P.3d 110 , 114–15 (Colo. App. 2011); People v. Cisneros, 2014 COA 49 , ¶¶ 105–06, 108, 356 P.3d 877, 898 ; People v. Knapp, 2020 COA 107 , ¶¶ 32–34, 44, 487 P.3d 1243 , 1252–53. ¶80 The majority justifies discarding this foundational doctrine by pointing to its inconsistent application and misuse in Colorado’s courts, see Maj. op. ¶ 41, whic

2022See People v. Czemerynski , 786 P.2d 1100, 1109 ( Colo. 1990 ) ; Quintana , 882 P.2d at 1373 -74 ; Rollins , 892 P.2d at 872 -73 ; People v. Skufca , 176 P.3d 83, 86-87 ( Colo. 2008 ) ; People v. Merklin , 80 P.3d 921, 924-25 ( Colo.App. 2003 ) ; People v. Thomeczek , 284 P.3d 110, 114-15 ( Colo.App. 2011 ) ; People v. Cisneros , 2014 COA 49 , ¶¶ 105-06 , 108, 356 P.3d 877 , 898 ; People v. Knapp , 2020 COA 107 , ¶¶ 32-34 , 44, 487 P.3d 1243 , 1252-53 . ¶80 The majority justifies discarding this foundational doctrine by pointing to its inconsistent application and misuse in Colorado's courts ,

2022See People v. Czemerynski, 786 P.2d 1100, 1109 (Colo. 1990); Quintana, 882 P.2d at 1373–74; Rollins, 892 P.2d at 872–73; People v. Skufca, 176 P.3d 83 , 86–87 (Colo. 2008); People v. Merklin, 80 P.3d 921 , 924–25 (Colo. App. 2003); People v. Thomeczek, 284 P.3d 110 , 114–15 (Colo. App. 2011); People v. Cisneros, 2014 COA 49 , ¶¶ 105–06, 108, 356 P.3d 877, 898 ; People v. Knapp, 2020 COA 107 , ¶¶ 32–34, 44, 487 P.3d 1243 , 1252–53. ¶80 The majority justifies discarding this foundational doctrine by pointing to its inconsistent application and misuse in Colorado’s courts, see Maj. op. ¶ 41, whic

2022See People v. Czemerynski , 786 P.2d 1100, 1109 ( Colo. 1990 ) ; Quintana , 882 P.2d at 1373 -74 ; Rollins , 892 P.2d at 872 -73 ; People v. Skufca , 176 P.3d 83, 86-87 ( Colo. 2008 ) ; People v. Merklin , 80 P.3d 921, 924-25 ( Colo.App. 2003 ) ; People v. Thomeczek , 284 P.3d 110, 114-15 ( Colo.App. 2011 ) ; People v. Cisneros , 2014 COA 49 , ¶¶ 105-06 , 108, 356 P.3d 877 , 898 ; People v. Knapp , 2020 COA 107 , ¶¶ 32-34 , 44, 487 P.3d 1243 , 1252-53 . ¶80 The majority justifies discarding this foundational doctrine by pointing to its inconsistent application and misuse in Colorado's courts ,

2025See Tibbels, ¶ 24 (“The [reasonable doubt] standard provides concrete substance for the presumption of innocence — that bedrock ‘axiomatic and elementary’ principle whose ‘enforcement lies at the foundation of the administration of our criminal law.’” (quoting In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 363 (1970))). ¶ 23 For these reasons, I respectfully encourage the supreme court to intervene and adopt a uniform definition of reasonable doubt that will permit Colorado’s courts to speak with a clear and unified voice on this fundamental issue. 14

2024See, e.g., Salomon Smith Barney, Inc. v. Schroeder, 43 P.3d 715 (Colo. App. 2001) (“Although a default could properly enter against the defendant in Frow, and although he could not participate further in the proceedings, he would be entitled to the benefit of any favorable judgment that might enter against his codefendants.”) (emphasis added). 47 ¶ 104 The majority’s rationale gives Ortiz the benefit of the Frow rule without adhering to the basic precept that any judgment entered in favor of the remaining defendants must be obtained without the participation of the defaulted defendant.3 And in

2020Court, 242 P. 997, 998 (Colo. 1925) (second and third omissions in original) (quoting Mills v. Green, 159 U.S. 651, 653 (1895)).

2020Court, 242 P. 997, 998 (Colo. 1925) (second and third omissions in original) (quoting Mills v. Green, 159 U.S. 651, 653 (1895)).

2001As Montoya makes clear, evidence of a prior statement that is otherwise inadmissible, or incompetent, to prove the substance of the statement, fails to satisfy a foundational requirement of section 16-10-201 for substantive use. 740 P.2d at 997 (noting by way of example that prior custodial statements taken in violation of Miranda or statements made in connection with a guilty plea, which for other reasons may not be used for substantive purposes, fail to satisfy the foundational requirements of 16-10-201 and may at most be admissible for impeachment purposes pursuant to CRE 613).

1997We explained that such a technical violation raised a question of “evidentiary admissibility and not constitutional suppression.” Id. at 473 ; cf. Thomas v. People, 895 P.2d 1040, 1045 (Colo.1995) (“We have therefore determined that the failure to demonstrate one’s certification to conduct a breath test, a foundational requirement found in section 42-4-1202.2, does not automatically render inadmissible the breath test results at trial.”).

1992See Larson, 911 F.2d at 394 (recognizing that "a defendant [has] a constitutional right to be present at summations, jury instructions, and the return of the jury verdict"); United States v. Fontanez, 878 F.2d 33, 34, 35 (2nd Cir. 1989) (stating that "[t]he right to be present at all stages of one's trial constitutes a foundational principle underpinning the entire law of criminal procedure," and holding that "every criminal defendant ... [is] entitled to be present at all stages of his *280 trial," including merely the reading back of testimony to a jury during their deliberations); Burrell v

1992See Larson, 911 F.2d at 394 (recognizing that “a defendant [has] a constitutional right to be present at summations, jury instructions, and the return of the jury verdict”); United States v. Fontanez, 878 F.2d 33, 34, 35 (2nd Cir.1989) (stating that "[t]he right to be present at all stages of one’s trial constitutes a foundational principle underpinning the entire law of criminal procedure,” and holding that “every criminal defendant ... [is] entitled to be present at all stages of his trial,” including merely the reading back of testimony to a jury during their deliberations); Burrell v. Aaro

1992See Larson, 911 F.2d at 394 (recognizing that "a defendant [has] a constitutional right to be present at summations, jury instructions, and the return of the jury verdict"); United States v. Fontanez, 878 F.2d 33, 34, 35 (2nd Cir. 1989) (stating that "[t]he right to be present at all stages of one's trial constitutes a foundational principle underpinning the entire law of criminal procedure," and holding that "every criminal defendant ... [is] entitled to be present at all stages of his *280 trial," including merely the reading back of testimony to a jury during their deliberations); Burrell v

1992See Larson, 911 F.2d at 394 (recognizing that “a defendant [has] a constitutional right to be present at summations, jury instructions, and the return of the jury verdict”); United States v. Fontanez, 878 F.2d 33, 34, 35 (2nd Cir.1989) (stating that "[t]he right to be present at all stages of one’s trial constitutes a foundational principle underpinning the entire law of criminal procedure,” and holding that “every criminal defendant ... [is] entitled to be present at all stages of his trial,” including merely the reading back of testimony to a jury during their deliberations); Burrell v. Aaro

1992See Larson, 911 F.2d at 394 (recognizing that "a defendant [has] a constitutional right to be present at summations, jury instructions, and the return of the jury verdict"); United States v. Fontanez, 878 F.2d 33, 34, 35 (2nd Cir. 1989) (stating that "[t]he right to be present at all stages of one's trial constitutes a foundational principle underpinning the entire law of criminal procedure," and holding that "every criminal defendant ... [is] entitled to be present at all stages of his *280 trial," including merely the reading back of testimony to a jury during their deliberations); Burrell v

1992See Larson, 911 F.2d at 394 (recognizing that “a defendant [has] a constitutional right to be present at summations, jury instructions, and the return of the jury verdict”); United States v. Fontanez, 878 F.2d 33, 34, 35 (2nd Cir.1989) (stating that "[t]he right to be present at all stages of one’s trial constitutes a foundational principle underpinning the entire law of criminal procedure,” and holding that “every criminal defendant ... [is] entitled to be present at all stages of his trial,” including merely the reading back of testimony to a jury during their deliberations); Burrell v. Aaro

1990See People v. Strock, 623 P.2d 42, 45 (evidence was admissible to show duress but not choice of evils pursuant to section 18-1-702, since a foundation for the choice of evils defense was not laid).