foundational requirement in Iowa

2013Neiderbach claims the State did not show the hearsay was within the scope of Iowa Rule of Evidence 5.703, which allows an expert to rely on facts or data if “of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in forming opinions or inferences upon the subject.” Niederbach points to State v. Barnett, 445 N.W.2d 749, 752 (Iowa 1989), in which we stated, “The usual facts or data, under the rule, would ordinarily be lab or other test results, charts, texts, etc.” Neiderbach asserts that the State failed to meet the foundational requirement of rule 5.703.

2013Neider-bach claims the State did not show the hearsay was within the scope of Iowa Rule of Evidence 5.703, which allows an expert to rely on facts or data if “of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in forming opinions or inferences upon the subject.” Neiderbach points to State v. Barrett, 445 N.W.2d 749, 752 (Iowa 1989), in which we stated, “The usual facts or data, under the rule, would ordinarily be lab or other test results, charts, texts, etc.” Neiderbach asserts that the State failed to meet the foundational requirement of rule 5.703.

1988Compare State v. Sehlemme, 301 N.W.2d 721, 723 (Iowa 1981) (time limit was listed in an itemization of procedural requirements under chapter 321B) with State v. Jensen, 216 N.W.2d 369, 372 (Iowa 1974) (time limit was not listed under a similar itemization).

1985Compare State v. Jensen, 216 N.W.2d 369, 372 (Iowa 1974) (not listing any time requirement in an itemization of “standards for the [Iowa Code chapter 321B] procedure”) with State v. Schlemme, 301 N.W.2d at 723 (Itemizing, as one of the “specific procedural requirements,” “that the test be provided within two hours after the arrest.”). 3 It is sufficient for the disposition of this case that the test was made available to defendant within the two-hour period, whether or not that period is a foundational requirement for the introduction of the test results in a criminal trial.

1988Compare State v. Sehlemme, 301 N.W.2d 721, 723 (Iowa 1981) (time limit was listed in an itemization of procedural requirements under chapter 321B) with State v. Jensen, 216 N.W.2d 369, 372 (Iowa 1974) (time limit was not listed under a similar itemization).

1985Compare State v. Jensen, 216 N.W.2d 369, 372 (Iowa 1974) (not listing any time requirement in an itemization of “standards for the [Iowa Code chapter 321B] procedure”) with State v. Schlemme, 301 N.W.2d at 723 (Itemizing, as one of the “specific procedural requirements,” “that the test be provided within two hours after the arrest.”). 3 It is sufficient for the disposition of this case that the test was made available to defendant within the two-hour period, whether or not that period is a foundational requirement for the introduction of the test results in a criminal trial.

2025The presumption of innocence is the “bedrock ‘axiomatic and elementary’ principle whose ‘enforcement lies at the foundation of the administration of our criminal law.’ ” In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 , 363 11 (1970) (quoting Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432, 453 (1895)).

2018See State v. Biddle, 652 N.W.2d 191, 196-97 (Iowa 2002); State v. Orozco, 290 N.W.2d 6, 10 (Iowa 1980).

2018See State v. Biddle, 652 N.W.2d 191, 196-97 (Iowa 2002); State v. Orozco, 290 N.W.2d 6, 10 (Iowa 1980).

2016Interpreting section 622.10(6) to regulate fees charged by providers and their authorized agents is consistent with the foundational principle of the common law of agency that one “who acts through another acts by or for himself.” See Andrews v. Young Men’s Christian Ass’n of Des Moines, 226 Iowa 374, 380 , 284 N.W. 186, 190 (1939).

2016Interpreting section 622.10(6) to regulate fees charged by providers and their authorized agents is consistent with the foundational principle of the common law of agency that one “who acts through another acts by or for himself.” See Andrews v. Young Men’s Christian Ass’n of Des Moines, 226 Iowa 374, 380 , 284 N.W. 186, 190 (1939).

2016“This foundational requirement is generally met by showing the continuous custody of the exhibit was such as to render it improbable that anyone tampered with the original item or substituted a different item.” State v. Piper, 663 N.W.2d 894, 907 (Iowa 2003), overruled on other grounds by State v. Hanes, 790 N.W.2d 545 (Iowa 2010).

2003State v. Gibb, 308 N.W.2d 673 , 681 (Iowa 1981); State v. Bakker, 262 N.W.2d 538, 542-43 (Iowa 1978).

1996Brunner, 480 N.W.2d at 37 ; Kim v. Nazarian, 216 Ill.App.3d 818, 827 , 159 Ill.Dec. 758, 764 , 576 N.E.2d 427, 433 (1991).

1996Brunner, 480 N.W.2d at 37 ; Kim v. Nazarian, 216 Ill.App.3d 818, 827 , 159 Ill.Dec. 758, 764 , 576 N.E.2d 427, 433 (1991).

1995See Hobbs, 172 N.W.2d at 272-73 .

1988In support of its first argument, the State relies on our decision in State v. Martin, 383 N.W.2d 556 (Iowa 1986).

1988State v. Martin, 383 N.W.2d 556, 559 (Iowa 1986) (section 321B4(2), a predecessor statute, “imposes a two-hour limitation”); State v. Vietor, 261 N.W.2d 828, 831 (Iowa 1978) (“a chemical test is to be administered within two hours of the time of arrest or not at all”); State v. Richards, 229 N.W.2d 229, 233 (Iowa 1975) (the state could not satisfy the foundational requirements for admission of the test by a written request following the test as it is untimely); State v. Wallin, 195 N.W.2d 95, 97 (Iowa 1972) (in listing the protective standards of a predecessor statute, we stated that the test

1988State v. Martin, 383 N.W.2d 556, 559 (Iowa 1986) (section 321B4(2), a predecessor statute, “imposes a two-hour limitation”); State v. Vietor, 261 N.W.2d 828, 831 (Iowa 1978) (“a chemical test is to be administered within two hours of the time of arrest or not at all”); State v. Richards, 229 N.W.2d 229, 233 (Iowa 1975) (the state could not satisfy the foundational requirements for admission of the test by a written request following the test as it is untimely); State v. Wallin, 195 N.W.2d 95, 97 (Iowa 1972) (in listing the protective standards of a predecessor statute, we stated that the test

1988State v. Martin, 383 N.W.2d 556, 559 (Iowa 1986) (section 321B4(2), a predecessor statute, "imposes a two-hour limitation"); State v. Vietor, 261 N.W.2d 828, 831 (Iowa 1978) ("a chemical test is to be administered within two hours of the time of arrest or not at all"); State v. Richards, 229 N.W.2d 229, 233 (Iowa 1975) (the state could not satisfy the foundational requirements for admission of the test by a written request following the test as it is untimely); State v. Wallin, 195 N.W.2d 95, 97 (Iowa 1972) (in listing the protective standards of a predecessor statute, we stated that the test

1988State v. Martin, 383 N.W.2d 556, 559 (Iowa 1986) (section 321B4(2), a predecessor statute, “imposes a two-hour limitation”); State v. Vietor, 261 N.W.2d 828, 831 (Iowa 1978) (“a chemical test is to be administered within two hours of the time of arrest or not at all”); State v. Richards, 229 N.W.2d 229, 233 (Iowa 1975) (the state could not satisfy the foundational requirements for admission of the test by a written request following the test as it is untimely); State v. Wallin, 195 N.W.2d 95, 97 (Iowa 1972) (in listing the protective standards of a predecessor statute, we stated that the test

1988State v. Martin, 383 N.W.2d 556, 559 (Iowa 1986) (section 321B4(2), a predecessor statute, "imposes a two-hour limitation"); State v. Vietor, 261 N.W.2d 828, 831 (Iowa 1978) ("a chemical test is to be administered within two hours of the time of arrest or not at all"); State v. Richards, 229 N.W.2d 229, 233 (Iowa 1975) (the state could not satisfy the foundational requirements for admission of the test by a written request following the test as it is untimely); State v. Wallin, 195 N.W.2d 95, 97 (Iowa 1972) (in listing the protective standards of a predecessor statute, we stated that the test

1988State v. Martin, 383 N.W.2d 556, 559 (Iowa 1986) (section 321B4(2), a predecessor statute, “imposes a two-hour limitation”); State v. Vietor, 261 N.W.2d 828, 831 (Iowa 1978) (“a chemical test is to be administered within two hours of the time of arrest or not at all”); State v. Richards, 229 N.W.2d 229, 233 (Iowa 1975) (the state could not satisfy the foundational requirements for admission of the test by a written request following the test as it is untimely); State v. Wallin, 195 N.W.2d 95, 97 (Iowa 1972) (in listing the protective standards of a predecessor statute, we stated that the test

1988State v. Martin, 383 N.W.2d 556, 559 (Iowa 1986) (section 321B4(2), a predecessor statute, "imposes a two-hour limitation"); State v. Vietor, 261 N.W.2d 828, 831 (Iowa 1978) ("a chemical test is to be administered within two hours of the time of arrest or not at all"); State v. Richards, 229 N.W.2d 229, 233 (Iowa 1975) (the state could not satisfy the foundational requirements for admission of the test by a written request following the test as it is untimely); State v. Wallin, 195 N.W.2d 95, 97 (Iowa 1972) (in listing the protective standards of a predecessor statute, we stated that the test

1980We discussed the status of the polygraph’s “general scientific acceptance,” as well as other indicia of its reliability in State v. Conner, 241 N.W.2d 447, 458-59 (Iowa 1976), and concluded that this area of study had not been proven sufficiently reliable for expert testimony, in part because “the breadth, sensitivity and importance of the inference of polygraph evidence demands a higher standard of trustworthiness than is required of other kinds of scientific evidence.” Id. at 459 .

1980We discussed the status of the polygraph’s “general scientific acceptance,” as well as other indicia of its reliability in State v. Conner, 241 N.W.2d 447, 458-59 (Iowa 1976), and concluded that this area of study had not been proven sufficiently reliable for expert testimony, in part because “the breadth, sensitivity and importance of the inference of polygraph evidence demands a higher standard of trustworthiness than is required of other kinds of scientific evidence.” Id. at 459 .