foundational requirement in Nebraska

2025With the benefit of hindsight, we think a uniform procedure for applying available jail credit to multiple sentences will be simpler to use, will be easier to understand, and may help reduce confusion when calculating the total amount of time a defendant will serve on contempo- raneously imposed sentences. 44 See id. 45 Sanchez, supra note 13 , 2 Neb.

2025With the benefit of hindsight, we think a uniform procedure for applying available jail credit to multiple sentences will be simpler to use, will be easier to understand, and may help reduce confusion when calculating the total amount of time a defendant will serve on contempo- raneously imposed sentences. 44 See id. 45 Sanchez, supra note 13 , 2 Neb.

1997In State v. Price, 202 Neb. 308 , 275 N.W.2d 82 (1979), the Supreme Court held that the foundational requirement may be met either before or after the introduction of the extrinsic impeaching evidence.

1997In State v. Price, 202 Neb. 308 , 275 N.W.2d 82 (1979), the Supreme Court held that the foundational requirement may be met either before or after the introduction of the extrinsic impeaching evidence.

2021II, § 1, precludes us from exer- cising powers belonging to the Legislature, and decisions on whether and how to limit the government’s potential tort liability belong to the Legislature. 77 Courts must not, through judicial construction, usurp the Legislature’s role in draw- ing the line between governmental liability and immunity. 78 Prior courts have strayed from this foundational principle. 79 This court will not. 73 See Glasson v. Board of Equal. of City of Omaha, 302 Neb. 869 , 925 N.W.2d 672 (2019). 74 See, Moser, supra note 3 ; Jill B. & Travis B., supra note 22. 75 See Neb.

2021II, § 1, precludes us from exer- cising powers belonging to the Legislature, and decisions on whether and how to limit the government’s potential tort liability belong to the Legislature. 77 Courts must not, through judicial construction, usurp the Legislature’s role in draw- ing the line between governmental liability and immunity. 78 Prior courts have strayed from this foundational principle. 79 This court will not. 73 See Glasson v. Board of Equal. of City of Omaha, 302 Neb. 869 , 925 N.W.2d 672 (2019). 74 See, Moser, supra note 3 ; Jill B. & Travis B., supra note 22. 75 See Neb.

2006We further note that in Schafersman v. Agland Coop, 262 Neb. 215 , 631 N.W.2d 862 (2001), we adopted the standards of Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 , 113 S. Ct. 2786 , 125 L.

2006We further note that in Schafersman v. Agland Coop, 262 Neb. 215 , 631 N.W.2d 862 (2001), we adopted the standards of Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 , 113 S. Ct. 2786 , 125 L.

2006We further note that in Schafersman v. Agland Coop, 262 Neb. 215 , 631 N.W.2d 862 (2001), we adopted the standards of Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 , 113 S. Ct. 2786 , 125 L.

2006We further note that in Schafersman v. Agland Coop, 262 Neb. 215 , 631 N.W.2d 862 (2001), we adopted the standards of Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 , 113 S. Ct. 2786 , 125 L.

1997In State v. Johnson, 220 Neb. 392 , 370 N.W.2d 136 (1985), the Supreme Court again held that the extrinsic impeaching evidence may be introduced before the witness is given an opportunity to explain or deny the alleged prior inconsistent statement, depending upon the defendant’s strategy.

1997In State v. Johnson, 220 Neb. 392 , 370 N.W.2d 136 (1985), the Supreme Court again held that the extrinsic impeaching evidence may be introduced before the witness is given an opportunity to explain or deny the alleged prior inconsistent statement, depending upon the defendant’s strategy.

1993Hyde v. Cleveland, 203 Neb. 420 , 279 N.W.2d 105 (1979).

1993Hyde v. Cleveland, 203 Neb. 420 , 279 N.W.2d 105 (1979).

1982ABA Standards for Criminal Justice, supra. However, such consultation with the defendant was made impossible in this instance by the defendant’s voluntary absence from the trial. *563 In light of such a voluntary absence from the trial, we are persuaded by the rationale in State v. Mihill, supra, that the defendant remains bound by a waiver of the foundational requirement made outside his presence and without consultation with him.

1982This is not unlike the responsibility which the trial judge has in satisfying himself that the Miranda warnings have been given as a foundation for the introduction in evidence of a defendant’s “in-custody statement.” In this regard, relying upon United States v. Watson, 469 F.2d 362 (5th Cir. 1972), this court adopted, in State v. Irwin, 191 Neb. 169 , 214 N.W.2d 595 (1974), syllabus 8, which reads as follows: “In determining whether the State has shown the admissibility of custodial statements by the requisite degree of proof, this court will accept the factual determination and credibility

1982This is not unlike the responsibility which the trial judge has in satisfying himself that the Miranda warnings have been given as a foundation for the introduction in evidence of a defendant's "in-custody statement." In this regard, relying upon United States v. Watson, 469 F.2d 362 (5th Cir. 1972), this court adopted, in State v. Irwin, 191 Neb. 169 , 214 N.W.2d 595 (1974), syllabus 8, which reads as follows: "In determining whether the State has shown the admissibility of custodial statements by the requisite degree of proof, this court will accept the factual determination and credibility

1982This is not unlike the responsibility which the trial judge has in satisfying himself that the Miranda warnings have been given as a foundation for the introduction in evidence of a defendant’s “in-custody statement.” In this regard, relying upon United States v. Watson, 469 F.2d 362 (5th Cir. 1972), this court adopted, in State v. Irwin, 191 Neb. 169 , 214 N.W.2d 595 (1974), syllabus 8, which reads as follows: “In determining whether the State has shown the admissibility of custodial statements by the requisite degree of proof, this court will accept the factual determination and credibility

1982This is not unlike the responsibility which the trial judge has in satisfying himself that the Miranda warnings have been given as a foundation for the introduction in evidence of a defendant’s “in-custody statement.” In this regard, relying upon United States v. Watson, 469 F.2d 362 (5th Cir. 1972), this court adopted, in State v. Irwin, 191 Neb. 169 , 214 N.W.2d 595 (1974), syllabus 8, which reads as follows: “In determining whether the State has shown the admissibility of custodial statements by the requisite degree of proof, this court will accept the factual determination and credibility

1966The defendant complains that the procedure followed by the trial court did not comply with the constitutional requirements established by the United States Supreme Court in Jackson v. Denno, 378 U. S. 368 , 84 S. Ct. 1774 , 12 L.

1966The defendant complains that the procedure followed by the trial court did not comply with the constitutional requirements established by the United States Supreme Court in Jackson v. Denno, 378 U. S. 368 , 84 S. Ct. 1774 , 12 L.