foundational requirement in California

2015However, in People v. Soto (1999) 21 Cal.4th 512, 515 , footnote 3, the California Supreme Court explained that as Frye had been supplanted in federal jurisprudence, the foundational test formerly referred to as the Kelly/Frye test is now referred to as the Kelly test. 6 As the trial court explained to Mackey’s counsel at the evidentiary hearing, instead of a tracking device, assume the teller had placed a blue rock inside a robbery suspect’s bag of stolen money before the suspect fled from the bank.

2002The foundational requirement is now referred to as the Kelly test. ( People v. Leahy, supra, at p. 612 , 34 Cal.Rptr.2d 663 , 882 P.2d 321 ; People v. Soto (1999) 21 Cal.4th 512, 515, fn. 3 , 88 Cal.Rptr.2d 34 , 981 P.2d 958 .) [16] We consider the terms "procedure," "technique," and "methodology" interchangeable in this context. [17] We note that this conclusion by Venegas calls into question the principle that one appellate court's decision is not binding on another appellate court.

1982(See, e.g., People v. Mehaffey (1948) 32 Cal.2d 535, 544-545 [ 197 P.2d 12 ]; People v. Cantrell (1973) 8 Cal.3d 672, 679-680 [ 105 Cal.Rptr. 792 , 504 P.2d 1256 ].) “[I]t is likewise well settled [.however,] that . . . the prosecutor is not required to establish the corpus delicti by proof as clear and convincing as is necessary to establish the fact of guilt; rather slight or prima facie proof is sufficient for such purpose.” (People v. Mehaffey, supra, 32 Cal.2d at p. 545 .) As we explained in People v. Jacobson (1965) 63 Cal.2d 317, 327 [ 46 Cal. Rptr. 515 , 405 P.2d 555 ]: “To meet the fo

1982(See, e.g., People v. Mehaffey (1948) 32 Cal.2d 535, 544-545 [ 197 P.2d 12 ]; People v. Cantrell (1973) 8 Cal.3d 672, 679-680 [ 105 Cal.Rptr. 792 , 504 P.2d 1256 ].) “[I]t is likewise well settled [.however,] that . . . the prosecutor is not required to establish the corpus delicti by proof as clear and convincing as is necessary to establish the fact of guilt; rather slight or prima facie proof is sufficient for such purpose.” (People v. Mehaffey, supra, 32 Cal.2d at p. 545 .) As we explained in People v. Jacobson (1965) 63 Cal.2d 317, 327 [ 46 Cal. Rptr. 515 , 405 P.2d 555 ]: “To meet the fo

2009“It is a foundational principle that: ‘ “[T]he language of an opinion must be construed with reference to the facts presented by the case, and the positive authority of a decision is coextensive only with such facts.” ’ ” (Harris v. Capital Growth Investors XIV (1991) 52 Cal.3d 1142, 1157 [ 278 Cal.Rptr. 614 , 805 P.2d 873 ].) Here, O.S. is unemployed and he receives his entire income from the Sycuan tribe.

2009“It is a foundational principle that: ‘ “[T]he language of an opinion must be construed with reference to the facts presented by the case, and the positive authority of a decision is coextensive only with such facts.” ’ ” (Harris v. Capital Growth Investors XIV (1991) 52 Cal.3d 1142, 1157 [ 278 Cal.Rptr. 614 , 805 P.2d 873 ].) Here, O.S. is unemployed and he receives his entire income from the Sycuan tribe.

2026As discussed, “ ‘[a]ssertions of instructional error are reviewed de novo.’ [Citation.] Whether or not the trial court should have given a ‘particular instruction in any particular case entails the resolution of a mixed question of law and fact,’ which is ‘predominantly legal.’ [Citation.] As such, it should be examined without deference.” (People v. Hernandez (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 559, 568 (Hernandez).) The requirement that the jury be instructed on unanimity in certain cases is based on the foundational principle that “[i]n a criminal case, a jury verdict must be unanimous.” (People v. Russ

2022But “[a]s a tactical matter, competent counsel could rationally conclude that it would be counterproductive to request an instruction highlighting [CSAAS] expert testimony supporting the victim’s credibility.” (Mateo, supra, 243 Cal.App.4th at p. 1076 ; see also People v. Maury (2003) 30 Cal.4th 342, 394 [“A reasonable attorney may have tactically concluded that the risk of a 39 limiting instruction . . . outweighed the questionable benefits such instruction would provide.”].) II.

2003The foundational requirement for admission of new scientific evidence in California is now referred to as the Kelly test or rule. ( People v. Leahy (1994) 8 Cal.4th 587, 612 , [ 34 Cal. Rptr.2d 663 , 882 P.2d 321 ].)" [7] See footnote 5, ante. [8] Defense counsel: "I would just like to generally outline for the record the areas that I would like to get into that at this point at least the court has barred me from getting into.

2003The foundational requirement for admission of new scientific evidence in California is now referred to as the Kelly test or rule. ( People v. Leahy (1994) 8 Cal.4th 587, 612 , [ 34 Cal. Rptr.2d 663 , 882 P.2d 321 ].)" [7] See footnote 5, ante. [8] Defense counsel: "I would just like to generally outline for the record the areas that I would like to get into that at this point at least the court has barred me from getting into.

2000The Attorney General counters that Anderson waived any claim of violation of the corpus delicti rule by her failure to object on that ground at trial, and we must agree. "`The corpus delicti of a crime consists of two elements, the fact of the injury or loss or harm, and the existence of a criminal agency as its cause.' [Citation.]" ( People v. Jennings (1991) 53 Cal.3d 334, 364 , 279 Cal.Rptr. 780 , 807 P.2d 1009 .) "Proof of the corpus delicti need not be beyond a reasonable doubt; a slight or prima facie showing is sufficient. [Citation.]" ( People v. Diaz (1992) 3 Cal.4th 495, 529 , 11 Cal

2000The Attorney General counters that Anderson waived any claim of violation of the corpus delicti rule by her failure to object on that ground at trial, and we must agree. "`The corpus delicti of a crime consists of two elements, the fact of the injury or loss or harm, and the existence of a criminal agency as its cause.' [Citation.]" ( People v. Jennings (1991) 53 Cal.3d 334, 364 , 279 Cal.Rptr. 780 , 807 P.2d 1009 .) "Proof of the corpus delicti need not be beyond a reasonable doubt; a slight or prima facie showing is sufficient. [Citation.]" ( People v. Diaz (1992) 3 Cal.4th 495, 529 , 11 Cal

1978(People v. Steccone (1950) 36 Cal.2d 234, 238 [ 223 P.2d 17 ].)” (People v. Earnest, 53 Cal.App.3d 734, 741 [ 126 Cal.Rptr. 107 ]; People v. Lipinski, 65 Cal.App.3d 566, 575 [ 135 Cal.Rptr. 451 ]; People v. Morales, 263 Cal.App.2d 368, 375-376 [ 69 Cal.Rptr. 402 ].) Existence of a conspiracy may be proved by circumstantial evidence, and the sufficiency of the evidence offered to establish such conspiracy must be viewed against the background of the type involved.

1978(People v. Steccone (1950) 36 Cal.2d 234, 238 [ 223 P.2d 17 ].)” (People v. Earnest, 53 Cal.App.3d 734, 741 [ 126 Cal.Rptr. 107 ]; People v. Lipinski, 65 Cal.App.3d 566, 575 [ 135 Cal.Rptr. 451 ]; People v. Morales, 263 Cal.App.2d 368, 375-376 [ 69 Cal.Rptr. 402 ].) Existence of a conspiracy may be proved by circumstantial evidence, and the sufficiency of the evidence offered to establish such conspiracy must be viewed against the background of the type involved.

2023One, the party-admission exception codified in Evidence Code section 1220, covers ‘[e]vidence of a statement . . . when offered against the declarant in an action to which he is a party . . . .’ ” (People v. Flinner (2020) 10 Cal.5th 686, 735 .) “While ‘sometimes referred to as the exception for admissions of a party,’ Evidence Code section 1220 ‘covers all statements of a party, whether or not they might otherwise be characterized as admissions.’ ” (People v. Gonzalez (2021) 12 Cal.5th 367, 409 (Gonzalez).) Nothing in the text of Evidence Code section 1220 suggests that a party admission must

2023(People v. Carpenter (1999) 21 Cal.4th 1016, 1049 [concluding party admission was admissible upon a showing that “defendant was the declarant, the statements were offered against him, and he was a party to the action”]; Gonzalez, supra, 12 Cal.5th at p. 409 [same]; People v. Horning (2004) 34 Cal.4th 871, 898 [same]; People v. Rodriguez (2014) 58 Cal.4th 587, 637 [same]; People v. Kraft (2000) 23 Cal.4th 978, 1035 [rejecting contention that admission of writing pursuant to Evidence Code 1220 is subject to a “heightened reliability requiremen[t]”].) Defendant has not cited to any authority for

2024(See People v. Becerrada (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1009, 1024 [statements admissible because Becerrada wrote the statements, he was a party, and the statements were offered against him]; Rodriguez, supra, 58 Cal.4th at p. 637 [to be admissible, the statements must have been made by the declarant, be offered against the declarant, and the declarant must be a party to the action]; Gonzalez, supra, 12 Cal.5th at p. 409 [same]; People v. Horning (2004) 34 Cal.4th 871, 898 [same]; People v. Carpenter (1999) 21 Cal.4th 1016, 1049 [same].) Nonetheless, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding

2023(People v. Carpenter (1999) 21 Cal.4th 1016, 1049 [concluding party admission was admissible upon a showing that “defendant was the declarant, the statements were offered against him, and he was a party to the action”]; Gonzalez, supra, 12 Cal.5th at p. 409 [same]; People v. Horning (2004) 34 Cal.4th 871, 898 [same]; People v. Rodriguez (2014) 58 Cal.4th 587, 637 [same]; People v. Kraft (2000) 23 Cal.4th 978, 1035 [rejecting contention that admission of writing pursuant to Evidence Code 1220 is subject to a “heightened reliability requiremen[t]”].) Defendant has not cited to any authority for

2024(See People v. Becerrada (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1009, 1024 [statements admissible because Becerrada wrote the statements, he was a party, and the statements were offered against him]; Rodriguez, supra, 58 Cal.4th at p. 637 [to be admissible, the statements must have been made by the declarant, be offered against the declarant, and the declarant must be a party to the action]; Gonzalez, supra, 12 Cal.5th at p. 409 [same]; People v. Horning (2004) 34 Cal.4th 871, 898 [same]; People v. Carpenter (1999) 21 Cal.4th 1016, 1049 [same].) Nonetheless, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding

2023(People v. Carpenter (1999) 21 Cal.4th 1016, 1049 [concluding party admission was admissible upon a showing that “defendant was the declarant, the statements were offered against him, and he was a party to the action”]; Gonzalez, supra, 12 Cal.5th at p. 409 [same]; People v. Horning (2004) 34 Cal.4th 871, 898 [same]; People v. Rodriguez (2014) 58 Cal.4th 587, 637 [same]; People v. Kraft (2000) 23 Cal.4th 978, 1035 [rejecting contention that admission of writing pursuant to Evidence Code 1220 is subject to a “heightened reliability requiremen[t]”].) Defendant has not cited to any authority for

2024(See People v. Becerrada (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1009, 1024 [statements admissible because Becerrada wrote the statements, he was a party, and the statements were offered against him]; Rodriguez, supra, 58 Cal.4th at p. 637 [to be admissible, the statements must have been made by the declarant, be offered against the declarant, and the declarant must be a party to the action]; Gonzalez, supra, 12 Cal.5th at p. 409 [same]; People v. Horning (2004) 34 Cal.4th 871, 898 [same]; People v. Carpenter (1999) 21 Cal.4th 1016, 1049 [same].) Nonetheless, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding

2023(People v. Carpenter (1999) 21 Cal.4th 1016, 1049 [concluding party admission was admissible upon a showing that “defendant was the declarant, the statements were offered against him, and he was a party to the action”]; Gonzalez, supra, 12 Cal.5th at p. 409 [same]; People v. Horning (2004) 34 Cal.4th 871, 898 [same]; People v. Rodriguez (2014) 58 Cal.4th 587, 637 [same]; People v. Kraft (2000) 23 Cal.4th 978, 1035 [rejecting contention that admission of writing pursuant to Evidence Code 1220 is subject to a “heightened reliability requiremen[t]”].) Defendant has not cited to any authority for

2023(See generally People v. Mickey (1991) 54 Cal.3d 612, 689, fn. 17 [a foundational presumption underlying our constitutional system of trial by jury is that jurors are capable of understanding and applying all of the instructions they are given].) In light of all these considerations, it is virtually inconceivable appellant would have obtained a more favorable verdict had the YouTube videos been excluded from his trial.

2023(See generally People v. Mickey (1991) 54 Cal.3d 612, 689, fn. 17 [a foundational presumption underlying our constitutional system of trial by jury is that jurors are capable of understanding and applying all the instructions they are given].) DISPOSITION The judgment is affirmed.

2001(See authorities cited, ante, 106 Cal.Rptr.2d p. 611, 22 P.3d pp. 376-377.) Moreover, because evidence that the defendant committed other violent crimes "is often of `overriding importance ... to the jury's life-or-death determination,' " California law imposes a foundational requirement one not mandated by the Constitutionโ€”that other-crimes evidence offered for this purpose be subject to the reasonable doubt standard of proof. ( Miranda, supra, 44 Cal.3d 57, 98 , 241 Cal.Rptr. 594 , 744 P.2d 1127 ; see also Avena, supra, 13 Cal.4th 394, 429 , 53 Cal. Rptr.2d 301 , 916 P.2d 1000 .) In other

2001(See authorities cited, ante, 106 Cal.Rptr.2d p. 611, 22 P.3d pp. 376-377.) Moreover, because evidence that the defendant committed other violent crimes "is often of `overriding importance ... to the jury's life-or-death determination,' " California law imposes a foundational requirement one not mandated by the Constitutionโ€”that other-crimes evidence offered for this purpose be subject to the reasonable doubt standard of proof. ( Miranda, supra, 44 Cal.3d 57, 98 , 241 Cal.Rptr. 594 , 744 P.2d 1127 ; see also Avena, supra, 13 Cal.4th 394, 429 , 53 Cal. Rptr.2d 301 , 916 P.2d 1000 .) In other

2014(See In re Kathleen W. (1987) 190 Cal.App.3d 68, 72 .) Rather, subject to a foundational hearing, the results of a polygraph test may be admissible if the results are relevant to the primary issue before the court.

2012Code, § 351.1, subd. (a), 8 added by Stats. 1983, ch. 202, § 1, p. 667.) However, “[t]he Legislature left open the question of use of a polygraph examination in civil and noncriminal juvenile matters.” {In re Kathleen W. (1987) 190 Cal.App.3d 68, 72 [ 235 Cal.Rptr. 205 ] {Kathleen W.); see also People v. Fields (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 1001, 1017 [ 96 Cal.Rptr.3d 668 ].) When a party seeks the admission of polygraph evidence at a jurisdictional hearing under section 300, the juvenile court is required to hold a foundational hearing to determine the admissibility of polygraph examination results,

2024The juvenile court’s express reliance on our decision in In re A.J. (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 525, 536 (A.J.)—where we recognized the “‘fundamental premise of dependency law is to serve the best interests of the dependent child’” and, “consistent with this foundational principle,” “‘“[t]he juvenile court has broad discretion to determine what would best serve and protect the child’s interest and to fashion a dispositional order in accordance with this discretion”’”—supports our conclusion that the court applied the proper legal standard when making its dispositional order.

2014The juvenile court has wide latitude in making orders necessary for the well-being of a child who has been adjudged as its dependent and may make "any and all reasonable orders for the care, supervision, custody, conduct, maintenance, and support of the child." (§ 362, subd. (a).) In making a decision on a child's placement the court must 5 consider that child's best interests. (§ 361.3, subd. (a)(1).) "[T]he fundamental premise of dependency law is to serve the best interests of the dependent child." (In re A.J. (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 525, 536 .) "The law provides the juvenile courts with the

2022(See People v. Williams (1997) 16 Cal.4th 153, 196 .) 55 Thus, defense counsel having never requested an Evidence Code section 402 hearing, defendant has forfeited any argument on appeal that one was required.

2013Analysis Apparently abandoning any claim that his proposed expert could offer opinions on questions of law (Williams v. Coombs (1986) 179 Cal.App.3d 626, 638 , approved on this point and disapproved on another in Sheldon Appel Co. v. Albert & Oliker (1989) 47 Cal.3d 863, 884, 885-886 ), defendant contends the trial court abused its discretion in declining to conduct a foundational hearing (Williams, supra, 16 Cal.4th at p. 196 ) with respect to the defense expert’s opinions regarding the effect of mold on usability, whether the seized marijuana was in fact moldy, and whether the practice of ma

2018(Delgado, supra, 36 Cal.4th at p. 249, fn. 28 .) 21 another, will be found to have a duty to exercise due care in the performance of that undertaking if one of two conditions is met: either (a) the volunteer’s failure to exercise such care increases the risk of harm to the other person, or (b) the other person reasonably relies upon the volunteer’s undertaking and suffers injury as a result.” (Delgado, supra, 36 Cal.4th at p. 249 .) The foundational requirement for liability under a negligent undertaking theory is the undertaking of a task that the defendant allegedly performed negligently.

2018(Delgado, supra, 36 Cal.4th at p. 249, fn. 28 .) 21 another, will be found to have a duty to exercise due care in the performance of that undertaking if one of two conditions is met: either (a) the volunteer’s failure to exercise such care increases the risk of harm to the other person, or (b) the other person reasonably relies upon the volunteer’s undertaking and suffers injury as a result.” (Delgado, supra, 36 Cal.4th at p. 249 .) The foundational requirement for liability under a negligent undertaking theory is the undertaking of a task that the defendant allegedly performed negligently.

2017Mar. 8, 2000.) We recently addressed a challenge to the validity of the amended special circumstance in People v. Johnson (2016) 62 Cal.4th 600 , 634-637, 197 Cal.Rptr.3d 461 , 364 P.3d 359 . 18 "Gassing" involves intentionally throwing human excrement or bodily fluids, or a mixture containing them, that results in contact with a person's skin or membranes. (§ 4501.1, subd. (b).) 19 California law requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt of other crimes evidence as "a foundational requirement-one not mandated by the Constitution." ( Anderson , supra , 25 Cal.4th at p. 589 , 106 Cal.Rptr.2d 575

2017Mar. 8, 2000.) We recently addressed a challenge to the validity of the amended special circumstance in People v. Johnson (2016) 62 Cal.4th 600 , 634-637, 197 Cal.Rptr.3d 461 , 364 P.3d 359 . 18 "Gassing" involves intentionally throwing human excrement or bodily fluids, or a mixture containing them, that results in contact with a person's skin or membranes. (§ 4501.1, subd. (b).) 19 California law requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt of other crimes evidence as "a foundational requirement-one not mandated by the Constitution." ( Anderson , supra , 25 Cal.4th at p. 589 , 106 Cal.Rptr.2d 575

2012Code, § 402.) In the hearing the proponent of a new scientific procedure must prove three preliminary facts: (1) that the reliability of the scientific technique is generally accepted by recognized authorities in the scientific field(s) in which the technique belongs; (2) that the witnesses giving expert testimony on the acceptance in the relevant scientific communities are qualified experts on the subject; and (3) that correct scientific procedures were used in administrating the scientific technique. {People v. Roybal (1998) 19 Cal.4th 481, 505 [ 79 Cal.Rptr.2d 487 , 966 P.2d 521 ]; Kelly, s

2012Code, § 402.) In the hearing the proponent of a new scientific procedure must prove three preliminary facts: (1) that the reliability of the scientific technique is generally accepted by recognized authorities in the scientific field(s) in which the technique belongs; (2) that the witnesses giving expert testimony on the acceptance in the relevant scientific communities are qualified experts on the subject; and (3) that correct scientific procedures were used in administrating the scientific technique. {People v. Roybal (1998) 19 Cal.4th 481, 505 [ 79 Cal.Rptr.2d 487 , 966 P.2d 521 ]; Kelly, s

2001However, the ultimate question for the sentencer is simply whether the aggravating circumstances, as defined by California's death penalty law (ง 190.3), so substantially outweigh those in mitigation as to call for the penalty of death, rather than life without parole. ( People v. Brown (1985) 40 Cal.3d 512, 541-542, fn. 13 , 230 Cal.Rptr. 834 , 726 P.2d 516 .) In making this essentially normative determination, penalty jurors need not agree on the dispositive factors, or on the existence of any specific aggravating factor or crime, as a prerequisite to imposing the death penalty.

2001However, the ultimate question for the sentencer is simply whether the aggravating circumstances, as defined by California's death penalty law (ง 190.3), so substantially outweigh those in mitigation as to call for the penalty of death, rather than life without parole. ( People v. Brown (1985) 40 Cal.3d 512, 541-542, fn. 13 , 230 Cal.Rptr. 834 , 726 P.2d 516 .) In making this essentially normative determination, penalty jurors need not agree on the dispositive factors, or on the existence of any specific aggravating factor or crime, as a prerequisite to imposing the death penalty.