foundational principle in North Carolina

2022See, e.g., M.E. v. T.J., 2022-NCSC-23 ¶ 1 (“For well over a century, North Carolina courts have abided by the foundational principle that administering equity and justice prohibits the elevation of form over substance.”) (first citing Currie v. Clark, 90 N.C. 355, 361 (1884) (“This would be to subordinate substance to form and subserve no useful purpose.”); then citing Moring v. Privott, 146 N.C. 558, 567 (1908) (“Equity disregards mere forms and looks at the substance of things.”); and then citing Fid. & Cas.

2022See, e.g., M.E. v. T.J., 2022-NCSC-23 ¶ 1 (“For well over a century, North Carolina courts have abided by the foundational principle that administering equity and justice prohibits the elevation of form over substance.”) (first citing Currie v. Clark, 90 N.C. 355, 361 (1884) (“This would be to subordinate substance to form and subserve no useful purpose.”); then citing Moring v. Privott, 146 N.C. 558, 567 (1908) (“Equity disregards mere forms and looks at the substance of things.”); and then citing Fid. & Cas.

2022See, e.g., M.E. v. T.J., 2022-NCSC-23 ¶ 1 (“For well over a century, North Carolina courts have abided by the foundational principle that administering equity and justice prohibits the elevation of form over substance.”) (first citing Currie v. Clark, 90 N.C. 355, 361 (1884) (“This would be to subordinate substance to form and subserve no useful purpose.”); then citing Moring v. Privott, 146 N.C. 558, 567 (1908) (“Equity disregards mere forms and looks at the substance of things.”); and then citing Fid. & Cas.

2022See, e.g., M.E. v. T.J., 2022-NCSC-23 ¶ 1 (“For well over a century, North Carolina courts have abided by the foundational principle that administering equity and justice prohibits the elevation of form over substance.”) (first citing Currie v. Clark, 90 N.C. 355, 361 (1884) (“This would be to subordinate substance to form and subserve no useful purpose.”); then citing Moring v. Privott, 146 N.C. 558, 567 (1908) (“Equity disregards mere forms and looks at the substance of things.”); and then citing Fid. & Cas.

2022See, e.g., Currie v. Clark, 90 N.C. 355, 361 (1884) (“This would be to subordinate substance to form and subserve no useful purpose.”); Moring v. Privott, 146 N.C. 558, 567 (1908) (“Equity disregards mere form and looks at the substance of things.”); Fidelity & Casualty Co. v. Green, 200 N.C. 535, 538 (1931) (“To hold otherwise, we apprehend, would be to exalt the form over the substance.”).

2022Co. of N.Y. v. Green, 200 N.C. 535, 538 (1931) (“To hold otherwise, we apprehend, would be to exalt the form over the substance.”)).

2021App. 168, 173 , 519 S.E.2d 328, 332 (1999) (ruling the foundational requirement was met when witnesses testified their past statements were accurate).

2021App. 168, 173 , 519 S.E.2d 328, 332 (1999) (ruling the foundational requirement was met when witnesses testified their past statements were accurate).

2026We noted a foundational principle of common law self-defense allows an occupant to defend their home against an intruder, and that “the law does not require such householder to flee or to remain in his house until his assailant is upon him, but he may open his door and shoot his assailant.” Id. (citing State v. Blue, 356 N.C. 79, 86-87 , 565 S.E.2d 133, 138 (2002)).

2026We noted a foundational principle of common law self-defense allows an occupant to defend their home against an intruder, and that “the law does not require such householder to flee or to remain in his house until his assailant is upon him, but he may open his door and shoot his assailant.” Id. (citing State v. Blue, 356 N.C. 79, 86-87 , 565 S.E.2d 133, 138 (2002)).

2025Opinion of the Court contends the 2024 “clarifying” changes established the County’s “consistent application of” the UDO, and affirmed “that the Purpose statement was never intended to impose an additional set of 12 requirements[.]” Again, the County can only achieve its preferred outcome by neglecting the foundational rule of statutory construction: “If the language used is clear and unambiguous, the Court does not engage in judicial construction but must apply the statute to give effect to the plain and definite meaning of the language.” Id. at 8 , 727 S.E.2d at 681 (citation omitted).

2025Opinion of the Court contends the 2024 “clarifying” changes established the County’s “consistent application of” the UDO, and affirmed “that the Purpose statement was never intended to impose an additional set of 12 requirements[.]” Again, the County can only achieve its preferred outcome by neglecting the foundational rule of statutory construction: “If the language used is clear and unambiguous, the Court does not engage in judicial construction but must apply the statute to give effect to the plain and definite meaning of the language.” Id. at 8 , 727 S.E.2d at 681 (citation omitted).

2024The foundational principle of statutory construction is that “[w]here the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, there is no room for judicial construction and the courts must construe the statute using its plain meaning.” Burgess v. Your House of Raleigh, Inc., 326 N.C. 205, 209 (1990).

2024We have long called it a “time- honored maxim.” See Von Glahn v. Harris, 73 N.C. 323, 332 (1875).

2023WILSON Opinion of the Court hold otherwise would undermine the bedrock principle that “[c]ontradictions and discrepancies, even in the State’s evidence, are for the jury to resolve . . . .” Cox, 289 N.C. at 423 (citing State v. Mabry, 269 N.C. 293, 296 (1967)); see also Wilson, 293 N.C. at 51 (“[O]rdinarily the credibility of witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony is exclusively a matter for the jury[.]”).

2023WILSON Opinion of the Court hold otherwise would undermine the bedrock principle that “[c]ontradictions and discrepancies, even in the State’s evidence, are for the jury to resolve . . . .” Cox, 289 N.C. at 423 (citing State v. Mabry, 269 N.C. 293, 296 (1967)); see also Wilson, 293 N.C. at 51 (“[O]rdinarily the credibility of witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony is exclusively a matter for the jury[.]”).

2012The Eighth Circuit, on the other hand, reasoned that its view is in keeping with the foundational principle that an officer’s actions must be “objectively reasonable in the circumstances.” Martin, 411 F.3d at 1001 (citation and quotation marks omitted).

2012Moreover, the court observed that courts “ ‘should not expect state highway patrolmen to interpret the traffic laws with the subtlety and expertise of a criminal defense attorney,’ ” id. (quoting Sanders, 196 F.3d at 913 ), or “a federal judge,” id.

2012It is only where the testimony of the witness purports to be from refreshed memory but is clearly a mere recitation of the refreshing memorandum!] [that] such testimony is not admissible as present recollection refreshed and should be excluded by the trial judge. *551 State v. Ysut Mlo, 335 N.C. 353, 367 , 440 S.E.2d 98, 104-05 (1994) (quotations and citations omitted).

2012It is only where the testimony of the witness purports to be from refreshed memory but is clearly a mere recitation of the refreshing memorandum!] [that] such testimony is not admissible as present recollection refreshed and should be excluded by the trial judge. *551 State v. Ysut Mlo, 335 N.C. 353, 367 , 440 S.E.2d 98, 104-05 (1994) (quotations and citations omitted).

2010See, e.g., Eliason v. Wilborn, 281 U.S. 457, 462 , 50 S.Ct. 382, 383 , 74 L.Ed. 962, 967 (1930) ("As between two innocent persons[,] one of whom must suffer the consequence of a breach of trust[,] the one who made it possible by his act of confidence must bear the loss."); 1 William Lawrence Clark & Henry H.

2010See, e.g., Eliason v. Wilborn, 281 U.S. 457, 462 , 50 S.Ct. 382, 383 , 74 L.Ed. 962, 967 (1930) ("As between two innocent persons[,] one of whom must suffer the consequence of a breach of trust[,] the one who made it possible by his act of confidence must bear the loss."); 1 William Lawrence Clark & Henry H.

2010Id. at 149 , 675 S.E.2d at 632 (Martin, J., concurring).

2010Id. at 149 , 675 S.E.2d at 632 (Martin, J., concurring).