foundational principle in Oregon

2007We further developed that reasoning in Warner, where we held that the state’s failure to comply with ORS 813.160(2) 3 did not warrant suppression of a blood test, because that statute did not establish a foundational requirement for admissibility of the evidence. 181 Or App at 634 .

2006We also noted in Warner I that, in contrast to ORS 813.160(2), the ORS 813.160(1) requirement to test a blood sample in a qualified laboratory is a foundational rule of evidence because it expressly implicates the validity of the *35 analysis. 2 Id. at 634 .

2020In reaching that conclusion, the Court indicated that a waiver hearing would not permit the inquiry necessary to fully consider the juvenile’s youth and related characteristics, due to the different information and questions before the court at that early point in the pro- ceedings. 567 US at 487-89 . 294 Gillette v. Cain To explain, we recount that Miller drew from two lines of precedent in determining that, for juveniles, a man- datory sentence of life without parole was unconstitutional.

2019The Court began with the first strand of precedent by reaffirming the foundational principle articulated in Roper and Graham , viz ., "that children are constitutionally different from adults for purposes of sentencing * * * *164 [b]ecause juveniles have diminished culpability and greater prospects for reform." Id . at 470-71, 132 S.Ct. 2455 (citing Atkins v. Virginia , 536 U.S. 304 , 122 S.Ct. 2242 , 153 L.Ed.2d 335 (2002) and discussing the Court's adoption of "categorical bans on sentencing practices based on mismatches between the culpability of a class of offenders and the severity of a p

2025What is in front of this court at this time is the motion of [petitioner] to dismiss guardianship. * * * Cite as 339 Or App 106 (2025) 109 “This court finds that a foundational requirement for the court even to consider this matter is the establishment of paternity.

2022We agree, of course, that the attorney-client privi- lege “promote[s] broader public interests in the observance of law and administration of justice,” State ex rel OHSU v. Haas, 325 Or 492, 500 , 942 P2d 261 (1997), and that it is a foundational principle of our legal system.

2022We agree, of course, that the attorney-client privi- lege “promote[s] broader public interests in the observance of law and administration of justice,” State ex rel OHSU v. Haas, 325 Or 492, 500 , 942 P2d 261 (1997), and that it is a foundational principle of our legal system.

2020E.g., Comm’r. v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 US 426, 429-30 , 75 S Ct 473 , 99 L Ed 483 (1955) (cit- ing Comm’r v. Jacobson, 336 US 28, 49 , 69 S Ct 358 , 93 L Ed 477 (1949), and Helvering v. Stockholms Enskilda Bank, 293 US 84, 87-91 , 55 S Ct 50 , 79 L Ed 211 (1934)).

2020E.g., Comm’r. v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 US 426, 429-30 , 75 S Ct 473 , 99 L Ed 483 (1955) (cit- ing Comm’r v. Jacobson, 336 US 28, 49 , 69 S Ct 358 , 93 L Ed 477 (1949), and Helvering v. Stockholms Enskilda Bank, 293 US 84, 87-91 , 55 S Ct 50 , 79 L Ed 211 (1934)).

2020E.g., Comm’r. v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 US 426, 429-30 , 75 S Ct 473 , 99 L Ed 483 (1955) (cit- ing Comm’r v. Jacobson, 336 US 28, 49 , 69 S Ct 358 , 93 L Ed 477 (1949), and Helvering v. Stockholms Enskilda Bank, 293 US 84, 87-91 , 55 S Ct 50 , 79 L Ed 211 (1934)).

2020E.g., Comm’r. v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 US 426, 429-30 , 75 S Ct 473 , 99 L Ed 483 (1955) (cit- ing Comm’r v. Jacobson, 336 US 28, 49 , 69 S Ct 358 , 93 L Ed 477 (1949), and Helvering v. Stockholms Enskilda Bank, 293 US 84, 87-91 , 55 S Ct 50 , 79 L Ed 211 (1934)).

2020E.g., Comm’r. v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 US 426, 429-30 , 75 S Ct 473 , 99 L Ed 483 (1955) (cit- ing Comm’r v. Jacobson, 336 US 28, 49 , 69 S Ct 358 , 93 L Ed 477 (1949), and Helvering v. Stockholms Enskilda Bank, 293 US 84, 87-91 , 55 S Ct 50 , 79 L Ed 211 (1934)).

2020E.g., Comm’r. v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 US 426, 429-30 , 75 S Ct 473 , 99 L Ed 483 (1955) (cit- ing Comm’r v. Jacobson, 336 US 28, 49 , 69 S Ct 358 , 93 L Ed 477 (1949), and Helvering v. Stockholms Enskilda Bank, 293 US 84, 87-91 , 55 S Ct 50 , 79 L Ed 211 (1934)).

2019The Court began with the first strand of precedent by reaffirming the foundational principle articulated in Roper and Graham , viz ., "that children are constitutionally different from adults for purposes of sentencing * * * *164 [b]ecause juveniles have diminished culpability and greater prospects for reform." Id . at 470-71, 132 S.Ct. 2455 (citing Atkins v. Virginia , 536 U.S. 304 , 122 S.Ct. 2242 , 153 L.Ed.2d 335 (2002) and discussing the Court's adoption of "categorical bans on sentencing practices based on mismatches between the culpability of a class of offenders and the severity of a p

2019The Court began with the first strand of precedent by reaffirming the foundational principle articulated in Roper and Graham , viz ., "that children are constitutionally different from adults for purposes of sentencing * * * *164 [b]ecause juveniles have diminished culpability and greater prospects for reform." Id . at 470-71, 132 S.Ct. 2455 (citing Atkins v. Virginia , 536 U.S. 304 , 122 S.Ct. 2242 , 153 L.Ed.2d 335 (2002) and discussing the Court's adoption of "categorical bans on sentencing practices based on mismatches between the culpability of a class of offenders and the severity of a p

2019The Court concluded that the mandatory nature of the sentencing schemes contravene Roper 's and Graham 's foundational principle because the "laws prohibit a sentencing authority from assessing whether the law's harshest term of imprisonment proportionately punishes a juvenile offender." Id . at 474, 132 S.Ct. 2455 (emphasis added). 3 With regard to the second strand of precedent that deals with the lifetime nature of the punishment, the court stated that Graham 's treatment of juvenile life without parole sentences as analogous to capital punishment "makes relevant" the second line of precede

2019The Court concluded that the mandatory nature of the sentencing schemes contravene Roper 's and Graham 's foundational principle because the "laws prohibit a sentencing authority from assessing whether the law's harshest term of imprisonment proportionately punishes a juvenile offender." Id . at 474, 132 S.Ct. 2455 (emphasis added). 3 With regard to the second strand of precedent that deals with the lifetime nature of the punishment, the court stated that Graham 's treatment of juvenile life without parole sentences as analogous to capital punishment "makes relevant" the second line of precede

2017Whereas a clearly closed and opaque fanny pack is rendered open and transparent, lest we fail to account for the bottle of water and the tube of Chapstick. *389 Further, if a foundational requirement for a valid inventory search under Article I, section 9, as expressed by Atkinson , is "no exercise of discretion" by law enforcement, our closed container jurisprudence injects discretion, rather than removes it. 298 Or. at 10 , 688 P.2d 832 .

2017Whereas a clearly closed and opaque fanny pack is rendered open and transparent, lest we fail to account for the bottle of water and the tube of Chapstick. *389 Further, if a foundational requirement for a valid inventory search under Article I, section 9, as expressed by Atkinson , is "no exercise of discretion" by law enforcement, our closed container jurisprudence injects discretion, rather than removes it. 298 Or. at 10 , 688 P.2d 832 .

2009Kirkpatrick, Oregon Evidence § 401.03, 141-42 (5th ed 2007) (“The determination of relevance * * * allows the trial court to draw upon its own experience, knowledge, and common sense in determining whether a logical relationship exists between offered evidence and the fact to be proven.”). 11 Accordingly, the first part of the Johnson test was satisfied here. *636 The third part of the Johnson test requires that the letters’ probative value “not be substantially outweighed by the dangers or considerations set forth in OEC 403.” 313 Or at 195 .

2009And, although NADA purports to apply a "State Location Adjustment," it does not provide any local adjustment, which would seem to indicate that a NADA value estimate would be the same regardless of where the manufactured structure were located within the entire state of Oregon. ( Id. ) Location is a foundational principle in the value of any property.

2006We explained that ORS 136.432 “constrains the courts from creating rules of exclusion where the legislature itself has not created them,” State v. Thompson-Seed, 162 Or App 483, 489 , 986 P2d 732 (1999), and held that the legislature did not intend ORS 813.160(2) to be a foundational rule for admissibility.

2006We explained that ORS 136.432 “constrains the courts from creating rules of exclusion where the legislature itself has not created them,” State v. Thompson-Seed, 162 Or App 483, 489 , 986 P2d 732 (1999), and held that the legislature did not intend ORS 813.160(2) to be a foundational rule for admissibility.

2004Instead, shortly before trial, she filed a “OEC 104 Motion to Exclude” Sibell’s testimony regarding medial branch denervation treatment, arguing that it failed to meet the foundational test for admissibility of scientific evidence set forth in State v. O’Key, 321 Or 285 , 899 P2d 663 (1995).

2004Instead, shortly before trial, she filed a “OEC 104 Motion to Exclude” Sibell’s testimony regarding medial branch denervation treatment, arguing that it failed to meet the foundational test for admissibility of scientific evidence set forth in State v. O’Key, 321 Or 285 , 899 P2d 663 (1995).

2004See also Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael, 526 US 137 , 119 S Ct 1167 , 143 L Ed 2d 238 (1999); Daubert v. Merrill Dow Pharmaceuticals, 509 US 579 , 113 S Ct 2786 , 125 L Ed 2d 469 (1993); Jennings v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 331 Or 285 , 14 P3d 596 (2000).

2004See also Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael, 526 US 137 , 119 S Ct 1167 , 143 L Ed 2d 238 (1999); Daubert v. Merrill Dow Pharmaceuticals, 509 US 579 , 113 S Ct 2786 , 125 L Ed 2d 469 (1993); Jennings v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 331 Or 285 , 14 P3d 596 (2000).

2004See also Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael, 526 US 137 , 119 S Ct 1167 , 143 L Ed 2d 238 (1999); Daubert v. Merrill Dow Pharmaceuticals, 509 US 579 , 113 S Ct 2786 , 125 L Ed 2d 469 (1993); Jennings v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 331 Or 285 , 14 P3d 596 (2000).

2004See also Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael, 526 US 137 , 119 S Ct 1167 , 143 L Ed 2d 238 (1999); Daubert v. Merrill Dow Pharmaceuticals, 509 US 579 , 113 S Ct 2786 , 125 L Ed 2d 469 (1993); Jennings v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 331 Or 285 , 14 P3d 596 (2000).

2003As the Supreme Court explained in Libertarian Party of Oregon v. Roberts, 305 Or 238, 246 , 750 P2d 1147 (1988): *329 “A court * * * cannot divine the relative importance of interests absent reference to the constitution itself; it is in the constitution that competing interests are balanced.

2003As the Supreme Court explained in Libertarian Party of Oregon v. Roberts, 305 Or 238, 246 , 750 P2d 1147 (1988): *329 “A court * * * cannot divine the relative importance of interests absent reference to the constitution itself; it is in the constitution that competing interests are balanced.

2002Permits shall be subject to termination or revocation at the discretion of the [State Police].” (Emphasis added.) On its face, ORS 813.160(l)(b) contains a foundational requirement for admissibility — i.e., “to be valid.” See State v. Warner, 181 Or App 622, 634 , 47 P3d 497 , rev den, 335 Or 42 (2002) (using ORS 813.160(1) “to be valid” language as an example of a foundational requirement); State v. Chipman, 176 Or App 284, 294 , 31 P3d 478 (2001).

2002Permits shall be subject to termination or revocation at the discretion of the [State Police].” (Emphasis added.) On its face, ORS 813.160(l)(b) contains a foundational requirement for admissibility — i.e., “to be valid.” See State v. Warner, 181 Or App 622, 634 , 47 P3d 497 , rev den, 335 Or 42 (2002) (using ORS 813.160(1) “to be valid” language as an example of a foundational requirement); State v. Chipman, 176 Or App 284, 294 , 31 P3d 478 (2001).

2001They also contend that ORS 136.432 cannot save the evidence from exclusion, because ORS 813.131(4) (1997) is in the nature of a “special relevance” rule that sets a foundational requirement for the admission of drug test result evidence and that, without a showing of compliance with the NIDA standards, the evidence is not “relevant and otherwise admissible.” As we did in State v. Jayne, 173 Or App 533 , 24 P3d 920 (2001), we examine as an initial matter the accusatory instruments in each case. 3 In Chipman and Thomas, the citations allege a violation of “ORS 813.010 — Driving under the influen

2001They also contend that ORS 136.432 cannot save the evidence from exclusion, because ORS 813.131(4) (1997) is in the nature of a “special relevance” rule that sets a foundational requirement for the admission of drug test result evidence and that, without a showing of compliance with the NIDA standards, the evidence is not “relevant and otherwise admissible.” As we did in State v. Jayne, 173 Or App 533 , 24 P3d 920 (2001), we examine as an initial matter the accusatory instruments in each case. 3 In Chipman and Thomas, the citations allege a violation of “ORS 813.010 — Driving under the influen