foundational requirement in Illinois

2020People v. Williams, 238 Ill. 2d 125, 136 (2010) (“We apply the abuse of discretion standard to the defendant’s foundational challenge to the trial court’s admission of *** expert testimony.”); People v. Sutherland, 223 Ill. 2d 187, 281 (2006) (applying the abuse of discretion standard to the defendant’s argument that the court erred in denying his motion to bar expert testimony regarding a test the expert had not performed herself); see also Taylor, 2011 IL 110067, ¶¶ 26-27 (holding that the abuse of discretion standard applied to a challenge to the admission of VHS tapes on foundation grounds

2020See, e.g., People v. Williams, 238 Ill. 2d 125, 136 (2010) (“We apply the abuse of discretion standard to the defendant’s foundational challenge to the trial court’s admission of Lambatos’ expert testimony.”).

2020People v. Williams, 238 Ill. 2d 125, 136 (2010) (“We apply the abuse of discretion standard to the defendant’s foundational challenge to the trial court’s admission of *** expert testimony.”); People v. Sutherland, 223 Ill. 2d 187, 281 (2006) (applying the abuse of discretion standard to the defendant’s argument that the court erred in denying his motion to bar expert testimony regarding a test the expert had not performed herself); see also Taylor, 2011 IL 110067, ¶¶ 26-27 (holding that the abuse of discretion standard applied to a challenge to the admission of VHS tapes on foundation grounds

2017See, e.g., People v. Williams, 238 Ill. 2d 125, 136 (2010), aff’d, 567 U.S. ___ , 132 S. Ct. 2221 (2012) (“We apply the abuse of discretion standard to the defendant’s foundational challenge to the trial court’s admission of Lambatos’ expert testimony.”); People v. Sutherland, 223 Ill. 2d 187, 281 (2006) (applying abuse of discretion standard to trial court’s refusal to bar expert testimony where expert testified to results of tests he did not perform); Snelson v. Kamm, 204 Ill. 2d 1, 24 (2003) (defendant’s claim that expert testimony was inadmissible as “lacking foundation” was reviewed for a

2017See, e.g., People v. Williams, 238 Ill. 2d 125, 136 (2010), aff’d, 567 U.S. ___ , 132 S. Ct. 2221 (2012) (“We apply the abuse of discretion standard to the defendant’s foundational challenge to the trial court’s admission of Lambatos’ expert testimony.”); People v. Sutherland, 223 Ill. 2d 187, 281 (2006) (applying abuse of discretion standard to trial court’s refusal to bar expert testimony where expert testified to results of tests he did not perform); Snelson v. Kamm, 204 Ill. 2d 1, 24 (2003) (defendant’s claim that expert testimony was inadmissible as “lacking foundation” was reviewed for a

2016Williams v. Illinois, 567 U.S. ___ , 132 S. Ct. 2221 (2012) (“We apply the abuse of discretion standard to the defendant’s foundational challenge to the trial court’s admission of Lambatos’ expert testimony.”); People v. Sutherland, 223 Ill. 2d 187, 281 (2006) (applying abuse-of-discretion standard to trial court’s refusal to bar expert testimony where expert testified to results of tests he did not perform); Snelson v. Kamm, 204 Ill. 2d 1, 24 (2003) (defendant’s claim that expert testimony was inadmissible as “lacking foundation” was reviewed for abuse of discretion); see also People v. Lovej

2016See Arthur, 216 Ill. 2d at 82 . ¶ 47 “The circuit court abuses its discretion when its ruling on the admissibility of evidence rests on an error of law.” Aliano v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 2015 IL App (1st) 143367, ¶ 29 .

2008Arthur, 216 Ill. 2d at 82 ; see also Arthur, 216 Ill. 2d at 96 (McMorrow, C.J., dissenting), quoting 11 Ill.

2007General acceptance in the scientific community was established as the foundational test for the admission of scientific evidence in Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C.

2007General acceptance in the scientific community was established as the foundational test for the admission of scientific evidence in Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C.

2026After reciting the two prongs of the plain error doctrine, the appellate court focused on the second, observing that this court “has equated second prong plain error with structural error.” Id. ¶ 12 (citing People v. Glasper, 234 Ill. 2d 173, 197-98 (2009)). ¶ 41 The appellate court then changed direction from second-prong plain error to “the rationale for, and the foundational requirement of, a probable cause determination in criminal cases by a preliminary hearing or a grand jury indictment.” Id. ¶ 13.

2024See People v. Glasper, 234 Ill. 2d 173 , 197- 98 (2009). ¶ 13 Before we reach the issue of structural error, we review the rationale for, and the foundational requirement of, a probable cause determination in criminal cases by a preliminary hearing or a grand jury indictment.

2025As between the master and the innocent third party, the doctrine requires the master to bear any loss for his servant’s negligence.” Bristow v. Griffitts Construction Co., 140 Ill.

2025As between the master and the innocent third party, the doctrine requires the master to bear any loss for his servant’s negligence.” Bristow v. Griffitts Construction Co., 140 Ill.

2021See People v. Sanchez, 2013 IL App (2d) 120445, ¶ 27 . ¶ 55 Regardless of waiver, I am persuaded by the State’s argument that the foundational error, if any, constitutes harmless error.

2021See People v. Sanchez, 2013 IL App (2d) 120445, ¶ 27 . ¶ 55 Regardless of waiver, I am persuaded by the State’s argument that the foundational error, if any, constitutes harmless error.

2017An abuse of discretion will be found only where the trial court’s ruling is so arbitrary or fanciful that “ ‘no reasonable person would take the view adopted by the trial court.’ ” People v. Patrick, 233 Ill. 2d 62, 68 (2009) (quoting People v. Hall, 195 Ill. 2d 1, 20 (2000)). ¶ 115 We now turn to the merits of defendant’s foundational challenge.

2016“An abuse of discretion will be found only where the trial court’s ruling is so arbitrary or fanciful that “ ‘no reasonable person would take the view adopted by the trial court.’ ” People v. Patrick, 233 Ill. 2d 62, 68 (2009) (quoting People v. Hall, 195 Ill. 2d 1, 20 (2000)). ¶ 115 We now turn to the merits of defendant’s foundational challenge.

2017See, e.g., People v. Williams, 238 Ill. 2d 125, 136 (2010), aff’d, 567 U.S. ___ , 132 S. Ct. 2221 (2012) (“We apply the abuse of discretion standard to the defendant’s foundational challenge to the trial court’s admission of Lambatos’ expert testimony.”); People v. Sutherland, 223 Ill. 2d 187, 281 (2006) (applying abuse of discretion standard to trial court’s refusal to bar expert testimony where expert testified to results of tests he did not perform); Snelson v. Kamm, 204 Ill. 2d 1, 24 (2003) (defendant’s claim that expert testimony was inadmissible as “lacking foundation” was reviewed for a

2016Williams v. Illinois, 567 U.S. ___ , 132 S. Ct. 2221 (2012) (“We apply the abuse of discretion standard to the defendant’s foundational challenge to the trial court’s admission of Lambatos’ expert testimony.”); People v. Sutherland, 223 Ill. 2d 187, 281 (2006) (applying abuse-of-discretion standard to trial court’s refusal to bar expert testimony where expert testified to results of tests he did not perform); Snelson v. Kamm, 204 Ill. 2d 1, 24 (2003) (defendant’s claim that expert testimony was inadmissible as “lacking foundation” was reviewed for abuse of discretion); see also People v. Lovej

2017See, e.g., People v. Williams, 238 Ill. 2d 125, 136 (2010), aff’d, 567 U.S. ___ , 132 S. Ct. 2221 (2012) (“We apply the abuse of discretion standard to the defendant’s foundational challenge to the trial court’s admission of Lambatos’ expert testimony.”); People v. Sutherland, 223 Ill. 2d 187, 281 (2006) (applying abuse of discretion standard to trial court’s refusal to bar expert testimony where expert testified to results of tests he did not perform); Snelson v. Kamm, 204 Ill. 2d 1, 24 (2003) (defendant’s claim that expert testimony was inadmissible as “lacking foundation” was reviewed for a

2016Williams v. Illinois, 567 U.S. ___ , 132 S. Ct. 2221 (2012) (“We apply the abuse of discretion standard to the defendant’s foundational challenge to the trial court’s admission of Lambatos’ expert testimony.”); People v. Sutherland, 223 Ill. 2d 187, 281 (2006) (applying abuse-of-discretion standard to trial court’s refusal to bar expert testimony where expert testified to results of tests he did not perform); Snelson v. Kamm, 204 Ill. 2d 1, 24 (2003) (defendant’s claim that expert testimony was inadmissible as “lacking foundation” was reviewed for abuse of discretion); see also People v. Lovej

2017An abuse of discretion will be found only where the trial court’s ruling is so arbitrary or fanciful that “ ‘no reasonable person would take the view adopted by the trial court.’ ” People v. Patrick, 233 Ill. 2d 62, 68 (2009) (quoting People v. Hall, 195 Ill. 2d 1, 20 (2000)). ¶ 115 We now turn to the merits of defendant’s foundational challenge.

2016“An abuse of discretion will be found only where the trial court’s ruling is so arbitrary or fanciful that “ ‘no reasonable person would take the view adopted by the trial court.’ ” People v. Patrick, 233 Ill. 2d 62, 68 (2009) (quoting People v. Hall, 195 Ill. 2d 1, 20 (2000)). ¶ 115 We now turn to the merits of defendant’s foundational challenge.

2017See, e.g., People v. Williams, 238 Ill. 2d 125, 136 (2010), aff’d, 567 U.S. ___ , 132 S. Ct. 2221 (2012) (“We apply the abuse of discretion standard to the defendant’s foundational challenge to the trial court’s admission of Lambatos’ expert testimony.”); People v. Sutherland, 223 Ill. 2d 187, 281 (2006) (applying abuse of discretion standard to trial court’s refusal to bar expert testimony where expert testified to results of tests he did not perform); Snelson v. Kamm, 204 Ill. 2d 1, 24 (2003) (defendant’s claim that expert testimony was inadmissible as “lacking foundation” was reviewed for a

2016Williams v. Illinois, 567 U.S. ___ , 132 S. Ct. 2221 (2012) (“We apply the abuse of discretion standard to the defendant’s foundational challenge to the trial court’s admission of Lambatos’ expert testimony.”); People v. Sutherland, 223 Ill. 2d 187, 281 (2006) (applying abuse-of-discretion standard to trial court’s refusal to bar expert testimony where expert testified to results of tests he did not perform); Snelson v. Kamm, 204 Ill. 2d 1, 24 (2003) (defendant’s claim that expert testimony was inadmissible as “lacking foundation” was reviewed for abuse of discretion); see also People v. Lovej

2017See Smith, 2015 IL App (1st) 122306, ¶ 45 .

2017See Smith, 2015 IL App (1st) 122306, ¶ 45 .

2017See Smith, 2014 IL App (1st) 103436, ¶ 64 (rejecting similar claim because “[n]othing in the record suggest[ed] that counsel had evidence that would undermine the chain of custody for the bullet”).

2017See Smith, 2014 IL App (1st) 103436, ¶ 64 (rejecting similar claim because “[n]othing in the record suggest[ed] that counsel had evidence that would undermine the chain of custody for the bullet”).

2016See People v. Caruso, 201 Ill.

2015See People v. Caruso, - 10 - No. 1-12-2306 201 Ill.

2008People v. Black, 84 Ill.

2008People v. Black, 84 Ill.

2020We review a foundational challenge to the admission of expert testimony for an abuse of discretion, which will only be found “where the trial court’s ruling is so arbitrary or fanciful that no reasonable person would take the view adopted by the trial court.” (Internal quotations marks omitted.) Simmons, 2016 IL App (1st) 131300 , ¶ 114. ¶ 55 Defendant argues that we should review his foundational objection to the admission of expert testimony under a de novo standard of review, citing People v. Safford, 392 Ill.

2017See, e.g., People v. Williams, 238 Ill. 2d 125, 136 (2010), aff’d, 567 U.S. ___ , 132 S. Ct. 2221 (2012) (“We apply the abuse of discretion standard to the defendant’s foundational challenge to the trial court’s admission of Lambatos’ expert testimony.”); People v. Sutherland, 223 Ill. 2d 187, 281 (2006) (applying abuse of discretion standard to trial court’s refusal to bar expert testimony where expert testified to results of tests he did not perform); Snelson v. Kamm, 204 Ill. 2d 1, 24 (2003) (defendant’s claim that expert testimony was inadmissible as “lacking foundation” was reviewed for a

2022See Winterpacht, 2012 IL App (2d) 101192, ¶ 13 (holding that, when a BAC test result is above the statutory limit and “a reasonable amount of time elapses between when the defendant was driving and the test, extrapolation evidence is permissible but is not a foundational requirement”); Torruella, 2015 IL App (2d) 141001, ¶¶ 41-42 (same).

2021“In such a case, when a reasonable amount of time elapses between when the defendant was driving and the test, extrapolation evidence is permissible but is not a foundational requirement.” Id.

2022See Winterpacht, 2012 IL App (2d) 101192, ¶ 13 (holding that, when a BAC test result is above the statutory limit and “a reasonable amount of time elapses between when the defendant was driving and the test, extrapolation evidence is permissible but is not a foundational requirement”); Torruella, 2015 IL App (2d) 141001, ¶¶ 41-42 (same).

2015In such a case, when a reasonable amount of time elapses between when - 14 - 2015 IL App (2d) 141001 the defendant was driving and the test, extrapolation evidence is permissible but is not a foundational requirement. [Citation.] Matters of delay between driving and testing go to the weight of the evidence and must be viewed in light of the circumstances surrounding the arrest. [Citation.] Any concerns about the facts upon which the alcohol content is determined may be challenged on cross-examination.” Winterpacht, 2012 IL App (2d) 101192, ¶ 13 . ¶ 42 Here, defendant’s breath test was performe

2019The Miller Court “identified a foundational principle that ‘imposition of a State’s most severe penalties on juvenile offenders cannot proceed as though they were not children.’ ” Holman, 2017 IL 120655, ¶ 35 (quoting Miller, 567 U.S. at 474 ).

2018The Miller Court "identified a foundational principle that 'imposition of a State's most severe penalties on juvenile offenders cannot proceed as though they were not children.' " Holman , 2017 IL 120655 , ¶ 35, 418 Ill.Dec. 889 , 91 N.E.3d 849 (quoting Miller , 567 U.S. at 474 , 132 S.Ct. 2455 ).