12 Hawaii opinions name it 2 courts 1978–2021 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Hawaii courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Mauna Kea Anaina Hou v. Board of Land & Natural Resourcesgreen2 sentences2021Res., 136 Hawai#i 376, 389, 363 P.3d 224, 237 (2015) ("[J]ustice can perform its high function in the best way only if it satisfies the appearance of justice." (quoting Sifagaloa v. Bd. of Trs. of Emps. 2021Res., 136 Hawai#i 376, 389, 363 P.3d 224, 237 (2015) ("[J]ustice can perform its high function in the best way only if it satisfies the appearance of justice." (quoting Sifagaloa v. Bd. of Trs. of Emps. | 2 | 2 |
State v. Browngreen2 sentences2021Discussion A. Legal Framework We honor a foundational principle of our judicial system: "The integrity of the judicial process depends on 'justice ... satisfy[ing] the appearance of justice.'" Ross, 89 Hawai#i at 381, 974 P.2d at 21 (quoting State v. Brown, 70 Haw. 459, 467 , 776 P.2d 1182, 1188 (1989)); see Mauna Kea Anaina Hou v. Bd. of Land & Nat. 2021Discussion A. Legal Framework We honor a foundational principle of our judicial system: "The integrity of the judicial process depends on 'justice ... satisfy[ing] the appearance of justice.'" Ross, 89 Hawai#i at 381, 974 P.2d at 21 (quoting State v. Brown, 70 Haw. 459, 467 , 776 P.2d 1182, 1188 (1989)); see Mauna Kea Anaina Hou v. Bd. of Land & Nat. | 2 | 2 |
Shea v. City and County of Honolulugreen2 sentences2008The Moore court further acknowledged that this court, three years after the Messamore case was decided, transformed the observation in Messamore "into a foundational requirement for the applicability of the excited utterance. exception." Moore , 82 Hawai`i at 220, 921 P.2d at 140 (citing Shea v. City & County of Honolulu, 67 Haw. 499 , 692 P.2d 1158 (1985)). 2008The Moore court further acknowledged that this court, three years after the Messamore case was decided, transformed the observation in Messamore "into a foundational requirement for the applicability of the excited utterance. exception." Moore , 82 Hawai`i at 220, 921 P.2d at 140 (citing Shea v. City & County of Honolulu, 67 Haw. 499 , 692 P.2d 1158 (1985)). | 1 | 2 |
Sierra Club v. Department of Transportationgreen2 sentences2019See Superferry I , 115 Hawai'i at 320 , 167 P.3d at 313 ("[E]nvironmental plaintiffs must meet the three-part standing test, ... although there will be no requirement that their asserted injury be particular to the plaintiffs, and the court will recognize harms to plaintiffs['] environmental interests as injuries that may provide the basis for standing."); Sierra Club v. Hawai'i Tourism Auth. ex rel. 2019See Superferry I , 115 Hawai'i at 320 , 167 P.3d at 313 ("[E]nvironmental plaintiffs must meet the three-part standing test, ... although there will be no requirement that their asserted injury be particular to the plaintiffs, and the court will recognize harms to plaintiffs['] environmental interests as injuries that may provide the basis for standing."); Sierra Club v. Hawai'i Tourism Auth. ex rel. | 1 | 1 |
Tachibana v. Stategreen2 sentences2007A defendant’s counsel has “the duty to inform a defendant of the existence of certain constitutional rights[,j” inasmuch as “a trial court can justifiably presume, based on a defendant’s conduct or silence, that a defendant is aware of and has waived certain rights.” Tachibana, 79 Hawai'i at 240 , 900 P.2d at 1307 (Nakayama, J., dissenting) (citing State v. Silva, 78 Hawai'i 115 , 890 P.2d 702 (App.1995); State v. Savage, 120 N.J. 594 , 577 A.2d 455 (1990)). 2007A defendant's counsel has "the duty to inform a defendant of the existence of certain constitutional rights[,]" inasmuch as "a trial court can justifiably presume, based on a defendant's conduct or silence, that a defendant is aware of and has waived certain rights." Tachibana , 79 Hawai`i at 240, 900 P.2d at 1307 (Nakayama, J., dissenting) (citing State v. Silva, 78 Hawai`i 115, 890 P.2d 702 (App.1995); State v. Savage, 120 N.J. 594 , 577 A.2d 455 (1990)). | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Stanley Sowa, Jr., Also Known as Alfred Junior, IIgreen1 sentence1996See e.g., Sowa, 34 F.3d at 453 (time element important but not controlling; statement twenty minutes after event admissible); State v. Patino, 177 Wis.2d 348 , 502 N.W.2d 601, 608 (App.1993) (time lapse mea- sured by duration of excited condition rather than time lapse from event described; statement made one hour after event admissible); Ross v. State, 879 S.W.2d 248, 249 (Tex.App.1994) (time between event and statement is not the critical factor, where declarant under stress of event thirty to forty-five minutes later; statement admissible); People v. Knade, 252 Ill.App.3d 682 , 192 Ill.Dec. | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Daniel Riveragreen1 sentence1996See e.g., Sowa, 34 F.3d at 453 (time element important but not controlling; statement twenty minutes after event admissible); State v. Patino, 177 Wis.2d 348 , 502 N.W.2d 601, 608 (App.1993) (time lapse mea- sured by duration of excited condition rather than time lapse from event described; statement made one hour after event admissible); Ross v. State, 879 S.W.2d 248, 249 (Tex.App.1994) (time between event and statement is not the critical factor, where declarant under stress of event thirty to forty-five minutes later; statement admissible); People v. Knade, 252 Ill.App.3d 682 , 192 Ill.Dec. | 1 | 1 |
Territory v. Lewisgreen1 sentence1996The court, in In the Interest of John Doe, born on November 23, 1970, 70 Haw. 32 , 761 P.2d 299 (1988), recited the original rule from Lewis , adding the Shea requirement, and stated: “‘To be admitted[, statements] must be reasonably contemporaneous with the event to which they relate, i.e., they must be such as to have been proximately caused by the exciting influence of the event without opportunity for deliberation or [other] influence.’” Shea v. City & County, 67 Haw. 499, 506 , 692 P.2d 1158, 1164 (1985) (quoting Territory v. Lewis, 39 Haw. 635, 640 (1953)) (citations omitted). | 1 | 1 |
People in Interest of OEPgreen1 sentence1996See e.g., Sowa, 34 F.3d at 453 (time element important but not controlling; statement twenty minutes after event admissible); State v. Patino, 177 Wis.2d 348 , 502 N.W.2d 601, 608 (App.1993) (time lapse mea- sured by duration of excited condition rather than time lapse from event described; statement made one hour after event admissible); Ross v. State, 879 S.W.2d 248, 249 (Tex.App.1994) (time between event and statement is not the critical factor, where declarant under stress of event thirty to forty-five minutes later; statement admissible); People v. Knade, 252 Ill.App.3d 682 , 192 Ill.Dec. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Messamoregreen2 sentences1996This ill-supported observation was transformed into a foundational requirement for the applicability of the excited utterance exception in Shea v. City & County of Honolulu, 67 Haw. 499 , 692 P.2d 1158 (1985), wherein this court stated: “Because the ‘element that buttresses the reliability of [an ‘excited utterance’] is ... spontaneity[,] ... the time span between the event and the making of the statement [must be] short— very short.’” Id. at 506 , 692 P.2d at 1164 (brackets and ellipsis points in original) (quoting Messamore, 2 Haw.App. at 649, 639 P.2d at 418 ). 1996This ill-supported observation was transformed into a foundational requirement for the applicability of the excited utterance exception in Shea v. City & County of Honolulu, 67 Haw. 499 , 692 P.2d 1158 (1985), wherein this court stated: “Because the ‘element that buttresses the reliability of [an ‘excited utterance’] is ... spontaneity[,] ... the time span between the event and the making of the statement [must be] short— very short.’” Id. at 506 , 692 P.2d at 1164 (brackets and ellipsis points in original) (quoting Messamore, 2 Haw.App. at 649, 639 P.2d at 418 ). | 1 | 1 |
United States v. John Louis Iron Shell, Jr.green1 sentence1996See e.g., Sowa, 34 F.3d at 453 (time element important but not controlling; statement twenty minutes after event admissible); State v. Patino, 177 Wis.2d 348 , 502 N.W.2d 601, 608 (App.1993) (time lapse mea- sured by duration of excited condition rather than time lapse from event described; statement made one hour after event admissible); Ross v. State, 879 S.W.2d 248, 249 (Tex.App.1994) (time between event and statement is not the critical factor, where declarant under stress of event thirty to forty-five minutes later; statement admissible); People v. Knade, 252 Ill.App.3d 682 , 192 Ill.Dec. | 1 | 1 |
Ross v. Stategreen1 sentence1996See e.g., Sowa, 34 F.3d at 453 (time element important but not controlling; statement twenty minutes after event admissible); State v. Patino, 177 Wis.2d 348 , 502 N.W.2d 601, 608 (App.1993) (time lapse mea- sured by duration of excited condition rather than time lapse from event described; statement made one hour after event admissible); Ross v. State, 879 S.W.2d 248, 249 (Tex.App.1994) (time between event and statement is not the critical factor, where declarant under stress of event thirty to forty-five minutes later; statement admissible); People v. Knade, 252 Ill.App.3d 682 , 192 Ill.Dec. | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Thomas N. Mooregreen1 sentence1996See e.g., Sowa, 34 F.3d at 453 (time element important but not controlling; statement twenty minutes after event admissible); State v. Patino, 177 Wis.2d 348 , 502 N.W.2d 601, 608 (App.1993) (time lapse mea- sured by duration of excited condition rather than time lapse from event described; statement made one hour after event admissible); Ross v. State, 879 S.W.2d 248, 249 (Tex.App.1994) (time between event and statement is not the critical factor, where declarant under stress of event thirty to forty-five minutes later; statement admissible); People v. Knade, 252 Ill.App.3d 682 , 192 Ill.Dec. | 1 | 1 |
Cedric Webb v. Michael P. Lane, Director of Illinois Department of Correctionsgreen1 sentence1996See e.g., Sowa, 34 F.3d at 453 (time element important but not controlling; statement twenty minutes after event admissible); State v. Patino, 177 Wis.2d 348 , 502 N.W.2d 601, 608 (App.1993) (time lapse mea- sured by duration of excited condition rather than time lapse from event described; statement made one hour after event admissible); Ross v. State, 879 S.W.2d 248, 249 (Tex.App.1994) (time between event and statement is not the critical factor, where declarant under stress of event thirty to forty-five minutes later; statement admissible); People v. Knade, 252 Ill.App.3d 682 , 192 Ill.Dec. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Patinogreen2 sentences1996See e.g., Sowa, 34 F.3d at 453 (time element important but not controlling; statement twenty minutes after event admissible); State v. Patino, 177 Wis.2d 348 , 502 N.W.2d 601, 608 (App.1993) (time lapse mea- sured by duration of excited condition rather than time lapse from event described; statement made one hour after event admissible); Ross v. State, 879 S.W.2d 248, 249 (Tex.App.1994) (time between event and statement is not the critical factor, where declarant under stress of event thirty to forty-five minutes later; statement admissible); People v. Knade, 252 Ill.App.3d 682 , 192 Ill.Dec. 1996See e.g., Sowa, 34 F.3d at 453 (time element important but not controlling; statement twenty minutes after event admissible); State v. Patino, 177 Wis.2d 348 , 502 N.W.2d 601, 608 (App.1993) (time lapse mea- sured by duration of excited condition rather than time lapse from event described; statement made one hour after event admissible); Ross v. State, 879 S.W.2d 248, 249 (Tex.App.1994) (time between event and statement is not the critical factor, where declarant under stress of event thirty to forty-five minutes later; statement admissible); People v. Knade, 252 Ill.App.3d 682 , 192 Ill.Dec. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Knadegreen2 sentences1996See e.g., Sowa, 34 F.3d at 453 (time element important but not controlling; statement twenty minutes after event admissible); State v. Patino, 177 Wis.2d 348 , 502 N.W.2d 601, 608 (App.1993) (time lapse mea- sured by duration of excited condition rather than time lapse from event described; statement made one hour after event admissible); Ross v. State, 879 S.W.2d 248, 249 (Tex.App.1994) (time between event and statement is not the critical factor, where declarant under stress of event thirty to forty-five minutes later; statement admissible); People v. Knade, 252 Ill.App.3d 682 , 192 Ill.Dec. 1996See e.g., Sowa, 34 F.3d at 453 (time element important but not controlling; statement twenty minutes after event admissible); State v. Patino, 177 Wis.2d 348 , 502 N.W.2d 601, 608 (App.1993) (time lapse mea- sured by duration of excited condition rather than time lapse from event described; statement made one hour after event admissible); Ross v. State, 879 S.W.2d 248, 249 (Tex.App.1994) (time between event and statement is not the critical factor, where declarant under stress of event thirty to forty-five minutes later; statement admissible); People v. Knade, 252 Ill.App.3d 682 , 192 Ill.Dec. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Hawaii. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Ross
green
2 sentences2021Discussion A. Legal Framework We honor a foundational principle of our judicial system: "The integrity of the judicial process depends on 'justice ... satisfy[ing] the appearance of justice.'" Ross, 89 Hawai#i at 381, 974 P.2d at 21 (quoting State v. Brown, 70 Haw. 459, 467 , 776 P.2d 1182, 1188 (1989)); see Mauna Kea Anaina Hou v. Bd. of Land & Nat. 2021Discussion A. Legal Framework We honor a foundational principle of our judicial system: "The integrity of the judicial process depends on 'justice ... satisfy[ing] the appearance of justice.'" Ross, 89 Hawai#i at 381, 974 P.2d at 21 (quoting State v. Brown, 70 Haw. 459, 467 , 776 P.2d 1182, 1188 (1989)); see Mauna Kea Anaina Hou v. Bd. of Land & Nat. | 2 | 2021–2021 |
In the Interest of Doe
green
2 sentences2008Eventually, in 1988, this court, in In re Doe, born on November 23, 1970 [hereinafter, In re Doe], 70 Haw. 32 , 761 P.2d 299 (1988), combined the original rule in Lewis with the Shea time span requirement into factors for the excited utterance exception. 2008Eventually, in 1988, this court, in In re Doe, born on November 23, 1970 [hereinafter, In re Doe], 70 Haw. 32 , 761 P.2d 299 (1988), combined the original rule in Lewis with the Shea time span requirement into factors for the excited utterance exception. | 2 | 1996–2008 |
State v. Mainaaupo
green
1 sentence2020We held in State v. Mainaaupo, 117 Hawaii 235, 178 P.3d 1 (2008), that the foundational privilege against self- incrimination, commonly referred to as the “right to remain silent,” attaches during post-arrest police interrogation. | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Cox v. Cox.
green
1 sentence2017Id. | 1 | 2017–2017 |
State v. Torres
green
2 sentences2013Additionally, the ICA concluded that the State failed to “satisfy the threshold foundational requirement of showing that Agent Robbins was qualified as an expert[.]” Id. at 31 , 222 P.3d at 438 . 2013Additionally, the ICA concluded that the State failed to “satisfy the threshold foundational requirement of showing that Agent Robbins was qualified as an expert[.]” Id. at 31 , 222 P.3d at 438 . | 1 | 2013–2013 |
State v. Daniels
green
2 sentences2010The foundational principle in that framework is that a prosecutor must have reasonable grounds for posing questions during cross-examination that impugn a witness’s credibility.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted) (emphasis added). 2010The foundational principle in that framework is that a prosecutor must have reasonable grounds for posing questions during cross-examination that impugn a witness's credibility." Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted) (emphasis added). | 1 | 2010–2010 |
State v. Moore
green
2 sentences2008The Moore court further acknowledged that this court, three years after the Messamore case was decided, transformed the observation in Messamore “into a foundational requirement for the applicability of the excited utterance exception.” Moore, 82 Hawai'i at 220 , 921 P.2d at 140 (citing Shea v. City & County of Honolulu, 67 Haw. 499 , 692 P.2d 1158 (1985)). 2008The Moore court further acknowledged that this court, three years after the Messamore case was decided, transformed the observation in Messamore "into a foundational requirement for the applicability of the excited utterance. exception." Moore , 82 Hawai`i at 220, 921 P.2d at 140 (citing Shea v. City & County of Honolulu, 67 Haw. 499 , 692 P.2d 1158 (1985)). | 1 | 2008–2008 |
State v. Silva
green
2 sentences2007A defendant’s counsel has “the duty to inform a defendant of the existence of certain constitutional rights[,j” inasmuch as “a trial court can justifiably presume, based on a defendant’s conduct or silence, that a defendant is aware of and has waived certain rights.” Tachibana, 79 Hawai'i at 240 , 900 P.2d at 1307 (Nakayama, J., dissenting) (citing State v. Silva, 78 Hawai'i 115 , 890 P.2d 702 (App.1995); State v. Savage, 120 N.J. 594 , 577 A.2d 455 (1990)). 2007A defendant's counsel has "the duty to inform a defendant of the existence of certain constitutional rights[,]" inasmuch as "a trial court can justifiably presume, based on a defendant's conduct or silence, that a defendant is aware of and has waived certain rights." Tachibana , 79 Hawai`i at 240, 900 P.2d at 1307 (Nakayama, J., dissenting) (citing State v. Silva, 78 Hawai`i 115, 890 P.2d 702 (App.1995); State v. Savage, 120 N.J. 594 , 577 A.2d 455 (1990)). | 1 | 2007–2007 |
State v. Savage
green
2 sentences2007A defendant's counsel has "the duty to inform a defendant of the existence of certain constitutional rights[,]" inasmuch as "a trial court can justifiably presume, based on a defendant's conduct or silence, that a defendant is aware of and has waived certain rights." Tachibana , 79 Hawai`i at 240, 900 P.2d at 1307 (Nakayama, J., dissenting) (citing State v. Silva, 78 Hawai`i 115, 890 P.2d 702 (App.1995); State v. Savage, 120 N.J. 594 , 577 A.2d 455 (1990)). 2007A defendant's counsel has "the duty to inform a defendant of the existence of certain constitutional rights[,]" inasmuch as "a trial court can justifiably presume, based on a defendant's conduct or silence, that a defendant is aware of and has waived certain rights." Tachibana , 79 Hawai`i at 240, 900 P.2d at 1307 (Nakayama, J., dissenting) (citing State v. Silva, 78 Hawai`i 115, 890 P.2d 702 (App.1995); State v. Savage, 120 N.J. 594 , 577 A.2d 455 (1990)). | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Schmerber v. California
green
2 sentences2003The foundational standard, set by the United States Supreme Court in Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 , 86 S.Ct. 1826 , 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966), extends the fourth amendment's protection against unreasonable searches and seizures to invasions of the body for the purpose of extracting blood samples. 2003The foundational standard, set by the United States Supreme Court in Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 , 86 S.Ct. 1826 , 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966), extends the fourth amendment's protection against unreasonable searches and seizures to invasions of the body for the purpose of extracting blood samples. | 1 | 2003–2003 |
State v. Shaw
green
2 sentences1978The Shaw case also added a degree of flexibility to the foundational rule by providing that if a trial court finds itself satisfied that fairness will be maintained, it has discretion to dispense with the foundational cross-examination requirement when “exceptional circumstances would make it unduly burdensome to require it....” 93 Ariz. at 44 , 378 P.2d at 489 . 15 We are fully satisfied with the soundness of the rule set out in Shaw . 1978The Shaw case also added a degree of flexibility to the foundational rule by providing that if a trial court finds itself satisfied that fairness will be maintained, it has discretion to dispense with the foundational cross-examination requirement when “exceptional circumstances would make it unduly burdensome to require it....” 93 Ariz. at 44 , 378 P.2d at 489 . 15 We are fully satisfied with the soundness of the rule set out in Shaw . | 1 | 1978–1978 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.