foundational requirement in Georgia

1998Although a party may move to strike illegal evidence any time before the case goes to the jury, even where no objection was made when it was admitted, the result[s] of the blood [and urine tests] admitted in this case, without objection, despite the State’s failure to satisfy the foundational requirement that the blood [and urine were] withdrawn by a person qualified under OCGA § 40-6-392 (a) (2), w[ere] not illegal evidence subject to a subsequent motion to strike.” (Citations omitted; emphasis in original.) Carr v. State, supra at 778; see also Corley v. State, 192 Ga. App. 35, 36 ( 383 SE2d

1998Although a party may move to strike illegal evidence any time before the case goes to the jury, even where no objection was made when it was admitted, the result[s] of the blood [and urine tests] admitted in this case, without objection, despite the State’s failure to satisfy the foundational requirement that the blood [and urine were] withdrawn by a person qualified under OCGA § 40-6-392 (a) (2), w[ere] not illegal evidence subject to a subsequent motion to strike.” (Citations omitted; emphasis in original.) Carr v. State, supra at 778; see also Corley v. State, 192 Ga. App. 35, 36 ( 383 SE2d

2023See White v. State, 305 Ga. 111 , 122 n.10 ( 823 SE2d 794 ) (2019) (“When a high court finds discordant opinions among its own horizontal precedents, the court generally follows its decision in the most recent case, which must have tacitly overruled any truly inconsistent holding.”) (citation and punctuation omitted).23 D.

2023See White v. State, 305 Ga. 111 , 122 n.10 ( 823 SE2d 794 ) (2019) (“When a high court finds discordant opinions among its own horizontal precedents, the court generally follows its decision in the most recent case, which must have tacitly overruled any truly inconsistent holding.”) (citation and punctuation omitted).23 D.

2023Id. (emphasis in original).22 To the extent Teasley 21 Notably, this foundational principle was recognized by a case this Court cited in Moseley: Georgia Lions Eye Bank, which states that [r]ights of property which have been created by the common law cannot be taken away without due process; but the law itself, as a rule of conduct, may be changed at the will, or even at the whim, of the legislature, unless prevented by constitutional limitations. 255 Ga. at 61-62 (emphasis supplied). 22 Notably, although the dissenting opinion disagrees with our ultimate conclusion—based on the application of

2023As Nestlehutt held, when Georgia’s constitutional right to a jury trial applies, the legislature cannot infringe on that 21 Notably, this foundational principle was recognized by a case this Court cited in Moseley: Georgia Lions Eye Bank, which states that Rights of property which have been created by the common law cannot be taken away without due process; but the law itself, as a rule of conduct, may be changed at the will, or even at the whim, of the legislature, unless prevented by constitutional limitations. 255 Ga. at 61-62 (emphasis supplied). 42 right.

2023Id. (emphasis in original).22 To the extent Teasley 21 Notably, this foundational principle was recognized by a case this Court cited in Moseley: Georgia Lions Eye Bank, which states that [r]ights of property which have been created by the common law cannot be taken away without due process; but the law itself, as a rule of conduct, may be changed at the will, or even at the whim, of the legislature, unless prevented by constitutional limitations. 255 Ga. at 61-62 (emphasis supplied). 22 Notably, although the dissenting opinion disagrees with our ultimate conclusion—based on the application of

2023See Nestlehutt, 286 Ga. at 736.

2012Accord Worthy v. State, 252 Ga. App. 852, 853 (1) ( 557 SE2d 448 ) (2001). 14 that the GCIC was pulled from a terminal lawfully connected to the GCIC.” Mordica’s failure to specifically object to lack of this foundational requirement at the hearing is fatal to this objection as he has not preserved the issue for us on appeal.25 Judgment affirmed.

2012Accord Worthy v. State, 252 Ga. App. 852, 853 (1) ( 557 SE2d 448 ) (2001). 14 that the GCIC was pulled from a terminal lawfully connected to the GCIC.” Mordica’s failure to specifically object to lack of this foundational requirement at the hearing is fatal to this objection as he has not preserved the issue for us on appeal.25 Judgment affirmed.

2008See Burse v. State, 232 Ga. App. 729, 730 (1) ( 503 SE2d 638 ) (1998) (although the police officers were not formally tendered by the State as expert witnesses, the prosecutor laid the foundation for their opinions by eliciting testimony about their experience in drug enforcement, training in drug interdiction, and knowledge of the customary methods employed in the use and sale of cocaine); see also Lindley v. State, 225 Ga. App. 338, 341 (1) ( 484 SE2d 33 ) (1997) (trial court implicitly accepted officer as an expert even though the officer was not tendered to the court as an expert by the St

2008See Burse v. State, 232 Ga. App. 729, 730 (1) ( 503 SE2d 638 ) (1998) (although the police officers were not formally tendered by the State as expert witnesses, the prosecutor laid the foundation for their opinions by eliciting testimony about their experience in drug enforcement, training in drug interdiction, and knowledge of the customary methods employed in the use and sale of cocaine); see also Lindley v. State, 225 Ga. App. 338, 341 (1) ( 484 SE2d 33 ) (1997) (trial court implicitly accepted officer as an expert even though the officer was not tendered to the court as an expert by the St

2008See Burse v. State, 232 Ga. App. 729, 730 (1) ( 503 SE2d 638 ) (1998) (although the police officers were not formally tendered by the State as expert witnesses, the prosecutor laid the foundation for their opinions by eliciting testimony about their experience in drug enforcement, training in drug interdiction, and knowledge of the customary methods employed in the use and sale of cocaine); see also Lindley v. State, 225 Ga. App. 338, 341 (1) ( 484 SE2d 33 ) (1997) (trial court implicitly accepted officer as an expert even though the officer was not tendered to the court as an expert by the St

2008See Burse v. State, 232 Ga. App. 729, 730 (1) ( 503 SE2d 638 ) (1998) (although the police officers were not formally tendered by the State as expert witnesses, the prosecutor laid the foundation for their opinions by eliciting testimony about their experience in drug enforcement, training in drug interdiction, and knowledge of the customary methods employed in the use and sale of cocaine); see also Lindley v. State, 225 Ga. App. 338, 341 (1) ( 484 SE2d 33 ) (1997) (trial court implicitly accepted officer as an expert even though the officer was not tendered to the court as an expert by the St

2005To the extent this misstatement was incorporated into our later opinions, including State v. Pierce, 266 Ga. App. at 238 (2), Lancaster v. State, 240 Ga. App. 359, 362-363 (3) ( 522 SE2d 30 ) (1999), and Tuttle v. State, 232 Ga. App. 530, 533 (3) ( 502 SE2d 355 ) (1998), we take this opportunity to limit those opinions as well. 9 See Compton v. State, 120 SW3d 375, 378-379 (A) (1) (Tex. App. 2003) (although the standardized techniques for the maximum deviation component of the HGN test mandates that *881 the stimulus he held stationary for a minimum of four seconds, the time taken to appropria

2005To the extent this misstatement was incorporated into our later opinions, including State v. Pierce, 266 Ga. App. at 238 (2), Lancaster v. State, 240 Ga. App. 359, 362-363 (3) ( 522 SE2d 30 ) (1999), and Tuttle v. State, 232 Ga. App. 530, 533 (3) ( 502 SE2d 355 ) (1998), we take this opportunity to limit those opinions as well. 9 See Compton v. State, 120 SW3d 375, 378-379 (A) (1) (Tex. App. 2003) (although the standardized techniques for the maximum deviation component of the HGN test mandates that *881 the stimulus he held stationary for a minimum of four seconds, the time taken to appropria

2005To the extent this misstatement was incorporated into our later opinions, including State v. Pierce, 266 Ga. App. at 238 (2), Lancaster v. State, 240 Ga. App. 359, 362-363 (3) ( 522 SE2d 30 ) (1999), and Tuttle v. State, 232 Ga. App. 530, 533 (3) ( 502 SE2d 355 ) (1998), we take this opportunity to limit those opinions as well. 9 See Compton v. State, 120 SW3d 375, 378-379 (A) (1) (Tex. App. 2003) (although the standardized techniques for the maximum deviation component of the HGN test mandates that *881 the stimulus he held stationary for a minimum of four seconds, the time taken to appropria

2005To the extent this misstatement was incorporated into our later opinions, including State v. Pierce, 266 Ga. App. at 238 (2), Lancaster v. State, 240 Ga. App. 359, 362-363 (3) ( 522 SE2d 30 ) (1999), and Tuttle v. State, 232 Ga. App. 530, 533 (3) ( 502 SE2d 355 ) (1998), we take this opportunity to limit those opinions as well. 9 See Compton v. State, 120 SW3d 375, 378-379 (A) (1) (Tex. App. 2003) (although the standardized techniques for the maximum deviation component of the HGN test mandates that *881 the stimulus he held stationary for a minimum of four seconds, the time taken to appropria

1999OCGA § 24-9-83; Daniels v. State, 203 Ga. App. 873, 874 (1) ( 418 SE2d 137 ) (1992). “[T]he statute does not require that the prior inconsistent statement be admitted into evidence before it is used for impeachment purposes.” Duckworth v. State, 268 Ga. 566, 568 (2) ( 492 SE2d 201 ) (1997); Whitehead v. State, 232 Ga. App. at 141 (2).

1999OCGA § 24-9-83; Daniels v. State, 203 Ga. App. 873, 874 (1) ( 418 SE2d 137 ) (1992). “[T]he statute does not require that the prior inconsistent statement be admitted into evidence before it is used for impeachment purposes.” Duckworth v. State, 268 Ga. 566, 568 (2) ( 492 SE2d 201 ) (1997); Whitehead v. State, 232 Ga. App. at 141 (2).

1999OCGA § 24-9-83; Daniels v. State, 203 Ga. App. 873, 874 (1) ( 418 SE2d 137 ) (1992). “[T]he statute does not require that the prior inconsistent statement be admitted into evidence before it is used for impeachment purposes.” Duckworth v. State, 268 Ga. 566, 568 (2) ( 492 SE2d 201 ) (1997); Whitehead v. State, 232 Ga. App. at 141 (2).

1999OCGA § 24-9-83; Daniels v. State, 203 Ga. App. 873, 874 (1) ( 418 SE2d 137 ) (1992). “[T]he statute does not require that the prior inconsistent statement be admitted into evidence before it is used for impeachment purposes.” Duckworth v. State, 268 Ga. 566, 568 (2) ( 492 SE2d 201 ) (1997); Whitehead v. State, 232 Ga. App. at 141 (2).

1998Sosebee v. State, 169 Ga. App. 370, 371 (3) ( 312 SE2d 853 ) (1983).

1998Sosebee v. State, 169 Ga. App. 370, 371 (3) ( 312 SE2d 853 ) (1983).

1996Although a party may move to strike illegal evidence any time before the case goes to the jury, even where no objection was made when it was admitted (see Mable v. State, 261 Ga. 379, 380-381 ( 405 SE2d 48 ) (1991)), the result of the blood test admitted in this case, without objection, despite the State’s failure to satisfy the foundational requirement that the blood was withdrawn by a person qualified under OCGA § 40-6-392 (a) (2), was not illegal evidence subject to a subsequent motion to strike.

1996Although a party may move to strike illegal evidence any time before the case goes to the jury, even where no objection was made when it was admitted (see Mable v. State, 261 Ga. 379, 380-381 ( 405 SE2d 48 ) (1991)), the result of the blood test admitted in this case, without objection, despite the State’s failure to satisfy the foundational requirement that the blood was withdrawn by a person qualified under OCGA § 40-6-392 (a) (2), was not illegal evidence subject to a subsequent motion to strike.