11 Arizona opinions name it 2 courts 1984–2026 6 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Arizona courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State of Arizona v. Ronald Bruce Biggergreen2 sentences2026“When evaluating the reasonableness of counsel’s strategic decisions, the foundational inquiry is the rationale for the decision.” Bigger, 251 Ariz. at 408 ¶ 11. 2026See Bigger, 251 Ariz. at 408, ¶ 11 (“When evaluating the reasonableness of counsel’s strategic decisions, the foundational inquiry is the rationale for the decision.”). | 1 | 2 |
League of Arizona Cities & Towns v. Brewergreen1 sentence2025See, e.g., League of Ariz. Cities & Towns v. Brewer, 213 Ariz. 557 , 559 ¶ 9 (2006). | 1 | 1 |
City of Phoenix v. Donofriogreen1 sentence2022It is a foundational rule of statutory construction “that courts will not read into a statute something which is not within the manifest intention of the legislature as gathered from the statute itself,” and similarly the “court will not inflate, expand, stretch or extend a statute to matters not falling within its expressed provisions.” City of Phoenix v. Donofrio, 99 Ariz. 130, 133 (1965). | 1 | 1 |
Strickland v. Washingtongreen1 sentence2021See generally, e.g., Pandeli, 242 Ariz. at 181–91 ¶¶ 9–68 (evaluating the reasoning behind counsel’s decisions); Goswick, 142 Ariz. at 586 (considering, for example, that “[t]here are a number of reasons why an attorney may choose not to call a witness”); Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689 (noting that decisions must be evaluated from counsel’s perspective at the time). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Valdezgreen1 sentence2021BIGGER Opinion of the Court a defendant can show that “counsel’s decision was not a tactical one but, rather, revealed ineptitude, inexperience or lack of preparation.” State v. Goswick, 142 Ariz. 582, 586 (1984); see also State v. Valdez, 167 Ariz. 328 , 329– 30 (1991) (noting that a strong presumption exists that defense counsel provided effective assistance). ¶11 When evaluating the reasonableness of counsel’s strategic decisions, the foundational inquiry is the rationale for the decision. | 1 | 1 |
United California Bank v. Prudential Insurance Co. of Americagreen1 sentence2021“This foundational requirement helps to eliminate the risk that a party will circumvent the reliability requirements set forth in [Federal Rule 702] by adducing expert testimony in lay witnesses’ clothing.” DIJO, Inc., 351 F.3d at 685–86; see also United Cal. Bank, 140 Ariz. at 456 (“[W]here the owner has no knowledge of the value about which he expresses an opinion, the presumption arising from ownership is overcome and the opinion may be inadmissible.”) (quoting M. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Goswickgreen2 sentences2021BIGGER Opinion of the Court a defendant can show that “counsel’s decision was not a tactical one but, rather, revealed ineptitude, inexperience or lack of preparation.” State v. Goswick, 142 Ariz. 582, 586 (1984); see also State v. Valdez, 167 Ariz. 328 , 329– 30 (1991) (noting that a strong presumption exists that defense counsel provided effective assistance). ¶11 When evaluating the reasonableness of counsel’s strategic decisions, the foundational inquiry is the rationale for the decision. 2021See generally, e.g., Pandeli, 242 Ariz. at 181–91 ¶¶ 9–68 (evaluating the reasoning behind counsel’s decisions); Goswick, 142 Ariz. at 586 (considering, for example, that “[t]here are a number of reasons why an attorney may choose not to call a witness”); Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689 (noting that decisions must be evaluated from counsel’s perspective at the time). | 1 | 1 |
State of Arizona v. Darrel Peter Pandeligreen1 sentence2021See generally, e.g., Pandeli, 242 Ariz. at 181–91 ¶¶ 9–68 (evaluating the reasoning behind counsel’s decisions); Goswick, 142 Ariz. at 586 (considering, for example, that “[t]here are a number of reasons why an attorney may choose not to call a witness”); Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689 (noting that decisions must be evaluated from counsel’s perspective at the time). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Medrano-Barrazagreen2 sentences2001Calik v. Kongable, 195 Ariz. 496, 498 , 990 P.2d 1055, 1057 (1999) ("With only a few exceptions, if the language is clear and unambiguous, we apply it without using other means of statutory construction") (emphasis added); State v. Thomas, 196 Ariz. 312, 314 , 996 P.2d 113, 115 (App.1999); State v. Medrano-Barraza, 190 Ariz. 472, 474 , 949 P.2d 561, 563 (App.1997); Resolution Trust Corp. v. Western Technologies, Inc., 179 Ariz. 195, 201 , 877 P.2d 294, 300 (App.1994). 2001Calik v. Kongable, 195 Ariz. 496, 498 , 990 P.2d 1055, 1057 (1999) ("With only a few exceptions, if the language is clear and unambiguous, we apply it without using other means of statutory construction") (emphasis added); State v. Thomas, 196 Ariz. 312, 314 , 996 P.2d 113, 115 (App.1999); State v. Medrano-Barraza, 190 Ariz. 472, 474 , 949 P.2d 561, 563 (App.1997); Resolution Trust Corp. v. Western Technologies, Inc., 179 Ariz. 195, 201 , 877 P.2d 294, 300 (App.1994). | 1 | 1 |
Resolution Trust Corp. v. Western Technologies, Inc.green2 sentences2001Calik v. Kongable, 195 Ariz. 496, 498 , 990 P.2d 1055, 1057 (1999) ("With only a few exceptions, if the language is clear and unambiguous, we apply it without using other means of statutory construction") (emphasis added); State v. Thomas, 196 Ariz. 312, 314 , 996 P.2d 113, 115 (App.1999); State v. Medrano-Barraza, 190 Ariz. 472, 474 , 949 P.2d 561, 563 (App.1997); Resolution Trust Corp. v. Western Technologies, Inc., 179 Ariz. 195, 201 , 877 P.2d 294, 300 (App.1994). 2001Calik v. Kongable, 195 Ariz. 496, 498 , 990 P.2d 1055, 1057 (1999) ("With only a few exceptions, if the language is clear and unambiguous, we apply it without using other means of statutory construction") (emphasis added); State v. Thomas, 196 Ariz. 312, 314 , 996 P.2d 113, 115 (App.1999); State v. Medrano-Barraza, 190 Ariz. 472, 474 , 949 P.2d 561, 563 (App.1997); Resolution Trust Corp. v. Western Technologies, Inc., 179 Ariz. 195, 201 , 877 P.2d 294, 300 (App.1994). | 1 | 1 |
Calik v. Kongablegreen2 sentences2001Calik v. Kongable, 195 Ariz. 496, 498 , 990 P.2d 1055, 1057 (1999) ("With only a few exceptions, if the language is clear and unambiguous, we apply it without using other means of statutory construction") (emphasis added); State v. Thomas, 196 Ariz. 312, 314 , 996 P.2d 113, 115 (App.1999); State v. Medrano-Barraza, 190 Ariz. 472, 474 , 949 P.2d 561, 563 (App.1997); Resolution Trust Corp. v. Western Technologies, Inc., 179 Ariz. 195, 201 , 877 P.2d 294, 300 (App.1994). 2001Calik v. Kongable, 195 Ariz. 496, 498 , 990 P.2d 1055, 1057 (1999) ("With only a few exceptions, if the language is clear and unambiguous, we apply it without using other means of statutory construction") (emphasis added); State v. Thomas, 196 Ariz. 312, 314 , 996 P.2d 113, 115 (App.1999); State v. Medrano-Barraza, 190 Ariz. 472, 474 , 949 P.2d 561, 563 (App.1997); Resolution Trust Corp. v. Western Technologies, Inc., 179 Ariz. 195, 201 , 877 P.2d 294, 300 (App.1994). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Thomasgreen2 sentences2001Calik v. Kongable, 195 Ariz. 496, 498 , 990 P.2d 1055, 1057 (1999) ("With only a few exceptions, if the language is clear and unambiguous, we apply it without using other means of statutory construction") (emphasis added); State v. Thomas, 196 Ariz. 312, 314 , 996 P.2d 113, 115 (App.1999); State v. Medrano-Barraza, 190 Ariz. 472, 474 , 949 P.2d 561, 563 (App.1997); Resolution Trust Corp. v. Western Technologies, Inc., 179 Ariz. 195, 201 , 877 P.2d 294, 300 (App.1994). 2001Calik v. Kongable, 195 Ariz. 496, 498 , 990 P.2d 1055, 1057 (1999) ("With only a few exceptions, if the language is clear and unambiguous, we apply it without using other means of statutory construction") (emphasis added); State v. Thomas, 196 Ariz. 312, 314 , 996 P.2d 113, 115 (App.1999); State v. Medrano-Barraza, 190 Ariz. 472, 474 , 949 P.2d 561, 563 (App.1997); Resolution Trust Corp. v. Western Technologies, Inc., 179 Ariz. 195, 201 , 877 P.2d 294, 300 (App.1994). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Morenogreen2 sentences1994State v. Moreno, 173 Ariz. 471, 472 , 844 P.2d 638, 639 (App.1992). 1994State v. Moreno, 173 Ariz. 471, 472 , 844 P.2d 638, 639 (App.1992). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Lopezgreen2 sentences1994State v. Lopez, 180 Ariz. 209, 212 , 883 P.2d 446, 449 (App.1994). 1994State v. Lopez, 180 Ariz. 209, 212 , 883 P.2d 446, 449 (App.1994). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Arizona. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Dijo, Inc. v. Hilton Hotels Corp.
green
1 sentence2021“This foundational requirement helps to eliminate the risk that a party will circumvent the reliability requirements set forth in [Federal Rule 702] by adducing expert testimony in lay witnesses’ clothing.” DIJO, Inc., 351 F.3d at 685–86; see also United Cal. Bank, 140 Ariz. at 456 (“[W]here the owner has no knowledge of the value about which he expresses an opinion, the presumption arising from ownership is overcome and the opinion may be inadmissible.”) (quoting M. | 1 | 2021–2021 |
State v. Mathers
green
2 sentences2011Mathers, 165 Ariz. at 71 , 796 P.2d at 873 . ¶ 18 We therefore hold that Garcia’s convictions for theft by extortion under § 13-1804(A)(1) were not supported by sufficient evidence. 2011Mathers, 165 Ariz. at 71 , 796 P.2d at 873 . ¶ 18 We therefore hold that Garcia’s convictions for theft by extortion under § 13-1804(A)(1) were not supported by sufficient evidence. | 1 | 2011–2011 |
State v. McMurtrey
green
2 sentences1994However, the court of appeals in this case thought that because we did not mention hypnosis standards in McMurtrey, 136 Ariz. at 99 , 664 P.2d at 643 , and Neely, 165 Ariz. at 511 , 799 P.2d at 852 , the safeguards described in Collins II are not a foundational requirement. 1994However, the court of appeals in this case thought that because we did not mention hypnosis standards in McMurtrey, 136 Ariz. at 99 , 664 P.2d at 643 , and Neely, 165 Ariz. at 511 , 799 P.2d at 852 , the safeguards described in Collins II are not a foundational requirement. | 1 | 1994–1994 |
State Ex Rel. Neely v. Sherrill
green
2 sentences1994However, the court of appeals in this case thought that because we did not mention hypnosis standards in McMurtrey, 136 Ariz. at 99 , 664 P.2d at 643 , and Neely, 165 Ariz. at 511 , 799 P.2d at 852 , the safeguards described in Collins II are not a foundational requirement. 1994However, the court of appeals in this case thought that because we did not mention hypnosis standards in McMurtrey, 136 Ariz. at 99 , 664 P.2d at 643 , and Neely, 165 Ariz. at 511 , 799 P.2d at 852 , the safeguards described in Collins II are not a foundational requirement. | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Bentley v. State
green
1 sentence1984We believe *453 Bentley v. Alaska, supra, is one of those cases. | 1 | 1984–1984 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.