9 District of Columbia opinions name it 1 courts 1996–2023 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by District of Columbia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Clayborne v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2015The more pointed and directly accusatory the examiner‟s question, the stricter the foundational requirement becomes, while a „very slight‟ basis is enough to support „nonaccusatory questions‟ on cross-examination.”28 (continued…) preclusion of his prior bad act cross-examination (as opposed to the preclusion of his cross-examination for bias). “„[T]he confrontation clause mandates that the trial court give [the] defendant leave to cross-examine about [a] prior [false] claim only where it is „shown convincingly‟ that the prior claim is false.‟” Garibay v. United States, 72 A.3d 133, 138 (D.C. 2 2010This foundational requirement “is meant to be ‘fairly lenient,’ ” id. (quoting Carter v. United States, 614 A.2d 913, 919 (D.C.1992)), and it must be applied flexibly, Cla yborne v. United States, 751 A.2d 956, 963 (D.C.2000). | 3 | 4 |
Carter v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2010This foundational requirement “is meant to be ‘fairly lenient,’ ” id. (quoting Carter v. United States, 614 A.2d 913, 919 (D.C.1992)), and it must be applied flexibly, Cla yborne v. United States, 751 A.2d 956, 963 (D.C.2000). 2003The foundational requirement is “fairly lenient.” Id. (citing Carter v. United States, 614 A.2d 913, 919 (D.C.1992)). | 3 | 3 |
Scull v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2015The more pointed and directly accusatory the examiner‟s question, the stricter the foundational requirement becomes, while a „very slight‟ basis is enough to support „nonaccusatory questions‟ on cross-examination.”28 (continued…) preclusion of his prior bad act cross-examination (as opposed to the preclusion of his cross-examination for bias). “„[T]he confrontation clause mandates that the trial court give [the] defendant leave to cross-examine about [a] prior [false] claim only where it is „shown convincingly‟ that the prior claim is false.‟” Garibay v. United States, 72 A.3d 133, 138 (D.C. 2 2010This foundational requirement “is meant to be ‘fairly lenient,’ ” id. (quoting Carter v. United States, 614 A.2d 913, 919 (D.C.1992)), and it must be applied flexibly, Cla yborne v. United States, 751 A.2d 956, 963 (D.C.2000). | 1 | 5 |
United States v. Ho Ka Yunggreen1 sentence2023“The First Amendment protects lots of speech that is substantially emotionally distressing.” United States v. Yung, 37 F.4th 70, 77 (3d Cir. 2022); see also United States v. Sryniawski, 48 F.4th 583, 587 (8th Cir. 2022) (“The Free Speech Clause protects a variety of speech that is intended to . . . make another timid or fearful.”). | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Dennis Sryniawskigreen1 sentence2023“The First Amendment protects lots of speech that is substantially emotionally distressing.” United States v. Yung, 37 F.4th 70, 77 (3d Cir. 2022); see also United States v. Sryniawski, 48 F.4th 583, 587 (8th Cir. 2022) (“The Free Speech Clause protects a variety of speech that is intended to . . . make another timid or fearful.”). | 1 | 1 |
Newman v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2015The more pointed and directly accusatory the examiner‟s question, the stricter the foundational requirement becomes, while a „very slight‟ basis is enough to support „nonaccusatory questions‟ on cross-examination.”28 (continued…) preclusion of his prior bad act cross-examination (as opposed to the preclusion of his cross-examination for bias). “„[T]he confrontation clause mandates that the trial court give [the] defendant leave to cross-examine about [a] prior [false] claim only where it is „shown convincingly‟ that the prior claim is false.‟” Garibay v. United States, 72 A.3d 133, 138 (D.C. 2 2015The more pointed and directly accusatory the examiner‟s question, the stricter the foundational requirement becomes, while a „very slight‟ basis is enough to support „nonaccusatory questions‟ on cross-examination.”28 (continued…) preclusion of his prior bad act cross-examination (as opposed to the preclusion of his cross-examination for bias). “„[T]he confrontation clause mandates that the trial court give [the] defendant leave to cross-examine about [a] prior [false] claim only where it is „shown convincingly‟ that the prior claim is false.‟” Garibay v. United States, 72 A.3d 133, 138 (D.C. 2 | 1 | 1 |
Roundtree v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2015The more pointed and directly accusatory the examiner‟s question, the stricter the foundational requirement becomes, while a „very slight‟ basis is enough to support „nonaccusatory questions‟ on cross-examination.”28 (continued…) preclusion of his prior bad act cross-examination (as opposed to the preclusion of his cross-examination for bias). “„[T]he confrontation clause mandates that the trial court give [the] defendant leave to cross-examine about [a] prior [false] claim only where it is „shown convincingly‟ that the prior claim is false.‟” Garibay v. United States, 72 A.3d 133, 138 (D.C. 2 2015The more pointed and directly accusatory the examiner‟s question, the stricter the foundational requirement becomes, while a „very slight‟ basis is enough to support „nonaccusatory questions‟ on cross-examination.”28 (continued…) preclusion of his prior bad act cross-examination (as opposed to the preclusion of his cross-examination for bias). “„[T]he confrontation clause mandates that the trial court give [the] defendant leave to cross-examine about [a] prior [false] claim only where it is „shown convincingly‟ that the prior claim is false.‟” Garibay v. United States, 72 A.3d 133, 138 (D.C. 2 | 1 | 1 |
Garibay v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2015The more pointed and directly accusatory the examiner‟s question, the stricter the foundational requirement becomes, while a „very slight‟ basis is enough to support „nonaccusatory questions‟ on cross-examination.”28 (continued…) preclusion of his prior bad act cross-examination (as opposed to the preclusion of his cross-examination for bias). “„[T]he confrontation clause mandates that the trial court give [the] defendant leave to cross-examine about [a] prior [false] claim only where it is „shown convincingly‟ that the prior claim is false.‟” Garibay v. United States, 72 A.3d 133, 138 (D.C. 2 2015The more pointed and directly accusatory the examiner‟s question, the stricter the foundational requirement becomes, while a „very slight‟ basis is enough to support „nonaccusatory questions‟ on cross-examination.”28 (continued…) preclusion of his prior bad act cross-examination (as opposed to the preclusion of his cross-examination for bias). “„[T]he confrontation clause mandates that the trial court give [the] defendant leave to cross-examine about [a] prior [false] claim only where it is „shown convincingly‟ that the prior claim is false.‟” Garibay v. United States, 72 A.3d 133, 138 (D.C. 2 | 1 | 1 |
McGrier v. United Statesgreen1 sentence2003Here, the proffer was sufficient for the court to determine that the prosecutor had a good faith basis for the inquiry. 10 See id. (citation omitted); see also McGrier v. United States, 597 A.2d 36, 44-45 (D.C.1991). | 1 | 1 |
Ray v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2002See Guzman v. United States, 769 A.2d 785, 790 (D.C.2001) (citing Ray v. United States, 620 A.2d 860, 862 (D.C.1993)). 2002See Guzman v. United States, 769 A.2d 785, 790 (D.C.2001) (citing Ray v. United States, 620 A.2d 860, 862 (D.C.1993)). | 1 | 1 |
Guzman v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2002See Guzman v. United States, 769 A.2d 785, 790 (D.C.2001) (citing Ray v. United States, 620 A.2d 860, 862 (D.C.1993)). 2002See Guzman v. United States, 769 A.2d 785, 790 (D.C.2001) (citing Ray v. United States, 620 A.2d 860, 862 (D.C.1993)). | 1 | 1 |
Jones v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2002When opposing counsel objects to bias cross-examination, the examiner must proffer to the court “the basis for her genuine belief that her questioning is well-grounded and hence that the answers may be probative of bias.” See Clayborne, 751 A.2d at 963 (citing Jones v. United States, 516 A.2d 513, 517 (D.C.1986)). 2002When opposing counsel objects to bias cross-examination, the examiner must proffer to the court "the basis for her genuine belief that her questioning is well-grounded and hence that the answers may be probative of bias." See Clayborne, 751 A.2d at 963 *493 (citing Jones v. United States, 516 A.2d 513, 517 (D.C.1986)). | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Larry Edward Fowlergreen1 sentence2000United States v. Fowler, 151 U.SApp.D.C. 79, 81, 465 F.2d 664, 666 (1972). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in District of Columbia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
McCraney v. United States
green
2 sentences2015The more pointed and directly accusatory the examiner‟s question, the stricter the foundational requirement becomes, while a „very slight‟ basis is enough to support „nonaccusatory questions‟ on cross-examination.”28 (continued…) preclusion of his prior bad act cross-examination (as opposed to the preclusion of his cross-examination for bias). “„[T]he confrontation clause mandates that the trial court give [the] defendant leave to cross-examine about [a] prior [false] claim only where it is „shown convincingly‟ that the prior claim is false.‟” Garibay v. United States, 72 A.3d 133, 138 (D.C. 2 2010However, the foundational requirement is not intended to be “trivial,” and “ ‘[t]he more pointed and directly accusatory the examiner’s question, the stricter the foundational requirement becomes.’ ” McCraney, 983 A.2d at 1052 (quoting Clayborne, 751 A.2d at 963 ). | 2 | 2010–2015 |
Snyder v. Phelps
green
1 sentence2023It is a foundational principle of the First Amendment that “speech cannot be restricted simply because it is upsetting or arouses contempt.” Snyder, 562 U.S. at 458 . | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Alford v. United States
green
1 sentence2003The foundational requirement is “fairly lenient.” Id. (citing Carter v. United States, 614 A.2d 913, 919 (D.C.1992)). | 1 | 2003–2003 |
Brown v. United States
green
2 sentences2002In order to balance the guarantee of the Confrontation Clause, which is violated when there is a “refusal to allow any questioning about facts indicative of bias from which the jury could reasonably draw adverse inferences of reliability,” Brown, 683 A.2d at 124 , and the firmly embedded postulate that the “right to cross-examination ‘is subject to reasonable limits imposed at the discretion of the trial judge,’ ” id. (quoting Scull, 564 A.2d at 1164 ), we have established a basic foundational requirement before permitting inquiry about a witness’s possible bias or partiality. 2002In order to balance the guarantee of the Confrontation Clause, which is violated when there is a “refusal to allow any questioning about facts indicative of bias from which the jury could reasonably draw adverse inferences of reliability,” Brown, 683 A.2d at 124 , and the firmly embedded postulate that the “right to cross-examination ‘is subject to reasonable limits imposed at the discretion of the trial judge,’ ” id. (quoting Scull, 564 A.2d at 1164 ), we have established a basic foundational requirement before permitting inquiry about a witness’s possible bias or partiality. | 1 | 2002–2002 |
Johnson v. United States
green
2 sentences1996Johnson, supra, 552 A.2d at 516 . 1996Johnson, supra, 552 A.2d at 516 . | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.